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Securitization in Statebuilding and Intervention

Nomos

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Introduction: Securitization in Statebuilding and Intervention

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1. The Concept and Practice of "Statebuilding" and the Politics of Security

Over the last three decades, "statebuilding" has developed into a powerful global practice of involvement in domestic affairs, not only with respect to "failed states" or in "areas with limited statehood" (Risse 2013), but more broadly as a tool used in development cooperation and governance assistance (Fukuyama 2004; Duffield 2007; Bliesemann de Guevara 2008; Marquette/Beswick 2011). International organizations, governments, the media, and academics all refer to statebuilding, but the meaning of the concept and the means to achieve its inherent goal remain highly disputed (Paris/Sisk 2009). This is due to the fact that statebuilding could be seen as part of an ongoing international intervention in the domestic affairs of states mainly (though not exclusively) located in the Global South, which challenges the international norm of state sovereignty and throws into stark relief the asymmetry of states in international relations.

The authors in this volume all argue that the politics of security play a crucial role in these international interventions. They aim to identify und explain the driving forces of statebuilding interventions by applying a social constructivist framework of security, which focuses on the references to specific domestic and international threats that serve as the political justification for interventions and statebuilding practices. But such processes of 'securitization', in the words of the 'Copenhagen School' of Critical Security Studies (Buzan et al. 1998), are not only limited to international interventions; they are also inherent in internal statebuilding by domestic political actors who, in the aftermath of independence, civil conflict, or as consequence of a fundamental political shift, aim to reshape the political orders of their respective societies. In our introduction, we lay out the general conceptual framework of the volume by outlining the relationship between statebuilding and security, and emphasize the value of analyzing this relationship within a securitization framework. The first chapters of the volume will then focus on international interventions and statebuild-

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ing, with studies on the securitization of peacebuilding, on interventions in Libya, Iraq, Kosovo, and Cameroon, and on the intervention discourses in the USA. The second part of the volume will focus on the politics of security in internal statebuilding in Turkey, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Mexico.

Typically, intervening statebuilding operations conducted by the United Nations, the European Union, other regional organisations or international donors are justified with two security related arguments. First, such operations (perceivably) aim to prevent "fragile states" from compromising global and regional security (Duffield 2007; Weinstein 2005; Dobbins et al. 2007; Ghani/Lockhart 2009). The most obvious of such cases are those legitimized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII in order to "restore international peace and security". Secondly, such operations aim to stabilize countries in order to avoid an internal security dilemma – that is, a relapse into violent confrontation between former conflict parties because of a mutual uncertainty about motivations (Roe 1999). These operations include quasi-governmental policies: mainly electoral assistance, human rights and rule of law assistance, institutional or security sector reform (Chesterman 2004: 5).

Therefore, not surprisingly, security forms the legal as well as the political framework for statebuilding intervention. The reconstruction of a functioning state is commonly identified as the most prominent task of international interventions which aim to protect both international peace and the local population from threats. This is further reflected in mandates and statebuilding literature (Schneckener 2011). The debate on the expanded notion of security, whereby the construction of security is depicted as a political process which extends beyond traditional security spheres such as the military and police, illustrates that a functioning state and accountable state institutions are necessary conditions for human and citizen security (Paris 2001; Hultman et al. 2013; Shesterinina/Job 2016). In this regard, the main strand of literature on the nexus between security and statebuilding focuses on security sector reforms, with many authors arguing that the police and the military should be reformed in a way that ensures the effective and legitimate protection of civilians (Brzoska 2006; Bayley/Perito 2010; Egnell/Haldén 2009; Chappuis/Hänggi 2013).

However, critical perspectives point to the paradoxes of security interventions, such as the militarization of statebuilding efforts nominally directed at police building (Friesendorf 2011; Jackson 2011), or the risk of 'imperial policing', "an essential characteristic of which is that it seeks to

incorporate a troubled region into an economic and moral order imposed from outside" (Rubinstein 2010: 468). These paradoxes endanger the desired goal of peaceful and less conflictual statebuilding. Doubts remain over the aims and sustainability of newly constructed state institutions in the security sector, especially against the background of so-called 'local' non-state security providers. Scholars are increasingly emphasizing the overall limitations of externally induced reforms. (Hughes, Hunt, and Kondoch 2010; Risse 2013). Beyond security sector reform, much research reminds us that there are inherent risks in using a security agenda as the basis for statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. These consist in the unintended consequences of security governance for the citizens of a given society, such as a lack of accountability on the part of security actors, the strengthening of autocratic rule, or an overemphasis on security at the expense of socio-economic development (Rubin 2006; Daase/ Friesendorf 2010; Jackson/Albrecht 2010).

Furthermore, critical approaches emphasize the notion that statebuilding is predominantly influenced by conceptions of security and the state which are formulated by the policymakers and drawn from the discourses and experiences of the Global North (Wesley 2008: 373). A number of authors have stressed the (neo)liberal character of statebuilding as part of the liberal peace (Chandler/Sisk 2013; Mac Ginty 2011), which entails a mimicry of Western institutions, the down-sizing of the public sector, and integration into the global market economy. Others focus on the similarities between historical examples of imperialism and current practices of statebuilding (Bellamy/Williams 2005; Doyle/Sambanis 2006; Veit 2010). Consequently, statebuilding interventionism has been described as "empire-lite" (Ignatieff 2010), "Neo-Trusteeship" (Wilde 2010), and "postmodern imperialism" (Wesley 2008), especially because of its focus on security (Richmond 2014).

This focus on security in international statebuilding to guarantee stability and peace seems to present an ironic turn in the debate on the nexus of security and the state, insofar as the formation of states has historically been rather violent and conflict-ridden (Newman 2013). This argument has been made particularly forcefully by authors from historical sociology. For example, Charles Tilly has argued that the state is essentially a historical by-product of the waging of war, with the monopolization of the means of violence and the ability to generate resources from society arising from the need to increase the state's capacity to wage war against its enemies (Tilly 1985). This forms the basis for the integration of groups

and territories into the state, the development of which is based on the ability of the

> "state manager [...] to penetrate society and to extract resources while simultaneously retaining some degree of autonomy from domestic political and societal interests. Penetration of society is crucial because it allows leaders to tax, and taxation provides the reliable, steady stream of revenue from which the institutional infra-structure of the state is built" (Pickering/Kisangani 2014: 389).

It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the emergence of statehood as a type of political rule (state formation) is an unconscious historical process. Firstly, it remains limited to certain regions of the world and is, secondly, an ideal image of the monopolization of violence and control produced by states – an image not always reflected in reality. Max Weber expressed this ideal in the classical definition of the state. According to Weber, the state is characterized, firstly, by a de facto and effective monopoly over violence, which, secondly, provides the basis for rule on a delimited territory, enforced by uniform regulations. While the state may ultimately have recourse to violence, it can only achieve stability if, thirdly, it is based on a belief in its legitimacy among those it governs. Characteristic of the modern polity is, according to Weber, the type of rational-legal domination on which this belief in legitimacy is based. This includes, fourthly, an orientation to the ideal of the state as an autonomous institution compared with social actors (Weber 1968).

Elias (1994), then, has divided the historical process of state formation into two phases: In the first phase, the means of violence are less centralized. In the second phase, this private monopoly over the means of violence increasingly becomes a public monopoly. "While the first phase of the monopoly process is associated with absolutist and authoritarian forms of rule, the second phase deposes coercive state-makers and establishes structures of legal authority. The two phases conceptualize the transition from traditional to rational authority in the emergence of the modern state" (Jung 2008: 35). Therefore, state formation includes not only the monopolization and centralization of the means of violence, but also a change in the basis of political rule, which is no longer based on personal ties to the ruler or traditions. Instead, it is founded on process-based and ultimately democratic forms of governance in which the ruled are, at least to some extent, also the authors of the rules.

Though state formation may initially have been limited to the European continent, the state as a legitimate form of political rule has been institu-

tionalized globally since at least the 19th century, and it remains the basic unit of the international legal and political order. Sovereign statehood can claim undisputed legitimacy at the international level. If state formation is characterized as an unintended historical process from which the ideal of the modern state –and its often contradictory practices – emerge, then statebuilding consists in the conscious construction of state institutions and state-organized rule that is orientated towards this historically formed ideal. This, then, is the difference "between statebuilding, as a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control, and state-formation, as an historical process whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs constitute the 'vulgarisation' of power" (Berman/Lonsdale 1992: 5). There are several European predecessors of statebuilding projects, such as the creation of Imperial Germany in 1871, German reconstruction after the Second World War, Italian Unification in the 1860s and 1870s, or the creation of an independent Ireland since the 1910s, just to mention a few. However, statebuilding became an increasingly globalized practice over the course of the 20th Century. Here, statebuilding includes strategies and policies developed by actors that are based on the ideal of the state. They construct the appropriate public institutions, such as democratically constituted parliaments, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and a public administration. Statebuilding is thus a political programme whose legitimacy is based on the globally institutionalized idea of the state (Meyer 1987).

Given this, security is both an outcome of a conflict-ridden and violent process of state formation, which can eventually lead to a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in order to provide security, *and* an aim of international statebuilding interventions. Historical processes of state formation have established a concept of the state as a set of institutions that provide security. Statebuilding interventions have adopted this image and justified their policies by referring to empirical deviations, such as an inability to effectively protect citizens from threats or to enforce the monopoly of violence:

> "As long as the idea of the state is uniform and constant, the variation of states, even the failure of some states, can be expressed only in terms of deviation from the standard. If real states fell short of the standard, as they were bound to do, all sorts of words had to be invented to express the gap between actual practice and the ideal. Terms such as quasi-states, soft states, shadow states, weak states, non-state states, decay, corruption, weakness, and relative capacity, all implied that the way things really work are somehow exogenous

> to the normative model of what the state and its relations to society are, or should be. Comparison comes in specifying and measuring deviation from the norm of the ideal-type. State capacity can be gauged against a measuring stick whose endpoint is a variant of Weber's ideal-type of the modern rational state" (Migdal/Schlichte 2005: 11).

The greater the deviation, the greater the need for statebuilding and international intervention. Hence, statebuilding reproduces not only the idea of the state, e.g. as the provider of security; it also connects this idea with an ongoing motive for international or state intervention in societies. It is aimed at closing the gap between the idea of the state and its reality.

This leads to the question of what deviations count as relevant in order to enforce statebuilding and to justify international intervention. With regard to the security focus of international statebuilding, it is crucial to consider which or what kind of threats statebuilding actors perceive as significant; whose security has to be protected; and what means are deemed appropriate and legitimate for enhancing the states' capacity to provide internal and external security. In this regard, critical security studies have argued that security is not an object, but is socially constructed in the political discourse as well as by security and statebuilding professionals. Consequently, a basic assumption of this volume is that the construction of significant security threats largely shapes the way statebuilding is legitimized and conducted.

In our volume, the authors engage with the phenomena of *statebuilding* from a critical security studies perspective, chiefly within the framework of securitization studies, which will be introduced in the following section. While there is a clear connection between security and statebuilding, as argued above, there is surprisingly little literature on the construction of security in international and non-Western statebuilding discourses and practices. One reason for this might be that the securitization framework was developed against the background of the OECD world and, after twenty years, studies still mainly focus on security constructions in the Global North. Furthermore, from the beginning, critical security studies distanced themselves from the traditional fixation on *statehood* and *state actors* at the same time as a rise in popularity of statebuilding in international politics. With this in mind, one aim of our volume is to analyze international statebuilding with the help of securitization studies, because the state remains the dominant form of organizing a political community. On the other hand, statebuilding can be understood as a form of "international domination" (Laiz/Schlichte 2016) carried out through the interna-

tional, but also domestic, construction of security threats. The empirical studies in the following volume reflect not only on international but also on domestic actors, whose strong position and agency in statebuilding experiences is illustrated.[1] Examples come from the United Nations and national governments engaged in interventions, and widen the focus beyond the OECD world, with empirical studies on Cameroon, Iraq, Libya, Kosovo, Mexico, South-Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey.

2. *Critical Security Studies and Securitization*

In the last few decades, critical Security Studies have expanded our understanding of the relationship between statehood and security by showing that this is not fixed (Booth 2005; Peoples/Vaughan-Williams 2015). Instead, this relationship is interpretively flexible, as the construction of security threats and a given states' "politics of protection" (Huysmans 2006a) depend largely on societal and political discourses at the global level (Booth 2005; Fierke 2015). Furthermore, external and internal security is far from limited to (respectively) the military sector or policing (compare the "wide" versus "narrow" debate about Security Studies, Buzan et al. 1998: 2-5). In fact, security shapes the political agenda in fields such as environmental protection (Floyd 2010), the regulation of migration (Huysmans 2006b), global health (Elbe 2010), or development cooperation (Duffield 2007). Consequently, the importance of the state with respect to security has been called into question by literature which focuses on the individual as the most important starting point for security studies (on human security: Paris 2001; Chandler 2012). Consequently, literature on non-state security actors has increased (Bryden/Caparini 2006).

Following this broader academic trend, the so-called 'Copenhagen School' (Buzan et al. 1998) established the securitization framework, which advanced a constructivist understanding of security after the end of

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1 Recent literature refers to the importance of local actors in statebuilding and peacebuilding, and to various entangled or hybrid processes and outcomes of any interventions (Björkdahl et al. 2016; Boege et al. 2009; MacGinty/Richmond 2013). While some case studies in our volume focus on international actors, we understand various other chapters as strong contributions on identities, strategies and motives of domestic actors in statebuilding, specifically the chapters on Mexico, South-Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey.

Cold War entanglements and direct bloc confrontation. Since then, securitization theory has become one of the most influential but also most controversial concepts in International Relations. It is rooted in A view of security as socially constructed rather than an objective condition. Security is understood here as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)" (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24).

From this perspective, securitization is defined as a speech act "through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan/Wæver 2003: 491), based on the speech act theory model of Austin (1975). The act of securitization, then, is negotiated between the securitizing actor and the relevant audience, in which the securitizing actor is an individual or a collective group which performs a security speech act and thereby tries to legitimize exceptional measures. Central to this theoretical assumption, then, are the notions of exceptionality and state of emergency. The main objects of securitization are referent objects, traditionally the state or the nation. However, though the Copenhagen approach focuses on those sectors that have traditionally been linked to security (such as military and political), it also emphasizes the centrality of referent objects in other sectors, such as the environmental or social sector. In the military sector, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state and the threats are accordingly defined in external, military terms. Yet, in the political sector, the referent objects are legitimacy, sovereignty or governmental authority, so the threats are defined as threats to the state administration in general. The widening of the security research agenda is even more visible in the societal sector, where the identity of a group is constructed as threatened by globalization dynamics, migration flows or economic integration. However, because successful securitizations are centered around an acceptance and representation of securitizing actors, the

state has the privilege of making successful securitization attempts rooted in its power and authority.

In the traditional securitization perspective, the trilogy of speech act, securitizing actor and audience is crucial. However, Buzan et al's initial approach has been expanded and further developed by new research on different or deepened aspects of securitization. To begin with, speech acts of securitization are interpreted as requiring much more contextualization (McDonald 2008: 573; Hansen 2000). Securitization as a strategic process occurs within a certain social or cultural context, while analyses of securitization have to reflect the predisposition of a particular audience for securitizing moves and the authority of the speaker, as well as the power of the listener (Balzacq 2010: 1). Power and authority (Hansen 2000: 306) are crucial for securitization, because the "capacity to securitise phenomena depends on both a hierarchical structure that distributes professional legitimacy, status and time and a more horizontal structure of mobilisation in which social and political mobilisation can cut across the more formalistic hierarchies of security institutions. Besides professional legitimacy and capacity, a political agenda depends on the position actors have and the tactics they develop in a relational field that is structured around competitions over the security agenda" (Huysmans 2006a: 9, with respect to the dominance of security in peacebuilding practices, see the chapter by Kappler in this volume).

The context of a speech act includes the expectations of the securitizing actor with respect to the audience – and vice versa. Concerning the audience, a securitizing move "works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions)" (Balzacq 2011: 3). Analyzing the reactions of an audience to securitizing moves requires the study of collective identity discourses and feelings (religious beliefs, belief in the nation etc., compare e.g. the chapters of MacLarren/Lucke and Özdikmenli) beyond strategic and rational politics. Therefore, securitization, especially in the domestic realm of politics, has to be reflected against the processes by which political collectives embed security in broader identity discourses. "A broader approach to the construction of security also entails a focus on how political communities themselves are constituted (beyond the designation of threat); how particular articulations of security come to capture the way that community deals with those issues" (McDonald 2008: 565).

Furthermore, newer research contends that securitizing moves are not necessarily reliant on existential threats or exceptional circumstances. As

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underlined by other, more sociologically coloured approaches (that of the so called Paris School, for example), it is important to consider "the routines, the day-to-day practices, of the bureaucracies that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice. Securitization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional (…)" (Bigo 2002: 73). A broader sociological analysis, beyond the speech act, can capture everyday practices that show how specific non-political actors manage and control security, because "(…) security does not emerge from everywhere, it is connected with special 'agents', with 'professionals' (military agencies, secret services, customs, police forces)..." (Bigo 2000: 326; compare also Hansen 2000). Securitization, therefore, is not only a speech act, but also a process that is built upon skills, expert knowledge, or institutional and policy routines (Huysmans 2006b: 153). Consequently, a constructivist analysis of security can focus on discourse, but can also bring physical action and non-verbal communication into the analysis (Hansen 2000).

A final important widening of the initial securitization approach was the recognition of the historical embeddedness and contingencies of security discourses and practices. It is this historical context which can address urgent questions regarding securitization, such as why some political communities are more likely to build their identity on the construction of threats, and what role narratives of history and culture play in this regard (McDonald 2008: 573). Guzzini (2015) recently pointed out that the understanding of security and the construction of threats depend largely on historical paths and therefore need to be elucidated within a particular national or regional context that has its own interpretative resources and security repertoires. This requires case studies on the nexus of security and statebuilding that take into account historical path dependencies as well as a perspective on how security concepts and threat perceptions travel across countries and regions (see e.g. the related international discourses and practices of security in regard to elections in trusteeship and neo-trusteeship in the chapter by Distler and Ketzmerick). In some cases, international perspectives on threats fit very well with regional and national constructions, e.g. in the case of Central Asian Tajikistan, where the international discourse on Islamism fits perfectly into official strategies of portraying Islam as a threat to state security (see the chapter by Bonacker and Liebetanz).

3. The Chapters

The following chapters draw on a sociologically and historically informed perspective of securitization, applying different approaches within the securitization framework. Focusing on different cases, they analyze the implications of the particular construction of security and securitization for statebuilding dynamics. Our volume is thereby inspired by recent literature which suggests a broader perspective on statehood and statebuilding, integrating sociological elements into an analysis of political processes and thereby arguing from a perspective of political sociology (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Lemay-Hébert 2013: 3).

While there is some literature with a wider perspective on security and statebuilding, the strengths of the securitization framework(s) have not been sufficiently utilized in order to understand the empirical phenomena of statebuilding (some exceptions are Lemay-Hébert 2014; Newman 2010; Gheciu 2006; Tschirgi 2013; on the securitization of aid and development in post-conflict societies: Brown/Grävingholt 2016). The case studies in this volume demonstrate that the securitization framework can help us to understand the dynamics of security in, and their impact on, statebuilding.

The authors focus on two dimensions, raising questions about the role of securitization in the process of statebuilding: *First, securitization in statebuilding as intervention* with a focus on those external actors who start or enforce statebuilding processes. Prominent international interventions of the last decades, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, or the current UN-led operations in the DR Congo or Sudan, may suggest otherwise, but the decision to directly intervene in the territory of sovereign states and start statebuilding operations is still very much an exception in international politics. As Walling has shown in her in-depth study of debates in the United Nations Security Council on the few cases of Humanitarian Intervention between 1990 and 2011, the discourse on the norms of non-interference and sovereignty are only seldom outweighed by the protection of human rights or the urgent need for external statebuilding (2013). Even when cases of international intervention occurred, this by no means enhanced the remit for intervening in similar cases. With the prevailing strengths of the norms regarding sovereignty and the right of self-determination, any attempts at external statebuilding demanded justification. The chapters in the first part of our volume examine how securitization influences statebuilding as intervention, through the

communication of threats and emergency for the international community and the society concerned.

Stefanie Kappler begins the first chapter by commenting on the oft-proclaimed 'death' of the ontologies of liberal peacebuilding – a set of ideas that seem to increasingly, discursively translate into a security framework. She investigates the relation of peace and security by focusing on the agents of securitized peacebuilding. Her article argues that the question 'Whose peace?' can increasingly be read as 'Whose security?', and suggests that *peace* has come to represent the *security* of the dominant actors in the international system. In her contribution, Kappler enquires into the meaning of the merging of peacebuilding and securitization agendas for the ownership of peace, both locally and globally.

Witold Mucha focuses on those discourses that led to the intervention in Libya. This article concentrates on speech acts from different periods (pre-intervention and post-intervention) and poses two questions: First, to what extent did western governments communicate the danger of independent militias in the (post-) conflict context and, second, to what extent did the short-term defeat of Muammar al-Qaddafi appear as more urgent prior to the intervention? Furthermore, he analyzes whether the negative effects of arms transfers were dealt with in post-Qaddafi speech acts. In doing so, the rhetorical and operational gap between the intervention phases, on the one hand, and the statebuilding phase, on the other, are disentangled and analyzed. The results reveal the importance of research on intervention, statebuilding and securitization (speech acts).

Continuing this focus on the discourse of intervention, *Katharina MacLarren* and *Robin Lucke* illustrate the role of religion in securitization speech acts. Their chapter analyzes speeches by US presidents spanning over five presidencies to determine the role of religious references in the securitization processes of foreign engagement. In doing so, they observe that the USA, as a state actor, appears to have consistently invoked religion in its securitizing speech acts. The contribution thus investigates the inner-state dynamics of securitization that lead to intervention by combining them with the politics of intervention.

Kerstin Eppert and *Mitja Sienknecht* re-visit one of the most prominent cases of statebuilding – Iraq. Their analysis reveals how difficult it is for an organization in a highly securitized environment to develop a non-securitizing practice. However, their case study of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq exemplifies that while the organization, on the one hand, contributed to the securitization of post-conflict Iraq, it was to some

degree able to simultaneously de-securitize and to open spaces for de-securitizing communication.

In their contribution, *Werner Distler* and *Maria Ketzmerick* focus on two different historical constellations of internationalized statebuilding, the United Nations Trusteeship system after the Second World War and UN International Administrations after the end of the Cold War. The authors compare the dynamics of securitization in the field of elections during the UN-mandated French trusteeship of Cameroon (1946-1960) and in Kosovo under the International Administration (1999-2008). As a common dynamic, both processes of statebuilding and state formation were guided by a 'politics of protection' in which external trustees legitimized their transitional rule by claiming to protect the new order and citizens against threats of instability and conflict. In both cases, the joint examination of security, protection, and statebuilding demonstrates similar patterns from a trans-historical perspective.

In the last chapter of this section, *Thorsten Bonacker and Maria Ketzmerick* focus on the case of Cameroon to explore how security dynamics in postcolonial statebuilding are shaped by the global context of decolonization. Critical security studies' analysis of the macro context of securitization tends to focus on the Cold War and on more contemporary processes of macrosecuritization, such as the Global War on Terror. In contrast, this chapter introduces a broader historical perspective on security constellations which emerged with the beginning of decolonization following World War I, but came fully into play with the founding of the United Nations. The authors argue that the UN Trusteeship Council functioned both as a global audience and as a forum for public communication which was used to address threats to the respective decolonization projects and portray other parties as dangerous and immoral.

The second section of our volume focuses on the role of *securitization in internal statebuilding*: States not only experience reconfigurations from outside. Endogenous shocks such as civil war, system transformations (e.g. after the end of the USSR), or secessionism change "the state" itself. We classify these processes as moments and situations of statebuilding, because state and non-state actors attempt to transform the foundations of the state. The articles in the second part of this volume ask how actors in these statebuilding situations use the communication of threats and security practices. How do actors criticize "the state"? To what extent can securitization challenge state elites, and how is the state re-configured by the construction of security – or even of desecuritization?

İlkim Özdikmenli pushes the boundaries of this edited volume by analyzing attempts at securitization in a particular intra-state perspective and emphasizing the idea of state transformation from inside. This chapter focuses on the case of Turkey in an attempt to understand the goals and means of the social construction of security in periods characterized by a (re)founding of government institutions within polarized societies. According to this author, the political order of Turkey has fundamentally changed due to a concurrent de-securitization and securitization of various different sectors of society, politics, and the economy. This chapter uses the case of Turkey to draw conclusions that are relevant to various discussions within securitization theory, such as the importance of the socio-political context, whether religion is a distinct security sector or not, and how the interactions of actors play a role, particularly in the existence of an audience inclined to polarization.

Richard Georgi studies the role of civil society organizations in reconciliation and peacebuilding by examining two types of human rights activism in ethno-political conflict. Though both organizations operated within the same inner-Mexican conflict context and political opportunity structure, the effect of their human rights activism differed significantly. The human rights invocation of one organization resembled a de-securitizing move which appealed for inter-group reconciliation, while the other issued a securitizing move which reinforced the mutual perception of the conflict groups as threatening. Through this, the case study is a contribution to research on the conditions under which human rights activism on the part of civil society facilitates (or, indeed, undermines) conflict transformation towards reconciliation.

In their chapter, *Thorsten Bonacker* and *Denis Liebetanz* aim to contribute to the ongoing debate on the illiberal outcomes of liberal statebuilding. According to the authors, security has a significant effect in many cases of statebuilding, and especially on the political discourse in post-conflict or "new" states. Referring to the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization, illustrated by the case of Tajikistan, the authors argue that internationalized statebuilding often leads to an institutionalization of securitization. This increases the likelihood of the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule because the construction of threats is, in a sense, the norm of political communication.

In the final chapter, *Ole Frahm* combines an external and internal perspective by applying the securitization framework to the study of state reconstruction in South–Sudan. This paper takes into account the different

actors that sought to shape policy and governance while competing for influence in the decision-making process. Particularly relevant for this chapter's arguments are dynamics of securitization from various angles (local, international, national) in a context where the state apparatus enjoys only limited sovereignty and autonomy over crucial policy decisions. The author thereby addresses the pitfalls of over-emphasizing security, focusing instead on the interplay between the goals of development and security, and the extent to which they conflict in both rhetoric and practice.

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Part 1

The Securitization of International Peacebuilding

Stefanie Kappler

1. Introduction

'State failure', 'state fragility', 'instability' – such terms increasingly seem to characterise the language of recent peace-related interventions. International players (such as the European Union, the United Nations, International Financial Institutions) have not given up their ambitions to intervene in the name of peace and peacebuilding. On the contrary, recent interventions seem to have taken a more robust and decisive form. Examples are numerous, including recent debates around the intervention in Libya, contested ambitions in Syria, the role of the United States and Western Europe in Ukraine, and so forth. However, what becomes obvious in this context is the discursive reconfiguration of peacebuilding to include security-related aspects. Indeed, the implementation of peacebuilding through security-centred languages and policies points to an overall picture of discursive networking which combines the two semantic fields of peacebuilding and security. In this chapter, I argue that this framing facilitates the survival of liberal peacebuilding, which has recently been seen as undergoing a deep crisis. This is not to create a strawman of 'liberal peacebuilding' which, as a concept, is hard to grasp in practice, but instead to problematise its discursive framing as a legitimate policy of intervention as promoted by its securitisation.

Against this background, this chapter asks why we are witnessing a discursive reframing of 'peacebuilding for peace' towards a framing of 'peace through security', or even 'security over peace', and also which political networks and agendas can be seen as linked to this semantic shift. I argue that this shift exposes practices of survival among the most powerful agents and institutions in the field of peacebuilding. The chapter therefore first investigates the death of the notion and policies of 'liberal peacebuilding,' before outlining emerging techniques of survival through its securitisation, both in discursive and material terms. The chapter focuses on 'framing' as a process through which speech acts are socially constructed. A brief analysis of this emerging semantic device of security-as-peace is

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framed according to 'whose security' is at stake, as well as which power inequalities are reproduced in this frame. This will help to explain practices of securitisation recognised by the author in two cases of intervention: Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Cyprus. Through empirical illustrations from both post-conflict cases, this chapter attempts to account for a discursive shift in the peacebuilding field in its early stages and links it to the political interests and agendas at stake. It raises the question of *who* – that is, which actors –peace and security are being constructed for, and what this means for the quality of interventions on behalf of peace and security.

2. The death of liberal peacebuilding and its critique

The 1990s was the heyday of peacebuilding as a western and highly structured model of dealing with conflict. It can be considered a comprehensive approach to dealing with conflict, in that it facilitates and engineers change not only in the political, but also the social and economic spheres of society, mainly through the involvement of civil society actors (Burton/ Dukes 1999: 144). In this context, in 1992, Boutros-Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace' defined the need "to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (1992). On this basis, peacebuilding has increasingly been referred to as 'liberal peacebuilding', in its attempts to promote peace through tools of democratisation as well as its assumption that the peace being promoted is universally applicable and valid (Howell/Pearce 2001: 23). The liberal peace is often implemented through the use of civil society actors, who have become key agents in the delivery of peacebuilding in various ways (Kappler 2014).

Some commentators now argue that the idea of a liberal peace is in major crisis or, indeed, already dead due to the extensive criticism it has been subjected to. In this context, Duffield (2005) has suggested that liberal peacebuilding, rather than being driven by a concern for the common good, is in fact a form of bio-politics and colonialism. Easterly (2006) provides a critique of the west's tendencies to impose its agenda, while Richmond refers to the liberal peace as a 'virtual peace' which lacks meaning for its recipient societies (2006: 309). It has also been argued that local manifestations of resistance are creating an increasing challenge for the liberal peace (Kappler/Richmond 2011). As a result, it is unable to survive

through the use of top-down power, but its survival is dependent on a hybridisation with local practices (Mac Ginty 2011). Overall, these approaches suggest that liberal peacebuilding is forced to take the kind of localised form which it may not have initially promoted. Such discussions have been particularly prevalent in the case of Kosovo, where peacebuilding ambitions have been to some extent locally co-opted, with local elites having derailed the 'original' plan of powerful peacebuilding elites (Franks/Richmond 2008).

These critiques certainly reflect a comparable trend in the policy world, whereby increasing manifestations of resistance against peacebuilding, including social movements and the rise of new actors such as China as a peacebuilding actor, seem to threaten the mission and impact of the liberal peace. They also represent a threat to those actors who have invested in and hold a stake in the liberal peace. It affects international organisations, policy-makers, and NGO personnel, all of whom have invested massive resources in liberal peacebuilding. In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone, the Carnegie Commission has estimated that, before 2001, "NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian aid efforts cost $53 billion" (United Nations 2001). Kuroda (not dated) reports that, according to the Commission, the seven major interventions in the 1990s (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, and El Salvador) cost the international community a total of $200 billion. Against the background of such major investments, the actors funding and implementing missions such as these are unlikely to give up on the notion of liberal peacebuilding without trying to save the mission. Indeed, in the policy world, liberal peacebuilding remains a key tool of intervention despite its shortcomings. It almost seems as if (civil) societies have become 'trapped in the liberal peace', as Marchetti and Tocci (2015) suggest in their chapter title. In that sense, the continuity of established approaches has remained prevalent over the search for alternative responses to the critique, or even death, of liberal peacebuilding as advanced by its critics.

In much the same way, a number of academics have continued to view the liberal peace as a necessary measure for bringing peace and development (Uvin 2002). In line with a much more positive view of peace-related engagement, academics have also argued that, for instance, critiques against liberal peacebuilding have been exaggerated or only justified to a limited extent (Paris 2010). This, too, has certainly resonated strongly in the policy-world. For example, Strauss-Kahn, then managing director of the International Monetary Fund, stated that "peace is a necessary precon-

dition for trade, sustained economic growth, and prosperity" (Strauss-Kahn 2009). Indeed, a glance at the overall approaches of international players such as the European Union over the last decade seems to indicate no major policy shift has occurred as a result of the critiques outlined above. The progress reports on Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, do not suggest a strong transformation of the EU's peacebuilding approach and instead indicate a high degree of continuity over time.

Given that liberal peacebuilding has been defended, implemented and legitimised for decades, critiques of it, or even its death, would be destructive to both policy-actors and thinkers who have invested in it and have a stake in it. The maintenance of the discourse of peacebuilding can thus be said to impact upon the survival of major policy actors and institutions. Consequently, in the following section, I will argue that the agents of liberal peacebuilding are currently ensuring the survival of the project through an attempt to discursively securitise it.

3. *Framing peacebuilding as security: survival through securitisation*

This chapter suggests that the re-orientation of liberal peacebuilding can be accessed through an analysis of the ways in which policy actors increasingly frame it in close proximity to security concerns. Entman argues that to "frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (1993: 52). He adds that "[f]rames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of communication, thereby elevating them in salience" (Entman 1993: 53). In that sense, framing is underpinned by the aim of drawing connections between events and issues in order to promote a particular narrative or interpretation (Entman 2004: 5). It thus enhances "the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of particular aspects of reality" (Entman 2004: 26).

Since Entman first advanced his model, framing has gained increasing prominence as an approach to understanding media representations of a wide range of issues, including the wars in Iraq and their consequences (Entman 2004; Garyantes/Murphy 2010). It is, however, equally useful for analysing the extent to which peacebuilding has been framed as a security-relevant action in both academia and policy practice. I argue here that the framing of peace as security has allowed for a stabilisation of the dis-

course and application of peacebuilding, and ensured its survival in an age where it has come under attack, both within its own sites of operation and in academic debates. Therefore, the survival of the concept of peace(building) in an age in which it appears outdated (or even 'dead') has been enabled by its securitised framing. In this context, securitisation theory as propounded by the Copenhagen School has viewed security as a speech act (Wæver 1995; Stritzel 2007; Balzacq, 2010), thereby suggesting that security threats are socially constructed and, essentially, 'spoken'. The response to security threats is therefore discursively mobilised through an intersubjective understanding within a political community as to what the respective threat consists of and what kind of response it deserves (cf. Buzan and Wæver 2003: 491). Williams (2003) suggests that, because the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory can be broadly situated within the constructivist tradition of thinking, securitisation is a matter for political debate and argumentation within the political community.

According to Balzacq, then, securitisation is a matter of power and a

> "sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, *based on what it knows about the world*, the claim that a specific development (oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it" (Balzacq 2005: 173).

If we consider the practice of securitisation essentially as a practice of framing, with framing acting as the process through which a speech act is discursively constructed by those with the power to do so, then the securitisation of peacebuilding entails a highlighting of problem definitions and evaluations in particular ways in order to suggest particular responses to such problems. This often takes the form of calling for a more robust intervention as a response to a perceived threat. Peacebuilding's survival mechanism, then, is to successfully frame itself and its resulting policy actions as security-related. Questions that arise through a framing analysis of liberal peacebuilding thus include: Who frames? Who is framed as a threat? To which audience? To which political ends? Such questions tie in with the Copenhagen School's focus on the interplay between "the securitizing actor and the audience" in the construction of particular speech acts (Stritzel 2007: 358).

The observation of an increasing securitisation of peacebuilding is not entirely new. Newman (2010) has already suggested that this tendency is clearly visible. He argues, on the one hand, that "[v]iewing conflict, weak statehood and underdevelopment as a threat to Western interests has brought much-needed resources, aid and capacity-building to conflict-

prone countries in the form of international assistance" (Newman 2010: 306). On the other hand, he suggests that such an approach "tends to externalize, demonize and contain problems in the developing - 'other' – world" (Newman 2010: 306). In that sense, the securitisation of peacebuilding has led to the pathologisation of weak and failed states (Newman 2010: 307) and has increased the use of top-down (rather than bottom-up) measures of international engagement (Newman 2010: 317). Newman's argument echoes Castaneda (2009), who suggests that security has increasingly become the driver for peace-related engagement, which is one of the key reasons for the failure of peacebuilding in local and national contexts. Richmond observes that prevailing conceptions of both peace and security emerged from the period between 1945 and 1990 (Richmond 2015: 177-178), in terms of both discourses used and threats perceived. Peace and security, as they are currently discussed, can thus be situated in the framework of Cold War-era power constellations. It thus comes as no surprise that, in contemporary conflicts, such as in Ukraine, the predominant rhetoric is one of Cold-War securitisation rather than a search for alternative and/or new mechanisms of resolution. The NATO Review magazine, for instance, has recently connected "[t]ransatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis" (NATO Review magazine, not dated) and Motyl (2015) highlights the extent to which Ukraine is the key to European security as a whole. The dominant framing seems to emphasise the necessity for de-escalation in Ukraine as a mechanism for creating security in Europe, rather than facilitating peace in Ukraine. Peace, then, is not the ultimate goal – it is merely a by-product of security and the removal of the discursively constructed emergency.

Indeed, as becomes evident in the policy sphere, there is an increasing connection between peace- and security-related events and institutions in a variety of contexts. It is therefore no coincidence that the United Nations Security Council "has the primary responsibility for international peace and security" (United Nations 2015), and other institutions have followed suit by embedding their peacebuilding activities in a security framing.

4. *The frame: investigating the peace-security nexus*

Concepts such as security and conflict are neither pre-social nor neutral, but part of a field of discourses that can only be understood when their (social) context is taken into consideration (Campbell 1998: 5). Conse-

quently, a framing analysis only makes sense if due consideration is given to the wider socio-political and economic context in which particular frames emerge. In the current political climate, we therefore see an increasing securitisation of the discursive field of peacebuilding, and the associated speech acts of securitisation.

First, we can observe the ways in which the political economy of peacebuilding is underpinned by a semantic framing of peace-as-security. Interestingly, in the policy world, we can perceive an emerging discourse which calls for the need for *more* governance in the global public space as a result of the lack of peace *and* security (UK policy-maker and international diplomat, policy conference, 04 November 2014, emphasis by the author). After having witnessed a number of policy debates around peace and security in the United Kingdom, I have realised an almost consensual notion of the need "to tackle problems early" (Senior DFID officer, policy conference, 04 November 2014). Overall, this suggests that there is a tendency to use the peace-security nexus as an entry point for a more proactive (read: interventionist) approach. The combination of peace and security intelligence does indeed lead to the strengthening of resources entering into combined conflict-security-oriented missions. NATO, for instance, has launched a "Science for Peace and Security Programme" which aims to pool resources between the organisation and neighbouring countries. The programme's attention to

> "contemporary security challenges, including terrorism, defence against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents, cyber defence, energy security and environmental concerns, as well as human and social aspects of security, such as the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325)" (NATO 2015)

suggests a particular focus on issues conventionally associated with security, while at the same time semantically privileging peace in terms of the wording of the programme. Similarly, the Africa-EU Partnership published a Roadmap in 2014 which stated the need "to ensure a peaceful, safe, secure environment, contributing to human security and reducing fragility, foster political stability and effective governance, and to enable sustainable and inclusive growth" (Africa-EU Partnership 2015). This reflects the interconnection between the political economy of peacebuilding in terms of the resources that are pooled into such programmes as a result of their securitisation on the one hand, and the semantic framing on the other.

In fact, in semantic terms, there is a plethora of examples confirming this security-focused trend, and the security of the west more specifically. To quote but a few frames used in this context: The *Fund for Peace*, based in Washington, famously produces the annual 'Fragile States Index' (formerly 'Failed State Index'). The Institute for Economics and Peace publishes a 'Global Terrorism Index'. In a similar vein, the Global Policy Forum (2012) reports that the "International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), whose members are primarily PMSCs, hosted a 'Haiti Summit' in Florida for corporations to discuss post-earthquake contracting opportunities". In this context, it is also interesting to note that the organisation has meanwhile been rebranded as *The International Stability Operations Association*. DFID refers to its peacebuilding work in the context of its activity in fragile states (DFID 2005: 5). What these examples reflect is the extent to which peace is increasingly being securitised and broadened to include issues such as failed or failing states, terrorism or natural disasters. 'Tackling instability' becomes the key 'speech act' guiding peace operations. Such labels are then used to discursively create a notion of 'threat' to peace, while linking it to the necessity of (foreign) intervention to tackle these issues.

This points to the second feature of our investigation into the global political power relations underpinning this framing; the fact that, as Richmond (2015) suggests, peace and security have become 'mono-ontologies', representing the power of the global north/west. Following this point, it could be argued that the framing of peace-as-security reflects the power of the global north/west to legitimise intervention on a global scale through the creation of threats – to peace. In this vein, the title of Kaplan's book "The Coming Anarchy" illustrates an academic discourse which problematizes insecurity and ascribes it to conflict-torn non-western countries (Kaplan 2001). The lack of peace is thus viewed as a result of insecurities in the global south, thereby creating, perhaps unintentionally, an almost orientalist binary between the 'civilised west' and the dangerous 'other' in need of external support.

Thirdly, in practical terms, Castaneda (2009) conducts a rather critical policy-field analysis to show how security has become an intrinsic component of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, though this has primarily resulted in the stabilisation of the state, rather than problematizing its underlying assumptions. Interestingly enough, while questioning the concept of 'stabilisation' as such, Mac Ginty (2012: 27) suggests that stabilisation is always a matter of control and "normalizes the role of the military and

aligned security agencies into peacebuilding." In this respect, the language of stabilisation, rather than opening a space for thinking about alternatives, in fact aims to maintain the status quo, whereby certain actors are privileged over others. In this case, peacebuilding has prioritised stabilisation over an investigation of the root causes of conflict, which potentially risks a deepening of the underlying issues or perhaps even a militarisation of 'peacebuilding.' Such observations encourage further critical investigation of the framing of security as a peace-related mechanism in order to explicate the underlying political assumptions and agendas.

However, this is not to argue that security always and necessarily equals stabilisation. Indeed, a continuing state of instability can even be interpreted as beneficial for the (income) security of certain actors, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) illustrate in their referral to the political value of disorder as a resource. Yet, in general terms, and as suggested by Mac Ginty (2012), it seems that the overall tendency of securitisation has been one which favours stability over disorder – not least as the status quo structures of liberal peacebuilding have been created by powerful institutions who do not necessarily have an interest in disrupting the structures they themselves have created. Stability has thus come to signify a cementing of the contemporary world order in favour of more powerful institutions. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) do not focus on a system of global power asymmetries in this exact sense, but they do provide an analysis of the ways in which hegemonic structures are a matter of socialisation. Against this background, the deeply-engrained policy–focus on stabilisation can indeed be viewed as a result of a wider political socialisation into the view that the current world order (framed as 'stability') is best maintained through a focus on 'security'. Of course, this then raises the question of whose security is at stake.

5. *Problematizing the frame: whose security?*

Overall, then, it is important to take into account that, as Rumelili (2015) argues, security is always a matter of identity construction. The process of securitisation constitutes not only the identity of the 'other' (the threat), but also of the 'self' (the one to be protected). This is, to a certain extent, reminiscent of colonial relationships, which consisted of a process of 'othering' through the representation of the 'other' as fixed and unchangeable to serve "the interests of the idealized 'self'" (Brown 1993: 662). In a con-

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text of peace-related intervention, such binarisations between 'self' and 'other' in turn lead to a conceptualisation of the latter as a threat to the security of the self. Consequently, security and peace are not only matters of concern *within* the society that is intervened into; they also represent a relational concern for the relationship between intervener and intervened. This in turn has to be considered in the light of possible policy-implications. What does it mean for the ways in which security policies are being constructed? Can the securitisation of peace be read as a particular framing of the relationship between self and other?

If we take a critical look at the frames used to legitimise interventions, which are framed as peace-related but in fact intended for security, we need to ask not only what frames are being used, but also for whom and for which political purpose. It has been suggested from a feminist perspective that the production of knowledge is always a political undertaking (Sylvester 2002: 275). This raises the question of 'whose security' is at stake in political terms – that is, on whose behalf a framing is developed and used. Such an analysis points us towards a system of global inequalities (including gender inequalities or the north-south divide) which is in turn reproduced in the framing of peacebuilding.

Interestingly enough, it can be argued that discussions around the nature of peacebuilding and security have a gender component. I can give an illustration from a high-profile conference I attended in 2014 on issues related to conflict and security. Populated by a mixture of well-established academics and policy-makers alike, less than a third of the speakers were female. This confirms evidence from some wider studies on the marginalisation of women from academia and science more generally (Isbell et al. 2012; Jones et al. 2014). Consequently, if we take for granted the assumption that the ways in which knowledge is constructed has an impact upon the 'real world', then we need to reflect on the implications of marginalising women from a central academic discourse (Sjoberg 2009). In that sense, security is perhaps more susceptible to this practice than peace, as the former has long been a field populated more by male than by female scholars. The logical follow-on question to the securitisation of peacebuilding is thus – to what extent does the discursive transformation of the field result in a (perhaps inadvertent) further marginalisation of women from that field, and what does this mean for the ontology of peace and peacebuilding? As Charlesworth (2008: 249) points out, the assumption that women are more prone to peace than men has faced criticism in the sphere of feminist academic thought but, nonetheless, the idea of the

'peaceable woman' is deeply engrained in international institutions. If this is indeed the case, the securitisation of the discourse of peacebuilding represents an attempt on behalf of institutions to impose a traditionally male frame upon what has long been considered a more female frame of peace – at least in the policy world.

Furthermore, if we move beyond the gendered notion of framing to look at the ways in which the term 'security' is used in policy-conferences as highlighted above, it becomes quickly evident that we are talking about the security of a particular part of the world – in orientalist terms, the security of the 'west.' Bilgin (2004), for instance, suggests that, in security discourses about the Middle East, a multiplicity of voices have been excluded or neglected, while highlighting the need to situate discourses in particular worldviews rather than taking them for granted.

This raises the question of *who* frames and defines the peace-security agenda, and with what political interests they do so. The fact that questions of instability, conflict and state failure tend to be discussed in the global north, which claims to be affected least by those issues, gives rise to another question: *whose* peace and security are these discussions concerned with? If there was an issue about the security of a given case, should the ensuing discussions not be held in, or at least include representatives of, these countries?

At the policy conference outlined above, almost all speakers were from the west. This may well be a logistical issue, given that the event took place in the United Kingdom. However, it reflects an interesting dynamic whereby western elites speak on behalf of the global south, which they aim to secure / securitise. All cases of conflict and insecurity discussed were located in the global south, albeit with almost no representatives from those countries. Yet this is by no means a new discovery. Indeed, as early as 1991, Ayoob (1991) published an article in which he questioned the applicability of security concepts as devised in the west to Third World countries. Boas (2000) has very clearly and critically addressed this issue in his article on 'security communities.' He suggests that there is a tendency to focus on a state-centric, elite-driven perspective on security instead of security for the people on the ground (Boas 2000). In a similar vein, Rubin (2006) suggests that the US intervention in Afghanistan is not necessarily accurately framed through a focus on peace- or state-building in the country, but rather through the lens of US security. In that sense, we need to examine the agents of peace-security frames in terms of who shapes them and to what end.

Investigating the peace-security nexus from such a perspective points to the political function of discourse and framing. The framing of peace-building as security produces a discussion about the security of countries actively involved in peacebuilding (also, historically speaking, a rather westernised concept), rather than peace for the sake of those on the receiving end of the intervention. In that sense, intervention is legitimised through its benefits for the intervener in the form of increased security. More specifically, the definitions of security tend to be framed stereotypically by a white, male, academic elite and their associated networks (cf. Latour 2005). This also means that the recipient societies are stripped of their agency to frame peace-and security-related concerns on their own terms.

In this respect, Castaneda argues that "the focus on security limits the political imagination and discussions for alternatives" (Castaneda 2009: 249). If we agree with this statement, it follows that the securitisation of peace has narrowed, rather than broadened, the range of options for empowerment. In that sense, the securitisation of peace does not necessarily empower the population amongst whom peace is to be built (as suggested by the body of reconciliation and community activism literatures (Lederach 1997; Rigby 2001; Schaap 2005), but instead empowers the interveners at the expense of the respective target society. This is made possible by the discursive framing of the 'other' as a threat to the interveners, rather than the more peace-specific framing of conflict between two groups of 'others'. Trends of securitisation have thus created a distance between the interveners and their target societies (see also Noreen/Sjöstedt 2004).

6. *Framing peace as security: examples from Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Let us turn to two examples to illustrate the extent to which the securitisation of peacebuilding has impacted upon policy practice.

