

**Presentations** (talk unless stated otherwise; \*peer-reviewed)

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Aug 2022	University of Heidelberg, Workshop: Personhood, Self-Consciousness, and the First-Person Perspective: <i>Relationalism about the Subjective Character and the Metaphysics of the Self</i> *
Jul 2022	University of Prague, Ernst Mach Workshop with David Chalmers: <i>Indexical Thought, Affordances and Virtual Realities</i> *
Nov 2021	University of Liege, Workshop: Inner Awareness – Past and Present: <i>Understanding the Subjective Character as Part of the Modality: Adverbialism vs. Evaluatism vs. Relationalism.</i> *
Nov 2021	University of Marburg, Workshop: Selbst und Affekt: <i>Vom De Se Skeptizismus zu einer Theorie erstopersonaler Sorge.</i>
Sep 2021	University of Milan, Vita-Salute San Raffaele, School of Philosophy: Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective: <i>Two Problems with Shoemaker's Regress and How to Deal with Them</i> *
Aug 2021	University of Leipzig, Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP): <i>First-Person Concern.</i> *
Aug 2021	University of Marburg, Colloquium of the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy: <i>Can the Concept of Intentional Modes Contribute to our Metaphysics of the Mind and Consciousness?</i>
Jun 2021	University of Graz, Meeting of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions (EPSSE): <i>First-Person Thought, De Se Skepticism and Concern for Oneself.</i> *
Nov 2020	University of Barcelona, LOGOS Research Group, Workshop: Consciousness, Agency and First-Person Representation: <i>The Subjective Character and other Mental Relations.</i> *
Oct 2020	University of Staffordshire, Society for European Philosophy (SEP)/Forum for European Philosophy (FEP) Joint Conference: <i>Fichte on Pure Will and Self-Individuation.</i> *
Aug 2020	University of Utrecht, European Conference for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 10): <i>The Subjective Character of Experience as a Mental Relation.</i> *
Aug 2020	University of Utrecht, European Conference for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 10): <i>First-Person Thought, De Se Skepticism and Concern for Oneself.</i> *
Jun 2020	University of Marburg, Colloquium of the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy: <i>The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness Based on the Meaning of "I".</i>
Mar 2020	University of Mannheim, Colloquium of the Chairs of Practical and

	Theoretical Philosophy: <i>First-Person Thought: Action, Identification and Experience.</i>
Jan 2020	University of Marburg, Colloquium of the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy: <i>Die Meinigkeit der Erfahrung und andere Mentale Relationen.</i>
Sep 2019	University of Bochum, European Conference for Cognitive Science (EuroCogSci 2019): <i>The Subjective Character of Experience and Impure Intentionalism.</i> *
May 2019	University of Mannheim, Workshop: Perspectives on First-Person Thought: <i>Facing Up to De Se Skepticism: Is the First Person Thick?</i> (cancelled because of illness)
Apr 2019	University of Liege, 13 <sup>th</sup> URPh Annual Seminar: Introspection and Self-Awareness: <i>The Subjective Character of Experience and Impure Intentionalism.</i> *
Feb 2019	University of Mannheim, Colloquium of the Chairs of Practical and Theoretical Philosophy: <i>Zur Rolle der Identifikation in Wahrnehmung und Selbstbewusstsein.</i>
Oct 2018	King's College London, Advanced Research Seminar: <i>Demystifying IEM – About the Irrelevance of the so-called Immunity to Error through Misidentification for Theories of Self-Awareness.</i>
Sep 2018	University of Rijeka, Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP): <i>Demystifying IEM – About the Irrelevance of the so-called Immunity to Error through Misidentification for Theories of Self-Awareness.</i> *
Sep 2018	University of Rijeka, Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP): <i>Personal or Subpersonal Level Explanation of First-Person Awareness? – The Argument From Language Use Reconsidered.</i> *
Sep 2018	University of Basel, Symposium of the Swiss Society for Philosophy: <i>Reviving an Adverbial Interpretation of Brentano's Concept of Secondary Consciousness.</i> *
Jun 2018	University of Genoa, Meeting of the Italian Cognitive Science Association (AISC) – Levels of Cognition: <i>Reviving an Adverbial Interpretation of Brentano's Concept of Secondary Consciousness.</i> *
Jun 2018	University of Genoa, Meeting of the Italian Cognitive Science Association (AISC) – Levels of Cognition: <i>Personal or Sub-Personal Level Explanation of First-Person Awareness? – The Argument From Language Use Reconsidered.</i> *

May 2018	University of Freiburg, Epistemology and Theory of Science (ETS)-Colloquium: <i>Demystifying IEM – About the Irrelevance of the so-called Immunity to Error through Misidentification for Theories of First-Person Awareness.</i>
Jan 2018	University of Göttingen, Research Colloquium of the Chair of Theoretical Philosophy: <i>Why the Subjective Character of Experience might be best understood as a Mode.</i>
Dec 2017	University of Freiburg, Think <sup>4</sup> -Workshop: Self-Consciousness – Philosophy Meets Empirical Science: <i>What Philosophers think about Mineness.</i>
Nov 2017	University of Notre Dame, Workshop: Current Issues on Self-Consciousness: <i>Comment on Kenneth Williford's Self-Acquaintance Account.</i> (Comment)
Nov 2017	University of Freiburg, Epistemology and Theory of Science (ETS)-Colloquium: <i>How to refute De Se Skepticism?</i>
Oct 2017	University of Fribourg, Lake Geneva Graduate Conference (LG2C) – The Self: <i>How to account for the Subjective Character of Experience?</i> *
Sep 2017	University of Salzburg, Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA): <i>First-Person Thought and Rational Action.</i> *
Sep 2017	University of Bochum, Fourth Philosophy of Language and Mind Network Meeting (PLM4): <i>How to refute De Se Skepticism?</i> *
Aug 2017	University of Munich, Meeting of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP9): <i>First-Person Thought and Rational-Action.</i> *
Aug 2017	University of Hertfordshire, Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP): <i>First-Person Thought and Rational Action.</i> *
Jun 2017	University of Cambridge, The Human Mind Conference: <i>First-Person Thought and Rational Action.</i> (Poster) *
May 2017	Charles University Prague, Brentano Centenary Conference: <i>Varieties of Subjective Character – Towards a Neo-Brentanian Approach.</i> *
Apr 2017	University of Freiburg, Epistemology and Theory of Science (ETS)-Colloquium: <i>Varieties of Subjective Character.</i>
Nov 2016	University of Freiburg, Epistemology and Theory of Science (ETS)-Colloquium: <i>First-Person Thought and Action.</i>

- Jun 2016 University of Freiburg, Epistemology and Theory of Science (ETS)-Colloquium: *Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness*.
- Jun 2015 University of Göttingen, Research Colloquium of the Chair of Philosophy of Mind and Language (Christian Beyer): *HOP-, HOT-, DHOT-, SOR- oder Präreflexivitäts-Theorie des Bewusstseins?*
- Apr 2014 Charles University Prague, Workshop on Schelling's Philosophy: *Zur Herleitung vom analytisch-synthetischen Ich<sup>Akt</sup> bin Ich<sup>Begriff</sup> in Schellings System des Transzendentalen Idealismus*.
- Jul 2013 Charles University Prague, Workshop on Fichte's Philosophy: *Zum Begriff intentionalen Selbstbewusstseins bei Reinhold und Fichte*.