Amber Griffioen

Amber Griffioen received her B.A. in Philosophy, German, and Linguistics from St. Olaf College in 2002. She is currently a PhD-candidate and teaching assistant in Philosophy at the University of Iowa. Her research interests include philosophy of action, practical rationality, problems of irrationality, medieval philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

My dissertation focuses on the issues raised by the phenomenon of self-deception (SD). If SD is analogous to interpersonal deception, then the self-deceived agent must play the role of both the deceiver and the deceived. But how could an agent ever deceive herself if she is aware of her intention to do so? Does SD involve her knowingly believing both p and not-p? I claim that not only is SD possible, it is both motivated and intentional (pace non-intentionalists like Mele). I also argue against homuncularist and partitioned-mind theories of irrationality. I contend that instead of viewing SD as a static condition, we ought to see it as a dynamic process in which an agent actively engages. This version of SD accounts for the cognitive tension commonly found in self-deceived agents, without thereby absolving them of responsibility for their deceptions. After defending this account, I go on to explore the connection between SD and other paradigm cases of irrationality. Finally, I examine the moral status of SD. I propose that agents are often morally responsible for deceiving themselves, but that SD might sometimes be morally praiseworthy or even practically necessary.