First, I would like to look at the so-called 'Occupy Buffer Zone Movement' (alias 'bufferer movement') in Cyprus, an off-spring of the Occupy Wall Street Movement that began in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, in 2011. The movement used the buffer-zone – that is, the UN-controlled zone which divides the city into the Turkish North and the Greek South – as a space of resistance against the UN-dominated peace process, which had led to the division of the city and, indeed, the entire island. The ac-

tivists of the movement first arranged weekly meetings in the buffer zone until some of them started camping there permanently in order to voice their discontent with the politics of a divided island. Interestingly, the activists were from both the north and the south, and their explicit goal was the unification of the island. One of their slogans was "from UN-controlled to UNCONTROLLED."

This movement is a highly relevant example of the securitisation of peacebuilding by international actors who are active in Cyprus, most notably the United Nations (leading the peacekeeping mission) and the European Union. While we might expect a degree of enthusiasm for this peace movement on the part of those international actors present on the island, instead, and surprisingly, they viewed it with suspicion. As one of the key activists reported, the movement soon received an eviction letter from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (personal interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014). This was coupled with a visit from both the UNDP and the European Commission, who tried to reduce the space of the campers in the buffer zone and the movement as a whole (personal interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014).

Part of the rhetoric of the international players was security-related, referring to issues of terrorism and drugs (personal interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014). Members of the movement even suggested that this securitised language of drug-abuse was deliberately planted so the movement could be evicted. As the activist explained, the movement had also begun an initiative which involved peace activists playing volleyball across the divide in its narrowest spot, as a way of showing their agency to overcome the division. Once again, however, the UN stopped this initiative. To quote the activist: "they can't cope with natives wanting peace" and "they are scared to lose authority over peace" (personal interview, Nicosia, 11 July 2014). This is certainly not to glorify this movement, but to highlight an interesting dynamic: it seems that the language of the movement, which took the question of unification and peace as its central concern, was sacrificed by some international actors who in turn securitised the issue of the movement. Rather than pointing to the peace-related core of the movement, they brought up the issues of 'drugs' and 'terrorism' as a way of minimising its agency. This in turn created a whole new set of relationships in the discourse. Instead of addressing the division of the island and international complicity in this division, the securitisation of the 'bufferer movement' served as a way to frame it as a security threat to the wider island communities - some of which were suspicious of the movement anyway (confi-

dential source, personal interview, Nicosia, 09 July 2014). This framing allowed for policy-action against the movement and significantly undermined it and, although some of the activists are still gathering today, the movement seems to have lost its initial momentum. In that respect, we can argue that the securitisation of the movement succeeded in negating its agency and subverting its initial peace-related agenda. We can also observe that international agents quickly took over the framing of the issue as something security-related. Surprisingly, the actors framed as threats to security were the very same activists who had initially set out to work for peace. What we can therefore see is that the framing has assumed the function of labelling security as linked to peace, but in an adversarial way. The international actors involved in the case prioritised their definition of 'security' above the type of peace the activists wanted to promote. The audience of this framing was, on the one hand, the activists themselves and, on the other, the wider island community. In a way, one could argue that the framing of the activists as a threat to the security of Nicosia as a whole (in terms of, for example, drugs) was a tool to undermine the movement and thus maintain the status quo in which international (not local) actors held authority over the definition and design of peace. The security frame thus became a tool for maintaining the stability of power relations in favour of international and at the expense of Cypriot actors.

A similar process was observable during the 2014 protests in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). These developed from a medium-sized movement of factory-workers in Tuzla to an almost country-wide movement/uprising against corruption, unemployment and for more social justice (see Plenum gradjana i gradjanki Sarajeva 2014). A number of citizens' plenums arose out of the movement to discuss political issues in a bottom-up manner. These plenums met regularly (some still do) to discuss and decide on political issues and communicate with the formal political sphere. The movement has clearly sent a wider message to the west, not least in terms of the ability of people to devise their own peace process and define its socio-political underpinnings themselves (Jansen 2014). It is therefore interesting to note how quickly the movement was securitised, both by local and international elites as well as the international media. The Economist, for instance, wrote: "By February 8th the protests had spread and violence had broken out. Several government offices, including the presidential building in Sarajevo, were set on fire." (The Economist 2014). The BBC headline on the protests read "Bosnia-Hercegovina protests break out in violence" (BBC 2014). It is certainly true that, in the initial stages of the

movement, some violence did occur. However, this was not the main message being sent from the movement, given that the vast majority of protesters were peaceful and small-scale incidents of violence were quickly contained.

Rather than being considered platforms for the construction of a truly locally owned process, however, the protests and associated plenums were viewed with, at best, suspicion. It was not only the western media that took a decidedly reserved view of the movement; so did international elites engaged in the Bosnian context. Valentin Inzko, the High Representative of BiH, nominated by the International Peace Implementation Council (PIC), even called for the deployment of EU-led troops as a potential response to unrest. Inzko traced the protests to the less active role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR 2014) and thus established a link between the protests, the associated security issues and the limited role of the international community. Similar statements could be read from Wolfgang Petritsch, former High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Petritsch, strikingly enough, associated the protests with the help- and hopelessness of the Bosnian people and thus called for "the EU to squarely set the reform agenda" (Petritsch 2014: 116-117). To quote directly, Petritsch said that

> "[t]he EU High Representative for External and Security Affairs along with the Commission and the newly appointed Commissioner, Austrian "Gio" Hahn, whose envelope includes the European Neighbourhood Policy plus enlargement, will have to put the European Union's West Balkan policy on a "political" and more assertive footing" (Petritsch 2014: 118).

What this example shows is a particular securitised framing of the protests, which could equally have been read as the reclaiming of ownership over the peace process by Bosnians themselves. Instead, international actors opted for a framing of the protests as illustrative of the need for more European Union involvement in BiH – which would certainly be a much more contested issue in local discourses (Kappler 2014). Intervention thus becomes a result of a securitized frame – not least against the background that international intervention has long been seen as a rather controversial and questionable undertaking in BiH (Chandler 1999; Belloni 2007; Richmond/Franks 2009). As in the case of Cyprus, it was mainly international actors, supported by national elites, who had an interest in maintaining this framing in which local protesters were presented as a threat to the security of the country as a whole. The audience of this framing transcended the local and national, even extending to a more global

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public to which the framers could ascertain the continuing need for inter-vention in order to protect Bosnian citizens from themselves. Locally owned peace yet again became subordinate to security. This can be readily interpreted as the stabilisation of engrained and asymmetrical power rela-tions, in which, once again, local communities hold very little power. This is not only true due to the internal political structures in BiH; it is also a result of the considerable degree of power that the Office of the High Rep-resentative and the European Union hold in the country.

What these cases reflect is the extent to which the security frame can be used to legitimise foreign intervention as well as acting as a survival tool for the peacebuilding project as such. The speech act of the 'local' as a threat not only to peace but also security in turn facilitates this discursive legitimation. Against the background of multiple forms of criticism and resistance against peacebuilding, a concern framed as security-relevant can thus act as a response to such critiques and more powerfully assert the legitimacy of the intervention. It equally deprives the intervention subjects of agency by framing them in a context of threats rather than possibility. Both the responses to the movement in Nicosia and to the protests in dif-ferent Bosnian cities are illustrative of the tendency of international peace-building to remain suspicious of local agency and a certain reluctance to endorse agendas which have not been developed in their discursive fram-ing of international peacebuilding.

7. Conclusion: implications for peacebuilding

This chapter has shed light on the political context and strategic value of the framing of peacebuilding within a securitising speech act. In this fram-ing, peace is not necessarily or always seen as a logical extension of secu-rity (and vice versa), but is instead sometimes even viewed as an obstacle, and thus a threat, to it. In terms of authorship, the semantic field of securi-tised peacebuilding is indeed predominantly occupied and discursively shaped by powerful actors who are also often male elites from the west. This context certainly privileges a particular type of narrative and frame, that is, one which is in line with the interests of those elites as far as wider power structures are concerned. It almost seems as if security frames have entered the peacebuilding field to dominate it and divert attention from the root causes of violence, and towards a focus on combating its symptoms. Using the examples of local activism in BiH and Cyprus, the chapter has

highlighted the wider political context in which such politically-laden frames emerge, as well as the functions they fulfil.

What these examples reflect is the extent to which the securitisation of peacebuilding prevents the interveners from addressing the root causes of resistance, conflict or unrest, and instead focuses attention on the legitimisation and justification of intervention. In that sense, peace becomes an instrument for powerful policy-makers and elites rather than a process that is expected to take place at local level, which should result from local agency. Local ownership is then only a desirable by-product if it complies with these larger policy agendas (Kappler/Lemay-Hébert 2015). The illustrations from BiH and Cyprus in fact reflect the reluctance of intervening powers to leave the discursive and material design of peacebuilding to local actors. A securitised frame instead serves to weaken their authority in the negotiation of the content of peace(-building) and instead secures the survival of the most powerful agents in the international system. In Cyprus, international organisations framed the 'bufferers' as a security threat in order to end the movement and undermine their reputation in the wider local community. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the framing of the protest movement as a social threat aimed at a weakening of the movement's authority in the field of peace and social justice, both of which were (and are) at the core of their mission. In that sense, it becomes obvious that the increasing securitisation of (liberal) peacebuilding is not a natural given, but a political strategy implicated in the perpetuation of wider political power structures. The authority to act on behalf of peace is handed to already powerful actors – that is, those who are in a position to publicly frame deviations from the model as a threat – and at the same time, it limits the extent to which alternative agencies can challenge this model. Who, after all, can argue against the need for security?

This of course raises wider questions, primarily about the ethics of security understandings and practices (Browning/MacDonald 2011). It also raises questions about the framing of different identities – that is, the identity of the intervener and the intervened-into society. In this context, Fierke suggests that dialogue can serve as a vehicle for the reconstruction of identities, thereby potentially transforming discourses and actions (Fierke 2007: 79, 84). This is certainly not an easy task: how can the identity of a framed 'other' as a threat be transformed into an identity which is on a level playing field with the interveners? How can the securitisation of peacebuilding be resisted locally? Perhaps through a de-securitisation of peace-related discourses? Again, this does not seem like an easy task,

bearing in mind that Hansen has pointed to the political difficulties in de-securitising discourses, which also needs to result in the dissolution of the friend-enemy dichotomy (Hansen 2012). At the same time, it is important that the power relations at play in the (re-)framing of peacebuilding and its recent increasing securitisation be exposed. If they are not, we risk naturalising a discourse which prioritises security above ethics and content, rather than going hand in hand with it. It also risks legitimising power structures which would otherwise be open to question and political challenge, as the examples of BiH and Cyprus show.

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The Proxy Myth. Western Securitization and Arms Supplies for Libyan Rebels

Witold Mucha

1. Introduction[1]

With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and increasing western military engagement against it, the Arab Spring eventually turned into winter.[2] But this shift in focus towards ISIS has diverted attention from other regional developments (Turner 2015; Stansfield 2014; Jabareen 2015; Kfir 2015; Hashim 2014). As a response to this scholarly neglect, this paper focuses on the case of Libya from an intervention and state-building perspective.

Much of the relevant literature has dealt with Libya in terms of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) issues (Thakur 2013; Garwood-Gowers 2013; Lubura-Winchester/Jones 2013; Wilson 2014; McQuinn 2013; Hamoudi 2012; Henderson 2014; Bellamy/Williams 2014; Chesterman 2011; Hehir 2013; Powell 2012; Çubukçu 2013; Rose 2014; Kuperman 2013). But this paper looks beyond questions related to R2P, instead analyzing speech acts by the British, French, and US administrations which covertly authorized arms transfers to Libyan rebels in 2011 (Loyd/Tomlinson 2011; Cornwell 2011; Busch/Pilat 2013). The Libyan case is significant because it is indicative of the 'proxy myth' western governments seem to buy into when they refrain from direct involvement on the ground (i.e. deployment of troops) and engage in, for example, training and/or arming of local forces in Iraq, Mali, or Syria (Mahapatra 2016; Kilcullen 2016; Cragin 2015).

There is a twofold argument here with respect to the Libyan case. First, in London, Paris, and Washington decisions were taken but their implications for the post-conflict scenario were disregarded. Second, there was a

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1 I am grateful to Christina Pesch and the reviewers for their helpful comments.
2 In this text, ISIS will be used as abbreviation for "The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria". It is synonymous with the term "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham" and "Islamic State" (Weaver 2015; Lister 2015).

justification gap between securitization speech acts prior to approving arms supplies in March 2011 (i.e. intervention) and after Qaddafi's fall in October 2011 (i.e. state-building). In other words, the British, French, and US administrations justified arms supplies on short-term security grounds (e.g. free Benghazi from Qaddafi's dictatorial rule). However, the prospect that military equipment might be misused or fall into the wrong hands *after* Qaddafi's fall was not publicly considered (Busch/Pilat 2013). More than four years later, the Libyan state is being eroded by an armed conflict fought by and between former freedom fighters, who make use of weaponry provided by the West in 2011 (Kuperman 2015; Brownlee et al. 2015). This is paradoxical, as the intended goal of building security ultimately led to heightened insecurity.

The objective of this paper is to address two questions: (a) prior to the intervention, did western governments communicate the danger of overly independent militias in the (post-) conflict context, and to what extent was the short-term defeat of Qaddafi deemed more urgent? (b) Were the negative effects of arms transfers addressed in post-Qaddafi speech acts?

The paper will be divided into four parts. First, a literature review of Securitization Theory and militia research will set the stage for the empirical analysis. Second, the selection of London, Paris, and Washington will be explained and the empirical basis of the analysis will be presented. Third, official statements from the administrations, both prior to and after the decision to supply arms, will be analyzed. The rhetorical and operational gap between the intervention phase on the one hand and the state-building phase on the other will be disentangled. Finally, implications for policymaking and future research will be discussed.

2. Securitization Theory and Militia Research in the context of Libya

Before the Arab Spring, securitization literature on Libya was concerned predominantly with migration issues, with most studies analyzing the crafting of the legal framework that prevented irregular migrants from arriving in the European Union (EU) (Gerard/Pickering 2014; Gabrielli 2014; Paoletti 2011; Bigo 2014; Menjívar 2014). With an Arab Winter looming across Libya, post-2011 scholars have begun to focus on R2P-issues. Against this backdrop, two perspectives have been neglected when dealing with Libya from a (post-) Arab Spring angle: western securitiza-

tion speech acts on the one hand,[3] and the static understanding of militias on the other.[4] With respect to the first topic, researchers have only seldom dealt with the inconsistencies in official justifications for militarization prior to and after supplying arms to local forces (Cooper 2011; Podder 2013; Podder 2014; Stritzel 2011). As to the second, despite a significant number of studies that look into militias and specifically pro-government-militias (PGMs) (Mitchell et al. 2014; Mitchell et al. 2013; Clayton/Thomson 2014), the principal-agent-dilemma in Libya has largely slipped under the radar – both from an intervention as well as a statebuilding perspective (Strazzari 2014; Strazzari/Tholens 2014; Kuperman 2013; Shaw 2013). The present analysis will contribute to the filling of these research gaps.

In the academic debate, the notion of security has been treated principally as a state domain. The central authority's capacity to exercise a monopoly on violence over a variety of state and non-state actors has been identified as one of its primary functional criteria (Sedra 2007; Sedra/Burt 2011). The Copenhagen School has applied the notion of securitization to the analysis of foreign policy behavior in international relations (Buzan et al. 1998; Abrahamsen 2005). Their assumption is that threat and insecurity are discursively constructed by political leaders, in an attempt to legitimize extraordinary measures on behalf of the threatened people (Buzan 1997; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan/Wæver 2009). US President George W. Bush's justification of the 2002 National Security Doctrine, in the wake of the global 'war on terror', has been pointed to here (Buzan 2008; Dunmire 2009). Meanwhile, the academic debate has shifted the notion of securitization away from strict foreign policy behavior and toward related security concerns such as minority rights (McDonald 2011; Karyotis/Patrikios 2010), transnational crime (Elliott 2007; Williams 2008), the spread of HIV/AIDS (Maclean 2008; Sjöstedt 2008), and to questions of migration governance – such as the pre-Arab Spring context of Libya.

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3 McDonald (2008) defined securitization as "(…) positioning through speech acts (…) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue" (McDonald 2008: 567).

4 Schneckener (2007: 10) defined militias as para-militarily organized armed groups that are tolerated by the ruling power: "Their task is to fight rebels, to threaten specific groups or to kill opposition leaders. These militias are often created, funded, equipped and trained in anti-guerilla tactics (counter-insurgency) by state authorities (Schneckener 2007: 10)."

But despite the growing body of research few studies have traced the change of security arguments adopted by western governments in the context of the Arab Spring (Heydemann 2014; Boening 2014; Börzel et al. 2015). This lack of interest in the subject has been reflected in the relative neglect of the recent security vacuum in Libya (Mattes 2014; Braithwaite/ Rashed 2014; Clément/Salah 2014; DeVore 2014). Most of those forces who opposed Qaddafi's dictatorial rule in mid-2011 were heralded as 'freedom fighters'. However, after his fall in October 2011 the majority of them refused to be integrated into the security services of the transition government (Lefevre 2013; Gaub 2013; Pelham 2012). In 2015, a variety of rival militias continued to erode the statebuilding efforts undertaken by the current government. All of this occurred against the backdrop of a growing divide between secular and Islamist forces (Waterman 2015; Dessouki/El Deen 2015).

The autonomous and independent approach pursued by the militias in this specific case points to a research gap in contemporary peace and conflict studies. First, militias have been predominantly dealt with as PGMs (Humphreys/Weinstein 2008; Bakke et al. 2012; Cunningham 2011). Second, militias have been mostly treated as static forces (Reno 2010; Carey et al. 2013). Only a few studies have problematized the notion of PGMs behaving autonomously over time. Yet they are capable of setting their own agendas that differ from the mandate authorized by the government (Barter 2013; Clayton/Thomson 2014; Meagher 2012). For instance, German public debates have treated Kurdish Peshmerga as regular military forces loyal to the regional government in Arbil (Gunter 2011; Stansfield 2014). However, only a few voices contemplated the likelihood of Peshmerga militias, or factions thereof, becoming independent over the course of time (Fischer-Tahir 2012; Ahmad 2012; Orhan 2014).

3. *Analytical Framework*

Two narratives have been advanced with regard to the ousting of Qaddafi. On the one hand, the NATO operation has been hailed as a model intervention (Kuperman 2013; Hehir/Murray 2013; Engelbrekt et al. 2014; Adler-Nissen 2014). On the other, the circulation of arms has been identified as a negative long-term effect (Strazzari 2014; Strazzari/Tholens 2014; Moore 2012; Moore 2013). The latter narrative – the increased availability of weapons on the ground – is of primary interest to this paper.

With respect to the former narrative, the rapid and coordinated reaction by the alliance has been especially praised. As Daalder and Stavridis (2012) pointed out:

> "The international community responded swiftly. In late February, the UN Security Council placed sanctions, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze on Libya and referred Qaddafi's crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Shortly thereafter, the Arab League suspended Libya from its sessions and then called on the international community to impose a no-fly zone. On March 17, the Security Council granted that request, mandating 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians." (Daalder/Stavridis 2012)

At first glance, the results of these actions were promising. Qaddafi's regime was ousted, an interim transitional government was installed, parliamentary elections were held, and former Qaddafi officials were prosecuted (Vandewalle 2012; Zunes 2013). Nevertheless, as the 2014 parliamentary crisis and subsequent internal violent conflict has shown Libya is now nearing a dramatic turning point (International Crisis Group 2015; Hoffman 2014; Lesch 2014):

> "Over six months of fighting between two parliaments, their respective governments and allied militias have led to the brink of all-out war. […] Libyans, who united to overthrow Qadfahi in 2011, now vie for support from regional patrons by casting their dispute in terms of Islamism and anti-Islamism or revolution and counter-revolution. The conflict's reality, however, is a much more complex, multilayered struggle over the nation's political and economic structure that has no military solution." (International Crisis Group 2015: i)

The early optimism after Qaddafi's fall has given way to concerns of state failure and its ramifications for regional stability. Against this backdrop, this paper will respond to two research questions: (a) prior to the intervention, did western governments communicate the danger of overly independent militias in the (post-)conflict context, and to what extent was Qaddafi's short-term defeat deemed more urgent? (b) Were these negative effects dealt with in post-Qaddafi speech acts?

The British (Prime Minister David Cameron, 2010-2015), US (President Obama, 2008-2016), and two French governments (President Sarkozy 2007-2012; President Hollande 2012-2017) were selected as significant cases in order to respond to the research questions. Three criteria separate these governments from the other 19 states that enforced the no-

fly zone over Libya (UN SC Resolution 1973):[5] First, prior to the military intervention (i.e. 19 March 2011), President Sarkozy and PM Cameron were the first to speak against Qaddafi. Despite its initial reluctance towards military involvement the Obama administration, eventually joined this unambiguous stance. Second, in contrast to the rest of its NATO partners governments in London, Paris, and Washington openly discussed arms supplies to anti-Qaddafi forces. According to newspaper sources, weapons were transferred to Libyan rebels via Qatar (Loyd/Tomlinson 2011; Cornwell 2011). Third, with the huge military, economic, and political involvement in the post-Qaddafi state, these governments were the loudest to voice concerns about Libya's deteriorating internal violent conflict in 2014/15, e.g. the 2012 attack on US consulate in Benghazi (Fisher/Anderson 2015; Koenig 2014; Strong 2014; Schaller 2015; Howorth 2014).

Although UN SC Resolution 1970 allowed only for the provision of non-lethal military equipment to anti-Qaddafi forces, the British, French, and US administrations eluded the arms embargo (UN SC Resolution 1970). According to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the UN's passage of Resolution 1973 provided for a waiving of the arms embargo (UN SC Resolution 1973): "It is our interpretation that 1973 amended or overrode the absolute prohibition of arms to anyone in Libya so that there could be legitimate transfer of arms if a country were to choose to do that" (Clinton quoted by Watt 2011). Within this framework, Wadi (2015) concluded that "[…] arms supplies to the rebels was not only widely known, but also endorsed by the international community as the world waited for Gadhafi's forced downfall" (Wadi 2015). In other words, despite UN concern about the likely spread of arms among militias in Libya, there was minimal disapproval from the West in March 2011. Only Russia and China criticized the NATO coalition for going beyond the remit of UN resolution 1973 (Snetkov/Lanteigne 2015; Schumacher/Nitoiu 2015).

The unofficial and covert nature of weapons transfers to Libyan rebels does not necessarily impede the empirical analysis. This paper does not focus on the specific type and/or amount of arms that were transferred via Qatar. Despite the lack of accessible primary data, external military sup-

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5 The NATO members (Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) allied with Jordan, Qatar, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates (NATO Website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm, 24 March 2015).

port by Paris, London, and Washington is taken as a given. This paper focuses on western speech acts before (i.e. intervention) and after (i.e. statebuilding) the NATO-intervention was launched in March 2011.

The empirical basis of this research consists of 13 speech acts. The research questions will each be addressed to this fund of governmental responses, represented by President or Prime Minister as well as their Foreign Ministers. The table below details the specifics. Given the focus of this paper on speech acts by 'securitizing' political leaders, the equally relevant dimensions of the "agents', habitus", and "audience" are excluded from the discussion (Balzacq 2011: 1-2). However, their contribution for further analytical purposes will be discussed in the final section of this paper. The time period under investigation is divided into an intervention phase (January-April 2011) and a statebuilding phase (May 2014-May 2015). The first phase is defined by the beginning of the popular uprisings in Libya, and the US joining of the NATO coalition; the second phase covers the time from the beginning of armed hostilities between current opponents up to the time of this analysis (i.e. May 2015).

Table 1: Speech Acts

	France	United Kingdom	United States
Intervention	Securitization speech acts: (a) communication of militia autonomization and priority of Qaddafi defeat over unbound militias		
Jan – Apr 2011	President Sarkozy "Verbatim - Sarkozy justifie l'intervention militaire en Libye" (19 March 2011) Minister of Foreign Affairs Juppé "Conseil de sécurité - Libye" (17 March 2011)	Prime Minister Cameron "Prime Minister's statement on Libya" (19 March 2011) Foreign Secretary Hague "Statement from the conference Chair following the London Conference on Libya" (29 March 2011)	President Obama "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya" (28 March 2011) Secretary of State Clinton "Clinton's Remarks at the International Conference on Libya, March 2011" (29 March 2011)
Statebuilding	Securitization speech acts: b) self-critique regarding militia autonomization		
May 2014 – May 2015	President Hollande "Discours d'ouverture de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs" (28 August 2014) Minister of Foreign Affairs Fabius "Libye – Déclaration à la conférence ministérielle de Rome" (6 March 2014)	Prime Minister Cameron "PM call with Prime Minister Renzi" (25 February 2015) Foreign Secretary Hammond "UK welcomes UN action to sanction Libyan terrorist groups" (19 November 2014)	President Obama "Statement by the President on the Elections in Libya" (26 June 2014) Secretary of State Kerry "Joint Statement on Libyan Political Talks" (21 March 2015)
	Joint Statement on Libya by Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States (13 August 2014)		

Source: Created by author

4. Securitization during Int ervention and Statebuilding

It is not surprising that intervention in early 2011 was focused on the crisis in Libya. This owed not only to the huge attention given to the Arab Spring in general but also to the looming NATO operation. With ISIS taking center stage, the Ukraine crisis getting out of hand, and Ebola spreading across West Africa by 2014 there was less focus on issues related to the Arab Spring (Mügge 2014; Bagger 2014; Crocker 2015). The same was true for the regional impact of civil war escalation in Yemen (Terrill 2014; Hughes 2015; Sorenson 2014). This was, however, not merely a medial shift of attention towards other crises around the globe. Policymakers were facing new challenges that had to be prioritized. As such, the increasingly fragmented conflict underway in Libya has been largely neglected. Indeed, more official statements were made regarding securitization speech acts *a* (external militia militarization and Qaddafi defeat) than *b* (self-critique). The qualitative decline in relevance of post-Qaddafi Libya is further shown by two observations. First, the current conflict parties were dealt with via joint statements rather than individual positions. Second, the few individual statements that were given targeted separate issues from parliamentary elections to sanctions against terrorists. The following section will therefore compare the public statements within the framework of the two overarching research questions.

a) Did governments communicate the danger of unbound militias prior to the intervention, and to what extent was Qaddafi's defeat deemed more urgent?

The basic intervention argument was set by UN Resolution 1970 and 1973 (2011). In line with the resolutions, President Obama stressed why the coalition had no other choice than to help oust Qaddafi in his speech on 28 March 2011:

> "[…] Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against Libyan people. Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed. […] Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air." (Obama 2011)

Besides the "brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis" Obama justified the operation as a means of safeguarding revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt: "A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful – yet fragile – transitions in Egypt and Tunisia" (Obama 2011). Along with a broad coalition of NATO and Arab League partners, this was in line with the British and French positions.

With respect to arms supplies to Libyan rebels none of the six selected speech acts explicitly mentioned weapons transfers to opposition forces. Moreover, anti-Qaddafi forces were not termed 'rebels', 'fighters', or 'militias'. Rather, they were simply referred to as 'People of Libya'. The Qaddafi regime was identified as an evil threat, one that was actively trying to slaughter Libyans. This Manichean rhetoric left little space for differentiation between the various opposition forces on the ground. The Libyan opposition was not portrayed as an armed force, nor was the likelihood of unbound militias mentioned. However, it is striking that London, Paris, and Washington not only stressed the no-fly zone but that each of the speakers highlighted the UN authorization of "all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack […]" (UN SC Resolution 1973). For instance, President Sarkozy laid emphasis on the military intervention: "The participants agree upon taking all necessary measures, in particular the military ones, to make respect the decisions of the UN Security Council (English translation of Sarkozy 2011)." This was in contrast to Clinton or Hague, who indicated the parallel need for long-term non-military solutions (Clinton 2011; Hague 2011).

Despite minor differences the British, French, and US administrations interpreted resolution 1973's passage on "all necessary measures" as a legitimizing gateway for arms supplies to anti-Qaddafi forces. They indicated that the resolution would allow for foreign governments to arm rebels. Two weeks after the adoption of UN SC resolution 1973, these plans were rejected by NATO, along with China, Russia, and Germany. The major argument against arms supplies was that an arms embargo was presently in place, and that some rebel factions had relationships to al-Qaida (Stringer 2011; Booth 2011). Despite this rejection from the majority of NATO members, Cameron supported Clinton's assessment that nations could legally supply weapons to Libyan rebels irrespective of the arms embargo. Apparently, UN SC resolutions "[…] would not necessarily rule out the provision of assistance to those protecting civilians in certain circumstances" (Cameron 2011). Similar to comments made by Obama, Cameron

stated that "[…] we do not rule it out, but we have not taken any decision" (Cameron 2011). A few months later, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Juppé confirmed that France was supplying arms to Libyan rebels – NATO and the UN Security Council having been informed about this decision" (Juppé 2011). According to Le Figaro (2011), the airdrops included rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, along with Milan anti-tank missiles (Avril/Hauter 2011). With Juppé's official confirmation of arms supplies in June 2011, it was no longer in doubt that Washington and London had done the same – mostly via Qatar (Black 2011; Risen et al. 2012; Fisk 2011; Loyd/Tomlinson 2011).

Among these administrations there was agreement on the need to militarily supply rebels. The official speech acts in Paris, London and Washington did not rule out the legal possibility of weapons transfers. However, there were a few exceptions – not in public speeches, but rather in informal talks. For instance, on 30 March 2011, Hague acknowledged that "[…] introducing new weapons into a conflict can have unforeseeable and unknown consequences. […] There are examples of weapons being given to people in good faith and then those weapons being used for other purposes" (Hague quoted by Stringer 2011). Despite these concerns and following talks with opposition leaders in Benghazi, Hague expressed his confidence that violent Islamists did not play a major role within rebel forces (Stringer 2011). Hague's statement reveals that western governments were aware of the likelihood of militias getting out of hand, but this concern was only rarely and quietly communicated in public. At this time, the risk of out-of-control rebels was not seen as highly likely.

Despite Hague's awareness of a potential 1980s Afghanistan-like scenario in Libya, unbound militias were not perceived as a serious threat – at least not serious enough to cast doubt on the decision to arm rebels. Hague's remarks represented the positions held in London, Paris, and Washington in 2011. Looking beyond Libya, in June 2013 Hague discussed the external militarization of rebels in Syria as a relevant option that should not be ruled out (Hague quoted by Wintour 2013). Given the deteriorating situation in Libya at the time, this is paradoxical. Apparently western decision-makers still believed in the 'proxy myth'.

The analysis reveals that in 2011 the threat of unbound militias was discarded by authorities in Paris, London, and Washington. The major speeches focused on the protection of Libyans against Qaddafi's repression. President Obama's remarks painted a particularly linear picture:

> "Qaddafi declared he would show "no mercy" to his own people. He compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we wanted – if we waited one more day, Benghazi […] could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world." (Obama 2011)

The urgency of the intervention decision ("if we waited one more day") had also been underlined by the French government eleven days earlier, when the first air strikes were launched on 17 March 2011. Minister of Foreign Affairs Juppé had declared: "We do not have lots of time. It is a question of days; maybe it is a question of hours. With every day, with every hour that passes by, the noose around the neck of civilians and those who desire liberty is tightened by repressive forces […]" (English translation of Juppé 2011).

At that time, ousting Qaddafi's regime was the top priority. However, on 29 March with the intervention ongoing, Obama, Clinton, and Hague all indicated the need for long-term engagement in Libya. This approach did not specifically deal with militias or any form of demobilization and/or disarmament programs. The speech acts were vague and stressed the Libyan people's ownership of the process. For example, Clinton stated that "[…] we know long-term progress in Libya will not be accomplished through military means. […] Now we cannot and must not attempt to impose our will on the people of Libya, but we can and must stand with them as they determine their own destiny" (Clinton 2011). Hague concurred by stressing that "[learning] the lessons from the past, we agreed on the need for priorities for long-term support […] [and therefore activities] to stabilize the situation will need to start early and be part of an integrated and comprehensive international response" (Hague 2011). In terms of long-range prospects President Sarkozy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Juppé vaguely addressed the need for international support and Libyan ownership after Qaddafi's fall.

The lack of attention towards unbound militias and the vague call for long-term engagement does not necessarily demonstrate the ignorance of these governments. In March 2011, public 'audiences' in France, the UK, and the US were convinced to support the intervention. In this regard, the priority from a policymakers' securitization perspective was to depict Qaddafi as a malignant threat to civilians.

b) Did governments problematize arms supplies as a contributing factor to the 2015 crisis?

In comparison to 2011, the recent crisis in Libya slipped largely under the radar (Kuperman 2015; Braithwaite/Rashed 2014; Stacher 2015). The current internal violent conflict is essentially being fought between four rival organizations, all of whom seek control over the eroding post-Qaddafi state. Firstly, there is the internationally recognized government of the 'Council of Deputies' that was elected in 2014. It commands the loyalty of the army and has been supported by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via air strikes against Islamist opponents. Given its organizational base in Tobruk, it is also known as the "Tobruk government". Secondly, there is the rival Islamist government of the "New General National Congress". Based in Tripoli it is led by the Muslim Brotherhood and supposedly supported by Qatar, Sudan, and Turkey. These two organizations control most of the territory in contemporary Libya. In addition, the Islamist "Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries" (led by Ansar al-Sharia) and the Libyan branch of ISIS add further fuel to the fire (International Crisis Group 2015: 7-8).

It was not until major hostilities erupted in July 2014 and the internationally recognized government had to relocate parliamentary work from Tripoli to Tobruk, that western governments raised concerns about Libya's stability. A Joint Statement on Libya by the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States on 13 August 2014) "strongly [condemned] the ongoing fighting and violence in and around Tripoli, Benghazi, and across Libya". Despite the appeal that "[violence] cannot and must not be a means to achieve political goals or settle ideological differences", there was no mention, whatsoever, of a relation of western arms transfers to unbound local militias (Joint Statement 2014). Similarly, the Joint Statement on Libyan Political Talks (21 March 2015) called "on the Libyan political leaderships to act responsibly, to make clear their support for dialogue, to exercise authority over military and militia leaders and to ensure civilian oversight and control of their actions […]" (Joint Statement 2015). With the rise of Ansar al-Sharia and a growing use of terrorist tactics, these governments expressed deep concerns "about the growing threat from terrorist groups in Libya" (Joint Statement 2015). It is significant that the lack of a "strong, united, central Government in the country" was blamed on the situation (Joint Statement 2015) – rather than on western arms supplied to many of the belligerents. Against

this background, it seems cynical that Obama greeted elections in Libya in late June 2014:

> "The United States was proud to support the Libyan people in the darkest days of their revolution and through their efforts to end the Qadhafi regime, and we remain committed to supporting the Libyan people as they work to lay foundations of a democratic society during this challenging yet historic time." (Obama 2014)

When the civil war escalated in July of the same year, however, there was little evidence of this 'commitment'. Whereas support in ousting Qaddafi in 2011 was highlighted, arms supplied to present-day belligerents were not mentioned. This one-sided perspective was also visible in statements made by President Hollande, Prime Minister Cameron, as well as Secretary of State Hammond throughout 2015. It is significant that more international engagement was yet again called for: "[…] [The] international community must redouble efforts to help bring about a national unity government" (Cameron 2015). However, the UN was proposed as the major stakeholder in this process instead of the governments that had initiated the NATO coalition against Qaddafi in early 2011: "There is total confusion […]. France demands that the UN organize exceptional support to Libyan authorities in order to reestablish their state; because it is the UN that should take responsibility" (English translation of Hollande 2014).

No public statement in London, Paris, or Washington identified western arms supplies as a contributing factor to the current crisis. On the one hand, Hollande's call for a multilateral intervention in Libya seems like a déjà vu questioning of France's lessons learnt capacities (CBS News 2015). On the other hand, the US administration had already problematized the principal-agent dilemma in April 2011 – four weeks after the beginning of the NATO intervention (New York Times 2012). Following the decision from the White House to encourage Qatar to ship arms to the Libyan opposition forces, Obama complained to the Emir of Qatar that his country was not coordinating actions in Libya with the United States. According to an official, "[the] president made the point to the emir that we needed transparency about what Qatar was doing in Libya" (New York Times 2012).

In sum, despite the lack of attention to the current crisis and despite the lack of self-criticism regarding unbound militias in Libya, the Obama administration seemed to be aware of the principal-agent dilemmas as early as April 2011. It is likely that at some point similar concerns were also discussed in London and Paris.

5. Conclusion

In 2011, despite criticism from their NATO partners Paris, London, and Washington made no secret of supplying arms to Libyan rebels as an additional measure to the no-fly-zone. In public statements the French, British, and US governments did not question the long-term risks of the intervention. Rather, the need to help local opposition forces ousting Qaddafi was set as the top priority. According to the administrations, UN SC 1973 resolution allowed for the use of "all necessary measures", which did not rule out the provision of assistance to those protecting civilians in certain circumstances.

This brings us back to the overarching research questions set out at the beginning of this chapter. In public statements, the French, British, and US governments (a) did not communicate the danger of unbound militias because Qaddafi's fall was deemed most urgent, irrespective of the means used to achieve it, and (b) they did not identify western arms supplies as a contributing factor to the ongoing crisis in 2015. The official speech acts examined here convey a linear argumentation: the UN resolutions allowed for arms supplies; Qaddafi's immediate fall was more important than the long-term risks; the West was entitled to make use of all necessary measures. In this light, it was believed that the local opposition forces would serve as proxies in the fight against Qaddafi. To public audiences, western arms supplies were thus communicated as legal, legitimate, and promising means for achieving regime change.

However, at some point during informal talks in June 2013 the long-term risks for statebuilding were finally dealt with. Foreign Secretary Hague mentioned a 1980s Afghanistan-like scenario as a future possibility for Libya, but he did not consider it very likely. Instead, he dismissed the likelihood of unbound militias because he had been assured that violent Islamists did not hold a major role among the rebels. While Hague's statement was in line with the official stance, Obama's concerns about Qatar's non-transparent shipment of US weapons to Libyan rebels indicated more awareness.

The ambiguities found in public and non-public speech acts have implications for research and policymaking: first, the analysis of securitization speech acts is limited to official, and thus accessible speech acts. It is therefore not surprising that western governments explicitly justified the NATO intervention, yet only implicitly pointed to arms supplies under the rubric of "all necessary measures". Second, securitization speech acts are

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based on the necessity to convince specific 'audiences'. While the intervention debate primarily targeted the general public in the West, the less publicized state-building discourses were aimed at special interest groups (e.g. NATO and UN personnel, diplomats, aid agencies etc.). Third, western governments tend to make use of local non-state proxies without considering their unpredictable potential. In this respect, the current analysis has revealed two factors: on the one hand, militia autonomization was tolerated for the greater goal of eliminating Qaddafi. On the other hand, western governments continued to supply arms to local proxies despite their poor track record. For instance, despite being aware of the radicalization of militias in Libya British Secretary of State Hague argued in favor of continued arms supplies to rebel forces within Syria in 2013.

The latter conclusion points to a familiar phenomenon in foreign policymaking. External states often make use of local non-state proxies in conflict in an attempt to influence domestic outcomes. Despite isolated terrorist attacks such as those in Copenhagen, Ottawa, Paris, or Sydney in 2015 the advantages of this strategy are obvious (Hirschfeld Davis 2015): one's own military personnel on the ground is limited and the external political influence outweighs the minimal internal costs. Indeed, in August 2014 the German government decided to militarily support Kurdish Peshmerga in Northern Iraq in their fight against ISIS (Ischinger/Bunde 2015), while Russia made no secret of annexing the Crimea via Prorussian Ukrainians in March 2014 (Tsygankov 2015). Most recently, US Secretary of State John Kerry has criticized Iran for supporting Houthi rebels in Yemen in their fight against the Riad-affiliated Hadi government (BBC 2015). Furthermore, the European Union (EU) is currently discussing ways to better integrate regional and local actors into a comprehensive security framework. Under the label "Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I)", this concept is being applied to statebuilding processes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kempin/Scheler 2015; Major et al. 2015). All these different examples illustrate that externally empowering local actors is not a 'proxy myth' but rather a 'proxy belief'. Despite the frequently evoked 'Afghan Mujahedin' scenario, and difficult lessons learnt, policymakers still apply this strategy – probably owing to ad hoc constraints rather than ignorance.

Regardless of the manifold ramifications for intervention and statebuilding strategies, each and every one of these decisions is contextual. This holds huge ethical implications – for example, with respect to Obama's decision-making in Libya and Syria: why intervene against Qaddafi and not against Assad? On the one hand, Obama has been criticized for

covertly supplying arms to Libyan rebels and thus contributing to the current crisis. On the other hand, he has been criticized for *not* supporting moderate rebel factions in Syria that have by now been crushed between the Assad regime and Islamist groups – principally Al-Nusra and ISIS (Ma'oz 2015; Edwards 2015).

Whether its origins lie in sound strategy or lack of alternatives, more research is needed that comparatively analyzes 'good' and 'bad' examples of making use of proxies. For instance, comparing cases such as Somalia or Mali could provide relevant empirical material that enables a closer assessment of the "Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I)".

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Invoking Religion in Securitizing Moves. Five Cases in US History

Robin Lucke, Katharina McLarren

1. Introduction

> *"Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world."(Reagan 1983a)*

The foundation of American identity is based upon the notion of freedom, in particular the freedom of religion. Once it attained independence, the USA was considered 'God's country'. It stood for religious and civil liberty, as opposed to the 'old world', which represented tyranny and the repression of religious freedom. The world was perceived as either or – as good or evil – and the reasons why battles were fought were just as clear. This mentality continued to have an impact on US foreign policy in the 20th and 21st centuries and was initially dubbed the "Apocalyptic Premise" (Hunt/Lefever 1982), in particular with respect to Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. Two decades later it was termed "Millennialism" (Judis 2005: 6) in reaction to George W. Bush's words and political actions. The authors look at how the idea of an impending apocalypse affects America's mentality and (political) behavior. Protestant millennialism originated in England and the Netherlands in the 17th century and refers to a belief that world-moving or -changing battles are imminent, that they would take the form of cataclysmic revolutions rather than gradual changes, and that they will have monumental consequences.

This article confronts a mainly theoretical puzzle. The USA is a state actor – not a religious one – within the international system but, over the course of more than five presidencies, securitizing actors appear to have consistently invoked religion (not limited to Christianity) in their securitizing moves. This raises the question of whether and how religion should be considered within the securitization framework. Our hypothesis is that,

due to the existential nature of (the freedom of) religion, it is easily securitized even by state actors, though the enemy posing the threat need not be a state actor itself.

More specifically, we aim to study the role of religion in securitization processes that enabled interventions and state-building by the United States. This explorative chapter is structured as follows: first, a section on the role of religion in International Relations (IR) theory is presented, followed by a brief section on the fundamentals of the Securitization framework. We then proceed to discuss specifically the role of religion within Securitization studies, addressing Laustsen and Wæver's (2000) article on this topic. To conduct the empirical study, we analyze speech acts by US presidents in five cases: President Roosevelt's change of policy to intervene in World War II (WWII), President Carter's case of intervening in Afghanistan subsequent to the Soviet invasion in 1979 (by providing financial and military assistance to the Mujahedeen), President Reagan's support of "freedom fighters" during the final decade of the Cold War, President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq in 2003, and finally President Obama's intervention in Iraq and Syria in 2014, combating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The cases are chosen to reflect a broad spectrum of interventions covering a long time span, initiated by Republican as well as Democratic office-holders, against a range of different enemies: Fascism, Communism, and transnational terrorism. The speech acts are analyzed by means of textual analysis (Buzan et al. 1998: 25; Milliken 1999; Balzacq 2011). The conclusion summarizes and reflects the findings of the cases and puts them into context regarding the theoretical discussion, as well as suggesting how Laustsen and Wæver's notion of the "sacred referent object" might be amended or even expanded.

2. Theoretical Aspects

Religion in International Relations

"For an approach that sees the Westphalian international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble" (Fox/Sandler 2004: 29). Discussing religion as a factor in political science, and International Relations (IR) in particular, poses a challenge which stems from the fact that, from a political science or IR point of view, it has not been considered necessary to take religion into account as a separate element: if anything, it is reduced

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to being an aspect of culture. Yet religion is present at all levels of analysis examined by the field of IR – it is mentioned in international declarations; it plays a role in inter-state conflicts; it is included in foreign policy debates; and it is found in the lives of individual statesmen. Why, then, does IR theory not include religion? There are two possible answers: either the various schools of thought do not see a need to include religion or the respective theoretical frameworks are devised in ways that cannot accommodate it.

In the past decade a handful of scholars have called for religion to be brought into the debate on theories. Their publications were intended to initiate a discussion, yet the hoped-for response did not follow. In their book "Bringing Religion into International Relations" (2004), Fox and Sandler review and assess why religion has posed such a challenge for political scientists. They reach the same conclusion as Hatzopoulos and Petito in their anthology "Religion in International Relations – The Return from Exile" (2003): the most prominent reason for its absence is the very Western-centered approach to political science, which goes back to the European age of Enlightenment. This initial rejection of religion, both empirically and in the realm of (social) science, has continued to characterize research until today. With the age of Enlightenment came the development of the modern state, eventually replacing the idea of the divine right to rule with other forms of legitimizing power. Hatzopoulos and Petito fittingly term this absence the "long Westphalian exile" (Hatzopoulos/Petito 2003: 2). They explain it was not due to a passive neglect of religion, but rather that such a state system regarded religion as "the ultimate threat to order, security, and civility" (Hatzopoulos/Petito 2003: 2). The authors go as far as to place religion back at the "center of international relations" (Hatzopoulos/Petito 2003: 2).[1]

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1 Perhaps the debate on including religion in IR has peaked; however there continue to be contributions. Especially Scott M. Thomas furthered the debate in his book *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations* (2005). While suggesting that the English School might provide a plausible theoretical foundation to embark from, Scott comes to the conclusion that in the end a new theory would be necessary to include religion in the analytical framework. In 2011 Snyder et al. explore such theoretical notions in the book *Religion and International Relations Theory*, admittedly raising more questions than providing answers, but continuing to spark the debate by providing important deliberations. A more specific and very recent attempt at including religion in IR theory is the edited volume by Jodok Troy, *Religion and the Realist Tradition* (2014), shedding light on

Fox and Sandler also examine religion and politics from different angles: what role religion can play as a means of legitimizing or undermining power, and what functions religion can assume. These functions can also be used by policy-makers. On the one hand, religion can be utilized to strengthen a sense of unity within a state, increasing support for policies. On the other, religion can be used to shape identity, even define a "political universe for their [policy-makers'] populations" (Fox/Sandler 2004). If politicians succeed in doing this, the population is almost incapable of questioning or opposing individual policies, for they would be questioning the entire (religious) identity which binds the population together. "Thus, a policy-maker who can successfully portray a political cause as a religious one has a powerful tool for mobilizing support and silencing opposition" (Fox/Sandler 2004). The authors then analyze how religion can be instrumentalized to mobilize groups, based upon the so-called theory of primordialism, which posits that myths (of origin, of liberation, of an idealized past) can be very powerful in strengthening the idea of identity. This can equally be applied to religion.

While defining religion, particularly in the field of IR theory, will continue to pose a challenge, an attempt is made in Hatzopoulos and Petito's edited volume. In their chapter titled "In Defense of Religion"[2], Laustsen and Wæver explore how religion might function as a referent object in the theory of securitization. Based upon the Copenhagen School's approach, which works with so-called sectors, it is necessary for the authors to determine what exactly religion is. The discussion on religion and securitization follows below: however, the definition of religion as it is used in this chapter is briefly elaborated here. Laustsen and Wæver attempt to find an appropriate definition of religion in this particular debate, which Fox and Sandler do not articulate as clearly. The former lay great emphasis on the fact that religion should primarily be considered as a separate element, not as a community, or as a societal phenomenon. For this purpose they look in particular at defining the religious discourse. One challenge that arises in defining religion is finding an approach which avoids a definition

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how the Realist debate might evolve, when including the unconventional element of religion.

2 Originally published as Laustsen, Carsten Bagge/Wæver, Ole (2000): In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization, *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29(3), 705-739.

marked by one religion or another. In the end the authors base their definition on Kierkegaard,

> "Religion deals with the constitution of being through acts of faith. [...] Religion is a fundamental discourse answering questions like, why being, why law, why existence? It is difficult not to pose such questions. Answers to such questions have the character of transcendental justification and as such anchor being (and societies)." (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 738)

Vendulka Kubálková's article "Towards an International Political Theology"[3] may offer one theoretical answer to Fox and Sandler's appeal. At the same time, it expands Laustsen and Wæver's proposed definition. She states that it almost goes without saying that religions, when viewed as institutions, are simply socially constructed edifices. And, similar to Fox and Sandler, she points out that in International Relations theory, religion is usually treated as nothing more than a type of organization – both at the national as well as international levels (Kubálková 2000: 682). She warns of two dangers; either being led astray by a solely state-centred approach, which would very closely link states and religion, no longer differentiating between the two but using the term "civilisations" to refer to both: or, alternatively, by an approach which completely separates states and religion (Kubálková 2000: 694-695). Her proposal is to look at religion from a Social Constructivist point of view. She therefore regards religions as:

> "1. a system of rules (mainly instruction-rules) and related practices, which act to
> 2. explain the meaning of existence including identity, ideas about self, and one's position in the world,
> 3. thus motivating and guiding the behaviour of those who accept the validity of these rules on faith and who internalize them fully." (Kubálková 2000: 695)

Here, as with Laustsen and Wæver, religion goes beyond shaping identity: it offers the *raison d'être*. The understanding of religion in this article is based on these two approaches, for this helps better explain the significance of freedom of religion in the USA, as it was briefly described in the introductory remarks. The fundamentals of Securitization will next be briefly discussed, before looking at how Laustsen and Wæver sought to include religion in the securitization framework.

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3 Originally published as Kubálková, Vendulka (2000): Towards an International Political Theology, *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 29(3), 675-704.

Fundamentals of Securitization and Sectors of Analysis

McDonald (2008: 567) aptly summarizes the core of the analytical framework, "securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue." This summary represents the 'mainstream' and basic definition of the theory based on Buzan et al.'s work, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*. Within the fundamental theoretical and epistemological debate[4] on the role of the speech act and the audience's role in deciding whether or not a securitization is considered successful, we do not have to take sides with either the post-structural (Wæver 1995) or more social-constructivist (Buzan et al. 1998) reading of the theory. As our analysis focuses on the reoccurring theme of religion in a range of *securitizing moves* by different US administrations, we are, naturally, especially interested in the *speech act* aspect of the theoretical approach. The predisposition of the audience – a general openness to accepting religion as a relevant issue in foreign policy – is certainly a precondition for the impact of such speech acts.[5]

In Securitization analyses, *sectors* delimit the scope or field of analysis and define the particular characteristics of attempts to securitize an issue within that field. Five sectors are presented and discussed by Buzan et al. (1998): military, environmental, economic, societal and political. These provide the context for the specific dynamics of securitization in a particular area (McDonald 2008: 571) and can be understood as "analytical lenses" (Albert/Buzan 2011: 414; see also: Buzan et al. 1998: 168) that "re-

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4 For an overview of this debate, see: McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007; see also: Balzacq 2005; 2011: 6-7.

5 Another important theoretical debate concerns the question of normativity, i.e.: Is Desecuritization generally desirable, and should researchers – in the spirit of Critical Security Studies (see, for instance: Mutimer 2010) – work to advance this goal? Here, we adopt the stance taken by Buzan et al. (1998, 34-35), whose approach is mainly motivated by the aspiration to comprehend and explain security issues ex-post. The approach also matches our case-selection, leaning towards more or less recent historical cases of the 20th century, and only two contemporary cases of intervention and state-building.

duce complexity to facilitate analysis" (Buzan et al. 1998: 8).[6] While securitization is always about an (alleged) existential threat which puts a particular referent object in danger, "the nature of survival and threat will differ across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form" (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). To that end, sectors serve to identify what form an existential threat takes in each of the areas. Furthermore, sectors help to identify the specific characteristics of typical referent objects in that particular field (Wæver 1999: 335). Wæver (1999: 335) as well as Albert and Buzan (2011: 414) all stress that the decision to include particular sectors in *Security…* is based on inductive reasoning and empirical research, not on a deliberate theoretical decision; i.e., there have been cases in each of the sectors that were observed in reality, cases where one can reasonably apply the securitization approach.[7]

Approaching Religion in Securitization Studies

The following question arises with respect to religion: in which of the proposed sectors – if any – can the subject be located? The answer to this problem depends decisively on what one perceives as securitization of religion. Laustsen and Wæver pursue an alternative approach here. Whereas Buzan et al. positioned the issue of religion in the societal (generating identity) and political sector, Laustsen and Wæver propose a separate sector for studying religion. They propose the case when "[r]eligious discourse does not defend identity or community, but the true faith, our possibility to worship the right gods the right way and – in some religions – thereby have a chance of salvation" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 709). In our analysis, we are not interested in specific religions as referent objects, where religious leaders "claim to be able to speak on behalf of the religious community" (Buzan et al. 1998: 124), nor do we adopt Laustsen and Wæver's approach of "religion as *religion*" 2000, 739). Instead, we focus

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6 For an alternative interpretation of sectors in Securitization Theory, namely as realms of functionally differentiated systems on an international scale, see: Albert/ Buzan 2011.

7 In the same vein, Stritzel (2007: 358) advocates a pragmatic stance, "leaving it to the empirical studies themselves to work out in detail which element of the framework is, when and why, most important."

on *how political leaders bring the topic of religion into play in securitizing moves*.[8]

The first possibility in this regard is the use of religious rhetoric, used to spur dramatization and/or the "politics of enmity" (Williams 2003: 515). Used in this way, religion does not constitute the referent object of securitization itself but is employed by the securitizing actor to strengthen the sense of identity among the audience: 'us' against 'them', 'good' against 'evil'. The referent object is thus located in the societal sector of security as proposed by Buzan et al. (1998).

The second possibility constitutes the principle *freedom of religion* as the referent object. As an internationally recognized human right, this principle is located on the system-level within the political sector. This referent object becomes threatened when the particular principle is attacked or questioned, by either a large international power or a number of smaller powers.[9] Transferred to the empirical case of President Carter's intervention in Afghanistan, for example, it would not be plausible to argue that – as an isolated case – the principle of religious freedom could be seriously threatened by the invasion itself (as it is confined to a small area of the globe). If, however, a big, radically secular (or religious) and ideology-driven power stands behind such a threat, it *does* become plausible. In the case of Afghanistan, this would have been Communism, whose territorial expansion – from the view of its opponents – had to be contained. The same can be argued for the cases of World War II (Fascism), Iraq (Ba'ath Party) or ISIL (transnational fundamental Islam). These 'powers' arguably possessed the capacity to bring the principle of religious freedom to a

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8 In this respect, our approach is closer to one proposed by Mona Sheikh (2014) in response to the Laustsen/Wæver article. She suggests to "make the analytical framework more applicable in various contexts, leave 'the essence' of religion to be defined by empirical investigation and enable important comparative studies on which dimensions of religion are especially disposed to securitisation. Doing so would also be one way of addressing the challenge involved in religion – due to its manifold dimensions – being of cross-sectoral relevance" (Sheikh 2014: 267). Thus, her suggestion aims at re-widening the scope of analysis of securitization studies that address the issue of religion, which had been narrowed by Laustsen and Wæver. In contrast to our research interest, however, she is mainly interested in strengthening "the contribution of securitisation theory to the study of religious violence and doctrinal conflicts" (Sheikh 2014: 252).

9 See also: Buzan et al. 1998: 154, and the corresponding reasoning with regard to system-level referent objects in the economic sector: Buzan et al. 1998: 107.

breakdown, as their worldview is – to say the least – incompatible with freedom of faith. We do not argue that the historic interventions against these powers were enabled decisively because of securitizations of religion or religious liberty, respectively, but we do claim that the latter substantially favored a successful securitization of the overarching "macrosecuritizations" (Buzan/Wæver 2009).[10] Hence, in addition to Laustsen and Wæver's enumeration of "three main ways religion can be involved in international politics" (2000: 720), we propose to complement this list with a fourth point:

> "1. A religious group is considered to be a threat to the survival of the state.
> 2. Faith is seen as threatened by whoever or whatever 'non-religious' actor or process (states, technology, industrialism, modernism, etc.).
> 3. Faith is seen as threatened by another religious discourse or actor." (Wæver/Laustsen 2000: 720)"

And our addition:

> 4. Freedom of religion (nationally and globally) is seen as threatened by a radical ideology (secular or religious).

Regarding the question of relevant securitizing actors, it can be noted that if our object of investigation was a particular religion (with the analysis consequentially located in the sector on societal security), religious leaders would be the relevant actors. However, the suspected securitization of the freedom of religion is located in the political sector, which means that states are the possible securitizing actors who speak for that referent object.

Although we do not follow Laustsen and Wæver's pursuit of studying securizations of religion per se, their approach generates valuable insights for our own research. As we illustrated in the introduction, religion is a fundamental element of US identity. Therefore it has to be stressed that "[i]f the practice of faith is threatened, one's very identity as man (one's being) is endangered. […] Religion deals with the constitution of being as such. Hence, one cannot be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 719). This explains why religion as the referent object is so "easily securitized" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 739), but it also

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10 In this case, the securitizations of Fascism, Communism and transnational fundamental Islamic terrorism are understood as macrosecuritizations, under whose umbrella "the more parochial securitisations beneath [them]" (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 253) are incorporated.

helps to explain why notions of religion or religious freedom can play a significant role in US political leaders' securitizing moves in cases where religion itself is not the main issue.

3. Cases

Franklin D. Roosevelt – The USA enters World War II

In September of 1939 President Roosevelt proclaimed, "I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance(s) and reassurance that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end" (Roosevelt 1939a). The end of the US' policy of isolationism may have been marked by the US entering WWII, a reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's declaration of war shortly thereafter. However, this policy change was enabled by an accompanying change in government discourse earlier on. US foreign policy changed drastically in the initial years of WWII. In our first case, we do not argue that a securitization of (a particular) religion led to this exit from isolationism, but that freedom of religion played a substantial role in the grand securitization of the enemy in WWII.

By 1940, the US had begun to step up its war production and President Roosevelt's rhetoric took on a more concerned and urgent tone, in particular regarding areas threatened by the Nazis and the Axis powers. Roosevelt would regularly address the American public via radio broadcasts, in so-called "fireside chats". In December 1940, one year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt found dramatic words to describe the threat the USA was facing. In his speeches, and in this radio broadcast in particular, he warned of "evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others" (Roosevelt 1940b). The religious references in his rhetoric are significant, for he goes beyond employing the terms good and evil. "It is an *unholy* alliance of power and pelf to dominate and to enslave the human race" (Roosevelt 1940b).

Furthermore, these forces, according to Roosevelt, "try to reawaken long slumbering racist and *religious* enmities which should have no place in this country" (Roosevelt 1940b). They not only put "servants of God in chains" (Roosevelt 1940b), their methods are "the very altars of modern dictatorships" (Roosevelt 1940b). The reference to religious symbolism is striking. By referring to the adversaries as evil powers who put "*servants*

of God in chains" and have *altars* of their own, Roosevelt not only explicitly declares the Nazis and the Axis powers to be evil, he implies that these powers are united in a hateful belief system. This system and the guiding laws for its behavior, according to the definition of religion applied here (see Kubálková above), is therefore nothing but villainous and destructive. "They may talk of a 'new order' in the world, but what they have in mind is only (but) a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope" (Roosevelt 1940b).

In January 1941, the recently re-elected president gave his State of the Union Address, which since then has simply been referred to as the "Four Freedoms Speech." In this speech, Roosevelt, more explicitly than at any point since the outbreak of the war in 1939, beseechingly addressed Congress with a "unique" message. He stressed the necessity and urgency with which the US should focus all its actions "primarily – almost exclusively – to meeting this foreign peril" (Roosevelt 1941a). What is the referent object according to these words? Roosevelt lists four freedoms which the US must secure for the future. Significantly, the second "essential" freedom Roosevelt names, following the freedom of speech and expression, is the "freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world" (Roosevelt 1941a). In light of the abovementioned description of the enemy, which poses such a threat to these freedoms, it is understandable why Roosevelt felt the need to assign religion such significance. Religion here, as Fox and Sandler (2004) state in their definition, serves to unify and at the same time, once again referring to Kubálková's definition, poses the very fundament of the rules according to which every individual – but also the USA as a nation – acts. This second essential freedom therefore affects the very core of each (American) individual's existence.

A few weeks later, in his inaugural speech, Roosevelt's language took on a further degree of gravity. By providing the "highest justification" for an intervention, he is clearly paving the way for US engagement in WWII:

> "If you and I in this later day lose that sacred fire—if we let it be smothered with doubt and fear—then we shall reject the destiny which Washington strove so valiantly and so triumphantly to establish. The preservation of the spirit and faith of the Nation does, and will, furnish the highest justification for every sacrifice that we may make in the cause of national defense. In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy.

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> For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of America. We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country, by the will of God." (Roosevelt 1941b)

Though not explicitly analyzed here, Roosevelt consistently took care to refer to the greater context, i.e. identifying the threat to the values, the freedom of Americans, but at the same time emphasizing the entire world's right to this same freedom, "the rights and dignity of all nations, large and small" (Roosevelt 1941b). In short, Roosevelt, in the period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attacks, had clearly identified a (sacred) referent object, convincing the American public (and Congress) of the existential threat to essential freedoms, which afforded emergency measures and ultimately helped pave the way out of isolationism and into war.

Jimmy Carter – US intervention in Afghanistan

The US intervention in Afghanistan – providing substantial financial and military assistance to the Mujahedeen – was preceded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by the end of 1979. The Soviet decision to fully and actively engage so quickly in the inner-Afghan strife for power came as a surprise to the world public[11] (Schetter 2010: 100). Within a few weeks, the number of Soviet troops in the country had risen to 85,000 (Schetter 2010: 100). The invasion was motivated by the concern for an ideological reorientation or a replacement of the existing Communist-oriented government in Afghanistan. The opposition of the Islamic Mujahedeen was rooted in the actions of the Afghan socialist government, which had taken major steps to deprive traditional and religious elites of power in the years of 1978 and 1979, and further intensified throughout the Soviet intervention in 1980.

In reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter addressed the American nation on live television via a short, nationally broadcasted speech on January 4, 1980. Early in his speech, he explained, "Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer

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11 It should be noted, however, that the invasion itself (in contrast to its exact moment and swiftness) was anticipated, if not provoked by the US government, as statements of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates suggest (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/akbar-ganji/us-jihadist-relations_b_5542757.html).

the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country" (Carter 1980a). The stated contrast between the "heavily armed Soviet troops" and the Afghan people, labeled explicitly as religious ("Muslim") could hardly be starker. The positively connoted notion of religiousness ("fiercely independent") ascribes a generally irenic attitude towards the Afghans, which is repeated as Carter declares the Soviet invasion "a deliberate effort of a *powerful atheistic government* to subjugate an *independent Islamic people*" (Carter 1980a; see also: Carter 1980c). The profound skepticism toward Atheism expressed in this sentence is, at first sight, quite astonishing, given that these words are uttered by the president of a country where the separation of Church and State is a generally recognized principle.[12]

During a White House briefing for members of Congress,[13] delivered on January 8, 1980, Carter describes the invasion of Afghanistan as "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War" (Carter 1980b). He contrasts the invasion with the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, noting that "[t]his, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, *a deeply religious nation*, and the Soviets *invaded it brutally*" (Carter 1980b; see also: Carter 1980d). As in the case above, his reference to the piousness of the Afghan people serves to underline the antagonism between the powerful Soviet regime on the one hand, and the small nation of Afghanistan on the other. By bringing up the issue of religion in the way Carter does here, the latter is constructed as *innocent* and *good*, especially compared with its invader, which is portrayed as a "brutal", thus almost *evil*, empire.

References to religion are also prevalent in other top administration officials' statements. Certainly one of the most prominent examples for this is Zbigniew Brzezinski's short speech to Mujahedeen fighters located at the Pakistani-Afghan border around 1980 (exact date unclear). In his statement, the influential national security advisor to President Carter declares:

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12 Moreover, freedom of religion, as a matter of course, also encompasses the right *not* to believe.
13 As a semi-public event ("a few members of the press have been in" (Carter 1980b)), the question of the audience needs to be addressed at this point. Paul Roe (2008: 620) convincingly makes the case of a duality of the audience in processes of securitization. Besides the 'standard' audience of the general public, he argues that governmental securitizing moves are, in many cases, also directed at national representatives of the legislature. Following his argument, it seems plausible to assume such a duality of the audience in the case at hand, comprising the US public as well as US Congress.

> "We know of [your] deep belief in God, and we are confident that [your] struggle will succeed. That land over there [Afghanistan] is yours. You will go back to it one day, because your fight will prevail and you'll have your homes and your mosques back again. Because your cause is right, and God is on your side" (Brzezinski 1979/1980).

Subsequently, the "Soldiers of God" were provided with financial and military aid in order to support their struggle against the "godless Communists" (CNN 2001).

In a statement on the "Relations with Islamic Nations" held on February 7, 1980, President Carter, in light of the recent developments in Iran[14] and Afghanistan, noted that he had been struck, "personally and in my experience as President, by the human and moral values which Americans as a people share with Islam. We share, first and foremost, a deep faith in the one Supreme Being. We are all commanded by Him to faith, compassion, and justice. We have a common respect and reverence for law" (Carter 1980e). While these comments are not to be seen as securitizing moves, they illustrate the extent to which notions on and of religion colored US foreign policy during Carter's term in office. The stated connection between Islam, one of the largest world *religions*, and the US as a *state*, is remarkable: "On the basis of both values and interests, the natural relationship between Islam and the United States is one of friendship" (Carter 1980e).

Regarding the Soviet Union's violation of the principle of peaceful conflict-resolution in Afghanistan, Carter notes, "Today, in a Muslim country, Russian troops are making war against a people whose dedication to independence is as fierce as their faith. In a time of grave danger and upheaval, I want to reaffirm what I said a few weeks ago: We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and all who share the faith of Islam" (Carter 1980e). The purely positive depiction of religion is particularly significant in light of the Iranian hostage crisis, to which the president alludes in the following paragraph, "Of course there is indignation among Americans today over events in one Islamic country. I share that indignation. But I can assure you that this just anger will not be twisted into a false resentment against Islam or its faithful. I say that with confidence, because a respect for religious faith is so deeply ingrained in the character of the American people" (Carter 1980e).

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14 The Iranian hostage crisis was ongoing during this time.

Ronald Reagan – Support of 'Freedom Fighters' (Reagan Doctrine)

Ronald Reagan was in office from 1981 to 1989, spanning the final decade of the Cold War. During Reagan's presidency, the US was directly or indirectly involved in numerous interventions, geographically ranging from Central Asia to Central America, most of which involved "freedom-fighters." This policy of providing such fighters with arms and funds was anchored in what came to be known as the "Reagan Doctrine." In 1985, Reagan's State of the Union Address established the basis for this doctrine. The following section provides an analysis of the threats Reagan identified in this and other speeches. The term "freedom fighters" already indicates that they are fighting for freedom – which also includes the freedom of religion, as the following analysis shows. This policy was a continuation, but also expansion of Carter's policy of providing support to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. Not only did Reagan continue and intensify efforts initiated by Carter: he also extended the latter's presidential rhetoric. Reagan's most famous speech, given in 1983, is known simply as the "Evil Empire Speech" and offers an unprecedented culmination for the depiction of the Communist threat.

Shortly after assuming office, Reagan clearly described the immediate threat faced by the Afghans, among others,

> "The Afghans, like the Poles, wish nothing more, as you've just been so eloquently told, than to live their lives in peace, to practice their religion in freedom, and to exercise their right to self-determination. As a consequence, they now find themselves struggling for their very survival as a nation. Nowhere are basic human rights more brutally violated than in Afghanistan today." (Reagan 1982a)

In these remarks, presented while commemorating "Afghanistan Day" – a gesture to annually mark US support for Afghanistan's fight against Communism – Reagan not only justifies supporting the Mujahedeen, but at the same time demonstrates what the Communist threat potentially means for any country, including the USA. Three years later, on the same occasion, the language had hardly changed and solidarity was once again underlined. The solidarity which Reagan is calling for is not limited to countries with a Christian majority. It is freedom in general and the freedom of religion in particular, which all countries should unite in defending. In the Evil Empire speech Reagan states, "While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by

armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a *spiritual* one; at root, it is a test of moral will and *faith*" (Reagan 1983a).

This crisis must, according to the American president, be averted in different ways – through prayer and through interventions.

> "[L]et us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world." (Reagan 1983a)

Picking up on this rhetoric, the world is clearly divided into good and evil – and it is the responsibility of the USA to fulfill its role as the "force for good" (Reagan 1985a) against "the aggressive impulses of an evil empire" (Reagan 1983a). This worldwide threat is a recurring theme which Reagan mentions in an address to the American public in 1983. "The events in Lebanon and Grenada, though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support through a network of surrogates and terrorists" (Reagan 1983c). As the US could not intervene everywhere at once, supporting this fight against evil was essential, either by supplying "freedom-fighters" with arms and funds or intervening with US troops, such as in Lebanon or Grenada. In his State of the Union Address in 1985 Reagan therefore declared, "Support for freedom fighters is self-defense" (Reagan 1985a). He continues, "We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth" (Reagan 1985a).

Throughout his presidency Reagan employed two complementary elements in his speech acts. On the one hand portraying the Soviet Union as an evil empire which threatened the entire world with totalitarian darkness, while on the other hand emphasizing the unifying wish for a peaceful world, in which every individual can worship freely. As already mentioned, Reagan sought solidarity and support for countries not only with Christian majorities. Additionally, there is one further element which Reagan repeatedly included – underlining the significance of faith in America – thereby implying that the Soviet threat was targeted at the very core of every American individual's system of beliefs and existence. A final excerpt from his policy-guiding State of the Union Address illustrates this,

> "Tonight America is stronger because of the values that we hold dear. We believe faith and freedom must be our guiding stars, for they show us truth, they make us brave, give us hope, and leave us wiser than we were. Our progress began not in Washington, DC, but in the hearts of our families, communities, workplaces, and voluntary groups which, together, are unleashing the invincible spirit of one great nation under God […] And tonight, we declare anew to our fellow citizens of the world: Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; it is the universal right of all God's children. Look to where peace and prosperity flourish today. It is in homes that freedom built. Victories against poverty are greatest and peace most secure where people live by laws that ensure free press, free speech, and freedom to worship, vote, and create wealth" (Reagan 1985a).

George W. Bush – Invasion of Iraq

Following the US intervention in Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks, Saddam Hussein's Iraq quickly became the next target of the Bush-Administration's so-called *War on Terror*. In the 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush coined the term "axis of evil" (Bush 2002a) to describe adversaries such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In this speech he laid the ground for the intervention in 2003 and the subsequent state-building process.

In Bush's State of the Union Address, freedom of faith, as one of the fundamental principles to be defended by the United States, is explicitly addressed, though no explicit reference is made to a possible intervention in Iraq. "America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and *religious tolerance*" (Bush 2002a; see also: Bush 2002b), Bush's articulated over-arching goal encompassed the spread of this principle, "including [in] the Islamic world" (Bush 2002a). The announced fight against "evil," represented among other cases by Saddam Hussein's regime, is deeply interspersed with religious references:

> "We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. […] And many have discovered again that even in tragedy – especially in tragedy – God is near. In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that *we've been called* to a unique role in human events." (Bush 2002a)

In designating the enemy as an incarnation of an abstract "evil," the president introduces clearly religious motives into the discourse on his admin-

istration's foreign policy. Not only is the US fighting its enemies for national security reasons but it is "God" who has been calling for the US to take on the fight against evil in the world. Bush's commitment to accept this mission is clear, as he expressed in a speech to West Point graduates on June 1, 2002, "We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it" (Bush 2002b).

George W. Bush's State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, reveals that the decision to intervene in Iraq – the operations started on March 20 the same year – had already been made at that point. The speech again includes various religious references with regard to the forthcoming "Operation Iraqi Freedom." The military campaign is not only supposed to serve the goal of security, but also to advance the Bush Administration's self-imposed missionary goal in foreign policy: "As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make this world better" (Bush 2003a). The contrasting juxtaposition of the US as a "force for good" and Saddam Hussein's "evil" rule is brought forward by the president once again. Referring to the regime's use of torture against its own people, Bush declares: "If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning" (Bush 2003a). The divine mission Bush believes himself to be carrying out is spelled out in the closing words of the State of the Union:

> "The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity. We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history. May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America." (Bush 2003a)

George W. Bush's statements reveal his persistent recourse to religiously characterized speech and motives. Yet, his remarks are not primarily marked by references to the *principle of religious liberty* as such, but rather by allusions to Christianity as a particular religion which dominates the president's as well as his audience's worldview. Thus, it has to be noted that the observed approach of including religion in the discourse on foreign policy employed by the Bush Administration is a rather narrow one, compared with the usages of the theme of religion in some of the other cases analyzed in this article.

In spite of repeated assertions that the administration is supportive of religious tolerance, one cannot escape the fact that inherent in the references made to religion is an implied conviction that the United States' role is that of a *moral* leader in the world; a self-proclaimed moral leadership deeply rooted in its identity as a *Christian* nation.

The process by which Iraq was securitized over the course of 2002 did not include references to the denial of religious freedoms or to anti-religious actions by the Iraqi regime[15]. Clearly, however, the constant inclusion of religious rhetoric, as shown above, plays its part in the dramatization of the issues. It would therefore be wrong to conclude that the question of religion is irrelevant in George W. Bush's securitization of the intervention in Iraq. The consistency in the use of language spanning several presidencies has to be noted as well; from "evil forces" (Roosevelt) via the "evil empire" (Reagan), Bush finally arrives at the term "axis of evil".

Barack Obama – the fight against ISIL

President Obama's foreign policy with respect to the civil war in Syria and the subsequent rise, there and in Iraq, of ISIL is characterized by his strong reluctance to use US troops to actively intervene. The drawing of a "red line" (Obama 2012) with regard to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and the ensuing controversy around that statement (see: Kessler 2013) illustrate this point. In the summer of 2014, however, after a series of military victories for ISIL, the American standpoint changed and the US military began its intervention, carrying out airstrikes against ISIL; first in Iraq (August) and later in Syria (September) (CNN.com 2015).

In a statement on August 7, 2014, Obama described ISIL fighters as "Terrorists [that] have been especially barbaric towards religious minorities, including Christian and Yezidis, a small and ancient religious sect. Countless Iraqis have been displaced. And chilling reports describe ISIL militants rounding up families, conducting mass executions, and enslaving

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15 In addition to the cited speeches, President Bush's televised statement on the Iraq War troop surge (another milestone in the history of intervention- and state-building-measures in the country by the US), delivered on January 10, 2007, was analyzed for references with regard to the research question. The defense of the counter-insurgency plan, however, contains no relevant material for the analysis.

Yezidi women" (Obama 2014a). There are mentions of the threatened communities' religious affiliation (Yezidis, Christians), and the context suggests an easy way to construct religion or freedom of religion as immediately threatened (Yezidis fleeing on a mountain, surrounded by the radical fundamentalist ISIL fighters). However, no securitizing moves can be observed in this particular line of argument. The mention of religion is primarily used by the president *to identify the threatened group* as a community. Even while he warns that "ISIL forces below [the mountain] have called for the systematic destruction of the entire Yezidi people, which would constitute genocide" (Obama 2014a), they are otherwise persistently described as "the *civilians* trapped there" (Obama 2014a). In the same way, Obama declares, "[W]hen many thousands of innocent civilians are faced with the danger of being wiped out, and we have the capacity to do something about it, we will take action" (Obama 2014a). For Obama, the situation constitutes a "humanitarian crisis and counterterrorism challenge" (Obama 2014a).

In a statement held two days later, the president explained that "our humanitarian effort continues to help the men, women and children stranded on Mount Sinjar" (Obama 2014b), thus again concentrating on the people themselves rather than religion. In the same speech, "Christians" are indeed explicitly named as victims of ISIL in other parts of Iraq. "Even as our attention is focused on preventing an act of genocide and helping the men and women and children on the mountain, countless Iraqis have been driven or fled from their homes, including many Christians" (Obama 2014b). Yet, this designation is employed again as a means to identify different regional communities in Iraq – in a nonjudgmental way. On September 10, 2014, Obama pledged aid to "*innocent civilians* who have been displaced by this terrorist organization. This includes Sunni and Shia Muslims who are at grave risk, as well as tens of thousands of Christians and other religious minorities. We cannot allow these communities to be driven from their ancient homelands" (Obama 2014c).[16]

Thus, in this case religion is mentioned as an identifying factor of the social groups distinguished in the president's remarks. This approach is remarkably distinct from that of other presidents, whose securitizing moves are either primarily characterized by a specific religious rhetoric (George

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16 A fourth statement, held on 23 September 2014, the day after the US military hit targets in Syria for the first time, contained no relevant references to religion.

W. Bush, Reagan) or by the construction of the principle of religious liberty as threatened (Carter, Roosevelt).

4. Conclusion

Religion deserves an explicit role in the study of IR, especially in Securitization studies. As we have shown, notions of religion or religious freedom were present in all of the analyzed cases that created the scope of action for different US governments to intervene in a range of situations, from WWII to the fight against ISIL. The meaning attached to notions of religion and their importance in securitizing moves varied between the different administrations. In some of the cases, the principle of religious freedom constituted the center of the argument – most notably in the case of Jimmy Carter, and to a lesser degree in the cases of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. In other cases, religious notions are characterized to a greater extent by articulations of Christian references and values, serving to spur the enmity between the US as a 'force for good' and the opposing power. The case of George W. Bush, alongside Ronald Reagan, is the prime example for this type. Religious rhetoric is used as an act of self-reassurance in view of the United States' own identity as a deeply religious nation. A third type appears to emerge with Barack Obama's presidency, as he seems to deviate from both models observed in the other cases.

The question this article raises is whether and how religion can and should be explicitly included in the analytical framework of Securitization. While Laustsen and Wæver introduced one way of doing so (granting the issue of religion a separate sector within the analytical framework), we aimed to explore whether there are other ways, in particular when analyzing a state actor who invokes religion (or the freedom of religion) within the Securitization process. We therefore proposed adding a fourth way of how religion can be involved in international politics, which should therefore be included in the Securitization framework: securitizing moves that are based on the notion that freedom of religion (nationally and globally) is threatened by a radical ideology (secular or religious). In reflecting on the crucial elements of the framework, we can note that religion is routinely brought into play by non-religious securitizing actors in the US, who frequently refer to their country's deep-rootedness in religion. As we have stated above, the receptivity of the audience is probably an absolute pre-

requisite for the success of securitizing moves that invoke religion, and yet studies have shown that religiousness is declining especially among young people in the United States (see Pew Research Center 2015). Whether or not Barack Obama's remarkably (qualitatively) weaker religious references in the case of ISIL in Iraq and Syria are an indicator that this trend is already reflected in the US-leadership's rhetoric remains to be seen. Therefore, it will be interesting to study whether another trend, with regard to national populations' religious affiliations – the growing diversity of faiths – will affect the invocation of religion in the future. The movement from a society dominated by traditional Christian faith towards one with a large range of faiths, including many believers of non-Christian faith as well as growing numbers of non-believers, such as atheists and agnostics, might suggest that the *principle of religious freedom* will move back into the center of attention instead of particular religions.

The cases analyzed can be attributed to the societal and political sectors, not to a separate sector on religion. Laustsen and Wæver have arguably devised one of the most convincing means of including religion in an analytical framework in the field of International Relations. Though we do not limit our analysis to the sacred referent object as they do, their basic idea of including the "sacred" element (i.e. that which relates to the very core of existence) enabled us to uncover an element in US securitizing moves which had been neglected up to now. It was therefore possible to show that (the freedom of) religion did play a role in various securitizing moves in the past decades of US foreign policy.

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Engaging with the "Threat"? Tracing Desecuritization between the UN Security Council and UN Missions

Kerstin Eppert, Mitja Sienknecht

1. Introduction[1]

The implications of the concept of *securitization* for political discourses on violence have been widely debated in Critical Security Studies. The Copenhagen School's initial concept of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998) focused primarily, however, on the discursive processes leading to a securitized agenda. More work, consequently, remains to be done if the implications and consequences of the other side of the coin, a successful *desecuritization*, are to be developed theoretically and empirically established. This paper contributes to this endeavor. It addresses the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and UN missions set up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as political instruments that inherently aim at transferring securitized topics to a political realm (desecuritization). Using the case of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) as a heuristic example to illustrate the empirical dimensions of the argument, it answers two questions: (1) How can UN missions contribute to desecuritization while they themselves are products of a securitization process? (2) How does a constant process of securitization by the mandating organization (the UNSC) create difficulties in "engaging with the threat".

The argumentation proceeds in three stages: First, securitization is applied conceptually to the UN Security Council. Second, it is argued that UN missions under Chapter VII can be framed as desecuritizing instruments. Third, the discussion reflects on the conceptual and empirical impact of the overarching *macrosecuritization* of the "global war on terror"

(Buzan/Wæver 2009; Watson 2013) on both securitization processes in the Security Council and desecuritization at mission level.

Despite an apparent and intuitive thematic connection between global securitization processes and the UNSC's regulatory powers under Chapter VII, the subject has generally been neglected in Critical Security Studies.[2] Scant attention has also been paid to the role of International Organizations (IOs) as actors, mediators and communicating entities at the center of both securitization and desecuritization processes. This is surprising, given that a number of IOs – particularly the United Nations (UN) and its Security Council – deal with "threats to international peace and security". As per its mandate and the special measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN is responsible for monitoring the international system and defining matters of political emergency. Debating certain political topics in the UNSC is already understood as a part of a securitization process that obliges the UN to impose political measures, e.g. a UN mission, in response to the threat. UN missions mandated under Chapter VII are, therefore, a product of a successful securitization process within the UNSC. In this way, the UN is involved not only in the development, creation and adoption of security policies, but also in their reproduction (cf. also Wæver 1996; Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006; Vaughn 2009; Walton-Roberts/Hennebry 2013). A UN mission generally aims to enforce compliance with international normative standards, so as to bring matters back to regular political processes, that is, to desecuritize the political issue in question. The mandate of the UN mission determines the scope of its engagement and defines its level of intervention.

This paper contributes to the theoretical debates in Critical Security Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies (e.g. Jackson 2006; Diez et al. 2008; Shepherd 2008), opening a discussion on the dialectics of hitherto unexplored securitization processes involving the UN Security Council, and the process of desecuritization through UN missions. Bearing in mind the international legal provisions that oblige UN missions to work cooperatively towards strengthening peace and security, it analyzes how UNAMI may have "engaged with the threat" in a case where securitization processes focused on the social relations between political actors, rather than on thematic issues. Methodologically, it integrates sociological and linguistic

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2 In our analysis, we focus on UN missions that are mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which we understand as results of a successful securitization process.

perspectives into an analysis of desecuritization. These perspectives entail an enhanced analysis of the social context, in particular the social and political interrelatedness of topics, speakers and audiences; the differentiation of speech contexts; and possible approaches to the empirical qualification of successful and unsuccessful examples of securitization (Salter 2008).

To answer the research questions posed above, the paper initially reflects on the theoretical concepts of securitization, macrosecuritization and desecuritization. The second section argues for a sociologically grounded concept of desecuritization and expands on methodological considerations for the comparative analysis of instances of securitizing and desecuritization, in the shape of strategies or events in the empirical context. The third analyzes conflicts and tensions that arose from securitizing discourses in the UN Security Council before and during the deployment of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), and their discursive reproduction and deconstruction at mission level, mostly in 2003. The fourth reflects on the implications of the findings for political engagements and UN missions in a global political environment that is strongly impacted by macrosecuritization.

2. The dialectics of securitization, macrosecuritization and desecuritization in the context of UN missions

Developed in the 1990s, the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization still remains one of the most prolific and influential approaches in contemporary Critical Security Studies. The approach argues that *security* has to be understood as a socially constructed concept that is more a "speech act" than an objective or material condition (Buzan et al. 1998). A securitizing actor, for example a government, tries to shift a certain issue from the realm of politics to the realm of security in order to justify the implementation of "emergency measures" (Aras/Karakaya Polat 2008).

For the purposes of Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen School frames the concept of security as "a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such" (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). In Buzan et al.'s approach, the sequence of events in a successful securitization process proceeds as follows. The securitizing actor makes a securitizing move that frames a threat and shapes

the social dimension of the political actors by determining an "Us vs. Them" dichotomy. The move then has to be validated by an audience, which provides the speaker with extra-procedural powers to counter the threat. In cases of securitization by democratic governments, the national population constitutes the audience. The relational component of the concept – the interaction between the securitizing actor and the audience – is decisive.[3] Whether or not securitization fails can only be established at the level of the securitizing move.

With the introduction of macrosecuritization, Buzan and Wæver (2009) further extended the scope of the concept to capture securitization processes in which the friend/foe relationship is structured not by a single actor or thematic issue, but by complex security constellations. As an example of macrosecuritization, the authors refer to the "global war on terror". Here a more or less vaguely determined referent object (Western Civilization, Democracies, etc.), that implies distinct subordinate objects (e.g. states, nations, institutions, ethnic groups, etc.), is exposed to an indiscriminate, existential threat, i.e. global terrorism (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 266). The universalized differentiation of "Us" and "Them" is then used to discursively separate those who support the fight against terrorism and those regarded as supporters of terrorism (the "axis of evil", as George W. Bush called them in his speech on 29 January 2002). Macrosecuritization allows for the alignment of multiple lower level securitizations: for example, the securitization of the potential existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq from 2001 onwards which resulted in the US-led invasion of the country (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 275). To Buzan and Wæver, the scope of the "global war on terror" is comparable to that of the Cold War in that an "overarching securitisation … relates, organizes and possibly subsumes a host of other middle-level securitisations" (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 256). Ap-

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3 The analytical benefit of the securitization approach lies in its more dynamic and ontologically open perspective on security, which paves the way for a more differentiated take on the concept compared to the classical approaches such as neo-realism and rational theories, which take certain conditions of security for granted and have for a long time dominated analysis of it. The constructivist element in the Copenhagen School and the focus on communication through analysis of securitizing speech acts enables researchers to draw a more nuanced picture of how certain political actors successfully securitize particular issues and how important the intersubjectivity of this process is. The aspect of intersubjectivity only becomes relevant, however, in democratic societies where the population is the sovereign and empowers the government (Buzan et al. 1998: 24–25).

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plied to the argument of this paper, the macrosecuritization of the global war on terror—compounded by the attacks of September 11, 2001—has resulted in the elevation of "terrorism" to a subjectified and securitized issue, in response to which extraordinary measures (e.g. war, targeted killings, the limitation of civil rights) are discursively justified and legitimated to "protect" a rather vague "Us".

The concepts of securitization and macrosecuritization go hand in hand with that of desecuritization. Desecuritization means shifting issues out of the sphere of security and emergency back into the normal political bargaining process of the public sphere (Buzan et al. 1998). Through desecuritization, formerly securitized and dramatized issues are brought back into the category of normal political business. Though securitization and desecuritization are epistemologically mutually conditional, however, ontologically they form a dialectical relationship. Hansen emphasizes that desecuritization and securitization are interdependent, that neither concept can exist without its counterpart (Hansen 2012: 531). For the Copenhagen School, however, the concept of securitization "has a (seemingly) superior status" (Hansen 2012: 530) to that of desecuritization. There is no desecuritizing equivalent to the securitizing speech act. "Desecuritisation happens as a result of speech acts, but there is not, strictly speaking, 'a' desecurity speech act" (Hansen 2012: 530). Currently, lack of a conceptualization of desecuritization results in the empirical observation of where the construction of securitization fails, or weakens over time and in substance. To better define the concept, however, the occurrence of desecuritization requires further elucidation. Is it just the fading of the securitization argument in the public imagination, as Salter (2008: 324) suggests? Is it concrete action or a change in the constitution of the securitized object? Can we detect active but possibly hidden desecuritization processes (in, for example, diplomatic moves not open to the public)? Or might desecuritization be a passive by-product of political responses to securitization?

By addressing the issue of desecuritization through the case of the UN Security Council and UN missions, this paper fills a gap in the current field of empirical research and contributes to the further development of desecuritization concepts. The focus here is on tracing desecuritization processes within institutionalized mechanisms of UN missions that are mandated to transform specific dimensions of a securitized context into politicized ones. The approach is guided by the following assumptions: first, the deployment of a UN mission requires a successful securitization process within the Security Council to formalize the mission's mandate in

a resolution; second, UN missions are an institutionalized form of conflict management whose long-term objective is desecuritization, the shifting of securitized issues back into the realm of politics. While it concludes a process of securitization through the definition of a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council simultaneously establishes communication and cooperation with this "threat" by means of the mandated mission. In such cases, securitization in the Security Council and desecuritization by UN missions can be thought of as two poles of the same process. The mission's objective thus is to influence and change the securitized context to ensure compliance with international political norms and expectations.

This intent shapes two central dimensions of the UN mission's engagement: one social, the other organizational-structural.

To succeed with desecuritization, the mission necessarily has to restructure the social dimensions of the conflict, that is, the relation between the parties to the conflict. It needs to engage with the securitized *Other* ("the threat") and reframe the securitized environment by including potential cooperation partners to fulfill its mandate. In other words, the mission needs to depart from the communicative frame within which potential counterparts and partners are constructed as threats and, instead, open avenues for partnership, or at least a minimum of cooperation, with office holders, civil society representatives and the population at large.

Likewise, in order to create a space conducive to this kind of engagement, the organizational-structural dimension has to be addressed. The mission needs to structurally disconnect from the Security Council so that it can move into a partly autonomous space and operate with a high degree of flexibility according to the conditions on the ground. This becomes organizationally possible through structural decoupling processes that unlink the mandating organizational unit from the implementing one (see also Eppert et al. 2015). Accordingly, the UN mission detaches itself from the UNSC and communicates at the micro level; it is therefore understood as a "global micro structure" (Greve/Heintz 2005: 111).

By focusing on IO's involvement in the re-production of securitization and desecuritization processes, this paper takes up a central critique of the securitization approach that relates to the framework's "under-theorization" of social dimensions (the "Us–Them dichotomy") and consequent inadequate reflection of the multidimensionality and complexity of settings in which speech acts and securitization processes may occur. The concept's lack of clear criteria and qualifiers to the different elements of

the sequence, however, has been subject to much criticism and many theoretical additions, some of which concern the conceptualization of desecuritization.[4] In particular, Stritzel (2007), Balzacq (2005) and Salter (2008) provided substantive theoretical additions to the concept that strengthened both the depiction of textual intersubjectivity and the social embedding of securitization processes (Stritzel 2007; McDonald 2008), the reflexivity and co-constitutionality of the relation between speaker and audience (Balzacq 2005) and the interdependence of authority–knowledge constellations, social context and the success of securitization and desecuritization processes (Salter 2008). In contrast to the elaboration of process-oriented, social constructivist contributions to securitization, Oren and Solomon (2015) recently pled for a return to the illocutionary core of the approach. By proposing to refocus on the initial centrality of securitization as an illocutionary act, and reframing it as "ritualized incantations" that redefine the relation between speaker and audience (Oren/Solomon 2015), the authors address a central critique to the unspecific constitution of the audience, and the validation of a securitizing move. Reinvigorating Wæver's claim that "the utterance ["security"] *itself* is the act" (Oren/Solomon 2015: 315), they suggest that securitization is not so much an argument between speaker and audience about the priority and urgency of an existential threat, but that it now consists of "the repetitive spouting of ambiguous phrases such as 'weapons of mass destruction'" (Oren/Solomon 2015: 315). Furthermore, and central to the argument developed here, the authors propose that "the acceptance of this oft-repeated utterance by an audience consists not in becoming 'convinced' or 'persuaded' so much as in the audience echoing the phrase" (Oren/Solomon 2015: 315). The audience thus is not being "performed *to*" but "rather partakes in the production of a 'political spectacle'" (Oren/Solomon 2015: 316). In conclusion, "successful securitisation … may be performed through the collective chanting of a phrase that becomes itself the existential threat it ostensibly refers to" (Oren/Solomon 2015: 316).

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4 Concurring with Floyd (2007) and Knudsen (2001), we further suggest the conceptual untying of normative attributions of good and bad from securitization approaches, as these do not seem to be helpful prior to empirical analyses. As Floyd (2007) and Salter (2008) argue, whether the effects of securitization are desirable or not needs to be analyzed in view of the specific empirical case – value judgments cannot be attributed *a priori*.

This significantly alters the analysis of securitization and desecuritization. Although the argumentation presented here also falls in line with process-focused, constructivist studies, Oren and Solomon's linguistic perspective has explanatory power for the analysis of desecuritization in the UN Security Council and UNAMI. In the case of securitizing moves by the UN, both speakers and audience are part of the Council. In other words, speakers and audience are defined as internal to the social context of the organization. In addition to the constitutive members of the Council (P-5 and the ten elected members), representatives of other countries may ask to be invited to specific sessions, as set forth in the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure (rule 37), and other competent persons may be invited to supply information and thereby assist the Council in its work (rule 39). Regarding the validation of a securitizing move, such as the discussion of a draft resolution under Chapter VII, the audience is comprised of all those speakers admitted to a specific session(s) within which the motion is discussed. In contrast, mission structures have two different audience constellations: one that is directed towards the organizational environment (including government counterparts and other cooperating partners from civil society, international agencies, etc.), and one that is directed towards the inside of the organization. Through the orientation of the mission's mandate, and its structural decoupling from the Security Council, the primary audience for UNAMI comprises the social and political constituency in Iraq that is to be "transformed" by the mission's work. The secondary audience is constituted along internal accountability lines, and therefore includes the Security Council and Secretariat as the apex of the organization, as well as the executives and directorates of other UN organizations and programs involved in the mission's implementation.

3. *Analyzing desecuritization as a social process*

To strengthen the concept of desecuritization, the following line of argument incorporates three central criteria, which address underlying social constructivist, process-orientated and linguistic critiques to Buzan et al.'s securitization approach. These are, first, an appeal for the social contextualization of securitization, i.e. for consideration to be given to the fact that the social and political interrelatedness of topic, speaker and audience define, and are defined by, the social context within which the process takes place. This leads, second, to the call for a clear differentiation and reflec-

tion of the linguistic and semantic specificities of the speech context, i.e. the settings in which securitizing moves take place and their different types of audiences (Salter 2008)—in other words, who can say what, to whom, and under what circumstances. The third relates to furthering the work on empirical qualification and measurement of successful or unsuccessful instances of desecuritization. With this last point in mind, it needs to be stressed that the aim here is not to provide quantitative indicators to measure "success" or "failure", but to take up the critique in the interpretative process later on, and to inductively propose indications for either criterion. While all the critiques mentioned are initially directed towards the specification of instances of *securitization*, they apply equally to the conceptualization and analysis of *desecuritization*. Moreover, they constitute a frame for the comparison of securitizing versus desecuritizing instances to the extent that these can be traced: do the same speech context, social contextualization, and empirical qualifications apply to both instances? Or does desecuritization occur in ways and in situations that securitization cannot?

Social contextualization of securitization

The argument with regard to desecuritization is illustrated here by the case of the UN's reframed engagement in Iraq following the invasion of the country by the US-led alliance in 2003, and extends into the initial years of the implementation of UNAMI. By transferring the concept of desecuritization to the process of international intervention through a UN mission, the social contextualization is provided by the United Nations' organizational constitution more generally, and the regulation of its operations more specifically.

   The organizational framework of the United Nations relates to a specific mandate that structures the epistemic and practical fields to which the organization can speak. It further defines the organization's members, and qualifies potential speakers and audiences, rules for communication, as well as the possible political and procedural consequences of securitization and desecuritization. The organizational context strongly prestructures formal communication, both within the organization (for example between veto powers and members of the G77 or non-state members with observer status etc.) as well as between the organization and its environment (for example, communications with the global public or other inter-

national institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). Furthermore, the organization is highly diversified, with complex hierarchies and a multitude of sub-organizations, such as its specialized funds and programs that cooperate for the implementation of a UN mission. Specially constituted units, such as special representatives, committees, command structures and the like, are responsible for deciding on and managing of extraordinary measures that can be exempted from regular political procedures and decision-making processes for the duration of their mission. These special units or bodies are generally subject to explicit procedural codes and rules, are more or less transparent, and are overseen by responsible internal offices. The process of securitization thus interconnects a complex set of intra- and extra-organizational communicative spaces that thenceforth form the social context within which both Security Council and UN mission operate.

Linguistic and semantic specificities of the speech context

Within the organizational context, the different functions and channels of organizational communication shape the possible speech contexts of desecuritization. Speech, in this instance, comprises not only verbal communications, but—to at least an equal extent—written ones as well. In view of the strongly formalized and project-oriented working culture of the organization, written text may play an even greater role. Furthermore, speech acts are mainly characterized by the specific purposes to which they are connected, i.e. a written report from a special representative (SRSG) to the Secretary General has a specific purpose, structure and language, as does a press release or other document. In other words, speech contexts are characterized by different genres of texts, which, in turn, determine the structure and content of the text that is communicated (e.g. in a UNSC resolution no specific instructions for the work of UN missions can be expected; likewise, documents emanating from UN missions do not deal with the meta-discourse of a given conflict). The analysis of documents and texts thus always requires consideration of the different social settings and contexts related to the text's creation. The production of text may thus constitute "speech" in the organizational setting and, more importantly, constitute a central aspect of organizational practices. Therefore, the practices and contextualization of text production need to be considered in the analysis.

Empirical qualification of desecuritization

To identify desecuritization, the analysis needs to bring together the conditions inherent to speech contexts and the dialectics of securitization and desecuritization in order to ascertain whether one or the other is being produced. The following section traces a process of desecuritization through the negotiation and implementation of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. The results shed light on whether or not and how these elements apply to instances of desecuritization.

While the conceptual approach to desecuritization in UN missions is guided by the theoretical perspective that a UN mission under Chapter VII aims at desecuritization, we define three different scenarios to which a UN mission may contribute. First, UN missions may reproduce securitization by strengthening the friend–enemy juxtaposition (reproduction). In this case, there is a clear discursive connection to securitizing dynamics. Second, the mission may desecuritize by deconstructing securitization and re-politicizing thematic issues and/or the securitized social groups (deconstruction). In this case, the structures that define the threatening "Other" are actively deconstructed and social groups are linked across friend–enemy boundaries. Third, the mission may focus on establishing programmatic objectives that lie *outside* the securitized frame, and allow the mission to work around the social boundaries prestructured by the securitization process (circumvention). Even though, the UN mission is focusing on sectors that are not part of the highly securitized topic and is, therefore, operating outside of the securitized spheres, it initiates a political process that directly or indirectly undermines the justification of "extraordinary measures". From the perspective of the Security Council and a UN mission, successful desecuritization results in the realignment of the securitized issue along international expectations and the completion and phasing out of the mission.

4. Competing processes of securitization and desecuritization: UNSC, UNAMI and the Occupying Powers

The implementation of UNAMI and the desecuritizing focus of the mission's mandate need to be understood in the context of two competing securitization processes: (1) the successful national securitization of Iraq by the US-led alliance that invaded the country, and (2) the UN Security

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Council's securitization of the occupation of Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion.

Before 2003, the US and UK governments (speakers) undertook repeated securitizing moves at the UN Security Council (audience) to win support for a UN-backed intervention in Iraq. By the end of 2002, the securitizing moves within the Council had failed, as a motion for an intervention (or the validation of the moves by the relevant audience) could not be passed. In parallel to the securitizing moves made at the UN Security Council, the US administration proceeded with the implementation of its national security strategy that foresaw the option of military engagement in Iraq. In view of a potential threat from nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in Iraq, this strategy received approval for military action (as a last resort) by the US Senate in October 2002. Outside the Security Council, a national securitization had thus succeeded, addressed first and foremost to the citizens of the United States ("the American people") as the audience, but requesting allegiance from friends and allies, thereby expanding the reach of the process to the later "Coalition of the Willing". The nationally-backed occupation of Iraq by the US constituted a continuation of US foreign policy in the country and, with its focus on the large-scale production of weapons of mass destruction, a subordinate securitization to the macrosecuritization of the "global war on terror".

In response to the US-led invasion of March 2003, the Security Council decided to intervene in Iraq (S/RES/1472), first and foremost to monitor the Occupying Powers' compliance with International Humanitarian Law and to provide humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. Resolution 1472, a predecessor to Resolution 1500, which explicitly formulates UNAMI's mandate, relates to the Council's powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As such, it constitutes a successful securitization of the situation in Iraq—that is, the validation of the securitizing move by the audience within the Council—as it was established in reference to the occupation. The securitization of the occupation and UNAMI's engagement in desecuritization can be viewed as two instances of the same process. The presence of Occupying Powers in Iraq and their continued reproduction of securitization in line with the narrative of weapons of mass destruction structured the social, political and material dimensions of the conflict as it evolved and set the context within which UNAMI operated.

Inscriptions of desecuritization in UNAMI's mandate

Against the normative frames of macrosecuritization and connected sub-securitizations, the desecuritizing mandate of a UN mission needs to be understood as a dialectical process. The elements in UNAMI's mandate that we understand as "desecuritizing" do not directly refer to the "war on terror" but are referenced to the unlawful invasion and occupation of Iraq. The main objective of the mission was to monitor the application of international law, provide humanitarian assistance to the population and work towards the restoration of the sovereignty of Iraq. In this regard, the UN mission moved within a securitized frame within which constructions of threats were reproduced or shifted, depending on the role of the actors involved in the conflict and their perspective on it. (Macro)securitization and desecuritization were thus parallel and, potentially, mutually obstructive processes. While the macrosecuritization of the war on terror was maintained at the global level, UNAMI's mandate needs to be read, firstly, as a demonstration of the UNSC's ability to act in the face of the US' defiance of the Council. Secondly, it can also be read as a summary of the minimum consensus on the Council's fields of action.

The data analyzed here is drawn largely from the Repertoire of the Practices of the Security Council, which provides authoritative documentation of the principal discussions in the Security Council. In the case of Iraq, the documentation shows that desecuritization was approached via two argumentative avenues: one related to ensuring humanitarian support to the Iraqi population, the other to the restoration of sovereignty in Iraq. The two arguments are mirrored in the mandate of the United Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), confirmed in Resolution 1500 (14 August 2003), "to support the Secretary-General in the fulfillment of his mandate under resolution 1483 (2003) in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 15 July 2003, for an initial period of 12 months."

Overall, the Resolution stressed that the UN should play a vital role in the political transition, thereby contributing to an inclusive process of political change in Iraq. The focus on the humanitarian dimension of the Iraqi conflict was reflected in the debates leading up to the negotiation of the initial Resolution (S/RES/1483 (2003)): "During the debate, most speakers welcomed the adoption of a resolution to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Iraq by restarting the oil-for-food program, and noted that its adoption was a positive signal that the Council could return to a

path of unity" (Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2002–2003, p. 674). This was, on the one hand, the lowest common denominator the member states of the Security Council could agree on, and at the same time allowed the UNSC the option of demonstrating its continued capacity for action. Besides these organizational reasons, the humanitarian dimension was one of the few sectors of UN action in Iraq that the US was prepared to tolerate (the work of the IAEA and UNMOVIC were mostly prevented by the Occupying Powers). This aspect needs to be read in view of the constitution of the UNSC, where the US and Great Britain—the two leading powers of the invasion—hold veto power and were consequently in a position to prevent any ex post condemnation of their actions by the Council.

The second point for discussion relates to the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty, which was defined as paramount for the normalization of the political context and therefore the dissolution of securitization. Desecuritization, then, was considered accomplished with the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty and the withdrawal of the Occupying Powers. The restoration of sovereignty was further qualified through the criteria that a sovereign Iraq would be a democratic and inclusive state that respects human rights; would possess no nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; would be fully in charge of its economy (especially its oil reserves); would have normalized its relations with its neighbors; and would not constitute a threat to regional peace and security (S/RES/1483 (2003)).

While the focus on supporting the humanitarian needs of the population was essentially undisputed and uncontroversial, the restoration of sovereignty, and its financing, remained a source of potential conflict with the interpretative power of the Occupying Powers. As will be argued in the next section, defining this area of intervention carried a significant risk of conflict between the UN mission and the command structures of the Occupying Powers.

5. UNAMI's implementation – a trade-off between securitization and desecuritization?

The central question of UNAMI's potential to desecuritize still needs to be answered. The implementation of UNAMI was marked by the macrosecuritization of the global war on terror. Though the latter did not provide the framework for the mission's legal grounding, it significantly shaped the

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social context of international relations more generally. The programmatic work of the UN mission and its wider implementation had little impact on the dynamics of the macrosecuritization, but the presence of international organizations in Iraq more generally did. In particular, the monitoring work of international human rights organizations contributed to uncovering the human rights abuses and cases of torture for which Iraqi security forces and forces of the Occupying Powers were responsible during this period.

As mentioned earlier, the deployment of UNAMI was grounded in the securitization of the unlawful occupation of Iraq. Furthermore, there also was an implicit connection to and interest in the resolution of the alleged existence of "weapons of mass destruction" in the country. Since this latter securitization was connected to the institutional compliance conflict on international oversight and monitoring that dominated much of the Council's work on Iraq in the months preceding the mission's deployment, UNAMI was likely to connect to this securitization in any of the three possible ways mentioned (i.e. reproduction, deconstruction or circumvention). While the two securitizations constituted the framing context for UNAMI, the analysis of desecuritization needs to focus on the two issues that were laid out as legitimizing circumstances for the deployment of the mission as per its mandate, i.e. the UNSC's securitization of the invasion and occupation of Iraq and its concerns about the humanitarian condition of the population.

In what follows, three snapshots of UNAMI's engagement in Iraq are presented to illustrate where and how desecuritizing instances can be found in UNAMI's implementation. The first relates to the extensive assessment process that was initiated by the UN, the World Bank and the IMF from May to September 2003. The second relates to the Madrid Donor Conference that was hosted by the Spanish Government in October 2003 and prepared under the aegis of the UN, which engaged all major international organizations and donor governments, both from the countries of the Coalition and those who had refused to participate in the invasion. Finally, the third relates to the projects implemented under the UNAMI umbrella, which give an insight into the accessibility and inaccessibility of thematic areas in the development of the program and project portfolio of the mission.

Competing instances of securitization and desecuritization in external governance mechanismsFrom May to September 2003, seven major sector-specific country assessments were conducted by the UN, World Bank

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and IMF in Iraq, covering economic, social and political issues, which from then on constituted the baseline for international cooperation in the country. Most assessments were conducted in close consultation with public office holders in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as the "governing apex" of the Coalition Forces, civil society organizations and other representatives of Iraqi society. The documents focused on the longer-term goal of assisting the country in restoring full control over statehood and services to its populations, and were geared towards the planned donor conference in Madrid from October 23 to 24, 2003. The intent of the papers was to deliver a description of the situation in Iraq, in terms that, first, allowed the organizations involved to engage in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and, second, provided context in a way that would prove engaging to donors, i.e. that would facilitate the allocation of financial resources through state parties in bilateral and multilateral constellations.

The assessment process in itself constituted a first attempt of desecuritization. The leading institutions were not engaged in the occupation of the country and had, therefore, space for maneuver. The establishment of a "knowledge base" of the country's reconstruction priorities, as it materialized in the assessment reports, signals that the definition of the international engagement would not be left only to CPA and the Occupying Powers. However, the reports themselves addressed neither the threat of weapons of mass destruction nor any other issues framed in the different preceding securitization processes. The documents were targeted at an unspecific audience of technical experts, financial authorities in donor countries and a wider public and did not deal with the social dimension of the securitization process between the Iraqi government and the Occupying Powers. They thus constituted attempts to desecuritize by reframing the interrelationship between international institutions, the population of Iraq and the future government of the country in terms of cooperation. However, since this happened under the wider control of the CPA, which constituted the interim authority in the country and controlled both physical and political access to it, the desecuritization was paralleled by continuing securitization moves at other levels and in different areas (for example, military combat and counter-insurgency, the control of institution-building and the parallel administrative structures). Furthermore, it is important to note that the US and UN were thought of as closely associated by a number of groups within the Iraqi population. This situation framed the work of international and local UN employees on the ground and increased the

strain on UNAMI staff to dissociate desecuritization from (macro)securitization.

Reproducing securitization through neoliberal frames of international engagementThe Madrid Donor Conference connected directly to the work and decisions of the UN Security Council, as formalized in the three major Resolutions, S/RES/1472 of March 28, S/RES/1483 of May 22 and S/RES/1500 of August 14, 2003. The conference based its decisions on UN SCR 1500 (cf. Conclusion of the Conference Chair), by recognizing the Resolution as the framing rationale for political-normative statements issued, pledges made and partnerships and cooperation agreed. The central call from the Security Council for international financial commitments to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq also points towards desecuritization efforts, by moving international political engagement from a securitized context to one of post-conflict reconstruction and development. The engagement of multiple international stakeholders in a forum that worked on the advancement of economic recovery, health, housing, electricity, infrastructure and especially governance agendas, is part of regular political engagement within international aid structures. Following the conference, UNAMI's role as the caretaker of international financial contributions to Iraq was substantially strengthened as they were allocated to the UN-managed International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI).

However, the details of the framing of the Madrid Conference point to a more complex setting and allow for different interpretations. As a first step to the restitution of Iraqi political autonomy, self-determination and sovereignty, one would have expected the Iraqi leadership to be given the responsibility of hosting the event and setting the agenda. Nonetheless, the maintenance of the securitized frame is indicated by the fact that the conference was hosted by Spain, one of the earliest supporters of the invasion; by an agenda-setting that favored the distribution of bilateral non-bidding contracts during a special private sector event on October 23; and by the appearance of the Iraqi representation as but one of the many delegations to the conference. Very radically, the conference can be interpreted as a performative act, in which participants performed the continued withholding of self-determination from, and refusal of political autonomy to, the Iraqi people by (re-)distributing financial and political decision-making powers among the multilateral alliances and international organizations present. In this situation, the securitization of the actual political setting in Iraq and continued, controversial control over the internal restructuring of the country's political institutions by the Occupying Powers and their apex

body seemed to provide justification for the extended macro-management of internal affairs in Iraq by the international community.

Bridging friend–enemy dichotomies in program implementation

The UN's project portfolio shows that, in addition to the large-scale infrastructure projects of the occupation's early years, numerous projects for institution-building were initiated with ministries and other public institutions (e.g. Support to the Ministry of Planning, Institutional Strengthening of Iraq Supreme Audit Institution, Support to the Independent High Electoral Commission, Capacity-building at the High Commission for Human Rights, etc.). According to interviews with UN staff, however, the scope of engagement with government institutions continued to be clearly framed and restricted by the CPA throughout the period under scrutiny here. The securitizing frame was thus reproduced and also impacted on UNAMI's implementation of its mandate. Additional data suggest that, in addition to these restrictions, cooperation was politicized by the recurrence of sectarian conflicts within the government and among government staff.

Three more issues illustrate the complexity of the competition between securitizing actors and the struggle for desecuritization within the organization, mainly at the policy level. The first relates to the fact that, despite requests made by the Iraqi leadership and UNAMI management after 2009, the UN Peacebuilding Commission never included Iraq in the list of supported countries. This decision highlights the UN's assessment of the (im)possibility of desecuritizing and repoliticizing its engagement in the country at the level of the UN Secretariat given the complex entanglements of macrosecuritization and sub-securitizations. The second issue concerns the long absence of a comprehensive UN-led conflict assessment in Iraq. This would have been an intuitive measure to take in the early years of the UN's engagement, and it would have constituted a specific measure that only the United Nations could have facilitated.[5] A conflict assessment would have entailed openly addressing the conflict potential, both of key national and international actors in Iraq and of unresolved po-

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5 UNDP and the Iraq Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit eventually undertook a Conflict and Development Analysis that was finalized in 2012, but even then still constituted an internal document.

litical issues (such as disputed internal boundaries and related questions of political administration, self-determination and participation, etc.). The repoliticization of these issues and the public discussion of the same would have constituted another step towards effective desecuritization.

Finally, a third issue that highlights the difficulties of desecuritization concerns the UN's uneven engagement with and recognition of religious leaders. As the initial international approach to Iraq was infused with the ideology of neoliberal state building, the need to address the deep divisions between Iraq's religious communities was not recognized or even mentioned. Again, the recognition of these divisions would have supported the repoliticization of social segregation and undermined their instrumentalization in securitization processes.

7. Conclusion

The analysis of UNAMI's different implementation processes has demonstrated the mission's active role in the securitized context and the restriction of its freedom of action by the decision-making authority of the Occupying Powers. With respect to the three different scenarios of possible behavior by UN missions within a securitized context (reproduction, deconstruction, circumvention), it is possible to conclude that UNAMI was initially subordinated to the framework established by the CPA. By default, and by supporting the normative work of the Occupying Powers (for example the constitutional process in Iraq or the preparation of elections), UNAMI therefore effectively reproduced securitization. By focusing on the humanitarian dimension and on the creation of infrastructural programs, UNAMI's room for maneuver consisted largely of what the CPA left to it. The mission therefore contributed to desecuritizing the situation in Iraq by shifting decision making on major programmatic and financial engagements in the country to the international sphere, but failed to directly address the conflict issues identified and dealt with in the UNSC (circumvention). Meanwhile, UNAMI's contingent mandate, the production of knowledge via macro-economic assessments and international coordination processes (Conference of Madrid, IRFFI-Management) enabled new actor-constellations and possibilities of cooperation, thus facilitating instances of desecuritization. Such ventures outside of the securitized framework provided space for desecuritized communication to emerge, in which actors were able to shift topics from a securitized to a more techni-

cal level (e.g. advisory boards on economic reconstruction), or to a more personal one (interaction with civil society organizations on the micro level). Country-specific advisory processes and personal contacts between the UNAMI staff and representatives of civil society (managers, consultants with Iraq-specific knowledge, civil society networks) generated additional context-specific knowledge possessed by no other organization or authority on the ground.

Viewing "desecuritization from within" as another possible development, the first Iraqi-led and -owned elections took place on January 31, 2009 (Repertoire 2008–09: 6) and constituted an important step towards the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. Other desecuritizing moves were made by Iraq in its joining of the international non-proliferation regime and compliance with other disarmament treaties (Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA) (Repertoire 2010–11: 1). This integration can be regarded as the communicative inclusion of Iraq into the structures of the world-political system. By the end of 2011 (18 December 2011), US forces had withdrawn from the country: an important cornerstone in Iraq's history which marked the complete reinstatement of Iraq as a sovereign state (Repertoires 2010–11: 11) and thus, in this sense, a successful desecuritization of previously securitized topics on the macro level. Yet, as shown by the evolution of the political situation in Iraq, and especially the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a counter-narrative to the re-engineered state of Iraq has produced its own securitizations and responses at the international level.

In line with this argumentation we can conclude that UNAMI, in its function as a global microstructure managed to open programmatic entry points for desecuritization by engaging with issues outside the macrosecuritization. It repoliticized communication on Iraq at the international political level within the space that both the CPA and the UN Security Council defined within its mandate.

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The 'Politics of Protection' and Elections in Trusteeship and International Administration. The Cases of Cameroun and Kosovo. [1]

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> *"Mon devoir est de tout mettre en ouvre pour ramener le calme dans les esprits et pour assurer la sécurité des citoyens [...] La France vous aidera, comme elle vous a aidés, mais elle ne peut se passer de votre concours, de la collaboration active de toutes les populations camerounaises, d'une prise de conscience par vous-mêmes des intéréts supérieures du Cameroun." [2] (High Commissioner Xavier Torré Communiqué, 9.7.1958, ANOM DPCT // 43)*

> *"This is a defining moment for Kosovo, and I call on all local political leaders and representatives of civil society to ensure that the upcoming election campaign is free of violence. While the majority has certain responsibilities towards the minority communities, the latter also have a crucial obligation to participate in the UNMIK-led election process. It is imperative that all communities participate in the election [...]." (Kofi Annan, S/2001/926)*

1. Introduction

Over the course of the 20th Century, International Organizations repeatedly entrusted external actors with the task of building new democratic states after colonial rule or war. It was expected that, for a limited period of time, the trustees would guide the relevant societies, guarantee peace, ensure public order, and fulfill a "mission civilisatrice" (Paris 2002) – a benevo-

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1 We want to thank Anne Menzel, Miriam Bach, Stephen Foose, and Thorsten Bonacker for comments. In this paper the following ways of spelling are used: Cameroun for the territory under French administration, the Cameroons to refer to the territory under British administration (Le Vine 1964; Terretta 2010).

2 Translation by Maria Ketzmerick: "My duty is to do everything in my power to calm down the minds and to ensure the security of citizens […] France will help you as it helped you before, but it cannot do this without your help, the active collaboration of all Cameroonians, and some awareness of superior interests of Cameroon."

lent manifestation of external rule. Though trusteeships were mandated against the background of civil wars and the potentially violent process of decolonization (Newman 2013), a peaceful transformation was nonetheless envisioned.

For some time, scholars on statebuilding and peacebuilding were reluctant to draw parallels with historical cases of territorial administration in the era of decolonization. The terms "trusteeship" and "protectorate" had perceivably been loaded with negative connotations due to their association with late imperialism (Berdal/Caplan 2004; Ayoob 2004; Fearon/ Laitin 2004; Caplan 2007; Paris 2010). Only recently has some attention been directed to the recurring patterns of external intervention, and the continuities and legacies of territorial administration throughout the 20th Century to the "new interventionism" (Doyle/Sambanis 2006) of the 1990s (Wilde 2001; Wilde 2010; Duffield 2007; Everill/Kaplan 2013; Skinner/Lester 2012). From a broader, historically-informed perspective, we still lack in-depth comparative studies on the mechanisms of trusteeship and state- and peacebuilding. Both areas need to be re-evaluated with regard to their distinct, yet not altogether dissimilar patterns of intervention, which mirror the *longue durée* of relations between the Global North and South (Burbank/Cooper 2011; Chakrabarty 2007; Mbembé 2001; Osterhammel/Jansen 2012; Richmond 2014).

In this paper, we draw on the securitization framework in order to analyze forms of trusteeship in two historical constellations – (1) decolonization and (2) the aftermath of the Cold War (Bigo 2002; Buzan et al. 1997). We suggest that trusteeship be understood as a "politics of protection" (Huysmans 2006) in which external trustees legitimize their statebuilding agenda via the claim to secure and protect evolving states and their citizens. Elections have been chosen as empirical focus areas (or *sites of protection*) within two cases which represent the distinct historical constellations: UN-mandated French Trusteeship in Cameroun from 1946 until 1960, and Kosovo under International Administration from 1999 until 2008 (United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK). [3]

As we will show, the concept of the politics of protection allows us to conduct a case-sensitive exploratory empirical analysis of the elections in

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3 Both cases are part of a broader qualitative-comparative framework of a research project at the DFG Collaborative Research Center/Transregio 138 "Dynamics of Security" at the University of Gießen, University of Marburg, and the Herder Institute Marburg: http://www.sfb138.de/index.php/en/ (19 June 2017).

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Cameroun and Kosovo. The comparative perspective on forms of trusteeship via *situated agency* and specific *sites of protection* will enable us to identify continuities as well as discontinuities of discourses and practices of external rule. The research design is grounded in the method of structured-focused comparison (George/Bennett 2005) of in-depth cases studies.

According to the rationale of trusteeship, democratic elections should serve to legitimize future independent statehood, establish party competition as a non-violent process and procedure, and teach citizens to participate in a democratic order. Furthermore, elections should prove the resilience of the new order in the face of recent histories of war and conflict, introducing a radical break with the past.

Based on the theoretical framework of securitization, original documents have been analyzed regarding the French Administration of Cameroun and the UN-Administration of Kosovo. For Cameroun, the analysis is focused on the elections of 1956 and is based on primary sources from the Archives d'Outre Mer in Aix-en-Provence, France, and the *United Nations Archives and Records Management* (ARMS) in New York, United States of America. More specifically, the analysis targeted election reports, security reports, public statements of the trustees, press articles, and the "Fiches quotidiennes".[4] The analysis of the first Kosovo-wide elections in 2001 rests mainly on a content analysis of public statements by UNMIK (UNMIK Press Briefings, UNMIK Press Releases), UNMIK legislative acts (Regulations, Administrative Directions), and UN Security Council Reports.

The guiding questions of the empirical analysis are: Which threats were identified by the trustees in their discourse? How did the trustees describe and frame the threats? Which practices were introduced to counter the threats? How similar are discourses and practices in both forms of trustee-

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4 Within the research process documents from the respective period have been reviewed, specifically used were the elections reports (for accounts of depositions, see: FM DPCT // 13-15), the weekly security report to the Ministry of Departments D'outre mer (FM DPCT // 23-50), and documents on the administration of the territory (FM DPCT // 3-6). Furthermore petitions by Cameroonian activists, tracts, press articles, and letters were considered in order to understand the environment and dynamic of the election processes (FM DPCT // 26, 17-19). The retrieved documents are showing the administration's logic of external administration, even though some of the documents are confidential in the first place, but providing the respective background of the public discourse.

ship? We then present our findings in four empirical categories, as derived from the qualitative content analysis of key documents: 1) Access to the elections, 2) protection of the election campaign, 3) the threat of violence, and 4) the presentation of the elections after the polling day.

Our explorative comparison reveals the importance of the social construction of security for externally-led statebuilding. In both election processes, the trustees were indeed engaged in the politics of protection. They refer to the protection of various referent objects (minorities, peace, order). In the discourse, the importance of peaceful relations, reconciliation, or a "better future" are ubiquitous. The practices in Cameroun and Kosovo – as well as the discernible intentions behind them – were focused on stability and entailed acts of silencing, violence, and the exclusion of opposition. In the following section we will discuss the concept of the *politics of protection* and we introduce the two forms of trusteeship in decolonization and after the Cold War. Following this, the empirical analysis is presented, followed by a short conclusion.

2. *The politics of protection and trusteeship in Decolonization and Post-Conflict Societies*

The interrelation of statehood and security manifests itself in the claim by a given state to protect its territory and citizens against external and internal threats via its monopoly on violence. While orthodox understandings of security in the literature tend to embrace the "focus on the duty of the state to protect its citizens and the national territory" (Huysmans 2006: 1)[5] from objective threats, critical security analysis instead focuses on "a widened security studies agenda that starts from the assumption that insecurities are socially and politically constructed through processes of representation" (Huysmans 2006: 5) and "security agencies and their policies actively contribute to transforming phenomena into security questions" (Huysmans 2006: 4). Jef Huysmans concept of the "politics of protection" can be seen as part of a wider complex of securitization theories and frameworks (Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2013) which focus on claims by state actors and agencies to protect citizens against perceived threats,

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5 On the relation of monopoly of force and statebuilding, compare, Tilly 1992, Duffield 2001, and Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010.

thereby legitimizing certain policies. For Huysmans, related studies should "unpack the politics of protection by looking at political agency in specific sites and/or in relation to specific policy questions" (Huysmans 2006: 15), the *site of protection*.

Though trusteeship administrations were not governments of a sovereign state, they were basically responsible for all executive, legislative, and even judiciary functions of a state. The link between trusteeship and the politics of protection is constituted here: We assume that, in the course of state transformation and building, the respective trustees engage in discourses and practices to protect the future state and its citizens from specific internal and external dangers and threats – in much the same way as do governments of sovereign states. These internal threats can be political instability, war or violence, weak economic performance, and the uncivilized behavior of citizens; external threats could be unstable neighboring countries or transnational organized crime.

How can we characterize the two constellations of trusteeship in the eras of decolonization and Post-Cold War?

After World War II the United Nations established an International Trusteeship System to oversee the process of decolonization in former League of Nations mandate territories; this system was legally covered by chapter XII of the UN Charter, and it was designed to facilitate the transition to self-government and lead to independence of trust territories (Jacobs 2004; Art. 75 UN Charter). According to article 76 of the UN Charter, the Trusteeship System's aim is "(a), to further international peace and security; (b), to promote the *political, economic, social, and educational advancement* of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their *progressive development towards self-government* or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement; […]". The Trust Territories and their respective administrations were supervised by the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship Council was made up of the five standing members of the Security Council, and the same number of members of the General Assembly (Art. 86, UN Charter). The Trusteeship Council was authorized to examine and discuss reports from the Administering Authority on the political, economic, social and educational ad-

vancement of the peoples of Trust Territories and to examine petitions from and undertake periodic and other special missions to Trust Territories (Art. 87, UN Charter). The Council suspended operations in 1994, with the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory. The specific tasks and administrative duties are regulated in each individual trusteeship agreement.

In comparison to the UN trusteeship system, neo-trusteeship and international administrations after the Cold War evolved according to a more complex process, without a definite legal source. While the UN had brief early experiences in territorial administration,[6] the development of international administrations is linked to the new interventionism of the 1990s. Faced with a growing number of internal conflicts and civil wars, the "UN´s agenda for peace and security thus rapidly expanded" (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 10). The famous "Agenda for Peace" (1992) of the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali paved the way for resolving conflict and more active peacebuilding. Alongside the traditional first generation peacekeeping, mostly based on Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, there evolved a far more ambitious group of *second generation*[7] operations which relied on the consent of the relevant parties. But this was then followed by an even more ambitious and intrusive group of *third generation*[8] operations under Chapter VII mandates (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 11). The mandates of International Administrations and external presences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East-Timor were third generation Chapter VII mandates (Zaum 2006: 463);

> "Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the right to take all necessary measures to maintain or restore international peace and se-

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6   "The United Nations first exercised territorial administration in the 1960s, asserting various administrative prerogatives in the Congo between 1960 and 1964, and administering West Irian for seven months between 1962 and 1963." (Wilde 2001: 586).

7   "[…] multidimensional operations that involve the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements designed to build the foundations of a self-sustaining peace (…). In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict." (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 14)

8   "[…] „peace-enforcing" – effectively war-making – missions are third generation operations […].[…] the defining moment of „third generation" operations is the lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate […] " (Doyle/Sambanis 2006: 14-16)

> curity, even without the consent of the affected states […]. This has been understood to include the right to assume the governance of a specific territory under Article 41 of the Charter." (Zaum 2006: 461)

Though the mandates gradually differed, the underlying goals were comparable: to prevent state "failure" and war (Call 2008), to "build" a new state (Wesley 2008), and to design a new liberal democracy (Zürcher 2011). It was intended that, after a certain period of dependency, local ownership would be realized (Donais 2009) and external actors would depart. Finally, a new independent state would take its place in international society.

Though very distinct patterns and agents of trusteeship are visible in both historical constellations, we nonetheless argue here that the general aim of both forms of trusteeship is similar – the formation or building of *stable new independent and sovereign states*. Granted, during decolonization the image of a "proper" state was influenced by traditional theories of Western modernization (Darwin 1999; Newman 2013), whereas such images have generally been coloured by neoliberal thinking in the Post-Cold War era (Newman et al. 2009). But despite these differences, both models share core features; a democratic state with clear territorial boundaries, a clearly defined state population, a functioning state administration, economic prosperity, and a state monopoly on violence. To guarantee a "successful" transformation, the external actors assumed the role of "protector" over the relevant polity.

3. Empirical Analysis: Elections in Cameroun and Kosovo

Case Introduction: Cameroun

The territory of Cameroun was colonized by Germany in 1884, in the context of the 19th century imperialist partition of Africa. After World War I, France and Britain divided the territory under a League of Nations mandate, which in 1946 was replaced by a UN Trusteeship mandate (Bayart 2013; Joseph 1977)[9]. Despite this specific international status, the French

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9 During the Second World War gaulliste troops fought also in West Africa, yet the French army recruited Camerounian soldiers also for Europe. According to Deltombe et.al (2011). in the course of the Second World War more than a thousand Camerounian soldiers were recruited, additionally more than 10 000 in the arms

Camerouns (and French Togo) were incorporated according to the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic and treated as "regular" overseas departments and colonies (Atangana 1997; Le Vine 1964). Within the trusteeship agreement, only structural matters of bureaucratic organization and responsibility were considered, but the importance of the trusteeship system for securing peace and public order were emphasized.[10] The period of trusteeship was beset by political and economic shifts, triggered mainly by decolonization processes elsewhere and massive French investment aimed at developing and modernizing the country (Atangana 1997: 83). In addition to the trusteeship agreement, the accords of Brazzaville in 1946[11] and the new French constitutions had implications for the evolving political system in Cameroun. These related specifically to the organization of the trusteeship and connection to the French political system, but they were also of economic significance (Le Vine 1964: 133).

Already in 1948, the first radical nationalist party, "L'Union des Populations du Cameroun (Union of the Populations of Cameroun, UPC) was founded in Douala. The UPC's major goals were independence under the terms of the United Nations and reunification with the British Cameroons. A decree by the French administrators dissolved the UPC in July 1955. This move was typical of the politics of protection, and the UPC considered it a violation of the Trusteeship agreement, while later scholars have seen it as a catalyst for the violence that ensued (Terretta 2013).[12] The stat-

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industry. In the interwar period especially the threat of the return of the Germans was communicated by the French administration (Joseph 1975).

10 As it stated, for instance, in article 3: "L'autorité chargée de l'administration sera responsable de la paix, du bon ordre et de la bonne administration du Territorie." and "Elle sera responsable également de la défense dudit territoire et veillera à ce qu'il apporte sa contribution au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité interantionale." (Trusteeship Agreement, COAM DPCT // 3)

11 The Brazzaville Conference was organized by the Free French Forces in January 1944, represented the perspective of colonial administrators of the overseas African territories. According to Le Vine, the conference „maintained the traditional assimilationist aims of French colonial policy, recommending administrative decentralisation as a policy and political assimilation as a goal." (Le Vine 1964: 134).

12 Concerning the ban of the UPC, Mbaku (1995) argues, "the banning of the UPC was important for French commercial interest in the colony and for indigenous political opportunists who could now help design a constitution that would provide them with opportunities for post-independence rent-seeking" (Takougang 2003: 428).

ed reasons for the passing of the act included violent incidents in several places, such as in Douala and Yaoundé, in assemblies and gatherings all over Cameroun, and homicides (Proposition de Loi, ANOM FM DPCT // 37, Atangana 1997: 90; Le Vine 1964: 286). After the UPC's dissolution in 1955, some activists went into exile, while others turned to underground (*maquis*) violence and participated in violent resistance in southern Cameroun. Thousands of petitions were registered by the UN Trusteeship Council and several UPC members presented their claims directly to the different UN bodies. In exile, UPC activists connected with, and mutually supported, other resistance movements in Ghana or Egypt that were also opposed to external rulers, while Cameroun society itself was rocked by UPC-organised political mobilization, violent resistance, and the destruction of property (Awasom 2002: 7; LeVine 1964: 152). At the same time, other political parties or groups were formed, some of them pro-UPC and opposed to French trusteeship or anti-UPC and in favor of French trusteeship (LeVine 1964). This was reflected in the first elections to the French National Assembly (June 1951) and Territorial Assembly (March 1952).

In 1956, France introduced the "Loi-cadre (Deferre)"[13] as a political concession towards self-government in French territories (Awasom 2002; Le Vine 1964: 157f). One year later, in 1957, the "Statute du Cameroun" were approved by the Territorial Assembly. These envisioned major infrastructural changes, yet reunification and independence remained the High Commissioner's responsibility (Atangana 2010: 73). To pave the way for future independence, several decrees made new elections for the local assembly a necessary prerequisite before further steps could be taken. National elections, based on universal adult suffrage, were thus scheduled for 23 December 1956 (Terretta 2013). These elections have never been analysed as part of an externally-led state building process in conjunction with violence. Still, several scholars (such as Terretta (2010), Joseph (1977), Fanso (1999), Takougang (2003) and Le Vine (1964)) have covered Camerounian nationalism during the trusteeship period, thereby also ad-

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13   The Loi-cadre was a reform act and marked a transition to a new policy towards the departments overseas. The background was the growing independence movement in the colonies; still, the idea was to build up a French Union. In contrast to other overseas territories, Togo and Cameroun could vote on passing the loi-cadre in April 1957 and December 1956. They were also valid in the trusteeship territories through the second chapter in their capacity as „associated territories" (Atangana 2010: 36; Terretta 2010).

dressing institutional changes, political shifts, and elections within the period of transition to independence.

Case Introduction: Kosovo

The International Administration in Kosovo was established during the summer of 1999. Following the war between NATO and Yugoslavia, and the ensuing conflict between the mostly Kosovo-Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Yugoslavian forces, the United Nations Security Council achieved a compromise in Resolution 1244. While Kosovo officially remained part of Yugoslavia, later Serbia, the multidimensional United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) took de facto control over all governmental responsibilities. Local actors held no formal positions of authority.

The early phase of the mission was appropriately described as an "emergency phase" (King/Mason 2006: 49-92), which included a number of challenges, such as the provisioning of hundreds of thousands of refugees, establishing basic services, and security. In 1999 and 2001, the Administration was unable to prevent inner-Albanian killings of political opponents and violence against members of minorities, mostly Kosovan Serbs (Boyle 2010: 198-99). Yet with the establishment of an international police force as well as a new Kosovan police force, and through the integration of various militant factions into the political process, the security situation improved. To protect minorities and safeguard the inclusive, nonviolent political process of statebuilding, UNMIK decided to transfer some political responsibilities after democratic elections (Brand 2003). Nevertheless, stability remained a particularly pressing concern for the Administration: "Within UNMIK, there is an increasing tension between those who regard respect for human rights and the rule of law as central to the institution-building aspect of UNMIK's mandate, and those who see this as secondary to the over-riding concerns of peace and security" (Chesterman 2001: 1).

The first Municipal elections in Kosovo under the trusteeship were held in fall 2000 and marked the beginning of the process of "democratization without a state" (Tansey 2007). UNMIK was concerned that the municipal elections could weaken the legitimacy of Resolution 1244 and the Administration. "UNMIK feared that as all the parties - with the exception of Serb political entities who were not contesting the elections - were advo-

cates of independence, the municipal elections would be a de facto refer-endum of independence, and would be used to pressure UNMIK and the international community into conceding immediate independence rather than contribute to creating an effective post-conflict governance. Indepen-dence at this stage was an impossible demand (…)" (Taylor 2002: 84). Se-curity concerns overshadowed the elections: "Some monitors felt that the elections would inevitably be overwhelmed by inter- and intra-community violence" (Taylor 2002: 87; compare UNSC 2000: 3-5). However, the 2000 elections, with over 80% turnout and only few violent incidents, were widely considered a success (Taylor 2002: 112).

In 2001, the unresolved status of Kosovo and the lack of real power-sharing between international and local actors put more pressure on UN-MIK. Furthermore, regional security was severely threatened by outbreaks of violence in neighboring Macedonia between spring and summer 2001, "What Kosovo added to the internal conditions of Macedonia were the in-dispensable elements of war-making – arms, logistical support and strate-gy. The failure of NATO to disarm and disband completely the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] allowed a major security threat to develop at Macedonia's doorstep" (Hislope 2003: 130). Therefore, UNMIK agreed to create new Provisional Institutions for Self-Government (PISG) in Kosovo after Kosovo-wide elections in fall 2001. Two years after the war, the elec-tions were supposed to make possible a "new future" (Fokus Kosovo, 2001).

Two factions dominated the political landscape in Kosovo-Albanian: the parties that evolved from the KLA (PDK and AAK) and the LDK, which was led by Ibrahim Rugova and had been the dominant party before the war (Taylor 2005: 440-441). There was considerable tension between the PDK and LDK between 1999 and 2000 which threatened a stable and peaceful Kosovo (Cohen 2000). Additionally, a huge effort was made by UNMIK to encourage the participation of the Kosovan Serbs, who were an important reference object of protection. Having boycotted the munici-pal elections in 2000, they agreed to join the 2001 election established in a common party list, Povratak (Taylor 2005: 452). In overviews of Kosovo's recent history and in comparative studies related to statebuilding and de-mocratization processes in Kosovo, the November 2001 elections are of-ten briefly discussed (Narten 2009; Tansey 2007; Yannis 2004), but only rarely subjected to detailed analysis (Taylor 2005).

Access to elections – code of conduct

Cameroun

The issue of elections was much debated during the entire mandate period, and the importance ascribed to elections is apparent in many documents. For instance, the High Commissioner Messmer claimed, "L'octroi du droit de vote municipal est l'un des premiers et des plus essentiells aspects de la démocratie"[14] (Messmer, confidential Note: The Aftermath of Cameroon in municipal elections, FM DPCT // 14). Active suffrage was granted to every Camerounian who registered to vote.

The dissolution of the UPC in 1955 had a major impact on the escalation of violence during the elections, as many scholars have shown (Terretta 2013). The French administration depicted this organization as a communist, terrorist, rebellious, violent threat to the public order (among others: Rapport Politique, ANOM FM DPCT // 46) and framed its activities as violent and antagonistic to the will of Cameroun society, while insisting that only the French Administration had the means and power to guarantee a calm transition.[15] In the context of framing the UPC as rebellious, the conflict in Algeria was presented as one potentially threatening scenario for Cameroun's future. As the conflict escalated, many political flyers distributed by the UPC referred to anti-colonial acts as a mobilizing factor in their fight against external rule: for instance, the officer F. Aerts, "Nous risquons d'aller allègrement vers une petite Algérie…" (Deltombe et.al 2011: 247)[16].[17] In press articles, the UPC was said to damage economic investment and the prospects for future independence while also

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14 Translation by author: "The allocation of local suffrage is one of the very basic but essential aspects of democracy."

15 In another note on the upcoming elections, the UPC is seen as the only threat to the peacefulness of the elections, "les masse s'y sont souvent laissés prendre car leur éducation civique est nulle" (Translation by author: "the masses can be taken easily to the left, since their civic education is zero.") (Messmer, Note confidentielle: Le Cameroun au Lendemain des elections municipales, FM DPCT // 14).

16 Translation: "We risk going briskly towards a small Algeria…"

17 Furthermore, "Sans remonter jusqu'à l'example indochinois, sans aller chercher des modèles en Algérie, jetons les yeux sur le Cameroun où la consience d'etre en guerre a permis de très bonnes réalisations." (Deltombe et.al 2011: 247)., Translation: "Without going back to the example of Indochina , without seeking models in Algeria, cast our eyes on Cameroon where consciousness of being at war has allowed very good achievements."

harming French colonial citizens, who could be protected only by the French authorities.[18] In reaction to their exclusion, the UPC used boycotts and acts of sabotage to influence the election campaign. Interference by the French administration in local and national political processes – for example, through support of certain politicians and sidelining – has also been linked directly to UPC violence.

Kosovo

As mentioned above, UNMIK and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) had the chance to prepare for the 2001 Kosovo-wide elections by way of Municipal elections that were held in October 2000. Voters' registration, party registration, a newly established Central Elections Commission, and a new code of conduct for electoral campaigning were all rather successfully "tested" in 2000 (see UNMIK/REG/2000/13, UNMIK/REG/2000/16, UNMIK/REG/2000/21) (Taylor 2002). However, the 2001 elections were held in a different context. In comparison to elections in 1999 and 2000, some real political responsibilities were at stake for Kosovan actors. A new *Constitutional Framework for Self Government* had been promulgated in May 2001 (six months ahead of the election date in November) that defined the responsibilities for the new PSIG. While elections were inevitable, it was intended that UNMIK would repress any hopes for a future

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18 According to a note "Sur les événement actuels au Cameroun" on 31 December 1956, in which Daniel Doustin, the responsible for South Cameroun, elucidates his opinion on the UPC and potential measures against the party. This includes: to define a policy against UPC by founding a party that also aims at independence respectively the same political goals but without acts of sabotage, involve the population in the fight against the terrorist organization, to put the action against the rebellion on the top level of the national agenda, and highlighted the importance of streamlining all security units to guarantee a fast information flow. Furthermore, to use radio and press to inform the public immediately on the crimes and financial costs of the rebellion, use anti-propaganda and psychological means, organize an auto-defence and build up militias on every local level, arrest all potential UPC members, and an explanation for the UN should be prepared to explain the flood of petitions originating from massive influence and pressure on the part of the UPC. Foremost to mention is, that he presents this all as a risk to a potential Algeria (CAOM FM DPCT // 47). Furthermore in the security reports the concerns of Europeans are mentioned who were afraid of decreasing businesses due to violent incidents (21.1.1956, ANOM FM DPCT // 30)

"Albanian" Kosovo that would be independent from Serbia. The Constitutional Framework explicitly recognized "the need to fully protect and uphold the rights of all Communities of Kosovo and their members" (UNMIK/REG/2001/9). As a consequence, UNMIK and the government of Serbia signed a so called *Common Document* in fall 2001. This was designed to foster the inclusion of Kosovo's Serbian population into the statebuilding process, starting with their participation in the upcoming elections. "OMiK put in place a closed-list proportional electoral system with a single electoral district and set-aside seats which guaranteed minority *overrepresentation* for the Assembly elections" (Taylor 2005: 447, italics in original). In legislative acts which dealt with elections, a key emphasis was placed on the proper code of party-political conduct, including the avoidance of hate speech (CEC/Electoral Rule/1/2001; UNMIK/REG/2001/16). Voter registration, via the civic registry, was as inclusive as possible, with the only generalized exclusion pertaining to individuals involved in allegations of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (UNMIK/DIR/2001/12). The discourse of protection can be easily traced in UNMIKs public statements, in which the Administration repeatedly stressed the unique historical moment for the whole of Kosovan society, and appealed to all political actors involved not to endanger this future (see UNMIK Press Release, 18.09.2001; UNMIK Press Release, 2.10.2001; UNSC S/2001/926).

Protection of the Election Campaign

Cameroun

During the early stages of the scheduled elections, the French security service placed suspects and potential threats to the public order under surveillance, to further ensure the peacefulness of elections. Countermeasures were also taken against potential suspects who, it was feared, might violate the peacefulness of the election campaign or endanger public order. These included the closure of gatherings, the imprisonment of leading figures, and press censorship. Framed as one of the main threats to the public order, many UPC's publications were analyzed and collected by the French authorities in an effort to predict future acts of violent resistance. Furthermore, secret agents were used to report on UPC gatherings and inform the Administration about the group's stated political aims.

Alongside surveillance and the sidelining of politicians, the French authorities censored the media (radio and press) in an effort to control public life as well as to prevent the UPC from disseminating its propaganda. For instance, Dr. Bebey Eyidi, the editor of the newspaper 'Presse Du Cameroun' and close to the UPC, was imprisoned and barred from publishing on several occasions. Certain other newspapers were also shut down for running pieces that were critical of the then-prime minister and the French authorities, and for supporting the UPC's ideology (Le Patriote, Arrete n. 798/PSS, ANOM FM DPCT // 38). The surveillance policy also included postal controls, with many postcards and letters seized and examined in order to acquire information. In these circumstances, then, the French authorities had considerable power to define the election campaign's parameters by determining which words and symbolic actions could and could not be employed. With respect to symbols: in many security reports, the hoisting of the old flag of the united territory of 'Kamerun' by the UPC was mentioned as a reason for breaking up meetings (Note de Renseignement, 29.5.1956, ANOM DPCT // 30). Indeed, according to Petition T/Pet.5/595, the administration was more interested in building police posts than schools or ambulance units (ARMS S-1555-0000-0053).

The slogan "independence for Cameroun" reflected a shift in discourse which was primarily connected to the UPC. Later, the French authorities changed their strategy and instead began to promote the interdependence of France and Cameroun which, in practice, meant that Cameroun was to become an autonomous country while still being integrated into the French Metropolitan Union. This position changed only after 1958, when independence became inevitable due to a global shift towards decolonization. During the election campaign, the UPC strictly differentiated between other parties that either supported or opposed their claim, which is evident from politicians' quotes in the security reports. And as already mentioned, references to the conflict in Algeria were also present.

Kosovo

Issues of security dominated the year 2001 and the campaigning period in the weeks prior to the election date, 17 November 2001. In summer of that year, UNMIK imposed "a robust package of legislation to combat violence" (UNSC 2001: 2), seizing weapons and detaining suspects. The Ad-

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ministration closely connected the upcoming elections with threats to stability,

> "As the Kosovo-wide elections approach, my Special Representative is mindful of the potential for political violence as parties compete for seats in the Assembly (…). Following a number of apparently politically motivated criminal incidents, including the attempted assassination of an LDK politician in Srbica (…), UNMIK has re-established the Political Violence Task Force to provide a coordinated response to any future attempts of this nature." (UNSC 2001: 3)

The NATO troops KFOR reinforced the forces on the ground in November (UNMIK Press Briefing (PB), 5.11.2001). To protect the electoral process, the Administration restricted the displaying of national symbols connected to the War of 1998/1999 (e.g. the Albanian or Serbian flag) at polling stations, but no strict practices against their general use were implemented.[19] While the Administration publicly denied any connection between the elections and possible independence, UNMIK opted for a non-confrontational approach on national symbols. Indeed, on Election Day, there were reports of the unwanted use of national symbols, but only across a minority of polling stations.[20]

The unstable situation in Macedonia was considered another threat, with the outbreak of civil war between the Albanian minority and other

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19   The highly sensitive issue of the flag as an identity symbol is illustrated by Andersen: "In the preparation for the municipal elections in October 2000, the OSCE, UNMIK and KFOR discussed their flag policy on election day. The idea was that the Albanian flag, because it represents one ethnical group (Albanians) and thereby excludes minorities, were not to be used on the buildings that were used for polling stations or in a distance of 100 meters from it. A discussion occurred between the parties, of who were going to remove illegally raised flags. The conclusion was that the 1000 International Polling Supervisors that had the responsibility for polling procedures in the polling stations were supposed to remove flags. After Haxhim Thaci (the Leader of PDK) went to the media right three days before election day urging people to put up the Albanian flag on the buildings, and warning about trouble in case they were taken down, the decision was waived the evening before the election day. Because of security reasons, no international personnel should try to remove any flags. The result was that the polling stations were signed with the flag of the ethnic minority in a UN protectorate urging ethnic minorities to participate in state formation and develop tolerance for their political representation." (Andersen 2002: 138)

20   "Observers did report that in 17% of polling stations community flags or symbols were present, outside the polling stations, and in one case inside the station." (Council of Europe 2001: 12)

groups in Macedonia considered a realistic possibility. The above mentioned UNMIK legislation to combat violence led to large scale operations in Kosovo in which KFOR and UNMIK attempted to reduce "the influence of members of ethnic Albanian armed groups operating from Kosovo" and "more than 1200 people have been detained and processed" (UNSC 2001: 3).

The Threat of Violence

Cameroun

The period surrounding the election campaign in 1956 was marred by violence, with reports of homicides, destruction of infrastructure and property, violent acts and injuries. Over the course of the election campaign, French Authorities strengthened security forces in the whole territory, but especially in the 'rebellious districts', where armed forces were deployed in order to combat the threat. Furthermore, a "Zone de maintien de l'ordre de la Sanaga-Maritime" (ZOE) was established in order to carry out military operations against opposition groups such as the UPC. But despite these measures, several candidates for the territorial assembly were murdered during the election campaign (Note, ANOM FM DPCT // 47), while there were also reports of acts of sabotage, such as the blocking of roads, destruction of bridges, and attacks on French forces (ANOM FM DPCT // 47). The freeing of political prisoners, jailed in connection with the events of May 1955, was considered a major security threat to the peacefulness of elections (Note de Renseignement, 7.4.1956, ANOM DPCT // 30).

Of huge importance for ensuring calm during the elections was the High Commissioner Roland Pré. In many speeches and communiqués, he presented his perspective on the UPC and his efforts to mobilize every means to guarantee public order (Discours de Cloture, 3.6.1955, DPCT // 15). Furthermore, in a range of UPC manifestos, letters and reports, the high commissioner was presented as chiefly responsible for draconian measures that were only directed against the UPC.[21]

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21 For instance Felix Moumié presented the new High Commissionar Messmer as less draconic than Roland Pré, still using means to drift UPC apart. ("[…] Le Gouverneur Messmer, a une politique trés fine: il ne veut pas employer la force comme

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Kosovo

Previous experience of political killings and forced evictions in the years prior to the elections ensured that the threat of actual violence would be the principle problem for the Administration's politics of protection. If the Administration's claim to be providing protection could be discredited through acts of violence against minorities or against political competitors, then the Administration itself would also lose legitimacy. That protection was the priority is documented in the public statements of UNMIK on violent incidents, which were taken seriously and proved the need to enhance protective measures (UNMIK PB, 22.10.2001). Incidents in minority areas and intimidation of voters in Northern (mostly Serbian populated) Kosovo were evident. UNMIK repeatedly demanded that the political leadership in Kosovo condemn public acts of violence and/or refrain from any violence themselves (UNMIK PB, 08.10.2001; UNMIK Press Release, 11.11.2001). At the same time, the Administration was able to refer to the (surprisingly) low level of violence during the campaign period and on the 17 November 2001 as evidence for the success of their protective measures (UNMIK PB, 29.10.2001; UNMIK PB, 5.11.2001).

After the elections: The display of the elections and the politics of protection

"Tout est calme à Yaoundé" – Cameroun

The elections held in 1956 were discussed extensively in many letters and telegrams to the French ministry of the overseas territories, but also within the French administration in Cameroun itself. This Administration described the elections as successful, largely uneventful, and having taken place in a calm atmosphere (Resultats Provisoires des Elections Generales au Cameroun, 24.11.1956, DPCT // 14), further stressing that the UPC boycott campaign had failed. During the elections a mixture of traditional and moderate politicians had been elected, which was considered positive.

Roland Pré, mais il emploie des manoevres de diversion" (Translation: The Governor Messmer, has a very fine policy : he will not use force as Roland Pre, but it employs diversionary manoevres,) Note de Renseignement, 19.10.1956, ANOM FM DPCT /30).

As for the election itself, it was highlighted that "Le calme dans lequel se déroulait la campagne électorale" was evident everywhere (Note de Renseignement, 9.1.1956, ANOM DPCT // 30). Voter turnout hit 55%, despite the acts of sabotage and appeals for abstention, which induced the French administration to register their satisfaction with the high levels of voter participation (Télégramme de Haussaire, 18.11.1956, DPCT // 14)[22].

Kosovo

The following statement of the head of UNMIK, Hans Haekkerup, from December 2001 is representative of all public statements made by UNMIK and the UNSC on the elections: "By any standard of measurement the 17 November Kosovo Assembly elections were a huge success […]. We in the UN alongside our partners […] and together with the people of Kosovo have demonstrated that democracy can begin to be built in societies previously driven by hatred and war" (UNMIK Focus Kosovo 2001). The participation of all major political parties, the low levels of violence, the overall turnout of over 64 % (including the relatively high Serbian turnout, which secured 11,34 % of the votes and 12 plus 10 set aside seats out of 120 in the Kosovo Assembly) proved the capability of UNMIK to protect the statebuilding process in Kosovo. Yet what made the claim of a "brighter future" (UNMIK Focus Kosovo 2001) for Kosovo ambiguous was the de facto detachment of the statebuilding process from independence. While nearly 90% of the Albanian population in Kosovo and all Kosovan-Albanian parties were in favor of independence from Serbia, who also interpreted the elections of 2001 as an important step in this direction, the Administration had no intention of connecting the two issues. This message was constantly repeated in public by the Administration (UNMIK PB, 22.10.2001). Therefore, even while the parties and citizens in Kosovo accepted the elections and refrained from violence, it never actually had a relationship to the form, duration, or end of trusteeship. In-

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22 Another comment on the result: „Il est très élévé pour l'Afrique et peut se comparer aux résultats des pays les plus anciennement rompus à l'exercise de la démocratie." (Translation: It is very High for Africa and can be compared to the results of the countries, that in the past fell in the execution of democracy.) (Brochure of High Commisionar: Le Cameroun 1946 de la tutelle à l'independence 1960, ARMS, S-0504-0044).

stead, seven more years of Administration and two more Kosovo-wide elections lay ahead.

4. Conclusion

In our paper, we compared different forms of international trusteeship in two historical contexts to illustrate the conjunction of security, external statebuilding and the politics of protection. In the respective contexts, de-colonization and post-Cold War, external trustees ruled dependent or post-conflict societies, with the mandate to guarantee peace, modernize, and ultimately release the entities into independence. For our two explorative cases of Cameroun and Kosovo, we asked how the threats of violence and conflict constituted the external rule, and which dynamics of conflict arose. We then asked if it was possible to compare trustee discourses and practices in the different historical settings. The empirical analysis was guided by the securitization concept of the politics of protection. Here, we suggest that the legitimization of the external trusteeship's rule and use of force are intrinsically connected to the claim of political actors to protect citizens and the polity against (socially constructed) threats.

The comparison reveals similarities in the politics of protection in both forms of trusteeship, although with different levels of intensity.

Public communication/ practice on:	Cameroun (1956) UN-mandated French Trusteeship	Kosovo (2001) International Administration (UNMIK)
Access to Elections	UPC marked as threat to peaceful elections and public order, exclusion as party to run for elections	Not parties, but content marked as threat (independence), inclusion of minorities / minority parties (Kosovo Serbs) of highest priority
Election campaign	Surveillance of political opposition, closure of gatherings, imprisonment, press censorship	Troops/police reinforced, campaigning surveillance, presentation of national symbols restricted, control of political elites
Violence	Massive violence (homicides, destruction of infrastructure and properties)	Low level of violence, but existing violence (especially against minorities) as threat for future
After the elections	Described as successful, calm atmosphere	Described as success, "brighter future" possible

Source: Created by authors

In Cameroun, the trustees referred to the protection of public order and Camerounian society, and to ensuring the peacefulness of elections. On the other hand, in Kosovo they referred to the protection of minorities, stability and peace, and a better future after elections. In both cases, the trustees presented themselves discursively as the only actors who could legitimately guarantee the representation of society. They tried to contain all dangerous speech acts (related to violence, independence, resistance, and emancipation in both cases) and countered possible challenges with emergency security measures. Here, the politics of protection severely weakened the political character of national elections. In both cases the trustees blocked and repressed central demands supported by large parts of the citizenry and by key political actors, aiming to depoliticize the respective elections under the primacy of protection. Additionally, both cases exhibited a similar type of ambivalence which arose from a putative link between elections and a perceived future "preparedness" for independence (defined as stability and democracy), even though an immediate transition or even a schedule for independence was not outlined.[23] On the contrary, in the aftermath of elections, both trusteeships became even more institutionalized and stabilized.

Disregard for key political demands had very different consequences for the two societies. In Kosovo in 2001, the key Albanian actors accepted the discourse and practices of protection and chose to refrain from political violence. By contrast, Kosovan Serbs only partially accepted the claim of protection and boycotted future attempts to include them on the part of the Administration. A small group turned to violent resistance, which is still present today. However, in 2001, the trustees refrained from an outright aggressive *practice* of protection. No national symbols were removed, nor were people imprisoned or even killed.

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23 In regard to Kosovo: "But the elections were never only about democratization, rather they could be understood much better in the course of a politics of protection against the threat of instability by the Administration: "First and foremost, UNMIK officials stress that elections provide a focus for non-violent political activity in Kosovo. With independence off the table, it is hoped that the election campaign and the transfer of limited civilian powers in Kosovo will keep the majority Albanian community engaged in a political process that is consistent with but not committed to independence. And, crucially, it is part of broader attempts to end the cycle of violence in both the short- and the longer-term. As a senior OSCE representative put it, 'Elections will buy us three years of stability.'" (Chesterman 2001: 6)

Conversely, whereas the 2001 Kosovan elections took a relatively non-violent course, the 1956 elections in Cameroun were marred by acts of violence and sabotage. The trustees opted for a much more aggressive practice against threats like the UPC before, during, and after the elections, thereby laying the ground for a continuing dynamic of violence against the backdrop of ongoing decolonization conflicts in other parts of the French Empire, such as in Algeria.

Overall, we would argue that the threat of war and large-scale violence is very much present in discourses and practices of protection. However, though ideas such as peaceful relations, reconciliation, or a "better future" were often mentioned in discourses, the practices were much more focused on stability and the status quo, and even the elimination of possible (national) competitors. Here, trusteeship and benevolence played no major role and the practices seem not to have differed significantly from rule in sovereign states or rule in other forms of intervention. These ambiguities of trusteeship in both constellations are very well exemplified in the public presentation of the elections. Even in Cameroun, the elections were presented as successful and peaceful, despite violent incidents. These observations point to the importance of discourses and practices of *de*securitization, which seem to be an equally important aspect of the politics of protection and require further research[24].

To conclude, our analysis reveals a strong interconnection of security and trusteeship in both cases. The key for legitimizing external rule and even the use of force lies in defining – or constructing – what has to be protected.

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24 For further research on dynamics of desecuritization, consult: Hansen 2012, Roe 2004, Aras 2008, MacKenzie 2009, among others.

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How Security Dynamics Shaped Trusteeship Statebuilding: The French Administration of Cameroon[1]

Thorsten Bonacker, Maria Ketzmerick

1. Introduction

Critical security studies' analysis of the macro context of securitization tends to focus on the Cold War and on more contemporary processes of macrosecuritization, such as the Global War on Terror. In this chapter, however, we broaden the historical perspective by analysing the security constellations that emerged from the processes of decolonisation which began after World War I and came fully into play with the founding of the United Nations. Specifically, we explore the impact of different internationally articulated narratives of security on the process of postcolonial statebuilding in Cameroon especially in the 1950s and 1960s. During this time, postcolonial statebuilding was discussed within the international Trusteeship System, whereby different actors made securitizing moves in order to shape the politics of statebuilding. We argue that the UN Trusteeship Council functioned both as a global audience and as a forum for public communication, which was used to address threats and portray other parties as dangerous and immoral. Secondly, we show that macrosecuritization, in the historical context of decolonization, served as a facilitating condition, with anti-colonial activists and the French government easily linking their security claims to an already established macro framework.

Our analysis draws on the securitization framework of the so-called Copenhagen School. In recent years, two different perspectives have emerged within the debate on the concept of securitization, which can be described as internalist and externalist positions, i.e. an understanding of security as self-referential activity or as an intersubjective process (Stritzel 2007). The internalist understanding focuses on security as a speech act,

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1 The chapter is based on our research as part of the Collaborative Research Center "Dynamics of Security" (SFB 138) at the University of Marburg and the University of Gießen, funded by the German Research Foundation.

its performativity and productive power, and is linked to the very early work of the Copenhagen School, which tried to broaden the research agenda of security studies by defining security as something that is done by saying it. But as Stritzel and others have argued, this idea of security as a speech act seemed limited for two reasons. First, it was only partly usable for empirical research on real-world securitizations (Stritzel 2007: 362). Second, from a theoretical point of view, it could not convincingly explain why some securitizing moves succeed while others fail. An internalist understanding could only point to the rhetoric, which has to be inherently convincing. Because of this explanatory weakness, there developed a more externalist understanding that concentrates on the environment of a speech act, rather than the speech act itself. Both the perlocutionary effect and the facilitating conditions for successful securitization thus became the focus of scholarly attention (Buzan et al. 1998: 31-33; Buzan/Wæver 2003: 71-74; Aradau 2010: 501[2]). Two conditions originally introduced by Buzan et al. (1998) were further elaborated on: the authority of the securitizing actor and the audience that, according to a conventional understanding in securitization theory, has to agree on a security claim made by a securitizing actor. Regarding the first condition, security is a structured field of discourses and practices whereby some actors are more privileged to speak and construct security than others (Vuori 2008: 70; Wæver 2000; Huysmans 2002; Balzacq 2005). The audience is of particular importance as – in the dominant reading – the success of securitization is highly contingent upon whether a security claim resonates with the audience.

In the following article, we adopt this externalist and more context-sensitive perspective, especially in the debate on facilitating conditions for successful securitization. The first aim of this article is to explore how security dynamics in processes of statebuilding in a postcolonial society are shaped by the global context of decolonization. Therefore, we make use of the concept of macrosecuritization introduced by Wæver and Buzan (2009) to explore the case of Cameroon and argue that the Cameroonian conflict could be traced back to security dynamics which emerged during the processes of decolonization. These security dynamics were mainly produced by the confrontation between former colonial powers and anti-

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2   The concept was originally developed by Austin (1962). In his reading of securitization theory as an empirical theory Guzzini (2011) goes even further than the externalist perspective on securitization insofar as he argues that facilitating conditions could be understood as variables that cause (de)securitization.

colonial, sometimes nationalist movements, both of which perceived the other as an existential threat. Whether these conflicts turned violent or remained more or less peaceful depended mainly on local or case specific conditions. From a more theoretical point of view, however, we assume that some more generalized facilitating conditions can be identified that render the emergence of local security dynamics in postcolonial settings more likely.

As with much of the Copenhagen School's output, the development of the concept of macrosecuritization is very much linked to the case of the Cold War. However, we argue that security dynamics in postcolonial societies cannot be sufficiently understood by reducing them to proxy conflicts of an overarching East-West rivalry. Therefore, our second aim is to introduce a broader historical perspective on security constellations. The findings of our case study are based, alongside existing literature, on primary sources retrieved from archives, including the Archives D'Outre Mer in Aix-en Provence France, the UN archives, the UN Photo Archives and the Collection of the League for Human Rights in New York, the National Archives in Buea und Yaoundé, Cameroon, the National Archives in London and Les Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis.

2. Securitizing Decolonization

The concept of macrosecuritization was introduced by Buzan and Wæver in order to explain how mid-level securitizations are sometimes integrated into a higher order of securitization. This makes it easier to portray referent subjects as an existential threat, as both the security and the threats are already constructed on the global or international level and are well known on lower levels. The main argument advanced by the authors is that size or scale seems to be the crucial variable in determining what is constructed as a referent object of security. On the meso level, states or mid-scale collective identities typically serve as the referent object threatened by referent subjects, according to a securitizing actor. On the macro level, referent objects are often discursively constructed through universalist ideologies which are used by actors to justify their security claims and to convince an audience about the need to act with grim determination, in order to secure the referent object (Buzan/Wæver 2009: 260-261).

As different authors have stressed, the whole concept of securitization and desecuritization is linked to the Cold War (e.g. Guzzini 2015). In this

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article, we take into account Guzzini's plea for a historicization of securitization theory and argue for a broader understanding of security constellations in the 20th century. It is worth noting here that, with respect to the 20th century and especially to international politics in the period from 1918-1975 (from the end of World War I to the end of the so-called period of decolonization), security was mostly related to the security constellation of the Cold War: statebuilding dynamics related to decolonization did not generally enter the equation. What we want to introduce here is a historical perspective on the emergence of macrosecuritization that shaped security dynamics on lower levels after the end of World War II and beyond, but which still sometimes relates to the Cold War security constellation. For instance, the security dynamics evident in Cameroon after 1946, when the French were given the mandate to serve as a trustee in the statebuilding process, were only partly shaped by the East-West-Conflict. In fact, securitized decolonization was more fundamental here as a frame of reference for constructing security on the macro level.

The historical process of decolonization started with the end of World War I and the foundation of the League of Nations, which was responsible for administrating the former colonial territories of Germany and Turkey. After the end of World War II, the League's mandates were transferred to the United Nations, and the colonial powers also agreed to enforce the development of the territories administrated by them, in order to enable them to establish effective self-government. However, France and Great Britain, but also most of the other colonial powers, disagreed on whether this would lead inevitably to full independence.

The construction of security has only been marginally addressed by the literature on decolonization and the trusteeship system (El-Ayouty 1971; Sellström 2009; Thullen 1971; Jacobson 1962; Chafer 2002; Chafer/Godin 2010; Mbembe 2016). From the standpoint of securitization theory, the foundation of both the League of Nations and the United Nations could be perceived as moves towards desecuritization on the macro level, because the "internationalization of imperialism" (Gorman 2014: 472) was seen as an instrument for the prevention of future wars. For this, secret treaties were abolished in order to ensure open negotiations and conflict resolution. No longer would states have a good reason to perceive each other as potential security threats. Furthermore, in principle, the attempt to end colonial rule could be understood as a desecuritizing move, as colonialism was essential not only for rivalries between colonial powers, but also for mobilizing people and resources from the colonies for warfare. Both the

UN and its trusteeship system as well as the League of Nation sought to provide a framework of international cooperation rather than egoistic power politics (Rothermund 2006: 49).

On a general level, however, decolonization was accompanied by several, often mutual threat perceptions. First, the colonial powers perceived the proclaimed necessity to end colonial rule, which emanated from anti-colonial movements as well as the US, the Soviet Union and the UN, as a threat to the survival of their empires. The British and the French also advocated against independence as the privileged outcome of decolonization. Instead, they enforced the distinction between self-government and independence. Although history eventually went in a very different direction, the idea behind this for the British and the French was to legitimately incorporate colonies, either in a reconfigured Commonwealth as a successor to the British Empire, or into a Greater France without giving full independence (Pungong 2000: 95). Second, the longer true independence was postponed, the more anti-colonial resistance saw the continuation of foreign domination as a threat to the people and their right for self-determination. Third, from the 1940s onwards, the US and the Soviet Union came to the conclusion that colonial rule threatened their security, as colonial powers could rely on resources outside their own territory. On the local level, a perception of mutual threat frequently existed between the colonial power and their chosen political elites on the one hand, and the anti-colonial groups on the other, which created a security constellation.

We argue that this mutual threat perception, as well as other security practices and claims from the middle (state) level, were linked to the broader macrosecuritization, which emerged with the decolonization process, and which made local security dynamics more likely. For instance, those dynamics typically consisted of practices of counterinsurgency, as well as anti-colonial campaigns and attacks on colonial or state infrastructure. Macrosecuritization functioned as a framework in which local security claims could easily resonate because they were perceived as part of a larger constellation. Anti-colonial movements were able to connect their own campaign to other struggles against colonial rule and to persuade people to join them. They were also able to take measures against existential threats emanating from the colonial power and their local allies. The project of Third Worldism, which "reached its apogee at the UN with the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960, which signalled the UN's symbolic support of decolonization" (Gorman 2014: 474), was a significant outcome which was aided by inter- and

transnational collective mobilization in the mid-1950s. A crucial event was the Bandung Conference in 1955, which sent a strong signal of Afro-Asian solidarity in the effort to end colonial rule (Rothermund 2006: 46). This and other similar conferences held in the 1950s created not only a transnational African-Asian identity and a call for Third World solidarity, but also fostered a macrosecuritization, insofar as this mobilization was portrayed as crucial for the survival of the newly independent as well as for the liberation of then still dependent countries (Patil 2008: 48-49). In several speeches at these conferences, the existential threat of colonial rule was addressed.

At the same time, the colonial powers often successfully convinced the international community, as well as national audiences and local political elites, that extraordinary measures had to be deployed in order to secure public order. For example, in several sessions of the UN General Assembly, representatives of the colonial powers argued that decolonization seemed to create "revolutionary moments rather than a balanced evolution towards self-government" (quoted in Patil 2008: 64). "Others argued that the 'liberal' attitude of anti-colonialist groups towards the Charter was 'dangerous' and 'extremist' rather than undertaken in a spirit of realism and compromise,' that the actions and arguments of anti-colonialist groups in general were 'too fast,' 'Hasty,' proceeding at 'an unduly rapid pace,' suffering from 'lack of wisdom,' 'unwise,' 'irresponsible,' 'not practical,' 'improper,' 'inappropriate,' […] 'insane,' 'premature,' […] and 'in the emotion of the moment'" (Patil 2008: 64).

Securitized decolonization, therefore, worked on the macro level as an overarching frame of reference through which actors in very different cases and world regions interpreted other security issues. In this regard, macrosecuritization fulfilled a facilitating condition for successful securitization on the middle level, as colonial powers as well as anti-colonial groups could easily link their interpretation of security issues and the construction of threats to the macro frame of securitized decolonization.

3. The UN Trusteeship as a Global Audience

A second facilitating condition, according to the externalist view of securitization theory, refers to the existence of one or more significant audiences that are addressed by securitizing actors. The concept of audience is crucial for the externalist view on securitization, as the Copenhagen School

argues that the success of securitization depends largely on the audience's approval of a security claim made by a securitizing actor. It seems that most scholars view the audience more or less as a collective actor who is addressed by a securitizing actor with a security claim and who can then respond to such a claim. From that perspective, the manner in which the audience responds to securitizing moves becomes essential for an empirical study on securitization, because securitization "is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development" (Balzacq 2005: 181). The existence of a significant audience can be deduced from public communication, which is addressed to a third party in order to persuade it and to gain public legitimacy and attention (Koloma Beck/Werron 2013). In this case, then, the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council function as the third party constituting indirect competition through institutionalized public communication. Securitizing moves are thus a means of gaining attention and legitimacy in public communication. From this point of view, one could assume that global public communication within the UN, in the context of decolonization, might increase the likelihood of securitization, because actors could easily assume an approachable global audience. Consequently, in all public communication, the construction of existential threats and security claims have the advantage of generating attention, so it is reasonable to assume that competition also boosts securitization.

This also sheds light on the entanglement between macro and meso levels of securitization during statebuilding. For this, we have to look for institutional mechanisms that help to translate security claims made on the macro level towards an international audience, to national audiences and practices 'on the ground'. In the following section, we show that the United Nations and its sub-institutions dealing with decolonization fulfilled this role of an institutional mechanism, as securitizing actors could direct their security claims to an international audience to gain legitimacy, which could be transferred to claims and policies in divergent national contexts and audiences. The United Nations' General Assembly as well as the Trusteeship Council gave "nationalist politicians in the trust territories an important new international platform on which to launch their campaign for the end of colonial rule" (Pungong 2000: 94). This campaign was also directed at significant domestic audiences (for instance, and to keep things simple, the domestic audiences in France and in Cameroon).

In terms of generating macrosecuritization within a global audience in the context of decolonization, the most significant forums for public com-

munication within the Trusteeship System were the principle organs of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council and, to a lesser extent, the UN sub-organizations. The UN was the main forum for addressing the issue of decolonization at the international level: "Many member states believed that the UN's universal precepts and support for the principle of self-determination permitted its constituent bodies to express views about member states' colonial affairs. Colonial states disagreed, arguing that their colonial territories were 'domestic' and thus, in accordance with Chapter II Article 7 of the UN Charter, immune from outside intervention. Anti-colonialism within the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council increased, however, as the UN's membership grew between 1945 and 1960. In 1945 only eight of the original fifty-one member states was African or Asian. By 1955 there were twenty-three such states out of seventy-six, when sixteen new states were admitted under an omnibus membership resolution. With the mass decolonization of French Africa in 1960, forty-five of the now ninety-nine member states were African or Asian. When Latin American states are considered, many of whom were sympathetic to the Afro-Asian bloc, the UN system was from its earliest days a welcoming environment for the assertion of post-colonial positions" (Gorman 2014: 486).

The Trusteeeship Council played a major role in the Cameroonian decolonization process, given that actors referred to it as an audience to defend, prior to creating referent objects and undertaking securitizing moves accordingly. This illustrates their favoured processes of macrosecuritization. Yet, despite its specific international status, French Cameroon (akin to French Togo) was incorporated according to the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic and treated as a "regular" overseas department and colony (Atangana 1997; Le Vine 1964).

4. *Postcolonial Security Dynamics – The Case of Cameroon*

In this chapter we delve into the case of French Cameroon while concentrating specifically on the dynamics within the Trusteeship Council. The Council was the instrument used to monitor the development and to provide a platform for discussions that mediated between mandate states and domestic actors during the statebuilding process. Even though the Council tried to keep a neutral position in the conflict for independence, we argue that it exercised a major influence on the conflicts' inducement, while so-

cializing the conflicting parties to a mode of competition on legitimacy and international attention. This competitive situation favoured security speech acts and securitizing moves. After a brief presentation of the historical background of the case and respective actors, the facilitating conditions for security dynamics in Cameroon will be discussed. To this end, the emergence of a mode of competition will be dissected by focusing on the council as the third party, symbolizing a global audience that had to be persuaded. Secondly, it will be shown how and to what extent the French administration described the U.P.C. as a threat by using security speech acts in the Trusteeship Council, followed by how the U.P.C. tried to impose a counter image. Both parties connected their requests to universalist claims – national sovereignty in the case of the U.P.C. and the Cold War-era threat of Communism in the case of the French administration.

a) The Trusteeship Council and the Decolonization of Cameroon

Already in 1948, the first radical nationalist party, "L'Union des Populations du Cameroun" (Union of the Populations of Cameroun, U.P.C.) was founded in a merger of loose resistance groups and union members together in Douala, Cameroon. The U.P.C.'s major goals from the beginning were independence under the terms of the United Nations and reunification with the British Cameroons (Joseph 1977, 1974; Takougang 2003). After violent protests in May 1955, a decree by the French administrators dissolved the U.P.C. in July 1955. This act was considered by the U.P.C. to be a violation of the Trusteeship agreement and it is seen by scholars as a catalyst for the violence that ensued.[3] Major reasons stated in the act for dissolution included violent incidents in several places, such as in Douala and Yaoundé, in assemblies and gatherings all over Cameroon, as well as homicides (Proposition de Loi, COAM FM DPCT // 37; Atangana 1997: 90; Le Vine 1964: 286). After their dissolution in 1955, some activists went into exile, while others turned to underground (*maquis*) violence or participated in violent resistance in southern Cameroon. Before and after

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3 Concerning the ban of the U.P.C., Mbaku (1995) argues, "the banning of the U.P.C. was important for French commercial interest in the colony and for indigenous political opportunists who could now help design a constitution that would provide them with opportunities for post-independence rent-seeking" (Takougang 2003: 428).

the dissolution, the UN Trusteeship Council registered thousands of petitions complaining about French interventions, while several U.P.C. members presented their claims directly to the different UN bodies, especially before the UN Trusteeship Council. In exile, U.P.C. activists connected with other resistance movements in Ghana or Egypt for mutual support against external rulers, and created a transnational network for national sovereignty and self-determination; inside Cameroon the U.P.C. tried to influence the country's transition through political mobilization, violent resistance, and the destruction of property. At the same time, other political parties or groups were formed in Cameroon that formulated their programmes as either pro-U.P.C. and against French trusteeship, or anti-U.P.C. and in favour of French trusteeship (LeVine 1964)[4]. In 1956, France introduced the "Loi-cadre (Deferre)"[5] as a political concession towards self-government in French territories (Awasom 2002; Le Vine 1964: 157.). One year later, in the "Statute du Cameroun", major infrastructural changes were approved by the Territorial Assembly, yet reunification and independence remained the High Commissioner's responsibility. On January 1st 1960 Cameroon became formally independent (Cameroun Tribune 1960) and, one year later, the (southern) British part joined the country.

In the next section, the analysis will focus on the mediation process within the Trusteeship Council, with the aim of showing how a communication of competition amplified and favoured securitization moves.

b) Audience – Emerging Competition in the Trusteeship Council?

As stated in the theoretical section of this article, we argue that the conflict in Cameroon could be traced back to security dynamics which emerged in the processes of decolonization, mainly due to the confrontation between

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4 This was reflected in the first elections for the French National Assembly (June 1951) and Territorial Assembly (March 1952), and mirrors the influence the U.P.C. had on the decolonization process.

5 The Loi-cadre was a reform act and marked a transition to a new policy towards the departments overseas. The background was the growing independence movement in the colonies; still, the idea was to build up a French Union. In contrast to other overseas territories, Togo and Cameroun could vote on passing the loi-cadre in April 1957 and December 1956. They were also valid in the trusteeship territories through the second chapter in their capacity as "associated territories" (Atangana 2010: 36; Terretta 2010).

the former colonial power and an anti-colonial, nationalist movement, who perceived each other as existential threats for the future state. In the following section, by focusing on speech acts that are directly related to security speech, we assess the extent to which the trusteeship council emerged as a global audience for securitizing acts. Despite contributions that observe a more general account (for instance Human Rights violations, as in Terretta (2012)), we aim at focusing on security speech acts in a narrow sense.

For the purpose of monitoring the development and decolonization process in Cameroon, the French government set up an elaborate structure of administration headed by a High-Commissioner and including many administrative units (such as a security service, a policy service, an economic service etc.) supported by the *Ministère Département d'outre Mer [Ministry for overseas departments]* in France, and the French special representative to the UN in New York. All units remained in close communication with each other to inform on local (in Cameroon) as well as international (in the Trusteeship Council) developments. Within annual reports and during visiting missions, the French administration emphasized the social and economic progress in the territory, but referred as well to the security situation, criminal statistics and police forces (UN Report 1952; ANOM 1AFFPOL / 930).

The High Commissioners of the French Administration in Cameroon regarded themselves as the legitimate preserver, representative, and 'protector' of Cameroonian security and their future (High Commissioner Xavier Torré Communiqué 9.7.1958, ANOM DPCT // 43). In speeches given before the Trusteeship Council, and in newspaper articles and reports provided to the Trusteeship Council, the French administration aimed to act on behalf of Cameroonian society, while trying to keep their territory peaceful from rebellious groups, such as the U.P.C. This formally enacted the political authority and created a referent object that is typically linked to states. The French Administration saw in the Trusteeship agreement the legal scope for their actions in Cameroon, thereby emphasizing the role of this body. From a structural perspective, the role of the High Commissioner was defined to protect citizens and property (see for instance décret number 57501 in article 40 and 41).

From the early stages of the Trusteeship, the U.P.C. used the trusteeship council to lobby for their claims of sovereignty and independence, which conflicted with French statebuilding policies. The first U.P.C. petitions date back to 1947: they show that claims for reunification, independence,

and also security threats had long been voiced and linked to Human Rights violations (ARMS S-0441-0623; Terretta 2012). From a very early stage, then, the U.P.C. grasped the importance of the Trusteeship Council and made it into an audience for their security speech acts. From the outset, the U.P.C. presented the French Administration as harming the political will of Cameroonian citizens. In the course of the 1950s, myriad petitions arrived at the Trusteeship council that were linked to the U.P.C. and that expressed protest against measures taken by the French administration, highlighted the harsh repression, and often referred to the threat to public order and security. For instance, "[…] depuis la guerre sanguinaire du Mai 1955 déclenchée par les colonialistes Francais nous vivons qu'au maquis"[6] (Petition Nyambé Tonga, 14.1.1957, DPCT // 43). This statement is often repeated in a similar vein by other petitioners, for instance "Dès le 20 Avril également, des petitions protestant "contre les mesures policières de l'Administration" émanèrent de plusieres Comités et furent adressées à l'ONU"[7] (Note de Renseignement, Période du 16 au 23 Avril 1955, ANOM DPCT 27). In this regard, it appears that the formulation "colonialists" points to the specific situation the French Cameroons found themselves in– not a colony in legal terms, but one by virtue of repression on the ground. Furthermore, the word war (guerre) is only used by oppositional groups, such as the U.P.C., and not by the French administration.

In the early 1950s, discussions in the Trusteeship Council emerged around the question of representation, which thus presented a first stage in the appearance of a mode of competition. At this stage, the significance of the council was emphasized by all actors. This can be seen in the case of Ruben Um Nyobé, leader of the U.P.C., who was invited to speak in front of the Trusteeship Council in October 1952. And yet visa issues occurred early on, and for a long period it was uncertain whether the French authorities would allow the Um Nyobé to leave Cameroon. Finally, he was granted a visa to travel the distance from his hotel to the United Nations Headquarters. The visa issues continued to be a problem between the French administration and the U.P.C. In other cases, the French administration tried to influence the U.P.C.s appearance's in the international community. Before Um Nyobés speech in 1952, many letters and petitions

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6 [From the bloody war in May 1955 triggered by the French colonialists we live in the maquis]

7 [From April 20 also petitions protesting "against the police action of the Administration" emanated from manifold Committees and were addressed to the UN.]

were directed to the Council in order to protest against the invitation (ARMS 0441-0571), and many petitioners declined to regard the U.P.C. as a legitimate representative of the Cameroonian people. This negative presentation of the U.P.C. was emphasised by the French administration in several speeches and speech acts during council meetings, mirroring the extent to which the trusteeship council allocated legitimacy between the two rivalling narratives in the early years of trusteeship.

Nevertheless, during this period, the U.P.C. tried to strengthen the image that they spoke and acted for Cameroonians. Interestingly, the U.P.C. was the only party at the time around which this kind of debate arose before the Council. Other oppositional parties, such as unions or politicians like Soppo Priso, were observed but not presented negatively to the Council, at least not to this degree. This hints, foremost, to either a certain degree of U.P.C. organizational mobilization or, and perhaps also, to a certain attribution of threat and security speech acts on behalf of the U.P.C.

The debate on representation was resolved after 1955, when it was decided to make the U.P.C. an illegal party. From then, debates continued over whether the French administration was able to keep the public order peaceful. Only in 1959 was the party again invited for discussions on matters regarding decolonization in the British Cameroons. In this regard, the U.P.C. claim for reunification appeared to be one major issue that was discussed in the Council, and to which the French administration was initially opposed (Letter, British Embassy, 1518/11/59, CO 936-422). This mirrors the extent to which the U.P.C. was regarded as an illegitimate party when it came to discussing de-colonisation, but also that the French administration tried to control developments in the territory. Finally, a referendum on reunification with the French Cameroons was only held in British Cameroon.

Still, what is remarkable is the comprehensive and direct approach the U.P.C. used in order to gain influence in the Trusteeship's decisions and thus the statebuilding attempts by the French administration. As already shown, from early on petitions were sent in by the U.P.C., while local committees also organized many self-portraits of their groups in order to show their high degree of mobilization (ARMS S-0441-0571). In the Trusteeship Council's assembly, the French representative was questioned intensively, specifically by the Chinese and Philippine representatives. Generally, the French Authorities were regarded quite positively by other Trusteeship members. In the very early reports from the French administration to the Trusteeship Council on conditions in the trusteeship territory

of Cameroon, the contribution of the French administrative authority was emphasized, even though a number of petitions were already directed to the Council complaining about racial discrimination (Trusteeship Report 1948; ARMS S-0504-0003). Yet the discussion of racial discrimination might represent a break with one of the pillars of colonialism, especially since France had to justify its policy of discriminatory practices several times in front of the Council (for instance in discussing the Trusteeship Report of 1948). In the end, however, the vague promise of the special representative to banish discriminatory practices was accepted without changing the resolution or in general the policy.

In the statements following the report in 1948, France's role in the trusteeship territory was described as utterly good (ARMS S-0504-0003). By focusing on the question of reunification of the two Cameroons, which was one of the main goals of the U.P.C. and already discussed in 1948, the French representative was reluctant but diplomatic: "it would be necessary to act with considerable caution. The answer on that subject has not yet been thoroughly examined" (ARMS S-0504-0003). This illustrates very well the configuration in and also range of the council in the early years of the Trusteeship Council. Later, the dynamics changed slightly, with the British administration becoming more involved in the territory, but also through the acceptance of former colonized countries to the Trusteeship Council, such as India. Specifically, in the years close to Cameroonian independence, the French administration was more frequently called up to justify its actions.

Despite being forbidden, the U.P.C. was able to mobilize support on different levels nationally, but also on behalf of the UN Trusteeship Council. Despite being presented as a threat to public order, the U.P.C. was able to win partners, such as the International League of the Rights of Man, and also in the person of Roger Baldwin, the organization's chairman, who supported their claims and provided infrastructure in New York (NYPL, funds of the ILRM, Boxes 1 and 14; Terretta 2012: 332). This supporting network mirrored the global dimension of the confrontation between the two rivalling visions for the future state. Generally, the Trusteeship Council functioned in this regard as a global audience for securitizing actors that was based on competition facilitated by public communication. The council cannot be considered here as an equal actor, since both conflicting parties approached the committee with the aim of gaining legitimacy and attention, which is shown by the debate on representation. Furthermore, since all claims needed to be addressed directly, an implicit consensus was

not established in the beginning but partly reached throughout the Trustee-ship period. The U.P.C. was not able to establish an alternative perception of the situation in front of its audience, even though party activists used many security speech acts.

c) Competing Macrosecuritizing Claims

French delegitimizing presentations against U.P.C. claims

During the Trusteeship, the French administration and the anti-colonial movement U.P.C. tried to connect their demands to macrosecuritizing claims in order to establish security claims on the domestic level. Macrosecuritizations, like all securitizations, require securitizing actors, appropriate speech acts, and addressed audiences. As stated above, already by the beginning of the trusteeship period, many petitions were directed to the Trusteeship Council in order to complain about the economic situation, destruction of roads and houses and specific political problems in local ar-eas, but also with regard to the French administration in general. These pe-titions emphasized the desire for independence and sovereignty, thus act-ing as macrosecuritizing claims. In the early years, the administering au-thorities replied individually to petitions raised but, later, after a signifi-cant rise in the intake of petitions, they were handled in an extra standing committee and clustered according to different classifications. Even in the early reaction papers to specific petitions, the administration regarded it-self as doing everything they could in the trusteeship, and also pointed to the responsibility of the private sector. Many of these petitions were writ-ten by U.P.C. members and, in reaction to them, the administration used very political language to describe the U.P.C – such as "propaganda", "symphatisant", "hostilité", all of which hint at the fact that the U.P.C. were considered troublemakers and a threat to the public order related to Communism. All allegations directed to the French administration were rejected and said to be without foundation. Furthermore, in a reaction no-tice, the French Authority tried to discredit the U.P.C. by stating that they were not representative of or able to fulfil the will of Cameroonian citi-zens (ARMS S-0441-0571).

After the prohibition of the U.P.C. in May 1955, the Administration in-tensified its attempts to link the party to communism, rebellion, and terror-ism. For instance, in the Anglo-French Talks of 1958, a bilateral forum to

discuss matters of the Trusteeship, the U.P.C. was described as "a totalitarian organization, which has borrowed both its ideology and methods from Communist parties in Europe" (Anglo-French Official Talks London, 10 June 1958, CO 936-419). According to Atangana (2010), the connection of the U.P.C. with the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), which had close ties with the French Communist Party, were one of the main reasons why the French administration perceived the organisation as a threat. This vision was also articulated by Catholic bishops in a joint letter: "It is necessary that Christians recognize the undeniable danger signs of the parties that pretend to guide them. Some of them are opposed to the truth, to charity, to justice, to prudence. … Christians should not be fooled to false promises, or solemn claims from movements inspired by materialism. What did communism do everywhere where it appeared and under whatever name it presented itself?" (April 1955, Atangana 2010: 44). Some political parties echoed this portrayal: for instance, ESOCAM: "recognizing and firmly convinced that Cameroon can be built and become rapidly emancipated under the combined influence of the two big entities, the European or French entity and the African or Cameroonian entity, asks the responsible persons of both entities to genuinely support our effort to curb the damage that the agitation of the communist annex called UPC has cause this territory […]" (28 May 1955, Atangana 2010: 44).

The conflict for legitimacy in the eyes of the Trusteeship Council intensified in the years that led towards independence, and facilitated security speech acts on both sides. In this regard, the security speech acts in the Council made securitizing moves on the local level even more possible. This can be seen, for instance, in newspaper articles in 'La Pesse du Cameroun', which presented the U.P.C. according to the French perception in the Council. Furthermore, in December 1956, a "Zone de maintien de l'ordre de la Sanaga-Maritime" [Special Area for keeping the public Order, Sanaga-Maritime] was established in order to secure the main region of rebellion. Building off the French perception of the U.P.C., the newly elected Cameroonian government, and also the British Administration, followed suit and criminalized the U.P.C. itself. Specifically, the Cameroonian government (from 1957) intensified the discourse on the U.P.C. in the following years, as seen in a petition by Mbida, the prime minister at this time, to the Trusteeship Council. In this petition, Mbida protested strongly against the hearing of Felix Moumié, a board member of the U.P.C. in front of the Trusteeship Council by saying that "Moumié Felix, who is nothing but a common murderer and rebel, sought by the law

for the murders and assassinations he has on his conscience, committed in the name of the same dissolved party U.P.C. The Cameroonian Government regrets and deplores the fact that high organs of the United Nations seem to be deliberately ignoring the fundamental political changes that have taken place in the development of the Camerouns since May 1957 [...]" (Mbida, 2.12.1957, ARMS S-0504-0058). In another petition, a similar view is strongly emphasized: "Cameroonian Government deplores the fact that appeal made to all political parties to desist from violence but that no official censure made of criminal activities of U.P.C. only party committing violence since 1955 despite dissolution by decree of 13 July 1955. In these circumstances resolutions advocating amnesty are liable encourage however illusorily the anti-democratic rebel bands which are still daily killing and robbing people in Sanaga Maritime who refuse to join U.P.C. Cameroonian Government recalling its earlier telegrams beginning December protests against systematic ignoring of new responsible Cameroonian institutions review of which might lead it to reconsider its position with regard to United Nations organs." (Mbida, 14.12.1957, ARMS S-0504-0058). These speech acts show that Mbida, as a local actor, followed France's lead in invoking the marosecuritizing threat of communism, and also the mode of competition in security speech acts by trying to achieve legitimacy in front of the international community and the Trusteeship Council. The public presentation of the U.P.C. as utterly criminal intensified even after independence, both in the national as well as international press. For instance, the Times referred to the Southern part of Cameroon as a security problem (The Times, 01.08.1961).

U. P.C. in front of the Council – Claims for Sovereignty and Independence

The U.P.C. used security speech acts to point to the disruption caused by the French Authorities, which was noticed by the Trusteeship Council. This can be seen in the following quote from the annual report of 1956: "The representatives of these three organizations requested the immediate unification and independence of the Cameroons. They claimed that abstention during recent elections, including those for the Territorial Assembly, showed a lack of support for the policy of the French Government and complained, in varying degrees, that a state of insecurity had existed in the territory since the events of 1955." (UN Yearbook 1956: 352). Next to pe-

titions, U.P.C. members made their appearance in front of the Trusteeship Council, as exemplified in 1951. They also condemned, explicitly, the violation of individual security, as well as Human Rights violations, thereby linking their nationalist claim to the macro claim for sovereignty and independence. Concerning the linkage to Communism as one of the main reasons presented as a threat, scholars and even the U.P.C. voiced ambivalent positions: Ruben Um Nyobé, for example, claimed that the U.P.C. was not a communist organization (Atangana 2010: 45). And yet the connection of the U.P.C. to the international communist movement dominated the political debate in Cameroon. Internationally, the party created networks for their cause; for instance, with the 'League for the Rights of Man' in New York (ILRM, NYPL). Members travelled extensively: for instance to Ghana, Egypt and Sudan, to connect their ideas with other transnational claims. But in contrast to other radical anti-colonial movements, the U.P.C. never gained the same publicity, legitimacy or attention from the international community.

In the later trusteeship period, policy instruments introduced by the French administrations were criticized directly. For instance, in 1957, the U.P.C. published a document "L'amitié Franco-Kamerunaise en Danger: Alerte à l'opinion kamerunaise et mondiale"[8] (L'opinion au Cameroun, No. 32, 23 September 1957). In press releases, the U.P.C. explained the goals behind the party's violent actions (Declaration à la presse mondiale, U.P.C., 30.1.1957, DPCT // 3). These documents were made available to the French administration and Trusteeship Council via the secret service.

A similar rhetoric blaming the French administration was evident in a letter to the Trusteeship Council that dates from 28.1.1958, written from exile and titled "Memorandum on the war waged by France in Kamerun" (U.P.C. Petition, ARMS S-0504-0058), in which the UPC called a council's resolution "timid" and described public order in Cameroon as shaky. They further discredited the Administering Authority and the new Cameroonian government by saying: "In his interview, Mbida gave notice of those preparations when he stated that France and Great Britain were co-ordinating their action with that end in view and when he said he had seen the British Consul at Doula on this subject. That explains why the Administering Authorities did their utmost in the Fourth Committee, by

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8 [The Franco - Kamerunaise friendship in Danger: Alert to kamerunaise and world opinion.]

statements and sometimes humiliating manoeuvres, to prevent the dispatch of a special visiting mission appointed by the General Assembly. The United Nations must choose between the principles of the Charter and support of the Colonialist Powers. […]". And again: "Is it going to stand by idly while France wages a wholesale war of annihilation in Kamerun, a Trust Territory of the United Nations? In short, the whole world is waiting for some gesture from you in this brutal tragedy of a defenceless people struggling against a Power endowed with modern means of extermination." (U.P.C. Petition, Moumié and Ouandié, ARMS S-0504-0058).

It is thus obvious that the U.P.C. used a much more aggressive, alarming, and accusatory language than the French administration, which might be explained by their positionality and of their failure to receive attention and legitimacy via other security speech acts. Even though the forum of the UN was used intensively, the diplomacy in front of the Trusteeship left the U.P.C. disappointed as early as 1955. In 1957 a telegram arrived at the UN General Assembly; "The Authorities put military pressure on Kamerun population to vote in election under loi cadre contrary to Kamerun wishes. We protest vehemently against this act which infringes dispositions of United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration Human Rights. We call on UNations to send immediately international forces to quell second envisaged attach on Kamerun by French Government." (Ngimbus, Vice President, 21.12.1956, ARMS S-0443-0026). Furthermore, Um Nyobé demanded several things from the French authorities: "amnesty, the recognition that the term 'Cameroun State under Trusteeship' is self-contradictory, and a declaration by French Government 'regarding the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Kamerun'" (Atangana 2010)

Particularly striking is the link between macrosecuritization and the local level, where support for the UPC was growing, despite the fact that they were no longer invited to speak in front of the council. Even though the U.P.C. had very few chances to express political ideas to the Cameroonian public, the resistance against the French administration expanded, as was observed by the French authorities; "Depuis Décembre 1956, directement ou indirectement, l'opposition à la politique francaise au Cameroun, s'est renforcée" (Bilan des Attentats, L'Union des Populations Du Camer-

oun, 11.4.1957, ANOM DPCT 26)[9]. In this regard, the U.P.C. directly challenged the policies introduced by the French administration immensely. Over the years of the Trusteeship, the U.P.C. went from being an oppositional party to outlawry and terrorism. Only in 1991 was the U.P.C. reinstated from outlawry, when a political thaw created new parties (Krieger 1994: 610). This perception of dangerousness was initially represented by the French administration, only later to be followed by the newly elected Cameroonian government and the British Trusteeship Administration. As one forum where the U.P.C. was successfully excluded, the Trusteeship Council enhanced security speech acts while presenting a platform of organizing language in the form of competition, even though the initial aim was desecuritization.

Still, the U.P.C. was able to open the subject of conflict – national sovereignty – for the global audience and make it into a subject of debate – even though the party was not able to make their claim a priority in the situation of competition on attention and legitimacy. What might be decisive in this case was the use of violence within the circumstances of an internationally-led statebuilding process. Even though the U.P.C. was considered a political representative in the beginning of the Trusteeship, and despite the fact that it won credibility on the local level even after its prohibition, the decision making in the trusteeship council went against U.P.C. claims and legitimacy. The use of violence, beginning in 1955, made the U.P.C., as a political representative for Cameroon's future, intolerable within the Trusteeship Council, even though it continued to make appearances after its prohibition (for instance in discussing matters of the independence for the British Part).

Nonetheless, it appears that in this period a certain logic of competition evolved by which the French representative tried to change the conditions for competition through securitization moves, which resulted in the exclusion of the U.P.C. from political decision making, even after the Cameroonians elected their own government. From framing them as being close to the communist movement, the U.P.C. was now seen and presented as remote and dangerous for the political future of the nation. The actions of the French administration, however, were regarded as legitimate since they performed the state monopoly of violence in the name of the

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9 [Since December 1956, directly or indirectly, opposition to the French policy in Cameroon has increased.]

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Cameroonians. Thus, the Administration convinced the Council that violence was necessary in order to secure public order. The third party in this case, the trusteeship council, performed here as the projection of the international community. The council was thus the audience for establishing a consensus and did not follow its own interests. Strikingly, the Trusteeship Council contained the conflict by breaking with colonial norms (see for instance the racial discrimination cases), but also followed the same logic and provided an arena for intensive security speech acts. This is even more surprising when contrasted with other international organizations, such as the International League for the Rights of Men, which positioned itself clearly in favour of the claim of the U.P.C.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter, we drew on the externalist perspective of securitization theory in order to explore two crucial facilitating conditions for mid-level security dynamics in the postcolonial context of Cameroon. First, we argued that the Trusteeship Council functioned as a global audience and a forum for public communication during the statebuilding period, which was used for addressing threats and portraying the other party as dangerous and immoral. Secondly, we argued that macrosecuritization, in the historical context of decolonization, served as a facilitating condition, as the conflict parties – mainly the U.P.C. and the French government – were able to readily link their security claims to an already established macro framework. From our case study, it can be concluded that the macrosecuritization of decolonization as well as the Trusteeship Council, as a global audience, enabled a competition between securitizing actors, and served as a facilitating condition for the emergence of a specific security dynamic between France and the U.P.C. We used archival material, such as petitions, speeches in front of the Council and minutes from Trusteeship meetings to illustrate the argument that the Trusteeship functioned as the audience for security speech acts for the respective actors.

According to the theoretical assumptions, France and the U.P.C. perceived and presented each other as mutually threatening and made securitizing attempts to compete for legitimacy and attention, as seen in the debate on representation. The acknowledgement of the Council appeared to be of interest to both actors, especially as a means of discrediting the other. Even though the whole system of Trusteeship was aimed at desecuriti-

zation, and thus at the creation of a sovereign state, the dynamic of competition also fuelled the conflict at the local level, which was evident in statements of the newly elected Cameroonian government that followed the mode of competition in depicting the U.P.C as an illegitimate party. Furthermore, we showed how, and to what extent, securitizing actors combined and linked their claims with macrosecuritizing positions –national sovereignty on the one hand, and Cold War threats on the other. The U.P.C. was portrayed as being close to the communist movement and dangerous for successful statebuilding and the political future of Cameroon. The French administration, however, were regarded as legitimate, since they performed the state monopoly of violence in the name of Cameroonians.

One of our aims was to introduce a historical perspective into the research on macrosecuritization, not only for the purpose of enriching empirical research in this area but also to further develop the discussion on facilitating conditions in securitization studies. In the future, this could be carried out by comparing cases of securitized decolonization, as well as cases of international rule after the end of the Cold War, which were beyond the remit of this particular macrosecuritization framework.

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Part 2

The De/Construction of Security in the Building of the "Second Republic" in Turkey, 2002-2015

İlkim Özdikmenli

1. Introduction

This chapter aims to elucidate the goals and means of the social construction of security during periods of the (re)founding of government institutions within polarized societies. It takes as its example the case of Turkey, which has undergone an attempted regime change under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Since this 13-year-old process owes much to the concurrent desecuritization and securitization of different sectors of society, politics and the economy, this case can offer many insights into various discussions around securitization theory – such as the significance of socio-political context; the role of actors and their interactions, particularly in the face of an audience prone to polarization; the limits of existing conceptual toolkits in non-OECD contexts; and whether or not religion can be viewed as a distinct security sector.

The far-reaching transformation of the Turkish state and society under the Islamist AKP since 2002 has been regarded by most academic and political circles as the establishment of a "Second Republic", since the AKP has radically altered the fundamentals of the (First) Republic founded in 1923. Major "path-breaking" shifts include full-scale economic liberalization, a reversal of the exclusion of religion from the public sphere through the introduction of religious elements into basic education and public debate, the search for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem, the curbing of the Turkish military's political activity, and an unprecedented activism in foreign policy. This is not to say that the founding principles of the Turkish Republic had remained unaltered for 80 years, but rather that the basic paradigm embedded in the wider international system had not been radically challenged until the 2000s. However, a significant divergence took place in the first decade of the new millennium, even against the loosening standards of the 1990s.

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In the last decade, it has become increasingly accepted to read the AKP-led transformation of Turkey as a consolidation of democracy. The focal point of this reading is the triumphal resurrection of previously excluded and subdued societal groups and their political elites (periphery) against the secularist/Kemalist state elites (center). "Securitization theory" has provided several concepts which have been integrated into an overall model for contrasting certain domestic policies of the Islamist AKP and the secularist establishment. The two domestic policy pillars of this model consist of the AKP's twin desecuritization of the Kurdish issue and of political Islam, while a desecuritization of certain foreign actors has also been evident in the policy goals of EU membership and of having "zero problems with neighbors". Alongside the locally produced center/periphery narrative, this portrayal of the AKP as an exclusively desecuritizing actor, one opposed by the power of the "inner state", has roots in the recent theoretical debate on the securitization of religion and the ensuing reconceptualization of secularism since the late 1990s. Many students of security have since then focused on the ways in which secular regimes have securitized religion – indeed, some have gone even further and suggested that secularism itself is a politics of exceptionalism, as it regards the inclusion of religion in public deliberation as a threat to the very existence of the public sphere. These approaches are critically examined in the first section of this paper. I argue that the discourse on the desecuritization of religion has been nested in a securitization of secularism, and I offer a critique of this tendency to put political manifestations of religion and its opposite, secularism (i.e. limiting political manifestations of religion), in the same box labeled "threats to identity".

The second section examines how these recent theoretical trends have been operationalized in the Turkish context by presenting and critically evaluating the claim that, since 2002, the AKP has acted as a desecuritizing actor. The most important flaw of liberal and conservative approaches to the construction of security in the creation of the Second Republic is their inability to grasp the continuity and totality of the AKP's political strategy. As of September 2015, the Second Republic, or the "New Turkey" as the government calls it, is on the brink of collapse, or at least of a serious reconfiguration of political forces. Haunted by a severe legitimacy crisis, one visible in a wave of protests, by internal conflict within the ruling bloc, and by declining foreign support, the AKP government has become a highly uncontainable actor since 2013. This has forced main-

stream approaches to revise some of their assumptions about the party and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

This article, however, argues instead that the AKP has not, since its inception, behaved solely as a desecuritizing actor: indeed, it has been as much a securitizing actor as the secularist establishment. Simultaneous or consecutive securitizing and desecuritizing acts of the same subject become explicable only when they are viewed as part of a broader construction of a "regime of truth". The last section of this chapter examines major securitization acts undertaken by the AKP since its accession to power, together with other context-transforming elements of the construction of a "regime of truth". The research focuses on Erdoğan's own speech acts, which is justified on the grounds of his uncontested leadership of the party, especially in terms of his decision-making position and rhetorical skills. The last section also aims to present the regime changing consequences of the desecuritization of political Islam and the securitization of secularism.

2. Desecuritization of religion? Securitization of secularism?

The AKP was established in 2001 by the "reformist" wing of the Islamist National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement[1] after a split with the "traditionalists". The party, which defined itself as democratic, conservative, reformist and modern (AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi 2002: 21-25), was able to win a majority in the parliamentary elections of 2002, which were held soon after one of the most devastating economic crises in Turkish history. The AKP proceeded to increase its share of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2011. The downfall of the worn out political parties of the 1990s resulted from a decade of acute economic crisis, low intensity

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[1] Until the late 1960s Islamist views in Turkey had been represented in democratic politics by center-right parties. Milli Görüş movement re-established Islamism in 1970 with a distinct political ideology, agenda and organization. The National Order Party and its successors (National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, and Virtue Party) have been closed down by the state for their anti-secular and anti-constitutional activities but they have managed to popularize Islamist views, to win many metropolitan municipalities including İstanbul, and even to govern as coalition partner in 1974, 1975-78, and 1996-97. The split in the movement after the closure of the Virtue Party in 2001 resulted in the establishment of the AKP. See Atacan 2005: 187-199; Yıldız 2003: 187-209.

war in the South East against the Kurdish separatist organization PKK, several unsolved murders of Kemalist, socialist and Kurdish intellectuals, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Against this background, the rise of the AKP was welcomed by many domestic factions of differing ideological provenance, as well as by international actors, most of whom regarded it as a revolution made by peripheral social forces against the secularist bureaucratic center. How the Turkish military and civilian bureaucracy acted as "guardians" of the regime, how they securitized Islam by defining it as a threat, and how they justified non-democratic, exclusionary policies – all of these issues were taken up by scholars and mainstreamed during the 2000s. In order to better understand this approach, we need to examine recent literature which has dealt with the securitization of religion either as a societal sector or as a completely separate sector.

The Copenhagen School has made many significant contributions to security studies, but the idea of societal security is of particular relevance to our subject. While the state is the referent object in political, military, environmental and economic sectors, it is society that constitutes the referent object for societal security. Wæver et al. have defined societal security as "the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats" (Wæver et al. 1993: 23-26). While "sovereignty" is the criterion of state survival, "identity" is the criterion of societal security (Wæver 1995: 67).

Some critiques of, or supplements to, this idea are also worth noting. The definition of "identity security" as the capacity "to continue to live as itself" is already quite controversial. It is legitimate to ask "is there room for change when identity is defined in an essentialist manner?" or "are all identities worth preserving?" Against the criticism that they have conceptualized identity "as fixed rather than constructed", Buzan and Wæver have pointed out the analytical merits of separating identity construction from fortified identities (Buzan/Hansen 2009: 215). Still, their affirmative approach to desecuritization might in some cases make their framework potentially useful for conservative political aims.

Another related set of questions concern the agents through which a society speaks. In the societal sector, it is not clear who can speak with legitimacy – that is, who can make a security claim on behalf of society. Wæver has stressed that societies are not undifferentiated but full of hierarchies, which makes "some better placed than others to speak on behalf of 'their' societies", and that "most often, there are no generally legitimized, uncontested representatives of society," (Wæver 1995: 69-70).

Wæver admits that there are risks involved in integrating various societal actors into the normal political game, in other words, in "the potential empowerment of various self-declared 'voices of society', including fascist and other anti-foreigner ones." Nevertheless, he thinks it is worth the risk. (Wæver 1999: 337). A significant aspect of the Copenhagen School's intellectual activity has indeed addressed how immigrants, Europeanization or cultural imperialism are being securitized, how "culture becomes security policy", and how this process could be reversed (Wæver 1995: 67-68).

Religion had not occupied an important place in the literature on securitization until the 2000s. But new debates were triggered by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the 9/11 attacks, the ensuing War on Terror, and the multiculturalist critique of some state practices against religious minorities. Religion had been considered a part of the societal sector until Lausten and Wæver co-authored an article in 2000, in which they argued that religion, conceptualised as faith rather than as community, might be seen as a separate sector (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 709). They claimed that *faith* is the referent object, and one's *being before God* is the criterion of survival. Religion, therefore, has fundamental "structural affinities" to securitization. Since religion is existential, the "threats" against it are often seen as existential, "demanding immediate and effective action by the state or an entity endowed with similar power". It is thus always tempting to securitize religion (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 719, 732).

Lausten and Wæver theorize on the conflict between "fundamentalists" and "secularists" who, they argue, have different opinions about the proper sphere of religion — either public or private. Referring to Juergensmeyer, they mention an understudied "irrational hatred some secularists harbor against the potency of religion" and state that the term "fundamentalism" (versus "conservatism") often serves to securitize. Among those conflicts around the world involving religion, mutual securitization between "fundamentalists" and "secularists" is much more common than religion-against-religion cases, and "securitization on behalf of secularization against 'fundamentalism' justifies many violations of democracy and civil liberties."(Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 720-723, 739). However, Lausten and Wæver's approach here is different from the approach that has dominated the literature in the following decade, in the sense that it does not completely break with the idea of secularity. Their call for desecuritization in this sector is a call for avoiding any ideologization of religion. For them,

> "Ideology is religion securitized. It is important to stress that securitizing religion means impoverishing it. By using religion for political gains one denies

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> the transcendence of the divine call.…Ideology is quasi-religion, not religion per se.…De-securitization then means de-securitizing ideology, or in other words respecting religion as it is." (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 726)

They of course have concerns beyond the impoverishment of religion through securitization; they regard religiously based securitizations as especially dangerous, since such securitizations are more inclined to mobilize violence "due to the logic of cosmic war" (Laustsen/Wæver 2000: 738-739).

The extent to which religious discourse can be included in public debate is not clear in this initial attempt. However, as the fervor of the War on Terror declined, other voices emerged to criticize the war's ineffectiveness, as well as the legal and social pressure on Muslim minorities in Western countries. Many students of securitization have derived their theoretical premises from critical secularization theories which reject the model of universal and linear decline of religion in the modern age (See Martin 1969; Glasner 1977; Towler 1974; Berger 1967; Hadden/Shupe 1989). These scholars have frequently focused on the ways secular regimes have securitized religion.

Mavelli argued that Laustsen and Wæver's approach reproduced Ken Booth's argument that the public sphere is a forum based on rational argumentation, compromise and consensus, with the involvement of religion in politics undermining the very existence of a public sphere. For Mavelli, this approach had fundamental problems. In the first place, a narrow definition of religion as "sensuality, emotionality and irrationality" implies that it is prone to violence and cannot be a part of the realm of rational deliberation. Hence, the desecuritization Laustsen and Wæver offer is not desecuritization as we know it; i.e., an attempt to shift religion from security to politics. Rather, "religion-turned-ideology" is shifted to the private sphere, *beneath* politics, on the grounds that religion in the public sphere represents a potential security threat, which actually entails a re-securitization of religion (Mavelli 2011: 2, 14). Nevertheless, it seems that Wæver had considerably revised his approach by 2007. He argued that fortifying secularism as a non-debatable principle confirmed the enemy image of the West in the eyes of the Muslim world. Instead, he proposes an acceptance of "value-full access to political debate", thus a "post-secularism" (Wæver 2008: 208-235):

> "The strategy of 'political solutions to cultural conflict' is not only impossible, but also part of the problem. It draws on the basic secularist, Hobbesian narrative of the modern state and state system: differences among people are

the problem; and if not contained by politics, will generate war. The role of politics, in turn, is to organize and constrain these subterranean forces and establish order. But today, most of the important conflicts derive from the inadequacies of this Hobbesian, Westphalian (secularist) model. It is not differences as such that generate conflict, but rather the blurring of differences and distinctions in a globalizing world and the ensuing, desperate attempts to mark out new differences through ethno-nationalism, fundamentalism and violence." (Wæver 2008: 229-230)

This understanding of secularism emphasizes the differences between European and American models of secularization, with the latter presented as the "proper" one. Mavelli expresses this as a dichotomy between "freedom *from* belief" and "freedom *to* believe". He argues that European elites and ordinary people are inclined to interpret the decline of religion as "normal and progressive". In this context, French securitization agents have constructed headscarves as an existential threat to the French values of freedom and equality between sexes, and to social cohesion, which parallels certain justifications of the War on Terror which invoked images of oppressed Afghan women (Mavelli 2013: 163, 172).[2] Sheikh supports this idea by arguing that doctrines of secularism and freedom are little different from religious doctrines in their use of myths and framing as incontestable (Sheikh 2014: 265-266). Jacoby and Yavuz similarly claim that secularism has been turned into a form of political religion in many European countries, adding that political claims based on religion have been considered a security threat (Jacoby/Yavuz 2008: 2).

In this line of argument, secular and religious worldviews are accorded equal epistemic and moral worth, as a postmodern approach might suggest. The desecuritization of headscarf wearing, which the AKP have depicted as an individual responsibility toward, principally, God, and then "even as a symbol" of political Islam, thus also entailed a celebration of headscarves. It has come to represent "the means both of *being* and *becoming* a certain kind of person", so any "silencing" of women in the name of liberating them from familial and social oppression has been condemned (Mavelli 2013: 176-177). Nilüfer Göle has argued that the classical Habermasian model of a public sphere based on rational-critical debate has become insufficient: "As distinct from the Enlightenment notion of the

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2 Another example is the "Muhammad cartoon crisis" in Denmark 2005. According to Hansen, the attitude of the newspaper that published cartoons was structurally incorporated within the macrosecuritizing discourse of "the clash of civilizations" (Hansen 2011: 364).

public sphere, which was assumed upon a Universalist definition of citizens and a homogenous national sphere, today, identity-based movements display and make public religious, ethnic, gender and sexual differences." (Göle 2006: 24). She thus offers a performative, rather than a communicative, understanding of the public sphere.

I agree with Mert that the recent revisiting of religion and secularity is a product of the postmodernist reduction of worldviews and modi vivendi to aesthetic choices (Mert 1994: 89-90). But this ignores the fact that secularism, though "imposed from above" by "republican elites", has resonated with the public, because secularization has historical-sociological roots – such as the birth of new structures of knowledge as required by capitalist production and their dissemination through public education, or a popular break with ancient regimes that had been underpinned by traditional-religious worldviews. The historical-sociological roots of secularism display themselves in the reaction to fundamentalism; e.g., the conflict over the definition of the nation or, to be more precise, whether or not Islam will be involved in the definition of nation. This has created a major fault line throughout the history of modern Turkey, and the active fault line between Islamism and secularism has "real", "regime-changing" political consequences. For a better understanding of the deep legitimacy crisis the AKP has found itself in since 2013, the party's securitization of Islamic identity should be recontextualized.

A final interrelated critique of the above-mentioned theoretical trends concerns the tangible threat posed by fundamentalism in the East as opposed to the West. Although most Western liberal democracies are economically and politically strong enough to absorb or marginalize various extremist societal elements, the prospects for a desecuritization of religion in non-European contexts are more limited. As Browning and McDonald argue, the dichotomy between "panic politics" and "normal politics" applies in a liberal democratic context, but the implications of alternative security conceptions and practices in other contexts should be reflexively examined. Even in liberal democracies, the normative commitment to desecuritization does not help in engaging with difficult questions such as when and how to curtail "hate speech" (Browning/McDonald 2011: 14-17). While desecuritization/repoliticization may be appropriate in a particular context or with respect to a particular issue, other areas may be more suited to non-politicization (i.e. not delegating an issue to the state and not making it a topic of public debate and decision (Buzan/Hansen

2009: 214)). Rejecting secularism in the name of an empty universal ideal of desecuritization seems like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

The rising trend within scholarly literature to represent public appearances of Islam not as threats to democracy and secularism (the American version) but as enriching aspects of it has been accompanied by objections to Islamists' exclusion from politics on security grounds. In the Turkish case, the logical conclusion of this approach has been to portray the AKP as a change-oriented actor that tried "to turn threats into challenges" (Wæver 1995: 55) in contrast to the "conservative" actors of the twentieth century. Arguments which adopt this narrative will be examined and criticized in the following section, which offers an understanding of securitization and desecuritization practices not simply in terms of speech acts but as part of a political strategy for transforming context and audience.

3. Taking the AKP at face value: the long-awaited desecuritizing actor

Embedded in this broader questioning of the secularization paradigm, a further sociological paradigm shift with respect to Turkey also played out during the 2000s. Ardıç has suggested that, in studies of Turkish secularization, there has been a shift from a "conflict paradigm", which assumes that religion and modernity are incongruous, to an "accommodation paradigm", which emphasizes the continual social and psychological functions of Islam as an identity constructing meaning system (Ardıç 2008: 61-92). The accommodation paradigm has its roots in the 1980s and 1990s, and its pioneer is Şerif Mardin, who also introduced the concepts "center" and "periphery"[3]. A new analysis of political Islam has complemented the changing perception about the relationship between modernity and Islam. This analysis argues that Islamist actors eager to effect the reincorporation of Turkey into the new global economy have gained the upper hand over secular nationalists who could not adapt to the post-Soviet world fast enough and thus found themselves in a reactionary position. Indeed, some of those liberal and conservative scholars who salute the AKP

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3 While the center refers to those groups who have enjoyed a privileged status in the state apparatus ever since the Ottoman era, the periphery is an amorphous category that corresponds to those who are excluded from such influential circles. As opposed to the secular worldview of the center, the periphery mostly has a semantic world constructed by religion. See Mardin 1973.

as a representative of the periphery have also borrowed concepts from critical security studies in order to credit the AKP with a visionary role in this area. The party's initial engagement with EU reforms, especially regarding the civilianization of policy-making, reinforced the expectation that the party would reverse the panic politics created by the Turkish state throughout republican history, particularly those directed at Islamists and Kurds.[4]

Savvides had used a Habermasian framework to define the secular center as a securitizing force, as we can see below:

> "Ataturk's reforms and, especially, what followed them, led to the colonization of the lifeworld of Turkey's society, which meant the "exclusion of the Islamic lifeworld" by a state elite attempting to construct a collective identity from above. This, in turn, led popular Islam down a one way street to reassert itself and reclaim its lifeworld from the state. Hence, political Islam gradually became the internal and imagined enemy to the Kemalist elite who securitized it. Losing its legitimacy and under a direct challenge from the bottom, Kemalism returned to the methods of "coercion and exclusion" in an effort to re-colonize the public sphere." (Savvides 2000: 66)

The argument that the principle of secularism has served as a tool for securitizing political Islam and establishing a firm control over religious life soon gained wide currency. Duran states that "securitization has to be seen as a key to understanding the relationship between Islam and the state in Turkey" (Duran 2010: 21). Gürbüz refers to the "postmodern coup" in 28 February 1997 as an example of securitization; he argues that although the military did not take over the government, the secular elite succeeded in justifying actions outside the boundaries of political procedure, such as censorship, party closure, dismissals from office, and various forms of discrimination, including expulsions from universities for wearing headscarves (Gürbüz 2009: 239). In Yavuz's words, it was a period of "monitoring, controlling and criminalizing all Islamic activism as a security threat, and institutionalizing a permanent legal framework for ostracizing devout and active Turkish Muslims from the market, educational, and political spheres." (Yavuz 2003: 277). Polat adds the securitization of minorities, particularly Kurds, to this picture and argues that, in the 1990s, the Centre resorted to securitization in the face of new challenges, such as

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4 For some studies that read the AKP's accession and rise in terms of a center/periphery dichotomy, see Çınar 2013; Yavuz, 2006; Çarkoğlu 2007; Özbudun 2006; Cizre 2008; İnsel 2003.

the rise of a new Muslim bourgeoisie that robustly articulated the demands of some peripheral forces, and the rise of Kurdish national movement (Polat 2009: 132-133).

It is true that the capture of PKK leader Öcalan and the approval of Turkey's candidature for the EU in 1999 opened a new chapter in the construction of security. Deputy Prime Minister Yılmaz's speech in August 2001, in which he identified and criticized a "national security syndrome", was indeed the first significant speech act to deconstruct threat perceptions. The AKP emerged in this context as a desecuritizing actor, either out of a sincere desire for democracy or for its own protection from the distrusted establishment. The AKP's initial reformist activity centered upon revising the composition of the National Security Council, the highest discussion and coordination body in the field of state security, to include more civilians, while also underlining its advisory character. These reforms were made as part of the EU harmonization process. For some time, Islamists had securitized the issue of EU integration, arguing that it would bring an unwelcome assimilation into European culture and thus a threat to identity (Duran 2010: 15). The AKP, however, sought security in the EU, and the desecuritization of prospective EU membership was expressed in the 2002 Election Manifesto:

> "The ideological approaches of the circles that oppose Turkey's integration into the EU, on issues of national sovereignty, national security, national interest, national and local culture, delays the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. Our party seeks to revisit these concepts that aim to maintain the bureaucratic-statist regime, with a democratic, civilian and pluralist approach based on protection of individual rights and popular participation." (AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi 2002: 24)

As for the Kurdish issue, despite some interruptions, the unilateral cease-fire of the PKK between 1998 and 2004 prepared a favorable environment for the retreat of panic politics. Although mutual violence has since returned, Erdoğan signaled a shift in the approach to the problem in his historic speech delivered in August 2005 in Diyarbakır, the largest Kurdish city in Turkey. He stated that "a strong state, a great nation is one that confidently walks towards the future by confronting its past and bringing to the table the mistakes and sins it has committed." He promised that these past mistakes would not be repeated and that the principles of non-discrimination and equal citizenship would prevail (Milliyet, 12 August 2005). His tacit acceptance of the "Kurdish problem" and the intermittent cease-fires, peace attempts and limited reforms since then have been re-

garded as a desecuritization of the Kurdish issue by the AKP (see Cizre 2003; Kaliber/Tocci 2010).[5]

Another area of AKP-led desecuritization is foreign policy. Firstly, the paradigm shift with respect to the Cyprus problem has received much attention. The AKP government has considered the de facto division of Cyprus as a problem that impeded relations with the EU, rather than as a "national cause". They encouraged Turkish Cypriots to approve the Annan Plan for a permanent solution in 2004 (see Kaliber 2005). It is also possible to trace acts of desecuritization in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East until 2010. Aras and Polat argued that the sources of political Islam and Kurdish separatism had been externalized to neighboring states, notably Syria and Iran, and that the desecuritization of these internal issues thus led to a flexibility and softening in relations with Syria and Iran (Aras/Polat 2008). Particularly significant here has been the role of Ahmet Davutoğlu, former foreign affairs minister and former prime minister: his concept of a "zero-problem policy towards neighbors" has served as the basis for desecuritization acts in Middle Eastern policy (see Murinson 2006). He saw an "opportunity" of regional leadership and economic cooperation, rather than "threats" from hostile neighbours. The limited improvement of relations with Armenia can also be mentioned in this context (see Aras/Akpınar 2011). Up until the Arab Spring, which has opened a new chapter in the region, this departure from the previous tendency to securitize foreign relations continued, with the notable exception of Israel[6].

The most fundamental, but controversial, sector of AKP desecuritization has been political Islam. As presented in the first section, the theoretical critique of the securitization of religion involves a securitization of secularism. In practice, too, the desecuritization of political Islam requires a counter-securitization move, rather than its simple removal from the security agenda. Since fundamentalism intrinsically aims at an expansion of religious norms from the private to the public sphere, Islamist actors intentionally blur the difference between religion as a cultural entity and religion as a political entity, accusing secular states of fighting against Islam itself. Nevertheless, the desecuritization of political Islam has been a chal-

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5 For an analysis of the security speak regarding non-Muslim minorities, see Soner 2010.

6 For the differing threat perceptions of the AKP and "Kemalist elite" regarding Israel, and successive desecuritization and securitization of Israel, see Balcı/Kardaş 2012; Ovalı/Bozdağlıoğlu 2012.

lenging and rather belated undertaking. Most studies in this area focus on the ongoing power of the military, or the "inner state", as the main reason for the slow pace of the process. The e-memorandum of the military in 2007[7], and the closure case in 2008[8], displayed the ongoing assertiveness of the secularist military and civilian bureaucracy. But this is only part of the explanation. Desecuritizing Islamism at a stroke would have evoked a legitimacy crisis that the AKP was not yet prepared for, either politically or ideologically. Desecuritization has thus been gradual and indirect in this sector, and the party's break with its radical Islamist past has been emphasised. Improved relations with the West, democratic reforms, and low profile reactions to pro-secular actors' criticisms are indicative of this change in attitude. This moderate/radical distinction made it possible for political Islam to be framed as a movement that could be challenged through normal political processes. It was not until 2008 that Erdoğan made his famous "even if it were a political symbol" statement about headscarves, and that the AKP initiated legislative attempts to revoke the ban on wearing headscarves in universities. In that statement Erdoğan attempted to desecuritize political Islam in a direct manner:

> "We do not have 'Islamists', we only have 'Muslims'. 'Islamist', like some shopkeeper.[9] This is ugly. There have been attempts to introduce that word into political literature but it is not suitable. We only have 'Muslims'. If a Muslim meets the requirements of religion properly, we call him 'devout'.

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7 E-memorandum refers to a statement released by the Turkish General Staff on its website in 2007. For the first time in republican history, an Islamist figure (Abdullah Gül) has run for presidency, and the statement expressed the concerns and will of armed forces about the future of secularism. It is stated that the Turkish Armed Forces were a party in the debates about secularism as "absolute defenders of secularism," and that they were prepared "to display attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary" and "to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey" (Sabah, 27 April 2007). For a detailed account of the conflicts in 2007, see Polat 2009.

8 In March 2008 Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor filed a lawsuit in request for the closure of the AKP and five-year ban of 71 politicians, including the President, from politics, on charges of becoming a hub of anti-secular activities. Missing only one vote for closure, the Constitutional Court decided in July to strip the party of treasury aid implying that the AKP has been found partially guilty of anti-secularism.

9 In Turkish, Islamist refers to "İslamcı". The suffix "-ci" in Turkish is mostly used to coin a new word to signify someone who makes or sells what the root word signifies. As a counter move, Erdoğan and his followers were to invent the word "laikçi" (secularist).

> […] University-age women wearing headscarves have been under pressure as they have been accused of using their headscarves as a "political symbol". Let's suppose that they wear it as a political symbol, can you consider it a crime? Can you bring in a ban on symbols?" (Zaman, 15 January 2008; Today's Zaman, 15 January 2008)

The desecuritization acts mentioned above have contributed to a scholarly assessment of Turkish politics in the 2000s which posits a contrast between a conservative and static state living in a "perennial insecurity complex" (Aydin 2003: 163-184), led by an autonomous and isolated military (Aydinli 2013: 1148), and a group of excluded reformists with a broad foothold in society, challenging the "realness" of threats. Bilgin states that a scholarly consensus explains Turkey's failed path to democratization through a "national security syndrome" and the use of "security-speak" by the state establishment. This scholarly consensus also links the post-1999 transformation to the AKP government's "skilled maneuvering in minimizing the number of issues framed as 'security problems'" (Bilgin 2007: 556). This, she believes, follows from a celebration of "universal desecuritization", which considers "desecuritization as the superior ethico-political option regardless of time and place" (Bilgin 2007: 557). She suggests that change has become possible because some societal actors, who are in fact the products of the very same political complex that they are expected to challenge, continued to use the security-centered language of the establishment, while introducing new security problems that could be solved by democratization (Bilgin 2007: 557-561). Bilgin offers valuable insights into state-civil society relationships, pointing out the power and authority enjoyed by the state elite in the field of security production. However, the appeal of democratic reforms in the early 2000s has restrained most scholars, even those suspicious of adopting the assumption that "center securitizes, periphery desecuritizes", from analyzing how the AKP has, from the very beginning of its rule, engaged in securitizing moves and in a comprehensive project of context transformation.

For example, scholarly observers have tended to emphasize factors external to the AKP in explaining securitizing acts related to the Kurdish issue. Aydınlı has pointed out that this issue's continued potential for generating widespread societal fear has made it an easy target for securitization (Aydinli 2013: 1156). Polat has implied that the AKP has been forced to use the language of hawkish nationalism because of certain international developments, such as the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, the disappearance of the EU as an anchor for Turkey, and excessive

securitizing moves from opposition parties and the army (Polat 2008: 81-85). Nonetheless, those who stress subjective factors in the AKP's retreat from reformism have been trapped into self-referential explanations like "reform fatigue" (Patton 2007: 340).

The AKP's rule is commonly analyzed in three phases that correspond to the electoral cycle: 2002-2007, 2007-2011, and 2011-2015. The scholarly literature that regards the AKP as a desecuritizing actor in the first and/or second phase fail to see the totality and continuity in the party's strategy, which also explains the progressive escalation of social polarization. I argue that this failure is underpinned by a unidimensional, linear and speech-act-based understanding of securitization that ignores context transformation.

The term "regime of truth"; i.e., established "legitimate causes of fear, of unease, of doubt and uncertainty," (Bigo 2006: 8) as developed by the Paris School of security studies, is highly illuminating here. According to the Copenhagen School, a new regime of truth is authorized through the securitizing "speech act" that resonates with a significant audience. Mavelli, however, argues that, "in the case of the Paris School, the relation appears to be reversed: an already-existing 'regime of truth' authorises a securitizing 'speech act', which is nothing else than a 'louder' manifestation of a process of securitisation". Therefore, the "exceptional" makes sense only if the "routines" of politics and administration have already laid the ground for it (Mavelli 2013: 174). Defining securitization as the activity of constructing a regime of truth better reflects the totality of the phenomenon than defining it as the one-time framing of a certain issue as an existential threat. The back and forth movement of the AKP, between securitizing and desecuritizing acts, thus ceases to appear so schizophrenic. The next section will focus on the AKP as a securitizing actor within this framework.

4. AKP as a securitizing actor: the construction of a "regime of truth"

The AKP's regime of truth consists of two meta-elements: the creation of the perception that the main political cleavage in Turkey lies between "conservative globalists and defensive nationalists,"[10] and the securitiza-

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10 The terms belong to Öniş 2009.

tion of secularism/desecuritization of political Islam as mirror images. The former owes much to securitization in the economic sector, and was mostly complete by 2007. Against this background, the e-memorandum, closure case and Republican Rallies[11] could be circumvented and legal operations against potential agents of resistance launched. The latter element is the work of an intellectual coalition between conservatives and liberal/liberal-left circles, who agreed on a reading of Republican history as an attack on the symbolic and semantic world of the periphery where religion functioned as the major source of identity and meaning. Yet the AKP waited until 2010 to initiate an overt securitization of secularism and an attack on basic secular principles.

With respect to the first element in the AKP's regime of truth: besides the desecuritization of the EU mentioned in the previous chapter, a simultaneous securitization in the economic sector played a crucial role in the creation of the globalist-nationalist dichotomy. The AKP's electoral campaign in 2002 and subsequent liberal reforms were based on a securitization of the economy. The accomplishment of economic security was promised within a liberal anti-corruption and pro-stability framework. Also in need of justification was the shift from the relatively slow and interrupted pace of privatization and deregulation of the 1990s, to a comprehensive economic liberalization under a strict IMF program.[12] The basic element of the speech act was the 2001 financial crisis, which led to massive shutdowns and unemployment. In a speech delivered in 2003, for the 932nd anniversary of a historic war, Erdoğan stated that "Our country is now under another sneaky attack. The enemy today is the economic crisis. …The War of Liberation has started. We are in close combat with economic crisis, inflation, unemployment, injustice and embezzlers, and we have the support of the Turkish people" (Hürriyet 2003, 27 August 2003). Erdoğan reminded his audience, from time to time, of the days of "pain and bitter experience when inflation was above 100% and interest was

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11 It refers to a series of mass rallies in Spring 2007, initiated by the Association of Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) in the name of protecting Republican values. Several million people attended these rallies to protest the likely nomination of an Islamist politician for presidency.

12 The fact that while the rrevenue generated from privatization of public enterprises amounted to $8 billion between 1986 and 2002, the AKP generated $28 billion revenue from the privatization only within six years, displays the scope of transformation (see Şen 2010: 74).

above 1000%, and when we did not know what was going to happen the next day." (Hürriyet 2004b, 22 May 2004). In a speech delivered in 2004, he simultaneously securitized and desecuritized, condemning panic-mongers while also making some alarming statements, emphasizing the "swamp in which we struggled only one and a half years ago." (Hürriyet 2004a, 12 May 2004).

Populism has also been framed as an existential threat to the economy. Erdoğan claimed that the people did not demand populist policies but justice, honesty, productivity, and respect:

> "The people want to be able to see the future, and they see now. We could have fired blank and claimed that we would resolve problems immediately after the 3 November 2002 elections. The politicians before us did. We did not; we made long-term observations. We do not aim to get the economy back on its feet for only a couple of months and then let it be. We do the projection of the next 5, 10 and 50 years. We want the Turkish economy to experience a permanent and stable growth." (Hürriyet 2004c, 23 May 2004)

The construction of a new type of populism has accompanied the neoliberal rejection of economic populism in Turkey under the AKP. This was necessary for successful securitization. Balzacq points out the contingency of securitization "upon the securitizing actor's ability to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests". Borrowing from Schneider and Ingram, he argues that securitizing actors "develop maps of target populations based on both the stereotypes [of the referent subject] they themselves hold and those they believe to prevail among that segment of the public likely to become important to them." (Balzacq 2005: 184). In our case, we observe a cultural populism based on a socio-cultural identification of the charismatic leader and the poor devout Muslim. Since his first electoral campaign, Erdoğan has emphasized his lower class origins, how he sold bagels, water and lemon in the streets of İstanbul to earn a living. He contrasted himself with other political leaders who were supposedly born with silver spoons in their mouths (Milliyet 2002, 29 October 2002). Aytaç and Öniş define such populism as "a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages." (Aytaç/Öniş 2013). The anti-establishment stance is expressed through a "people versus the power elite" dichotomy while, in fact, the citizens lack "meaningful control over the political processes" but "are frequently left with plebiscitary 'take it or leave it' choices." (Aytaç/Öniş 2013). Construction of this "right-wing

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populism" has been very influential in changing the context in Turkey over the last decade.

Having won the right/center-right votes in the 2007 elections that had previously been dispersed among multiple parties (rising from 34% to 47%), and securing the election of Abdullah Gül as President after a struggle with the secular establishment, the AKP began to engage in the elimination of potential centers of resistance to regime change through a series of legal proceedings. Sledgehammer (*Balyoz*), Ergenekon, Oda TV, Group of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK) cases, and various corruption cases against municipalities run by other political parties, have served as a means of criminalizing political rivals. The rapid increase in the applications to the European Court of Human Rights displays the extent of "emergency measures" the AKP has taken against those rivals.[13] The suspicion that these investigations would turn into a "politically motivated witch hunt" (Jenkins 2009) against opponents of the AKP and the Gülen movement[14], and that those cases signaled a transition from military to police tutelage, proved justified. In the Balyoz case, for example, hundreds of retired and active military officers, including former army, navy, and air force commanders, were sentenced to between thirteen and twenty years' imprisonment for involvement in a so-called attempted coup against the government in 2003. In 2014, the case was reopened following the AKP-Gülen split, and all defendants were acquitted on the grounds that accusations were based on unconvincing and probably fabricated evidence. These investigations have been made possible by the AKP's successful depiction of an "ultranationalist and pro-coup mindset" ("residue of the First Republic") as a threat to stability, democracy and peace. Erdoğan has firmly stood behind the investigations (until 2014), implying that there were indeed plans afoot to terrorize and destabilize Turkey in order to set the stage for a coup (Vatan 2008, 16 July 2008; Radikal 2009, 5 March 2009). The main opposition party, CHP, has been

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13 Between 2007 and 2011, the number of applications from Turkey allocated to a judicial formation within the ECHR were 2,830, 3,706, 4,474, 5,821, and 8,702, respectively (European Court of Human Rights).

14 Gülen movement or, as they call it, Hizmet (Service) movement is a large and influential religious community in Turkey, whose leader Fethullah Gülen is settled in the USA. Gülen movement has been a close ally of the AKP until 2013, and has especially staffed in law enforcement units from where they are currently being purged.

continually accused of harbouring this pro-coup mindset and of having supported and benefited from coups throughout history (Hürriyet 2012, 24 April 2012).

An assertive desecuritization of political Islam has gone hand in hand with a securitization of secularism as an enduring threat to Islamic identity. The deconstruction of republican history played a major role in both the securitization of secularism, and the ever-expanding post-2007 securitization of political competition. Collective memory, which plays a critical role in securitization processes, is continually tailored to the needs of the day. Every political conflict is therefore an ideological conflict over the representation of the past. The AKP has engaged in speech-acts that framed Turkish secularity, modeled on French *laicité,* and its political agent, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), as an existential threat to Islamic identity. Both early Republican history (1923-1950) and recent history (the 1990s and early 2000s) have been revisited. The short excerpt below is a case in point, for it reflects Erdoğan's securitization of the secular regime in economic, political and societal sectors at the same time:

> "In the past of the CHP, there is deprivation. In their past there is poverty. There are prohibitions and corruptions. There is the azan[15] in Turkish, mosques turned into barns, prohibited religious books, violations of the right to worship. In the past of the CHP, there is repression, persecution, torture. There is a weak and discredited Turkey. And they are still where they were in the past." (Zaman 2011, 9 June 2011)

Such an approach enabled the AKP to securitize any challenge to the counter-hegemony of the liberal-Islamist bloc, particularly since late 2007, and to engage in an accelerated Islamization of the public sphere from above. First among the indicators of Islamization came the educational reform known as the "4+4+4 system". This new system reintroduced imam-hatip schools at the second stage of primary education (for students aged 9-13). These schools have an Islamic curriculum, pursuant to the aim of producing imams and preachers. They currently train over one million students in secondary and high school level: and their graduates compete for university entrance with graduates of normal schools on equal terms. This creates many more students who are raised along religious educational

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15 Azan is religious chant calling for prayer, traditionally recited in Arabic. It was recited in Turkish between 1933 and 1950.

lines than are needed as imams or preachers. The system has also introduced many religious elective courses in normal schools: a student who takes all of their elective courses from the same pool will receive as many hours of Islamic courses as students in imam-hatip schools. Some other indicators of Islamization have consisted of "allowing" students over 5th grade to wear headscarves in schools, abolishing mixed-sex state summer camps for teenagers, and claiming responsibility for control of mixed-sex university student housing. The announcement in the Ankara metro that called the passengers to "act in compliance with moral rules", and time limitation for the sales of alcoholic beverages, both in 2013, are further examples. Erdoğan's statements, such as "whoever drinks alcohol is an alcoholic", "abortion is murder", or "I, like the vast majority, would not tolerate my daughter sitting on a bench with a boy," had broader practical implications that triggered social polarization. This can be seen when a deputy principle of a high school reportedly suggested that "male students could follow girls who wear short skirts to make them feel uncomfortable, after which the students would eventually have to dress 'properly.'" (Hürriyet Daily News 2015, 19 February 2015).

The sentences below are from one of Erdoğan's recent speeches, delivered during the closing ceremony of a contest among high school students, testing their knowledge about the prophet Muhammad. They demonstrated how the differences in Turkish society were transformed into a culture war at the hands of an Islamist government:

> "This is the youth we desire. We do not want a youth that carries blades, molotov bombs, slings and iron balls. We want a generation that seeks respect and love in the footsteps of our dear prophet. The assurance of our country's survival is a new generation who knows about his book [Quran] and prophet, who practices his faith, and who is very competent on his history and culture." (TRT Haber 2015, 18 April 2015)

Securing democracy and the identity of believers is now virtually code for the government's growing authoritarianism and anti-secular discourse and practice[16], which has deepened existing social fault lines and triggered a severe legitimacy crisis. It is beyond the scope of this study to offer an explanation for the outbreak of massive protests in June 2013, which started as a defense of the Gezi Park, the last green spot in the heart of İstanbul,

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16 For a critical inventory of the AKP's authoritarian and antisecular activities, see Özdikmenli/Ovalı 2014.

but turned into the largest and longest wave of protest in modern Turkish history. It can nevertheless be argued that the leitmotif of the protests has been a defense of a secular way of life (against the educational reforms that turned many second-stage schools into religious schools and introduced many elective religious courses in normal schools, prohibition on sales of alcoholic beverages between 22:00 and 06:00, the characterization of abortion as "murder" by Erdoğan, etc.).

Vuori argues that securitization theory can offer insights into the study of how support or suppression of social mobilization is justified. He shows how social movements are securitized. Labeling or identity framing is commonly used to intimidate protesters, and to justify violence against them (Vuori 2011: 186-188), which is why Erdoğan and the AKP quickly labeled the protesters as "marauders" (*çapulcu*), "pro-coup", and "pawns of external power groups", namely of the "interest rate lobby". In order to consolidate their "discursive realm" (Mavelli 2013), they even made false claims[17] - that the protesters drank beer in a mosque and assaulted a woman wearing a headscarf, for example, thereby depicting them as threats to Islam as well as to sovereignty and democracy.

It is striking that the official Turkish Language Association has come to define coup d'état as "the act of forcing the government to resign by exercising pressure, by force or by utilizing democratic means; or the act of toppling the government in order to change the regime".[18] This new discourse on coups enables the AKP to label any radical critique as having a pro-coup stance that needs to be addressed through emergency measures. A new example has been provided by the recent split in the conservative bloc that erupted when, from 17-25 December 2013, followers of Gülen in the judiciary and police initiated an anti-corruption investigation against a group that involved Erdoğan's son as well as the sons of three cabinet ministers. Erdoğan soon labeled Gülen, his former ally-turned-nemesis, as the leader of "neo-Ergenekon" or "the parallel state", and launched a cam-

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17 The target audience's asymmetric access to information sometimes makes resorting to lies convenient. "Since the audience is not fully informed, for instance, on the temporal proximity of threats, it usually relies on state officials'discourses because it thinks that the latter, who are the site of constitutional legitimacy, must have 'good reasons'to assert, in this case, that 'X'represents a threat to a state's survival." (Balzacq 2005: 190).

18 http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS. 5 53bc87f19ee92.66272337 (last accessed 25 April 2015).

paign to purge his sympathizers from the civil service. "Are you a cleric or are you the leader of an intelligence organization? What are you? You're in exile, but you're giving instructions in scenarios. You're writing in the international media, denigrating your country," Erdoğan said (Hürriyet Daily News 2014, 16 March 2014), and he called the Gülen movement a "spy ring", targeted not at himself, his family and comrades, but at Turkish independence itself (Hürriyet 2014, 14 August 2014). Among the recent emergency measures taken are the enactment of a highly non-democratic Homeland Security Law, excessive control over the judiciary which peaked in the trial of judges and prosecutors involved in the 17-25 December investigations, the arrest of journalists associated with the Gülen movement, and supposedly the inclusion of the movement on the list of internal threats in the National Security Politics Document (Cumhuriyet 2015, 29 April 2015).

The excerpt below from an Erdoğan speech illustrates the extent to which he identifies the party with the nation, and thus the extent to which a threat to the party is also a threat to the nation:

> "Almost all members of the AK Party are people who suffered in recent history. [Power holders] called some of them Kurds, and deprived them of their rights. They called some of them Alevis and alienated them. They called some others headscarfed, bearded, pious, and alienated them. They did not allow them to go to universities. They said 'you can only become a housemaid or doorman at most'. They said 'go to fields and do irrigation'. They called them poor, countrymen, peasant, ignorant. On every occasion they despised the nation. […]
> Don't forget, it is the nation that founded the AK Party. The desires and dreams of our nation have materialized in the body of the AK Party. The AK Party has been walking with the nation, and only with the nation, for 13 years. It has been a party that rejected any tutelage and patronage over the nation. Those centers of powers which had been used to usurp our national sovereignty have had to face the AK Party. The media had previously laid claims on sovereignty; the AK Party ended that imposed partnership. The AK Party ended the tutelage of capitalists, who had been a major center of power determining the destination of the nation. Gangs and juntas have had to take their hands off the nation. Bureaucratic oligarchy, the military and civilian bureaucracy ceased to restrain the national will." (Hürriyet 2014, 14 August 2014)

5. Conclusion

There is currently a popular social media joke in Turkey, whereby individuals conclude a discussion of anti-democratic and anti-secular state acts by observing that "on the other hand, at least we no longer know the names of commanders of the armed forces" – an ironic reference to a statement made by the AKP spokesperson in 2013 (CNN Türk 2013, 16 February 2013). It is argued in this study that a simplified understanding of the constructed nature of most threat perceptions, and the representation and celebration of the AKP as a desecuritizing actor, have played a role in the sentiment expressed in this joke — the reduction of democracy to civilianization and the underestimation of an Islamist threat.

The reading of Turkish politics outlined here, which became increasingly mainstream in the 2000s, assumes a contrast and conflict between the secular state elite, living in a century-long insecurity syndrome, and the hitherto excluded peripheral actors that had been defined as a threat to the Kemalist regime. According to this approach, the post-2002 transformation by the AKP government is a desecuritization and normalization process. The story of how the secular center instrumentalized "constructed" threats to the state while holding peripheral forces at bay fits well into the political and academic trends of the 2000s. That is why the increased scholarly interest in religion as a security sector, which began with an article written by Lausten and Wæver in 2000, is reviewed in the first section of this study. Here it was argued that to employ the concept of "securitization" in order to integrate religion into the political sphere is both theoretically problematic, as it empties the concept of any content, and politically dangerous, for it may serve as a justification for objective threats to secularity.

As a matter of fact, the reconstruction of the public presentation of Islam as an enriching aspect of democracy helped the AKP to engage in a rapid Islamization of politics. Besides other indicators, election rallies held in 2015 show that Islamization has reached an unprecedented level, with politicians pointing fingers at the religious-sectarian origins of political rivals.[19]

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19 Erdoğan, having been criticized for exploiting religion by showing a Quran in a rally, thus addressed Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of CHP: "I was brought up with the Quran, I live my life with the Quran. …The [limited] space the Quran occupies in your life is obvious." (Hürriyet 2015, 4 May 2015).

The second section presented major desecuritizing acts undertaken by the AKP since 2002, together with a critique of an ahistorical approach that has promoted desecuritization in every case. It is argued that mainstream studies have ignored the ways in which the AKP's desecuritization acts are embedded in an overall project of constructing a new regime of truth intended to authorize any speech act, as well as the party's securitizing moves since the very beginning of its rule. The locus of this new regime of truth has been the societal sector. The desecuritization of political Islam was aided by a rebranding of Islamist political actors as more accommodating and more socially rooted than secular actors. A new type of populism that offered the masses a shared anger against previous state elites, as well as a cultural identification with the new ones, has owed much to the securitization of secularism. This in turn has provided the ground for further securitization.

The interpretation of the AKP regime as a retreat from security-speak has obscured its ever-expanding record of securitization in the making of the "Second Republic". Firstly, securitization in the economic sector played a crucial role in the making of the globalist-nationalist dichotomy, which cleared the field for the legal investigations against potential centers of resistance to regime change. Since 2008, political opponents have increasingly been presented as threats to Muslim identity, democracy, and sovereignty. Supporting coups against democracy, being manipulated by lobbies and external actors, defiling holy places and believers, and establishing a parallel/inner state are some of the "existential threats" that the AKP has accused these opponents of. The last section therefore presented the AKP's record of securitization in the making of the Second Republic, a process which has ended in a severe legitimacy crisis and a probable collapse. It is thus possible to conclude from this case that securitization theory might still be quite useful in understanding complex state-building processes, if purged of the flaws of a universal desecuritization approach discussed throughout this study.

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The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Transformation. Human Rights and the (De-)securitization of Ethno-political Conflict

Richard Georgi

1. Introduction

Since the Cold War, ethno-political conflict – where a conflict's core incompatibility relates to identity groups, self-defined in ethnic terms, and their invocation of contesting needs and interests – has become a dominant cause of mass political violence (see Horrowitz 2000). In studying possible pathways for reconciliation and peacebuilding, recent research has emphasized the critical role played by civil society organizations (CSOs) (e.g. Forster/Mattner 2006; Paffenholz 2010). But empirical evidence from conflict regions, such as the Balkans in the 1990s, shows that CSOs can serve not only to drive peaceful change, but also to entrench the status quo or even further fuel discord (Kaldor/Muro-Ruíz 2003; Marchetti/Tocci 2011a). The question at hand, then, is not *whether* but *how* policy-makers should partner with civil society organisations. This is why the goal of academic debate has been to discern which forms of civil society engagement fuel conflict, in order to mitigate its impact and facilitate civic actions that spur peaceful transformation (Pishchikova/Izzi 2011: 50).

This chapter examines two types of human rights activism in the ethno-political conflict between the Mexican state and indigenous communities after the uprising of the Ejército Zapatista Liberación Nacional (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, EZLN) in 1994. The Zapatista conflict in the federal state of Chiapas is regarded as a prototype for civil society engagement in conflicts. Violent clashes between the Mexican state and indigenous communities, organized in the Zapatista movement, gave rise to significant civil society activity throughout Mexico which profoundly influenced the conflict's development (Mattiace 1997: 32). Much ink has been spilled to describe the role of the Zapatista supporter network in keeping the struggle for autonomy alive. In promising legitimacy and increased international awareness, Mexican civil society adopted human rights as a central frame (Stavenhagen 2003). Mushrooming human rights activities called national and international attention to the violent escalation in

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Southern Mexico and consequently exerted a significant influence on the ratio of conflict actor's behavior. Two organizations were particularly important, as they both represented regional hubs for civil society engagement. First, the Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de las Casas (Fray-Ba), established in 1989 on an initiative of the Catholic Diocese in Chiapas, became a pivotal source for information on the conflict and a regional port of call for national and international human rights organizations after the outbreak of violence in 1994. Second, Enlace Civil was founded in 1996 on the initiative of indigenous communities organized within the newly created Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas (Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities, MAREZ) as a major hub for the national and international solidarity network in support of the Zapatistas. Though both organizations operated within the context of the Chiapanecan conflict and the same political opportunity structure (POS), the effect of their human rights activism differed significantly. While FrayBa's human rights invocations resemble a de-securitizing move which urged inter-group reconciliation, the activities of Enlace Civil constituted a securitizing move that reinforced the mutual perception as threatening.

This case study contributes to research on the conditions under which human rights activism, undertaken by civil society actors, can help to steer conflict transformation in the direction of reconciliation. Building on field work and expert interviews with civil society representatives and academics, this chapter applies process tracing to make sense of the social mechanism by which structure- and agency-related factors interrelate in determining the impact of human rights invocations in ethno-political conflicts. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the theoretical approach, which conceptualizes the political effects of activism on the social system, sometimes also discussed under the label politicization of human rights (see Marchetti/Tocci 2011a; also Gordon 2014). Instead of looking at the effectiveness of civil society's engagement in implementing certain standards, the main focal point is civil society's role in securitizing 'otherness' and transforming the Self/Other divide that underpins ethno-political conflict. The nexus between conflict transformation theory and critical security studies is thus salient here. The second part presents the results of the empirical analysis and, finally, discusses the social mechanisms at play.

This chapter rejects simplistic normative perspectives on civil society as 'good' or 'bad', both of which fails to reflect the complex social dynamics of conflict settings. Instead, a differentiated analysis of the factors

that unlock the transformative potential of civil society may help to push forward the polarized debate on the role of local actors in peacebuilding (Pishchikova/Izzi 2011). The overall research objective is to provide some insight into a pressing policy issue in conflict and post-conflict societies: how to initiate and sustain reconciliatory processes through local actors in identity-driven conflicts which tend to generate hostilities and social fragmentation.

2. Theoretical Concepts

Securitization and Conflict Transformation

Conflictual discourses that construct incompatibilities and hostile stereotypes are a central dynamic that moves conflicts from the political sphere into stages of renewed violence. Consequently, the discursive terrain, in which antagonistic identity positions are constructed, is considered decisive in explaining why a certain difference (e.g. different ethnic identities) transforms into a (violent) destructive conflict (see Jabri 1996; Fearon/Laitin 2000). Correspondingly, a social constructivist perspective on systemic conflict transformation draws attention to the communication of incompatibilities, which establishes a social system that re-produces antagonisms and perpetuates hostilities. Addressing violent and destructive ethno-political conflict requires a transformation of hostile inter-group relationships that render impossible substantial negotiations (Bernshausen/ Bonacker 2011: 24). In their totality, restructured relationships – in Lederach's terms *sustainable reconciliation* – form new patterns, processes, and structures that enable conflicts to be managed constructively, provide for the discursive revision of identity frames, and create "new social relations, institutions, and visions" (Väyrynen 1999: 151; also Lederach 1997: 34-35). However, re-articulated identities need to develop from within the conflict discourse to ensure that the new narrative truly integrates society and does not appear as a cultural alien, constructing a new Other within a different form of particularity (Gheciu 2006: 109). Therefore, the role of civil society within the conflict context is particularly decisive for sustainable transformation towards reconciliation.

The discursive positioning of threats and their consequences for the Self/Other dimension lie at the core of securitization theory, which appears to make this a useful analytical tool for comprehending processes of con-

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flict transformation (Bonacker et al. 2011). Developed by scholars of the so-called Copenhagen School such as Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver, classical securitization theory claims that any issue may turn into a security issue, if an actor presents it as an existential threat to a reference object. Following John Austin's philosophy of language, the mere speech act – uttering security – changes the situation and transforms an issue from e.g. an economic question into a security problem (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). Consequently, security is understood as the performative effect of speech acts and not as something that can be defined objectively (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). As survival is at stake, the securitizing actor claims that the issue needs to be shifted from *normal politics* to *emergency politics*. The use of all necessary means, in turn, breaches the institutionalized rules of normal politics (see Wæver 1995; Balzacq 2011).

In a nutshell, securitization means that an issue or an actor is framed as a threat to a referent object and consists of three constitutive components: The mere claim that a threat to survival exists, coupled with the demand for extraordinary measures (*securitizing move*), the acceptance of the claim by the addressed audience, and the violation of rules that are otherwise binding (Buzan et al. 1998: 31). Conversely, proclaiming a threat to society constructs a reified, monolithic form of societal identity being threatened, challenging narratives of heterogeneity and negotiability (Williams 2003: 519). In conflicts, the increase in the spread of securitization indicates the level of escalation, since it highlights whether a certain identity group is constructed as a threatening Other, and to what extent emergency measures, often including violence, are seen as legitimate to combat the threat. Successful securitization establishes a social system in which a constructed Other needs to be addressed through the adoption of extraordinary measures in order to ensure survival. In some cases of high escalation this may even include mass atrocities (Bonacker et al. 2011: 27).

Given that transformation of ethno-political conflicts is targeted at restructuring hostile inter-group relations, the key issue – through the lenses of securitization – is how securitized situations become de-securitized. De-securitization means the withdrawal of emergency measures and opening the option of political negotiation which, ultimately, requires a change in perceptions, so that the other is no longer seen as an existential threat but as a partner with diverging interests (Hansen 2012: 533). According to the Copenhagen School's approach, de-securitization is composed of a de-securitizing move – referring to direct interventions that aim at changing

the conflict parties' discursively constructed perceptions and the prevalence of emergency measures – and the approval of an addressed audience, which moves the conflict back to normal politics. Referring to the typology proposed by Huysmans (1995), de-securitizing moves may present three types of argument: the claimed existential threat never existed or has been avoided (*objectivist strategy*); ordinary measures suffice to address the threat while emergency measures are not effective, or the extraordinary measures might negate the existential threat, but their costs are too high (*constructivist strategy*); the Other is not a threatening cultural alien, but a partner who can be co-existed with in mutual recognition (*deconstructivist strategy*).

Research on human rights, conflict transformation and (de-)securitization in ethno-political conflicts is innovative and highly relevant for peacebuilding actors. However, the connection between the research debates, which has been prominently established by the European SHUR research project[1], faces severe theoretical, methodological, and empirical challenges. The performativity of security utterances, on the one hand, and the social process of securitization, which involves actors, audience, and context, on the other hand, are so different that they form two contradictory centers in the classical theory (Stritzel 2007: 359). Balzacq (2005) claims that the logics of illocutionary acts – that is, acts performed in articulating a locution – and perlocutionary acts – the consequential effects that the utterances may cause – are confused (see also Butler 1997). Elaborating on the different elements, new approaches to securitization, and even different schools of thought, have arisen (Balzacq et al. 2016). The context conditions and concrete strategies that determine whether securitization or de-securitization moves are issued, as well as the likelihood of their success, seems not to be adequately addressed by the Copenhagen School's notion of securitization theory (McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2012). These factors, however, are of particular relevance for human rights practitioners in assessing the impact of their activism on conflicts, and for

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1 *SHUR. Human Rights in Conflicts: The Role of Civil Society*. STREP project funded by the European Commission. Website: www.luiss.it/shur. The project was based at LUISS University and involved seven European research institutions with over 20 researchers. Major results of the project's work between 2006 and 2009 were published in the edited volume: Marchetti, Raffaele/Nathalie Tocci (eds.) (2011): *Civil society, conflicts and the politicization of human rights*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

peacebuilding actors in creating an environment in which civil society can act as an agent of peaceful transformation. (Marchetti/Tocci 2011a). Methodologically, controversial discussions have recently formed around the definition of securitizing moves and the methods adequate to studying the cause of their appearance (Balzacq et al. 2016: 518). Finally, securitization is deeply embedded in the respective political and societal setting. Therefore, case studies that widen the scope of the European-centered research of the SHUR project are crucial in order to control for the impact of contextual variables and thereby to allow for generalizable findings.

This first part of this chapter will address the above-mentioned challenges and begin by suggesting components of securitizing and de-securitizing rhetorical practices in the context of human rights invocations (see table 1). It then proceeds with a discussion of potential contextual and agency-related factors that determine the impact of activism on behalf of human rights in ethno-political conflicts.

Table 1: Conceptualization of securitizing and de-securitizing moves

Human Rights Invocation	Components	Sample Phrases/Arguments
Securitizing move	Articulation of an irreconcilable self-other relationship Invocation of the Other as an existential threat to survival, self-determination, and/or core values Demanding emergency measures	Evil, bad, a threat to survival, genocide, extinction Slaves, colonialism, loss of roots/ homes To be or not to be, fight, struggle, resistance, revolution
De-securitizing move	Call to respect and comply with human rights standards addressed to all involved actors Claim for political debate Proposed starting points for political process to reconcile positions	Threat never existed, threat has been avoided (objectivist argument) Ordinary measures suffice to deal with the threat, emergency measures are not effective, the side costs of emergency measures are too high (constructivist argument) The Other is not a threatening cultural alien, but a partner who can be lived with within the realm of mutual recognition (deconstructivist argument)

Source: Created by author

Context – Civil Society in Conflict

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are non-governmental and not-for-profit entities that are defined through their function rather than their purely organizational form (see Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 2-3; also Merkel/Lauth 1998). They are both independent agents for change and dependent on an enabling environment, which is dramatically affected by conflict (Marchetti/Tocci 2011b: 12; Cox 1999: 4-5). In such contexts, human rights activism, on the part of civil society, may relate to seven functions:

Table 2: Civil society's functions in conflicts and human rights related activities

Civil Society Function in Conflicts	Examples for Human Rights Related Activity
Protection	Human accompaniment (e.g. BRICOs - Civil Brigades of Human Rights Observation) Maintaining Zones of Peace
Monitoring and Early Warning	Observation of conflict Reports on human rights violations
Advocacy and Communication	Advocacy for a societal group/own membership (e.g. ethnic minority group) Advocacy for an issue-based agenda (e.g. ban on land mines)
Socialization and Culture of Peace	Education on human rights
Conflict Sensitive Social Cohesion/Community Building	Creating community networks Facilitating collective action (e.g. protests, social movements)
Intermediation/Facilitation between all involved actors (state/non-state armed actor/ civilians)	Facilitating contacts (Track II diplomacy) Mediating between conflict parties
Service Delivery	Workshops and training programs Juridical support Supporting local population in conducting projects Build-up of peace constituencies

Source: Civil society functions taken from Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 32; Examples for Human Rights Related Activity created by author

Within ethno-political conflicts, societal networks are often destroyed, trust disappears, and formal governance structures are unresponsive (see Paffenholz/Spurk 2006: 11). Cooptation or intimidation might induce existing civil society to securitize identity groups that challenge the authority of elites, or not to securitize human rights violations perpetrated by the state. This is of particular relevance in the Central American context,

where authoritarian regimes, with patrimonial and corporatist characteristics, significantly shaped the character of emerging civil societies, setting well-defined ideological and political parameters. If basic rights and freedoms of association were curtailed, civil society engagement conducted beyond legal boundaries often turned against the state, instead of interacting with it (Marchetti/Tocci 2011a: 50; also Olvera 2010).

Yet there is another condition that significantly shapes the context for civil society in ethno-political conflicts, namely the low levels of social cohesion. Social cohesion refers to the absence of latent societal polarization (e.g. wealth inequality or ethnic tensions) and the presence of social bonds, such as norms of reciprocity, associations bridging social division, and institutions of conflict management, such as democratic political structures and an independent judiciary (Coletta/Cullen 2000). In the midst of armed ethno-political conflicts, social fragmentation along ethnic lines dissolves social cohesion, which dramatically affects networks of reciprocity and civic engagement. The prevalence of discourses re-producing hostile stereotypes and securitizing an ethnic Other facilitate the rise of securitizing actors with a clear ethnicist agenda and aggravate the work of CSOs trying to build up inter-group relationships (Strand et al. 2003; Pouligny 2005).

CSO Identity – Social Capital and Political Identity

Although contextual conditions define the working environment of civil society, the field of CSOs in ethno-political conflicts is by no means homogeneous with regards to organizational identities. Civil society functions are carried out by a variety of actors featuring different kinds of memberships, operating structures, and political agendas, all of which are crucial in determining the (de-)securitizing character of activism (Marchetti/Tocci 2011b).

In his case study on rural Southern Mexico, Jonathan Fox (1996) points out that the emergence and growth of civil society organizations depends on the spread of social capital, particularly in an authoritarian environment. Social capital comprises "systems that lead to or result from social and economic organization, such as worldviews, trust, reciprocity, informational and economic exchange, and informal and formal groups and associations" (Colletta/Cullen 2000: 2). There is little dispute over the importance of social capital in facilitating collective action and, thus, of in-

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creasing the breadth and density of societal organizations (Putnam 1993: 167; Grootaert 1998). In contexts characterized by authoritarian rule and conflict, the collaboration between local and external civil society organizations is an important causal pathway in accumulating social capital (Fox 2007: 61). External non-governmental actors can provide resources, such as material inducements and enabling institutional frameworks, as well as leverage, which reduces the costs that repressive authorities may threaten to impose on those engaged in constructing autonomous social capital through 'naming and shaming' strategies or public campaigns. (Fox 1996: 1096, 1098).

From a securitization point of view, the type of social capital from which a CSO emerges is decisive. Putnam differentiates between bridging social capital, which incorporates all sectors of a community across diverse social cleavages, and bonding social capital, which develops *within* ethnic boundaries, social cleavages or conflict divides (Putnam 2000: 22-23). The type of social capital feeds into the degree of inclusiveness and egalitarianism characterizing an actor's political identity. Bridging social capital induces a CSO to be inclusive and have a cross-cutting constituency. Activities that connect advisory groups and foster a framing of all social identity groups as equal can have a strong de-securitizing impact. Bonding social capital, on the other hand, tends to be expressed in a multiculturalist or even ethnicist agenda, which is only open to a limited section of society, and proclaims the primacy of one identity over another.

Framework of Action – Different Kinds of Human Rights Articulations

CSOs can choose from a range of rhetorical strategies in framing their human rights claims. The potential of human rights invocations to escalate conflict lies in their securitizing rhetorical structure: by their very nature, they articulate a threat to the basic rights of an individual or group (Pia/ Diez 2009: 20). This runs contrary to the perception of human rights in terms of non-political absolutes, and suggests that human rights are context-based social constructions, without any intrinsic universal morality (see e.g. Gregg 2012; also Mutua 2000). Consequently, it is not the articulation per se, but rather how human rights are invoked, that has major implications for the (de-)securitizing effect of human rights work.

Referring to collective rights not only emphasizes but also inscribes group identities, which can reinforce hostile stereotypes. Further, individu-

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al and collective rights can clash with each other: for example, if the claim for a collective right reasserts the traditional community over the individual. Even though individual rights are universal and are thus by definition inclusive, in conflict situations they are often only invoked for individuals belonging to a certain identity group. The invocation of exclusive rights on behalf of certain members of society only tends to reinforce the conflict antagonism, particularly if such articulations identify an enemy that the group must be defended against in order to ensure survival (Pia/Diez 2010: 51). Nevertheless, collective and group rights also represent necessary tools for preserving the living conditions of cultural groups, particularly in contexts where individual rights do not suffice to protect them from marginalization and discrimination.

Equally important from a securitization perspective is the kind of threat to human rights identified in the articulation. Framing a certain identity group as threatening will inevitably securitize the conflict antagonism, but de-securitizing articulations detach threats from social identities and focus on concrete issues or the violent past as the threatening Other (i.e. temporal securitization). De-securitizing activism emphasizes shared responsibility, which entails an acknowledgement of one's own failings and does not sustain conflict identities (Pia/Diez 2010: 52-53).

*Political Opportunity Structure – 'Filter' of Human rights activism*

Instead of determining the (de-)securitizing character of human rights activism, the POS must be understood as a 'filter' that facilitates certain human rights interventions and aggravates others. In phases of escalating ethno-political conflict, the environment tends to be more conducive to ethnicist agendas with conflict intensifying potentials, whereas civil society organizations working on cross-ethnic reconciliation see their room for maneuver increasingly narrowing (Marchetti/Tocci 2011a: 63). In addition to the timing of human rights work, the overall acceptance of human rights as universal, inalienable, and indivisible principles of social conduct determines the viability of de-securitizing activities. If human rights are solely perceived as a mere tool to legitimize political claims or for oppressive measures, reconciliation-based human rights activities are not likely to fall on fertile ground, and civil society will tend to refrain from adopting them as a framework (see Speed/Collier 2000: 901).

Finally, if a conflict actor wins the hearts and minds of civil society organizations and establishes a narrative of fighting for a good cause, civic engagement is more likely to take sides and re-articulate the rhetoric of such conflict narratives (Bob 2005: 4-6). Armed uprisings that result from social grievances and authoritarian rule can thus create windows of opportunity for the mobilization of contentious civil society movements who refer to human rights in order to denounce repression, securitize the conflict, and push for (violent) change (Brockett 2005: 64). On the other hand, when all armed actors are portrayed as destroying the social fabric and perpetrating human rights violations, de-securitizing interventions which demand an end to violence from all actors are more likely to succeed (see Bob 2005: 26).

3. Research Framework

Context, civil society identity, framework of action, and POS are not regarded as independent from one another, but rather form a conditional pattern in which each component creates structural constraints and opportunities for the following: the overall conflict's context shapes the conditions in which civil society operates and thereby influences its identity. Identities, in turn, determine the goals of activism and thus the applied frameworks of action. The ability of civil society actors to operate in the POS, shaped by the overall context, conditions the (de-)securitizing impact, which then feeds back into the original context (figure 1). Variable-guided process tracing can help to uncover the social mechanisms underlying the conditional pattern and the links between the factors and the outcome in the cases at hand (Beach/Pedersen 2013: 16). The theoretical concepts serve to structure the empirical material, which has been gathered through an analysis of evaluation reports, studies and interviews with civil society representatives and scholars.

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Figure 1: Causal Mechanism

Source: Created by author and based on a figure on the determinants of the impact of conflict society organization created by Marchetti/Tocci 2011a: 66.

4. The Zapatista uprising – "making ourselves heard"[2]

The first communiqués issued by the EZLN after the uprising on January 1, 1994, declared that the indigenous people of Chiapas took up arms to call attention to their desperate living conditions and to fight for a more democratic and inclusive Mexico. The seizure of four municipal capitals in Chiapas was framed as the revolt of the marginalized people declaring "enough!" ("Ya basta!") and finally demanding the rights they had been refused for so long (Bob 2005: 117; Mattiace 1997: 32). Thus, the public appearance of the EZLN and the mobilization of the Zapatista movement marked the intensification of a conflict that had developed between the Mexican state and indigenous communities in Chiapas with roots deep in the Mexican past.

Conflict Context

The national Mexican ideology of *mestizaje* (engl. racial mixing or misce-genation) and modernization resulted in a neglect of living indigenous

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2 EZLN communiqué (January 6, 1994) states "January 1 was our way of making ourselves heard" (EZLN 1994: 72-73).

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peoples with a historical continuity in pre-colonial societies and distinctive languages, cultures, and communities, and it underpinned a system of political and societal exclusion (Speed/Collier 2000: 883; see also UN 2008). This has had severe consequences particularly in Southern Mexico, which has long been one of the country's most poverty-stricken regions (Bob 2005: 120-121). In the federal state of Chiapas, the subjugated indigenous communities accounted for a disproportionate share of those that face grievous social and economic conditions.

A core issue in this respect was the uneven land distribution that resulted from Mexico's colonial legacy. Large landholders established patrimonial structures that secured their economic and political power (Olvera 1997: 107). Due to the lack of effective agrarian reforms, power structures remained and large landholders (*ladinos*) continued to exploit landless peasants and indigenous communities (Stephen 1997: 88-89). Local elites used fraud, repression and intimidation, while official state authorities cooperated with landholders to maintain control of the rural areas and largely ignored the needs of indigenous communities (Speed/Collier 2000: 886; Fox 1996: 1093). Consequently, discriminatory state policies, a lack of recognition, and structural exclusion created an environment where indigenous communities perceived themselves and their identity as threatened. The preservation of cultural characteristics and, thus, the existence as a distinct ethnic group became the core of an increasingly overt conflict between indigenous communities and state authorities (see Stavenhagen 2003).

In the late 1980s, Mexico's political system began to come under increasing pressure, which opened a window of opportunity for indigenous organizations and an emerging Mexican civil society to challenge authoritarian rule and exclusionist institutions. On the basis of formal democratic institutions inscribed in the constitution, an integrative authoritarian state under the hegemony of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) had developed and governed by means of a corporatist structure, maintained through co-optation, patronage, and repression. Mexico's economic import substitution model, however, reached the limits of its exhaustion as foreign debts and a decline in oil prices induced a financial collapse. An increasing dependency on international donor agencies forced the regime to yield concessions concerning the openness of the political system and economic liberalization. This led to tensions with those elites who had benefited from former subsidies, aggravated the economic conditions of the agricultural sector, and endangered

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the alliances that had maintained the PRI system in power. As a result, the regime increasingly lost its capability to integrate different factions of Mexican society (Neil 1998: 171). Social movements that could no longer be co-opted through traditional means began to mobilize, posing a significant challenge to the fusion of state and society that had been a core characteristic of the PRI system. The overt discrepancy between legal foundations stipulated in the Mexican Constitution and the PRI's authoritarian system became the focal point of public action. (Bizberg 2003: 160; Olvera 2003: 42). In response, the state securitized civil society activities as treason against the Mexican national project (De Grammont et al. 2009: 30). Although the political elite increasingly realized the urgent need for concessions and cooperation, state structures remained highly unresponsive and repressive, despite their declining capability to co-opt emerging civil society actors (Bizberg 2003: 155).

By the early 1990s, the social conflict had been intensified by myriad factors. Liberal economic policies provided the grounds for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was supposed to attract new investments in order to overcome economic crisis. In Chiapas, however, the suspension of price protection on coffee and an amendment of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in 1992, which allowed for the sale of communal land (*ejido*), led to a deterioration in the living conditions of small peasants and indigenous communities (García de León 2005: 511). The opportunities to achieve positive change within the political system diminished as the Chiapanecan governor cancelled existing reform proposals, and landholding oligarchies increasingly reacted with violence and deceit in the face of growing social mobilization (Fox 1996: 1096).

Finally, the Zapatista uprising transformed the ethno-political conflict. The EZLN represented itself as an army of national liberation in the tradition of Mexico's revolutionary past and severely securitized the conflict. It claimed to speak for the indigenous people in Mexico and strived for a nationwide uprising to conquer the Mexican army, advance to the capital, and initiate summary judgments. In well-conceived declarations, elites were portrayed as a threat that had to be fought with all means necessary (EZLN 2012). The reference to Emiliano Zapata – a symbol of the revolution in which the Mexican nation state grounded its ideological legitimacy –emphasized that the EZLN perceived the Mexican government as betrayers of the revolution and national heroes.

Massive protests in 1994 and overt sympathy for the EZLN were indicative of massive discontent with the political leadership within Mexi-

co's emerging civil society (De Grammont et al. 2009: 30-31; Olvera 1997: 117). Consequently, social cohesion became severely weakened and dynamics of inequality, oppression, and exclusion engendered violent conflict. With authoritarian structures prevailing, human rights violations, particularly in southern Mexico, became common. In addition to restrictions on freedom of association and freedom of speech, the working environment of civil society organizations in Chiapas was severely aggravated by pervasive militarization, as well as the counterinsurgent campaign against the EZLN (Bizberg 2003: 147-149). Here, human rights violations were not only directed against civilians and Zapatista supporters, but also against human rights activists (HRW 1994). Due to the high levels of social fragmentation between mestizo-dominated society and indigenous communities that resulted from the exclusive system of patrimonial reign, society did not possess the inclusive mechanisms necessary to manage conflicts non-violently. The protracted social conflict further destroyed the social fabric and any remaining cross-cutting network relations (Braig 2004: 272-273; also Corrochano 2005). The indigenous supporter base of the EZLN invaded large landholdings, started to develop autonomy structures in the framework of the MAREZ, and enforced the indigenous right to exercise cultural tradition and self-determination on a regional level, against the federal government and the landholding elites (Mattiace 1997: 45).

Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (FrayBa)

The Catholic diocese in San Cristóbal was led by Bishop Samuel Ruíz, on whose initiative the Human Rights Center Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas was founded in 1989. This Centre had long been recognized for its work with marginalized people in Chiapas, which not only provoked conflicts with Chiapanecan elites, but also within the Catholic Church (Loaeza Tovar 1996: 124). The Catholic diocese convened the first state-wide public indigenous forum, trained lay activists and promoted local self-empowerment projects, demonstrating the important role the Catholic Church can play in enabling local activists and organizations to take on key functions of civil society, particularly in the context of authoritarian Latin American states (see Oxhorn 2006; Paffenholz 2010). Catholicism is deep-rooted and widespread in rural Southern Mexico, which lends considerable legitimacy and repute to the diocese in the eyes of large parts of society. Tradi-

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tionally, it had been one of the few institutions in Chiapas spreading bridg-ing social capital within an otherwise highly fragmented society and it was accepted, as a mestizo authority, by indigenous communities (Kurtenbach 2000).

The organizational background of FrayBa further provided well-estab-lished links to international human rights organizations and policy-makers. The international reputation of Ruíz as a defender of human rights, particu-larly of indigenous rights, has been important for FrayBa in establishing a transnational network with Human Rights Watch Americas, Amnesty In-ternational, and international institutions, as well as to gain the trust of Chiapanecan oppositional groups (Bob 2005: 172). The Mexican authori-ties and allied landowners were highly suspicious of the work of Ruíz and FrayBa. Yet, as the conflict intensified and international pressure en-hanced President Salina's willingness to negotiate with the EZLN leader-ship, the Catholic diocese appeared to be the only remaining actor able to serve as an intermediary. Ruíz mediated the first peace talks in 1994, and the human rights center FrayBa was acknowledged by the Mexican gov-ernment and the Zapatistas as a neutral monitoring source. This in turn re-inforced the organization's importance as a local hub for verified informa-tion on the conflict for international human rights organizations and for-eign governments, particularly for those who could not send their own ob-server.

The international network and the institutional resources of the diocese, in turn, provided for some degree of leverage and protection, which was necessary to become involved with human rights in Chiapas. Moreover, spreading bridging social capital in the conflict, the diocese critically shaped FrayBa's political identity. Although FrayBa was established on a fundament of Christian ecumenical convictions, the non-governmental and non-profit organization worked independently of any political ideology or religious creed. The CSO pursued an inclusive approach with the overall aim of developing inter-group dialogue, a culture of tolerance, and recon-ciliation between fractions (FrayBa 1995). FrayBa did not serve a clear-cut membership or identity group, but conducted issue-centered advocacy. Their civic agenda fostered multiple identities and encouraged them to be recognized in a pluri-ethnic society (FrayBa 1994: 1-3). Consequently, FrayBa established ties to all conflict actors, but remained distant in order to reinforce the position as a recognized observer whose information could be trusted.

After the Zapatista uprising, the activities of FrayBa became centered on dispatching civil observer brigades in order to monitor the conflict and conduct human rights accompaniment in support of civilians amidst violent conflict. Indeed, this status as a neutral organization enabled the CSO to effectively discharge its activities (see Kenny 2001). International observers were permitted by Mexican authorities and granted access to conflict territories. This acceptance by combatants enabled FrayBa to further realize its monitoring, advocacy, and protection functions. Later, the organization also provided legal assistance to communities that had been denied basic rights. This was mainly in the area of individual, civil and political rights, but FrayBa also emphasized the role of structural and cultural violence in the progression of the conflict. Therefore, the CSO actively supported the empowerment of indigenous communities in their demand for collective cultural human rights as stipulated in ILO convention 169 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (e.g. FrayBa 1996a; FrayBa 1996b). The articulations of collective rights, however, were inclusive in character, since they were claimed on behalf of all Mexicans.

Enlace Civil

Enlace Civil, on the other hand, developed out of bottom-up, grassroots mobilization of the Zapatista supporter base. The Zapatista movement and their creation of the MAREZ demonstrated that bonding social capital in authoritarian contexts can spread fairly independently of external allies, through sustained collective action by autonomous, local political movements (Fox 1996: 1094). Excluded from PRI-dominated institutions, indigenous communities in Chiapas organized within the highly fragmented society and against the political elite and large landowners to preserve their ethnic identity independent of mestizo paternalism. This process demonstrated the enormous trust and loyalties that horizontal associations can produce (see Skoufias et al. 2010).

Whilst independent mobilization from below was fundamental, representing a second pathway for social capital accumulation, the growth and maintenance of Zapatista structures within the authoritarian state also benefited enormously from external allies. Once the state's counterinsurgency campaign was launched, the mobilization of solidarity networks, at national and international levels, was essential to exert international pressure,

which induced the Mexican government to declare a unilateral cease-fire after less than two weeks of fighting, rather than pursuing a military dissolution of the rebellion, as had occurred in many other Central American countries. Thus, external allies turned out to be essential for the sustained bottom-up mobilization in one of Mexico's most remote indigenous regions (Andrews 2011: 140). The societal capital produced within the global solidarity network, however, remained bonding social capital, because networks of civic engagement were organized along the conflict divide.

Enlace Civil was established in 1996 as the coordinator of solidarity activities in Mexico and the outward voice of the Zapatista communities. The organization was entrusted with the crucial task of maintaining the global solidarity network and thus with the survival of the movement. Enlace Civil supported the MAREZ through human rights accompaniment and the distribution of Zapatista material through the communication channels of the supporter network. The goal was to raise international awareness, advocate for Zapatista demands, solidify alliances, and attract new supporters (Enlace Civil 2014; Enlace Civil 1999). Enlace Civil gained international prominence, largely due to established international ties and activists, who arrived from Europe and the USA in order to conduct projects in close coordination with the organization. Consequently, the Zapatista movement was vested with external allies by Enlace Civil, which provided for leverage and some degree of protection in the face of hostile landowning elites and federal authorities, who were criminalizing supporting organizations (see Olesen 2004). The bonding social capital spread by the movement shaped, in turn, the CSO identity. As a major hub for the solidarity network, Enlace Civil represented the indigenous communities organized within the Zapatista movement and shared the goal of breaking the circle of marginalization and poverty through the unilateral declaration of autonomy. The organization adopted an exclusive agenda and re-produced bonding social capital, facilitating civic engagement of indigenous communities and strengthening ethnic and political ties. Close coordination with the EZLN was maintained in order to protect the MAREZ and, ultimately, Enlace Civil's staff working in the autonomous territories.

Enlace Civil denounced human rights violations by the Mexican state on Zapatista territory. Here, individual civil and political rights were invoked on behalf of the members of Zapatista communities. Apart from group rights, reports and urgent action requests condemned repressive state policies towards the Zapatista communities as a breach of collective

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social, economic, and cultural rights, as stipulated in the ILO convention 169, the Mexican Constitution and the ICESCR (Enlace Civil 1998a). Enlace Civil argued that the denial of such rights and the devastating living conditions of indigenous communities would legitimize the Zapatista autonomy project (Enlace Civil 1998b; Enlace Civil 1998c).

Political Opportunity Structure and Outcome

After the uprising in 1994, levels of violence and securitization in Chiapas remained high. The federal government reacted to the Zapatista uprising with severe counterattacks, forcing the EZLN combatants to retreat to the Chiapanecan highlands. Massive civilian casualties contributed to a climate of insecurity and danger. Only large-scale civil society mobilization against the Mexican authorities all over the country induced President Zedillo to finally agree to substantial peace talks in San Andrés in 1996. Although the talks showed progress at first, the Mexican government soon refused to implement what had been negotiated, which is why the Zapatistas withdrew from the negotiations. No major military campaign was launched after the final blow of the San Andrés talks in late 1996, but the army tightened its grip around Zapatista areas. Paramilitaries associated with state authorities and landowners perpetrated massacres that targeted the civilian supporter base to create an atmosphere of terror and fear (HRW 1996; also Bob 2005: 127). Failed top-level negotiations and the prevalence of violence worsened the operating conditions of human rights CSOs, particularly for those aiming at reconciliation between different ethnic groups.

The conditions were aggravated by the fact that human rights discourses in Chiapas have a politicized history of legitimizing repression and counter-hegemonic struggle. While the Mexican state invoked specifically individual human rights to curtail indigenous self-governance and to portray cultural customs as pre-modern and illiberal, indigenous movements had drawn, since the late 1980s, upon the stipulations provided by international covenants on basic rights to legitimize their claim for recognition of their ethnicity (Speed/Collier 2000: 878; Muñoz 2009: 46). Human rights came to be perceived as an 'empty concept' which could be adapted to any context and instrumentalized for any purpose, without any inherent capacity to reconcile and, thus, de-securitize.

In the wake of severe human rights violations by Mexican armed forces in Chiapas, the Zapatistas succeeded in framing their rebellion as a just fight against oppression, which caused widespread solidarity with the EZLN. The media coverage showed poorly armed Zapatista soldiers targeting strictly military and government installations, while the army's massive counterinsurgency campaign included indiscriminate bombardments and the execution of indigenous civilians, conveying the image of a vengeful government (García de León 2005: 515-516). Dismay within civil society toward the disproportionate government response increased, and Zapatistas came to be perceived as victims of long-term societal oppression and excessive government reprisals. In the face of growing civil engagement, repressive state measures were contrasted with the willingness of Zapatista to forge a broad alliance with Mexican civil society (Bob 2005: 175-176). The established Zapatista hegemony over the conflict narrative helped to create solidarity and mobilized anti-state activities, but also polarized Mexican society and further securitized the conflict.

In this situation, FrayBa was one of the few remaining voices demanding that all conflict actors comply with internationally acknowledged human rights and to "respect and ensure the existing cultural and ecological diversity in our country" (FrayBa 1995: 32). This had been coupled with a call to find negotiated solutions on the basis of mutual respect and tolerance: "Only creativity and the search for alternative and democratic proposals will make the emergence of favorable conditions for the respect for human rights possible" (FraBa 1996b: 27). Consequently, FrayBa acknowledged the threatening environment in Chiapas, but the CSO detached the threat from a specific social identity through temporal securitization, advocating for a negotiated solution to overcome the threatening past (see Pia/Diez 2010). In the de-securitizing move, FrayBa applied a mixture of constructivist and de-constructivist strategies, condemning all forms of violence to address exclusion and marginalization. It proclaimed that a shared future should "ensure all Mexicans the satisfaction of their basic needs" (FrayBa 1995: 32). The invocation of integrational rights did not exclude certain social identities, but underlined the equal status of all Mexican identity groups and urged the conflict parties to grant the same rights to all Mexican people. Referring to Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, which acknowledged the existence of different Mexican cultural groups, FrayBa demanded the inclusion of all societal groups into a pluricultural Mexican society without cultural assimilation, but through recognition of the diversity of customs and traditions. They emphasized that the

"Mexican nation has opposed this war since January 1994 and, therefore, has considered the destruction of the enemy as unacceptable, because the enemy is the other, our brother, our compatriot, a human being"[3] (FrayBa 1996a: 141).

Enlace Civil, on the other hand, enhanced the securitization of the conflict as a means of emancipatory contestation against the oppressive regime (see Browning/McDonald 2011). Facing a history of exclusion, marginalization and false state promises, Enlace Civil saw no point in reconciling conflicting positions, in the spirit of the Zapatista's *Ya Basta*. Instead, the major goal was to bring international attention to the injustice in Chiapas and the human rights-violating behavior of the Mexican state, by portraying authorities as illegitimate and a threat to indigenous communities. Here, Enlace Civil adopted the rhetorical strategy of the EZLN and constructed a clear-cut dichotomy between 'good' and 'bad': "Since the late twentieth century, the dispute over the territory has been configured as a clear tension between the interest for the commodification and control of the territory, and, on the other side, the territory inhabited as a source of life, of struggle and hope for a better future" (Enlace Civil 2014). Here, "over 500 years we lived exploited by bad government, […] and we are becoming poorer. This is because large traders are taking advantage of all our products while we, who work the land from sun-rise to sunset, have nothing" (Enlace Civil 2014).

In spite of Enlace Civil's strict commitment to peaceful means, emergency measures, in the form of a revolutionary struggle, were deemed necessary for self-defense: "We will not surrender, nor will we sell ourselves, we are here and we will continue resisting" (Enlace Civil 1999). Enlace Civil's activities supported the MAREZ as a legitimate expression of resistance and the Zapatista rebellion as the last option available.

5. Conclusion

This chapter examined the ambivalent role of civil society organizations advocating for human rights in ethno-political conflicts. The cases of FrayBa and Enlace Civil illustrate that human rights activism in conflicts is not homogenous and does not necessarily contribute to reconciliatory

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3 Quotes from FrayBa 1996a have been translated by Author.

transformation. Context conditions and political opportunity structure cannot preclude or cause a certain outcome; they rather restrict or enhance the strategic options available to different CSOs. While FrayBa adopted human rights to advocate for reconciliation and an integrative universal Mexican identity, Enlace Civil referred to securitization in order to reinforce the struggle for emancipatory change. The comprehensive analysis of the social mechanism linking context, CSO identity, framework of action, and POS in the cases, however, illustrates why human rights activism on the part of two organizations had such different impact with regard to conflict transformation.

Facing the repressive state and a fragmented Mexican society, cooperation with external allies was pivotal for operating in the conflict and bringing the neglected human rights situation in Chiapas to the national agenda. Since the overarching context did not represent an enabling working environment, both organizations strongly depended on the social context from which they emerged to provide leverage and protection. The kind of social capital produced within their social contexts critically influenced the political identity of the organizations. In FrayBa's case, bridging social capital induced an inclusive civic agenda and issue-centered activity, whereas the grassroots background dominated by bonding social capital induced Enlace Civil to advocate for a clear-cut constituency and adopt an exclusive agenda. The organizational background – that is, the kind of social capital from which the organization emerged – represented the first tipping point in the social mechanism.

At first glance, the findings seem to lead to the conclusion that the framework of action is not directly related to the outcome. Both organizations monitored the conflict, advocated for human rights, delivered services, and provided some degree of protection to the communities. Additionally, both organizations adopted an egalitarian political identity. Yet the degree of inclusiveness at the level of political identity, and its translation into concrete human rights activities, is a second important tipping point in the transition from CSO identity to framework of action. While FrayBa's de-securitizing move resulted from an appeal to an inclusive, universal Mexican identity that aimed to deconstruct the Self/Other antagonism in conflict (see Aradau 2004), Enlace Civil reified an indigenous Zapatista identity which entailed the exclusion of the state, the Mexican elites, and the large landholders as the threatening Other and, by means of security's us against them logic, emphasized the state of insecurity that had remained unrecognized for so long (see Booth 1997). The highly se-

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curitized situation in Chiapas, the polarized political landscape, and the lack of trust in the reconciling effects of human rights norms all contributed to an opportunity structure that intensified the securitizing effects of human rights activism on behalf of indigenous rights.

These results are a contribution to theory-building concerning the conditions under which CSOs can facilitate conflict transformation in ethnopolitical conflicts. The interplay between structure-related factors (such as the level of social cohesion, the organizational background and the overall acceptance of human rights in society) with agency-related aspects (such as strategic decisions on the organizational identity, the political agenda, and the human rights rhetoric) determines the securitizing or de-securitizing character of the resultant activism. Though both identified tipping points cannot be singled out and only gain significance in the realm of the overall social mechanism, the following hypotheses can be inferred: If an organization develops from bridging social capital, it shows an inclusive political identity and conducts integrational activities, resulting in de-securitizing moves. However, if the social context from which an organization develops is characterized by bonding social capital, the CSO is exclusive in its identity and its activities, and securitizing moves follow. The second set of hypotheses concerns the inclusiveness of the human rights rhetoric. Integrational invocations, which include all social identity groups, are the carrier for de-securitizing moves. Exclusive invocations, which invoke human rights exclusively on behalf of one conflict group, re-produce Self/Other narratives and convey securitizing moves.

Given the controversial theoretical debate on the role of securitization and de-securitization against the background of emancipatory struggles and politics, this article refrains from presenting de-securitizing activism as the only viable option for overcoming conflict. Yet in violent ethno-political conflicts that become protracted through deep-rooted hatred, where circles of violence and revenge are sustained, some de-securitization of the inter-group conflict antagonism is necessary in order to begin a process in which a shared future can be negotiated. The importance of the context for transformative civil society activities should prompt policy-makers to create an enabling environment for de-securitizing moves. Responsive and participative state structures, high social cohesion and inclusive societal structures can be expected to provide the grounds for bridging social capital and reconciling activities. Yet, since context and POS alone cannot prevent securitizing moves, CSO's concrete strategies of engagement are also of relevance. Advocating for the rights of people suffering from repression

is noble work, but the findings suggest that organizations should pursue their aims carefully. The chosen agenda and frameworks of action for advancing claims have (de-)securitizing effects and, thus, paramount implications for the prospects of conflict transformation.

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How Dynamics of Security Contribute to Illiberal Statebuilding. The Case of Tajikistan

Thorsten Bonacker, Denis Liebetanz

1. Introduction

As early as the mid-1990s, Richard Holbrook pointed to a central problem of international statebuilding in relation to processes of peacebuilding. An important element of international statebuilding, one aligned with the principles of liberal democracy, is conducting free and fair elections that legitimise a new government and thus highlight the transition to peace, guaranteeing a democratic post-war order. With respect to the forthcoming elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Holbrook noted: "Suppose the election was declared free and fair (...) and those elected are racist, fascist separatists who are publicly opposed to peace and reintegration. This is a dilemma" (quoted in Zakaria 1997: 22).

This dilemma makes it clear that statebuilding is a particular challenge in the conditions of a newly concluded peace and after a prolonged period of violence, oppression or foreign domination. It proceeds under the threat of an impending relapse into violence and uncertain or even contested rule. In such a situation, it seems risky, as Holbrook suggests, to hold free elections because, on the one hand, it cannot be guaranteed that those who are chosen will be committed to the peace process. On the other hand, it also appears uncertain whether the losers will acknowledge the outcome, accept the rules of democracy and assume the role of the opposition, especially since they can hardly be confident that the election winners will themselves abide by these rules. In fact, there are numerous examples of post-conflict statebuilding cases where elections were carried out only to maintain the semblance of democratic legitimacy in an autocratic system.

Even after 25 years, the dilemma highlighted by Holbrook's remark appears more relevant than ever. Even in cases where international governments have temporarily taken over territory, such as in Kosovo and East Timor, as well as (in a limited sense) in Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the regimes remain far from the ideal type of liberal democracy. This is especially surprising if one assumes that international statebuilding is

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committed to an explicitly liberal agenda and aims to implement civil, political, and property rights.

In this article, we want to contribute to the ongoing debate on the illiberal outcomes of liberal statebuilding (Chandler 2006; Mac Ginty 2013; Richmond 2014a). We develop a conceptual proposal that addresses the typical post-conflict starting point of international statebuilding, which has, we assume, a significant effect in many cases of statebuilding and, in particular, on political discourse in post-conflict states. Referring to the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization, our argument is that international statebuilding often leads to an institutionalization of securitization, which increases the likelihood of the emergence of authoritarian forms of rule. This is because the construction of threats is, in a sense, the norm of political communication.

The article proceeds as follows: We start with (1) a brief review of existing explanations for why post-conflict statebuilding produces illiberal states and (2) turn to a more sociological understanding of statebuilding, which allows us to explore security dynamics as deeply political and societal processes that affect statebuilding. In (3) we follow the work of *critical security studies* and propose a conceptual framework that assumes that statebuilding can trigger different dynamics of security, which undermine the emergence of liberal democracies (4). We then illustrate this conceptual proposal with the case of Tajikistan (5).

2. Perspectives on (il)liberal statebuilding

International statebuilding has rarely produced liberal democracies, and the literature has identified numerous reasons for this. Here, however, three explanations can be distinguished that have one thing in common: the motivations and interests of the dominant actors are central. This may be a crucial factor in explaining the emergence of illiberal democracies in statebuilding processes. Yet at the same time, the process of statebuilding itself, as well as its evolving dynamics, remain underexplored, even though they are also important in explaining the origins of illiberal democracies.

The critical literature on statebuilding and peace-building has suggested that international statebuilding mainly produces weak state institutions because it is based on a neoliberal image of the state. Following the end of the Cold War, the "liberal peace" of the peace-building agendas was over-

whelmingly a peace based on economic freedoms and the integration of countries into the capitalist world market. The resulting states necessarily lacked local legitimacy because they aimed at a Weberian and thus Western ideal of the state which was rarely anchored in the societies concerned. States tend to be illiberal for two reasons: First, they are often unable to adequately provide public goods, including public security. Instead, the political elite—often in cooperation with international actors—are more interested in satisfying their own economic interests and safeguarding their positions of power. Therefore, secondly, the security sector is often at the centre of statebuilding, as the construction of a functioning security apparatus is a crucial prerequisite for international actors so that fragile states are not a threat to international security. What results, in the words of Oliver Richmond (Richmond 2014b), is a "conservative peace", one fixed to the structure of state authority and with peace conceived negatively as the absence of violence due to its monopolization.

Based partially on a close reading of the critical literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding, a number of authors have proposed an understanding of statebuilding as a process of forming hybrid systems (Egnell/ Halden 2013). In the literature on hybridity, illiberal democracies appear mainly as a result of the interaction of various actors in statebuilding. Here, statehood is not generally conceptualised as an autonomous set of institutions but, in the spirit of Migdal and Schlichte (2005), as a normative form that is embedded in society and can compete with other normative orders. The hybridity of regimes is caused by (a) a wide variance of state and non-state forms of governance, from legal-rational to traditional and neo-patrimonial, (b) a combination of various social resources for legitimate governance, and (c) an interpenetration of these different forms of governance (Böge et al. 2009). The characteristics of hybrid statebuilding depend on both the motives as well as the resources and conceptions of normative orders among the actors involved. Put simply, on the one hand, international actors working within a liberal-peace paradigm attempt to impose their ideas of state order and to convince local actors to participate in the framework of the new political order. In response, local actors develop alternative conceptions of political order and undermine or prevent policies of liberal statebuilding (MacGinty 2013).

From the perspective of the hybridity literature, illiberal democracies in statebuilding processes therefore result from the interaction of national and international actors with their respective normative, instrumental and symbolic resources, whereas hybrid systems do not necessarily have to be

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illiberal. The embedding of traditional state institutions in neo-patrimonial social relationship patterns, however, can subvert liberal forms of governance and allow political domination, leading to illiberal developments despite democratic institutions. Elections, for example, are not used for the democratic legitimacy of political rule, but to shore up clientelistic relations (Bonacker 2014b). The inability of international actors to transform not only political institutions, but also the social structures of a society, leaves the politics of statebuilding at risk of producing illiberal results because liberal democracies are dependent on accommodations between political culture and social structure.

A third strand of literature does not deal with the illiberal effects of liberal statebuilding but with the alternative: that is, illiberal statebuilding, which has so far received little attention in statebuilding research. According to this perspective, illiberal forms of governance, contrary to the widespread adoption of liberal forms, can possibly be more effective at securing peace and stability in post-conflict societies. Two types of illiberal statehood systems following the end of violence and the establishment of peace can be distinguished: one where national political actors make government institutions increasingly authoritarian, and another in which both national and international actors—whether intentionally or unintentionally—legitimize illiberal forms of governance. Smith (2014) illustrates the first case by using the example of the transition in Indonesia, which in the late 1990s, as part of an internationally supported democratization, experienced domestic violence in several regions. This led to a termination of political reforms and to the strengthening of central government institutions under increasingly authoritarian leadership. In the second case, international actors support (for different reasons) illiberal and authoritarian forms of government authority. Jones, Soares de Oliveira and Verhoeven use the examples of authoritarian rule in Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan to show that illiberal statebuilding may also arise from the interaction of international actors and national political elites. Although all four have emerged from violent conflicts, they are all characterised by different types of illiberal political regime (Jones et al. 2013: 7). Yet they all, with the exception of Sudan, receive substantial support from Western donors. The authors attribute this, in part, to *Realpolitik* compromises by Western governments.

All three strands found in the statebuilding literature provide different explanations for why, especially after violent conflicts, illiberal democracies or autocracies arise out of statebuilding processes. Part of the criti-

cism of the idea of a 'liberal peace' relates to illiberal statehood being a consequence of international, top-down statebuilding that, while being rhetorically committed to the image of liberal democracy, in practice undermines these liberal principles. From the perspective of the literature on hybridity, however, illiberal democracies seem more likely to arise from an amalgamation of different normative patterns from which national and international actors all draw their legitimacy. Therefore, a mixture of liberal and illiberal institutions often characterize hybrid political orders. From the hybridity perspective, illiberal statebuilding is seen more as an unintended consequence of international statebuilding, but cases can also be identified where state actors have very deliberately taken the path of illiberal statebuilding. This can either be because they have the proper capacity to (re)establish authoritarian forms of governance, or because, for various reasons, they can convince those actors who are committed to the international and liberal agenda to tolerate or support illiberal statebuilding. We argue here that all of these explanations mainly focus on the motives and interests of the relevant national and international actors. The emergence of illiberal democracies in statebuilding contexts is thus ultimately explained by focusing on the actors, as the processes of statebuilding itself are not sufficient. In contrast, we propose a conceptual framework that tries to take into account the initial situation of international statebuilding by developing a stronger dynamic from it. Our argument is that illiberal statebuilding is less a result of the dominance and the agenda of certain national or international actors, but rather grows out of a specific dynamic of security in statebuilding, which is likely to lead in an illiberal direction. To explore this dynamic, we need a sociological understanding of statebuilding.

3. A sociological understanding of statebuilding

In order to understand the politics of statebuilding and explain the social structures resulting from it, one should not take the perspective of the state-builder as a given, but treat it as a historically contingent normative concept, such as the state as *fait social* in a Durkheimian sense. Taking a sociological point of view, Migdal and Schlichte propose two steps: they distinguish between the idea – or, rather, the image – of the state, and the practices of the state. State and non-state actors often hold very divergent images of the state, and these images orient their actions. This is true for

both how the state should be and how it is – or is perceived – in reality. The multiple practices of the state—or more specifically, of state actors such as judges, police, soldiers, teachers, and civil servants—often relate to the image of the state and establish a relationship between state and non-state actors, where the state is actually practiced – that is, through teaching, protection, punishment or management. "Both the image and practices of the state involve power, inducing people to think and behave in ways that they would otherwise not do, and particularly using its most direct inducement of all, violence" (Migdal/Schlichte 2005: 15). There-fore, during statebuilding, a variety of actors —government and non-gov-ernmental, national and international — produce and reproduce images and practices of the state.

Second, Migdal and Schlichte consider the state as a process in which images and practices of the state can affect and transform each other. Just as the idea of the state arose as a historical process, so too may concrete ideas and perceptions of the state change when confronted with its practices, such as when specific practices run counter to conceptions of le-gitimate statehood. "The dynamics of the state involve its changing image, its changing practices, and the changing relationship between them, as well as the effects of all these changes on the field of power that is the state. In this process, social groups are transformed, including their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting. Like any other group or or-ganization, the state, then, is constructed and re-constructed, invented and re-invented through its interaction as a whole and of its parts with others. It is not a fixed entity; its organization, goals, means, partners, and opera-tive rules change as it allies with and oppose others in and outside its terri-tory" (Migdal/Schlichte 2005: 19). Consequently, statebuilding cannot be understood as a project that has been completed once state institutions are established, but rather as a process in which the state and state power are permanently reconfigured anew by the practice of government and non-government, national and international actors. Such practices can strength-en the conceptions of the state, but also weaken them.

As part of historical state formation, one component of the image of the state that is of central importance for the state's legitimacy has crystal-lized: the ability of the state to ensure the security and protection of its citizens. Historically, state-formation was initially connected, in particular, with the capacity to unleash violence and less with guarantees of security. The formation of a central government and the spread of its institutions of-ten represented an extremely violent process which comprised insurgen-

cies, their repression, and prolonged civil wars. Newman (2013) lists a whole series of violent conflicts in order to demonstrate a strong relationship between the development of the state and violence: from the American Civil War, to rebellions during the Meiji Restoration in Japan in the late 19th century, to the civil and secessionist wars after independence such as in Nigeria (Biafra), Sudan, Uganda and Pakistan in the 1960s and '70s. From this, he concludes that the development of statehood is inherently violent and that there is little reason to believe that state development might increase the safety of the population and ensure peace. However, the state draws a significant portion of its legitimacy from an image of the state administering protection and safety, even if the practices of the state undermine this in certain empirical contexts, such as when state actors go beyond the legal use of force or cooperate with armed groups. A historical perspective shows that security is, in some sense, part of the semantic and normative inventory of the state, even if the image involved is often distorted. This includes the protection of external borders, the defence of state integrity and sovereignty, and the protection of public order. The idea of the state itself is, in an elementary sense, connected with the differentiation between internal and external security, where the increasing internationalization of security, such as the outsourcing of security to external actors, also creates a certain recognisable echo of the image of government authority. Furthermore, this indicates that security is itself a "deeply historical category that sheds promises about historical changes, and which is closely intertwined with changing security needs and thus a corresponding consciousness of safety" (Conze 2009: 17).

Security needs and claims – to be legitimately defined and satisfied – existed before the monopolization of violence by the state, and they exist beyond the state today. Why, then, is "security" not, as such, a "[...] characteristic of modernity, but a normative order in a specific form of political rule – specifically, the nation state – which asserts and determines its own security and the needs of its subjects and enforces them authoritatively" (Daase 2012: 400). In the course of state formation, security becomes a part of the state and is closely associated with its *raison d'état* (Guzzini 2015). The state monopolizes not only the means of violence, but also the function of being able to provide legitimate security. The guarantee of safety and security belongs to the image of the state in international statebuilding and the politics of statebuilding is generally based on this image. Yet, in statebuilding after violent conflicts, we observe that the actual practice of statebuilding often creates illiberal democracies or autocracies.

Below we argue that this development can be understood as a consequence of the emergence of a dynamics of security or the securitization of statebuilding (Daase 2012: 387).

4. *Dynamics of security in statebuilding*

In order to understand how security affects statebuilding, it is important to take into account post-conflict statebuilding's special empirical point of departure. After the cessation of violent conflicts and foreign rule, a strong symbolic collective or a political community barely exists (Brodocz 2008). Citizens usually maintain only weak ties or a common identity that could lead to identification with the state as a whole. Typically, however, group, family or regional loyalties remain particularistic as such against a state-level construction of citizenship. Moreover, the situation of post-war statebuilding is shaped by the fact that state rule is uncertain and potentially controversial, i.e. contested and often not completely enacted. This can extend to the monopoly of power, which remains fragile following peace agreements or in transition situations after formal independence. At the same time, it has yet to be proven whether state security actors are in the long term loyal to a government which was formerly one of the warring parties, or if they will submit to the rules of non-violent conflict resolution and, if necessary, accept electoral defeats, cooperating with different elite groups instead of joining secessionist movements.

Security as a discursive resource in statebuilding is of particular importance against such a background, where uncertain conditions for the transformation of state power, so as to consolidate the basis of state legitimacy, need to be strengthened or at least made more reliable. In other words, political action during statebuilding – whether national or international, governmental, non-governmental or sub-state actors – frequently consists of the production of threats to (internal or external) security, because the empirical legitimacy of political rule appears uncertain. The reference to security may increase this legitimacy in so far as this is accompanied by the promise that there will be no relapse into violence, civil war or foreign domination. Given the prevalence of fresh, first-hand memories of violence and oppression, the legitimacy of political action in statebuilding processes can be significantly enhanced through references to security.

The Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies has indicated that the reference to security in political action is more integral than a mere

description of state functions. Accordingly, Wæver draws an important distinction between whether or not a political action is security-related and a topic is securitized to that effect. Security has an inescapable performative dimension, because only a speech act defines what appears as a threat. "In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done (...) By uttering, security ', a state-representative moves a Particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever Means are there to block it" (Wæver 1995: 35). Whatever is depicted in a given speech act as threatening becomes a referent object of securitization. Wæver and others have made it clear that securitization, while proclaiming the existence of serious – and, in many cases, existential – threats, serves to justify extraordinary measures to protect against these threats. Securitization can be defined in this context as "the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with said issue" (McDonald 2008: 567).

One difficulty in this definition is that it casts securitization primarily as an event, with the speech act and its confirmation understood by the audience it is addressed to. In contrast, Guzzini has pointed to the procedural nature of securitization: "stressing the procedural character of the original securitization analysis means that its performative component is simply part of an ongoing social construction of (social) reality. In this, securitization refers to the successful mobilisation of the logic of the discourse of security […] which allows extraordinary means, and de-securitization refers to those processes that mobilise other discourses and diminish the role of the discourse of security, its successful demobilisation, if you wish. That means that all discussions about the factors that are necessary to make securitization successful are correct, but do not touch the underlying continuity and latent effect of such security discourses. That is, the discourse of security is stable; its (de)mobilisation is the variance in the study. Put more sharply: the discourse of security does securitization, always; it is what defines it. Nevertheless, the discourse of security is not always mobilised or prevalent. It is a discursive resource for some. To have this capacity, however, it needs to be a constitutive component of the way of thinking and of legitimate politics for all" (Guzzini 2015: 10). Consequently, securitization means that the topic relevant to safety is (made) by being integrated into an already institutionalized security dis-

course. This security discourse is always a genuine component of government authority. It belongs, at the same time, to the unquestioned life world, to the background consensus of the State, which makes it possible to securitize political issues in order to legitimize extraordinary measures.

The image of the state in the specific situation of post-war statebuilding is not only influenced by the fact that the state can effectively provide security and protection for its citizens against multiple threats. Rather, the state can also be portrayed as (at least potentially) threatened on an existential level, because its institutional order and its valid claims are not without controversy. The statebuilding state tends to be both protective and threatened. Against this background, security has a special significance: it stands for the legitimization of state rule through the monopolization of the provision of security, as well as for the institutionalization of an imagined threat that justifies government security-related action. The nature of those threats from which citizens, and especially the state itself, must be protected depends on the empirical conditions of the statebuilding.

Security, therefore, has a dual function in statebuilding: It signals the claim of the state to enforce its rule and to claim sole responsibility for the protection of society. Furthermore, it allows for the legitimacy of extraordinary policy measures by reference to existential threats to the state. The latter is obviously not typical for statebuilding processes, but it is also a common pattern in established democracies. As the work on Critical Security Studies in particular has shown, following the Copenhagen School, liberal democracies confronted with discursively constructed threats are willing to restrict liberties. However, in liberal democracies, mechanisms such as a public political sphere and an understanding of political legitimacy have emerged to counteract the extensive securitization of political discourse.

Yet, under conditions of uncertain rule in statebuilding processes, the state appears from the outset to be threatened which, potentially, significantly lowers the threshold for discursive inhibition. Given this, the construction of threats and the necessary related security practices appear to become plausible and are thus more quickly legitimated, especially with reference to collective experiences of violence and oppression. In this sense, we can speak of an institutionalization of an imagined threat in statebuilding: the state—and thus its ability to provide security—portrays the potential risk and the mobilization of actors facilitating security, whether international, national or sub-national. As ideal types, it is possi-

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ble to distinguish three dynamics of security that can arise from such a mobilization, with each increasing the likelihood of the emergence of illiberal democracies in statebuilding (cf. for an ideal type description of securitization, Balzacq 2015).

First, the state itself may become the referent object of securitizing mobilization by portraying itself as threatened. In post-war international statebuilding, inner peace and the stability of the post-war state are often the focus of security-related discourses. The reference to national interests and endangered national unity constitute typical discursive elements of such a mobilization of security. The resulting dynamics consist firstly in a restriction of rights and freedoms to ensure security in the threatened state —typically of expression and assembly, as well as other political, civil and property rights (Bonacker 2016). Furthermore, alongside this mobilization comes a tendency to demonize political opposition considered a threat to the stability of the state. As in the case of Indonesia, as violence perpetrated by the military and political elite escalated, political reform was considered to be "too risky to national unity", (Smith 2014: 1520) and a strong political opposition and active political civil society were considered to be a threat to peace and safety. Both mobilizations paved the way for authoritarianism and illiberal forms of governance, which may rely on the specificity of the fragile peace or on the new, and therefore insecure, independence.

Secondly, the image of the endangered and, at the same time, protecting state legitimises the security practices of the state. Put more precisely, various state security actors and their security practices are mutually recognized as a threat, such as when the police and military struggle over political influence or where different military or paramilitary forces try to exert territorial control. These security practices can largely be decoupled from both the image of the protective and security guaranteeing state. A classic example here is the corruption of state security actors and their cooperation with organized crime. Moreover, the security of the state, specifically the security of the regime, is often accompanied by associated (informal) security practices that increase the uncertainty of the population, or at least exploit it. In this context, Roe speaks of a particular type of security dilemma: "Arguably, while primarily seeking to ensure its own security, the regime's policies would necessarily seem to involve harmful actions directed against its own population. Thus, the situation could be characterized as 'required insecurity'; security for the regime depends on insecurity for its people" (Roe 1999: 198). This includes the use of extensive moni-

toring and extraterritorial securitization of diaspora and migrant groups, which are considered as a potential threat to national security (for the case of Uzbekistan, see: Lewis 2015).

On the other hand, security practices can also aim to enforce state power in the first place. This is expected to trigger an important dynamic of security, in particular, in the context of post-conflict statebuilding where former conflict parties have been integrated into the security institutions of the state (army, police) and a denial of the state as a hostile actor applies. In this way, people are "transformed into obedient subjects by the work of state institutions such as armies, schools, and universities (...). The spread of discourses and narratives that legitimized state rule was thus supplemented by practices that made peasants and unruly classes into law-abiding subjects of state institutions" (Schlichte 2007: 36).

The decoupling of state security practices from the image of the security which should be provided by the state may also have the consequence that non- or sub-state actors can potentially protect the security needs of such groups. "In this situation, the actors perceived as powerful and effective include warlords and their militias in outlying regions, gang leaders in townships and squatter settlements, vigilante-type organisations, ethnically-based protection rackets, millenarian religious movements, transnational networks of extended family relations, organised crime or new forms of tribalism. Occasionally, these new formations have seized power in certain regions of a given state's territory (be it a remote mountainous peripheral location or a squatter settlement in the capital city). They have the capacity to exert violence on a large scale against outsiders and the capacity to control violence within their respective strongholds" (Boege et al. 2009: 9). Such dynamics of security, then, not only undermine the image of the protective state, they can in addition strengthen illiberal actors' claims to provide protection—at least for certain groups and, optionally, *from* the state.

A third dynamic may arise from the fact that the state and its practices are themselves perceived as a threat. The referent object of securitization in this case is not the state, but society or social groups, so that it is possible to speak of a societal securitization, following the Copenhagen School. Securitization here is accompanied by the construction of a threatened identity that must be defended from the state. While the survival of the state depends on the defence of its sovereignty and the maintenance of public order, social groups—political, cultural, regional or social—primarily see their identity as threatened. "For threatened societies, one obvious

line of defensive response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and distinctiveness, and to ensure that society reproduces itself correctly" (Wæver et al. 1993: 191). However, this may also include various groups that organize their own safety and protect themselves, such as "big men", vigilante or paramilitary forces that arise against the state. Such security practices, beyond the state, may cause state actors to arrange counter-securitization, which aims to discredit such groups as a threat to national unity. It is readily apparent that this momentum can quickly lead to illiberal statehood, as in the case of the Solomon Islands highlighted by Dinnen (2008). Statebuilding can have destabilizing consequences when international statebuilders do not sufficiently consider that certain groups can feel threatened even by the enforcement of state order. This is largely because they have organized their own security: "Insufficient appreciation of the distinct forces that characterize post-colonial states, as well as of the contested character of the state itself in the fragmented settings where such interventions typically occur, has tended to render external statebuilding projects, at best, ineffective, and, at worst, disruptive and destabilizing. What is generally missing is an adequate understanding of why the particular state in question has been performing so differently from the idealized state that interveners seek to construct" (Dinnen 2008: 52).

In this section, we have tried to develop a conceptual framework that sets a more process-oriented perspective on the role of security in the statebuilding experience. It should be clear that the mobilization of security in statebuilding increases the probability of illiberal developments. This may be enhanced by different dynamics and cannot simply be reduced to the motives or interests of international, governmental, or sub-state actors. Rather, the dual structure of the threatened and protecting state provides something of a discursive resource that international, state and non-state actors can mobilise in postwar and statebuilding politics.

We have identified three dynamics resulting from this double structure: (a) a dynamic where security is mobilized by state actors with reference to the image of the threatened state, (b) a dynamic that undermines this image in the public security practices, and (c) a dynamic whereby social groups see themselves as threatened by the state and the enforcement of state order. Empirically, all three interrelated dynamics increase the probability of the emergence of illiberal statehood, because they are usually connected with a restriction on or blockage of political, civil and property

rights. In the following section, we illustrate these dynamics of security through the example of Tajikistan.

5. *Dynamics of security and illiberal statebuilding in Tajikistan*

A member of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)—now suspected of terrorism and banned—commented on the refusal of the government to make constitutional reforms in the security sector by pointing out that "the security sector is immune to reform, since security has been given an almost religious status in the state. Liberalisation in the security sphere will be perceived negatively as a weakness of the state, therefore the population has to be educated about it" (Kabiri, former member of the Parliament of Tajikistan and Chairman of the Islamic Renaissance Party, quoted in Matveeva of 2010: 40). The Tajik government, then, is an illustrative example of how the dynamics of security lead to illiberal forms of governance.

Since its final independence in 1992, Tajikistan has been a permanent recipient of extensive international assistance, which has predominantly benefited government institutions. Over the past 20 years a tight material and discursive link has emerged between state and international actors that has made Tajikistan, in certain respects, an "internationalized state" (Schlichte 2015; Heathershaw 2013). The security sector in particular is highly dependent on international support. With respect to US security sector aid, Tajikistan is one of the most dependent countries in the world, with almost 25% of the budget emanating from this source (Kucera 2016). Moreover, Russia has temporarily taken control of security on the Afghan border and, through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, now plays a major role in the Tajik state's capacity to ensure security. At the same time, the political elite of the country has enjoyed a high level of continuity. President Emomali Rahmon has been in office since independence and has recently been appointed leader of the nation for life by Parliament, while cabinet posts are rarely changed. For example, before they were both replaced in 2013, Prime Minister Akil Akilov was in office for 14 years, and Minister of Defense Sherali Hairulloev for 18 years.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Tajik State gained its independence in a manner similar to some decolonised African countries: there was no completely new beginning, but a mixture of old Soviet influences, already existing local power structures, and international democratization

projects (Schlichte 2015: 224-226). In the literature, the Central Asian Republics, and with them Tajikistan, are regarded as a region characterized by a specific post-colonial constellation because Soviet (as opposed to European) colonialism itself used anti-colonial rhetoric and was associated with large-scale modernization projects. From the Soviet perspective, the population of Central Asia was seen as backward and uncivilized—typical of colonial thinking (Adams 2011). The anti-Soviet politics during the 1980s used a decidedly anti- and post-colonial rhetoric that is still detectable today: "In Tajikistan, a clearer strain of anti-colonialism can be found amongst activists of the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) which was born in anti-Soviet struggle and remains a diminished but influential movement today. The demands of IRP's activists from its founding in the late-1980s for greater freedom of religion should not be seen as an acceptance of the public-private space dichotomy presupposed by the European secular state model" (Heathershaw 2010: 94). In addition, the early stages of a prolonged civil war (up until 1997) were crucial for the development of the Tajik state. This culminated in a power-sharing agreement, out of which evolved the (first) moderate autocracy under President Rahmon. However, since 2015, the ban on the IRP (the largest opposition party) and the strengthening of executive Presidential power have seen Tajikistan become a presidential autocracy.

Especially since 1992, the financial dependence of Tajikistan on external donors has increased dramatically. At the same time, the state has benefited greatly from remittances by Tajik migrant workers in Russia. The massive reduction of remittances in 2015 and 2016 contributed to an economic crisis of the state. In addition, the World Bank states that about 10 percent of gross domestic product comes from official development assistance. A significant part of this aid money is distributed to central government institutions. Through this, an international class has emerged which provides consultancy work for government agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, while also forming a tight nexus of personnel that maintains a high level of influence over international actors. Here, an important role is played by the increasing bureaucratization of power in the state, which is based substantially on the requirements of international programmes (Schlichte 2015: 232-234). As aid has been focused on central government institutions, these have gained domestic political power, just as international actors have lost autonomy. Still, international actors do retain an influence over decisions made by the Tajik state

through physical, personnel and conceptual resources (for the economic field, see: Broome 2010).

The starting point of our empirical analysis is the observation by Heathershaw and Montgomery that international security discourse has, for some time, fallen into the trap of Muslim radicalization in the Central Asian Republics (Heathershaw/Montgomery 2014). While the two authors argue that there is not enough evidence for such a development, it remains a question of particular interest, which is why the theme "Islam in Central Asia" is addressed in international contexts. This can only be understood against the background of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the consequent climate of fear, especially in Western countries, as well as the subsequent international intervention in Afghanistan. Even at an early stage, the so-called "war on terror" established the interpretation of a struggle of the free world against the Islamist threat. The primary location of this struggle was Afghanistan, where the Taliban (and al Qaeda) could freely prepare various terrorist attacks. The strategy of the international community was to build a stable, democratic state in Afghanistan, and to make it impossible for the Taliban to provide al Qaeda with logistical support. In this context, Tajikistan, as the northern neighbour of Afghanistan, increasingly became part of the "theatre of intervention in Central Asia" (Bonacker 2014a) from the point of view of international security policy.

First, it became clear at a relatively early stage in the armed struggle between the Taliban and the ISAF (operation "Enduring Freedom") in Afghanistan that troops were being financed by trading raw opium, which was, inter alia, smuggled via a northern route through Tajikistan to Russia and then Western Europe. In terms of a weakening of the Taliban, the international community developed a significant interest in a strong Tajik State which could contribute both by securing the borders, as well as combating drug smugglers within their territory in order to weaken the Taliban in Afghanistan (Eschment 2009: 12- 14; Kunze/Gronau 2012). Secondly, Western strategists assumed that the Taliban could use not only Pakistan, but also Tajikistan as a retreat in order to regroup in their asymmetrical struggle against international forces and recruit new fighters among the Islamic population of Tajikistan. In this context, the capabilities of the Tajik state in terms of border security and "fighting" Islamist tendencies became the centres of interest (Eschment 2009: 8-12; Kunze/Gronau 2012). The international expectation was that the Tajik state would prevent drug trafficking, keep out the Taliban, and fight Islamist tendencies on their own territory.

What can be observed here is a security dynamic, one supported by national and international actors, in the image of a threatening Islamic extremism which feeds into an image of the state guaranteeing national and international security. Tajikistan always was an unusual post-civil war country because of the high dependence of the political elite on international support, and it has been described as a failing state due to a continuing threat to its stability from Islamist tendencies in Central Asia (Heathershaw 2013). However, the Tajik State was seen as both a vulnerable object and as a central actor in a (security policy) solution to this problem, which forced the international community into a "small steps - statebuilding" approach and increasingly focused their donor policies on the Tajik security sector.

This security dynamic materialized concretely via sharply increased grants from international (aid) funds to the Tajik security sector. According to the internet platform *Security Assistance Monitor,* the sums spent by the US government between military assistance, on the one hand, and economic development, on the other, have been moving closer together in the past few years. This trend has continued and, since 2014, military aid has for the first time exceeded economic development. However, it is not just financial aid for the Tajik security sector that has risen: during the same period, there has been a tenfold increase in safety-related development projects and a quadrupling of arms sales to Tajikistan (Security Assistance Monitor 2014). Experts in security sector development further point out that the Tajik government increasingly outsources regional tasks (such as external security) to international actors, which allows more funds for internal security (Matveeva 2005). For example, Russia deploys a large contingent of troops to secure the Afghan-Tajik border. At the same time, the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) run extensive training programs in Europe for Tajik soldiers in the field of border management and the war on drugs. These activities now attract the largest share of international aid funds, whereby the Tajik security agencies benefit more from financing aimed to combat drugs than financing for prevention services (De Danieli 2011: 135).

Since 2001, the focus of international statebuilding policy in Tajikistan, with respect to the security capabilities of the state, has exerted an increasingly significant structural effect. This becomes particularly visible at the institutional level (De Danieli 2011: 139-141). In particular, in both the area of drug control and border security, new institutional structures have arisen due to increasing international aid (for example, the national Drug

Control Agency, DCA). Their legitimacy is closely linked to the existence of, or the political focus on, issues of internal security. These include very specific new programmes and international organizations that the EU or the OSCE have established in the field of border security. Furthermore, the number of new jobs, particularly in the Tajik Interior Ministry, in the Secret Service, and particularly in the military have risen by higher than average rates. This means that a growing number of people have a pure "existential" professional interest in the security sector.

It is also possible to observe that these institutional changes are broadly characterized by an increasing dominance of the security sector and its representatives in policy debates, as well as by a new political balance of power in the state. This is not surprising, however, as Tajikistan and especially the government of President Rahmon, as shown above, are dependent on international aid. This aid is underpinned by the securitization of the Tajik state in international security discourses, which further enables pressure to be applied on political opposition, resulting in the portrayal of the IRP as part of transnational organized extremist networks and, eventually, its prohibition. The fact that the former head of the special police, Gulmurod Chalimow, later joined the so-called Islamic State has been recognized internationally as indicative of a particular threat in the region. In response, the international community has facilitated the government's development in a more illiberal direction and has generally accepted repressive practices against oppositional actors, rather than publicly denouncing them.

Similarly, it can be assumed that the Tajik state took up the conceptual and substantive model of the international community not only to obtain continued access to international aid, but also because of its national policies and self-understanding as a threatened and security guaranteeing state. This fact can only be understood in light of the peculiarities of the Tajik nation-building process following independence from the Soviet Union in 1992 and the role of the Rahmon government. Rahmon and his party defined themselves from the outset as guarantors of a secular state inherited from the Soviet Union. For political actors with an Islamic background, they created a "conservative ideology devoid of Islamic content, resting on imagined national traditions, national purity and ancient wisdom" (Thibault 2016: 1). In this regard, the government was immediately able to tap into the liberal and secular self-understanding of international statebuilding and security policy after 9/11 (Hurd 2008: 23). The fact that the political opposition largely backed the IRP during the civil war further

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buttressed the predominant impression of a "secular vs. islamic" line of conflict, which became the central feature of nation-building discourse in Tajikistan. An indicator of this is that, for much of the population, Islam is increasingly seen as a medium for the expression of political discontent in general (Thibault 2013: 11). In 1997, a peace treaty was concluded that institutionalised this line of conflict in the state-political context, and provided a means whereby different conceptions of the state and its various security needs (such as protection of state stability, protection of religious freedom) could be publicly discussed and evaluated in a democratically transparent way.

Rahmon used the new material and discursive resources of liberal statebuilding after 9/11 to stigmatize opposition forces in general, and Islamic actors in particular, as a threat to the Tajik government. National discourses were, so to speak, copied from what we have described above as an international statebuilding discourse of securitization. This securitization drew on two referent objects which are characteristic of post-colonial as well as post-war statebuilding. First, the Tajik government's sovereignty appeared to be threatened by drug trafficking and transnational terrorism. Second, the domestic threat of Islamism from the perspective of the government raised the risk of a new civil war. The legitimacy of state security practices is thus substantially supported by appeals to the necessity of security and peace, given what happened between 1991 and 1997.

Another aspect of state security practices is the criminalization of opposition forces, as well as the depiction of recalcitrant governors as a threat to state stability. Simultaneously, by referencing these same circumstances, the government increasingly justifies severe restrictions on all forms of political party organisation and civic opposition. For example, since the last election there are no longer any opposition parties sitting in the Tajik Parliament. According to international election observers, this is not the result of a free and fair political choice, but rather of systemic campaigns against and political persecution of opposition candidates, against whom the government leverages not only state media, but also the security apparatus (Kunze/Erdmann 2013). NGOs are increasingly occupied with onerous regulatory requirements and frequently face accusations from government bodies that they harbour foreign agents (Human Rights Watch 2015: 2).

Overall, the government deliberately labels repression as necessary to a policy of national security with which it defends the supposedly questionable stability of the state against various opposition groups. Official antag-

onism toward Islamic groups is particularly vehement and the thesis of Islamic radicalization in Tajikistan, as advocated in international security discourse, is continuously invoked: "This danger of post-Soviet Muslim radicalization is repeated *ad nauseam* by the region's government, which fear political opponents and seek foreign security" (Heathershaw/Montgomery 2014, emphasis in original).

In criminalizing the opposition, especially Islamic actors, the international community is confirmed in their impression of a radicalization of the political culture in Tajikistan and more willing to pay the very aid on which the Rahmon government is fundamentally dependent. DeDanieli believes that a deliberate calculation lies behind this policy. Using the example of the national anti-drug policy, he refers to several cases in which the government dramatized circumstances in order to simulate the need for assistance and to adjust the flow of aid funding for the activities of specific projects (DeDanieli 2011: 136). In this context, John Heathershaw speaks of a "global performance state" (Heathershaw 2013a), whereby the simulated performance of the state generates further international assistance through independent strategies in special areas. However, this sphere of simulated state action is a direct consequence of domestic political processes, because the government uses international impulses to progressively push the (Islamic) opposition out of public areas of political action (parliament, civil society). This obstructs opposition attempts to question government policies or insert their own alternative protection needs (such as the protection of religious freedom) into the political discourse. Rather, they are increasingly forced to act in the political underground. The opposition thus becomes less transparent to the general population and thus more prone to being described as illegal, or at least as a potential danger. The illiberal tendencies of Tajik statebuilding are thereby consolidated.

20 years of international aid has focused on the Tajik security sector. Consequently, the process described here, by which domestic issues are securitized, is now so advanced that one must speak of an institutionalization of securitization. This is apparent not only in the physical but also the discursive domain. In the spirit of Buzan and Waever, various "signal words" have emerged in the political discourse of Tajikistan. Their use automatically carries the threat of 'blaming and shaming' for the relevant actors or circumstances which create a threat to the state and thus to national security. The most obvious example of this is the term "Islam" in relation to "Islamism" (Dagiev 2014: 150; Lenz-Raymann 2014), which is

a symbol of an integrated Tajikistan but, at the same time, acts as a label for security (Nourzhanov 2015: 72).

Official Tajik security practices have largely continued to undermine the image of the protective state (Heathershaw 2011). This is certainly true in regions that traditionally do not see themselves as part of Tajikistan but have a strong regional identity, the latter of which is only minimally represented by state institutions. The subdivision of Tajikistan into four relatively closed regional identities—Kulyab, Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO), Sughd and the central region around the capital Dushanbe—was already a dynamic of central importance during the civil war and played an important role, both in the Soviet Union and in the informal recruitment practices for positions in state institutions. It is also the cause of an endemic tension and conflict within state institutions that points to an extreme distrust among regional groups: "the regions are plagued by exclusivist attitudes and intolerance of other identities, as was suggested by the absence of external regional employees in regional institutions, especially in the Sughd, Kulyab, and GBAO. The great majority of state institutions are fragmented by cross-regional contentions, cleavages, and rivalry, as is the state apparatus overall. With sectional interests and regionalist recruitment pursued within state institutions, a coherent and overarching policy aimed at the implementation of nation-building goals is rendered impossible […]" (Kasymov 2013: 19). At the same time, a number of events indicate that through state security policies, groups and actors see themselves as threatened and independently ensure their own security. Since independence, and most recently in 2012, there have been repeated clashes between state security forces and local authorities who feel responsible for the safety of the population and at the same time claim their own territory, especially in the region of Gorno-Badakhshan, The government answered this form of *societal securitzation* not only with military action, but also with the restriction of public services, as well as access to the internet and public information. However, there is evidence that, since 2013, Rahmon has made a more purposeful attempt to take regional interests into account – for example, by appointing ministers from different regions, thereby aiming to weaken regional loyalties (Malashenko/Niyazi 2014).

Our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows: Tajik statebuilding is dominated by a dynamic of security which presents the state as both threatened and the provider of security. But the security practices of the state undermine the image of security guaranteed by the state. At the same time, there are indications that groups see the state as a threat to their re-

gional identity and autonomously organize their security. All three dynamics reinforce the illiberal tendencies of Tajik statebuilding, which is supported by international and national actors. Buttressed by substantial assistance from the international community, the Tajik leadership has developed the material and discursive resources to copy a politics of state security through institutionalized securitization on a national level. The state becomes the central object of reference when it comes to the production of security. This, in turn, is interpreted by social actors and groups as a threat. Through the institutional and discursive perpetuation of a sense of latent internal and external political insecurity, the Tajik leadership, against its own people and the international community, conjures a permanent condition in which the state is permanently threatened in its role as guarantor of security and peace. The power to foreground the question of security seems indispensable to this government, which may also explain the grudging acceptance with which international actors have repeatedly allowed waves of repression in Tajikistan to go largely unmentioned (Eurasianet 2015).

6. Conclusion

Post-conflict international statebuilding has produced only a few examples of liberal democracies, although international actors are often, at least rhetorically, oriented towards a liberal agenda. Explanations for this fact generally refer to the motives and interests of political elites and international actors, which are subject to change in the course of statebuilding processes, but the central frame of reference for an explanation of the results of statebuilding remains (see, for example Högelund/Kovacs 2012). The aim of this article was to outline a conceptual framework that can bring the processes and discourses of statebuilding itself more strongly into focus. It asked the question – to what extent does statebuilding generate typical and predictable dynamics of security whereby illiberal forms of government arise? Drawing on approaches to Critical Security Studies and in particular the Copenhagen School, we have argued that security is anchored as a core value in the political discourse of post-war societies in which statebuilding is taking place. Following this, we identified three dynamics through which security is mobilized in a way that encourages illiberal practices. The example of Tajikistan illustrates the extent to which the dynamics of security, in the interaction of international, national and sub-

national actors, bring about autocratic regimes or confirm their legitimacy. Essentially, Tajik statebuilding is based on a new kind of security dilemma: The more the government mobilizes supposed threats in order to enforce its authority, the more it undermines the image of the state as guaranteeing security, and thereby legitimizes a societal securitization of regional identities that are seen as threatened by the security practices of the state. This process of securitization, with the participation of international players, facilitates the development not of *liberal* but of *illiberal* democracies whereby security assumes the status of a state religion.

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The Snake Bites its Tail: Securitization instead of Development in South Sudan

Ole Frahm

1. Introduction

One of the many and often ambivalent legacies of the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington has been the rise of public discourses that seek to promote the creation of security as a political goal of the highest order. These discourses have had a profound impact on public policy – for instance, in restricting civil liberties as part of the Patriot Act of 2001 in the United States and the deliberate use of torture by allegedly liberal democratic countries. The academic offspring of these discourses is the theory of securitization, also known as the Copenhagen School (Stritzel 2007), whose aim it is to analyze and explain them.

However, there is a gap in the literature around the application of securitization theory and methodology to the study of developing countries, and in particular to post-conflict countries in a period of state reconstruction. There are some studies which emphasize securitization by the development industry (Larzillière 2012). Alas, there is a lack of research on securitization strategies in weak post-conflict states, and especially of studies that take into account the multitude of competing actors who seek to shape policy and governance, while competing with one another over influence on actual decision-making. In such an environment, where the state apparatus only enjoys limited sovereignty and autonomy over crucial policy decisions – including decisions on the security sector – it is vital to approach the discourses and practices of securitization from various perspectives – namely, of 1) the national government, 2) the relevant international actors, and 3) the local public sphere and civil society.

In this article, I aim to empirically address all three perspectives by using the securitization framework to assess the securitization discourses and practices in a specific post-conflict country. Specifically, I want to look into the pitfalls of emphasizing securitization and security – both on the part of the international community and national politicians – in the statebuilding exercise that has been underway in South Sudan since the end of the

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long civil war with the North in 2005. The concepts and perceptions of security will be assessed from three different vantage points here: those of (a) the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), (b) the international actors involved in South Sudan, and (c) South Sudanese civilians[1]. The analysis is based on documents and insights gathered during my own fieldwork in Juba. A particular focus will lie on the interplay of the dual goals of development and security, and to what extent they conflict in both rhetoric and practice.

2. Securitization Theories

Realist or neo-realist conceptions of international relations assume that a given national government's threat perception and focus on security is informed by objectively recognizable facts, such as military doctrines and the number or capabilities of neighboring countries' armies (Waltz 1990). The Copenhagen School generally, though not entirely, agrees with realist schools in that states are deemed the primary agents of international politics and analysis of security should principally focus on relations between states (Buzan/Wæver 2009). This stands in contrast to the Paris School, embodied among others by Didier Bigo, who views the field of defence and international security as connected and shaped by the actions of security professionals – from police officers to counter-espionage agents. These professionals are not necessarily tied to states and, in spite of their different areas of focus, they combine to shape a transnational 'truth' of security threats and needs (Bigo 2008).

Crucially, from a securitization theory perspective, "the very way threats are tackled depend upon how they are perceived which is not always commanded by the objective features of what is called a 'menace'" (Balzacq 2011: xiii). In other words, more important than the actual presence of threats is the way that different phenomena are publicly discussed and framed as constituting (potential) threats to security. Hence, the real research focus of securitization studies is official and public discourses.

Discourses of securitization are significant because of the susceptibility of important policy issues, e.g. the protection of civil liberties online or the

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1 Parts of this article are based on Frahm, Ole (2014a): *How a state is made. State-building and nationbuilding in South Sudan in the light of its African peers*, Humboldt University, Berlin.

treatment of immigrants, to be taken out of the realm of normal political deliberation into the non-democratic realm of extraordinary emergency legislation, where dissent is easily likened to treason (Aradau 2004). Unfortunately, when it comes to altering policy decisions, the public designation of what ought to be *protected* from potential threats can be as important as the definition of what *constitutes* a threat. Thus, as McDonald points out, in several cases of changing attitudes on an issue (for example the treatment of refugees or the Amazon rain forest) "articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent — and I would suggest more politically significant — than articulations of 'from what or whom we need protection'" (McDonald 2008: 579).

However, deciding whose voices and which audiences to take into account is a key problem for the utilization and application of securitization theory in empirical case studies. For example, it is necessary to define the group of people that shapes the security discourse, but it is also necessary to delimit the arena that constitutes the relevant public sphere for discourses of securitization. On the one hand, Buzan and Hansen argue that, although the public sphere in many developed countries has evolved significantly, traditional elites still dominate security discourses (Buzan/Hansen 2009). Huysmans, however, believes that wider strata of society are included and that, for instance, debates over immigration and environmental protection raise the issue "about whose security claims do matter and how competing claims of insecurity open up the security agenda to a contestation of the very meaning of security" (Huysmans 2006: 5). Moreover, even when there is agreement on how the process of securitization occurs, academics disagree over whether securitization is a bad thing per se and whether or not strategies of 'de-securitization' are a sensible counter-measure (Wæver 2000). These questions arise with added force in less developed countries of the global South.

3. *Securitization in the Global South*

Securitization has so far resonated primarily in Western developed countries, particularly in Western Europe and the United States. However, a strong case can be made that securitization has long been an integral component of public policy in many parts of the developing world. This holds true for post-conflict countries emerging from protracted internal violence. What makes these countries particularly interesting and intriguing to study

is that international actors, from governments to international organizations like the UN, IMF, World Bank as well as humanitarian organizations, are frequently involved. Thanks to their resources, international players often hold major leverage over decisions taken at the national level, which means that, in certain cases, international actors' rationales and conceptions of security are highly significant for the national security agenda.

And yet a growing prioritization of securitization has had a lasting impact on the development-security nexus even in countries that were not subject to an intrusive, unilateral imposition of foreign political will, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. International development agendas, such as the Millennium Development Goals and now the Sustainable Development Goals, emphasize the maintenance of peace and security, just as security strategies inevitably invoke the fight against poverty and underdevelopment (Stern/Öjendal 2010: 6). An example that reveals the duality of continuity and change in Western interventions is Kenya, where Hönke and Bachmann find that US, British and Danish support for the country's antiterrorism struggle frequently takes the form of direct support to local communities, thereby blurring the lines between development and security cooperation (Bachmann/Hönke 2010). The underlying rationale here is a military logic that relies on a highly simplified view of domestic politics in fragile countries, where bad governance and ungoverned spaces are thought to lead to crime and extremism, which in turn spawn terrorism. From a U.S. army perspective, it is, therefore, vital to help these states by "using military advisory missions, security sector reform and training programs, intelligence cooperation, and *reconstruction and development assistance* [my emphasis]" (McNerney 2006: 34).

Of interest, then, is not only an analysis of how the presence, interests, and agendas of international actors interrelate with the interests and agendas of national governments, but also how different international actors pursue contrasting policies that are then reflected in the prioritization of security in their calculations, as well as their public pronouncements. As such, the long-standing debate over peace versus justice[2], as well as the debate over the prioritization of security versus development in post-conflict settings (Krause/Jütersonke 2005), can in fact be located squarely in the middle of the securitization discourse (Frahm 2014c). While there is a strand of thought in the development industry that denies the existence of

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2 See for example Hannum 2006.

a trade-off between security and development, many case studies indicate the opposite. Furthermore, advocates for either of these positions can be found both among the international community, as well as among national elites and other stakeholders.

Thus, in order to gain a full understanding of the discourses that dominate political debate in a context characterized by frail governance and a strong role for the international development sector, this context itself has to be examined and incorporated into the analysis of securitization discourses. What this means, in practice, is that discussions over policies and the framing of policy options in post-conflict and other developing countries have to be examined from at least three angles: that of the national government, of the national public and civil society (where it exists), and of international actors. This triangulation of perspectives has the benefit of more accurately reflecting the policy-making reality in developing countries dependent on foreign assistance.

There are, however, two critical shortcomings of this approach. First, restricting the analysis to three strands lumps together a host of international actors – i.e. from foreign governments to international NGOs – that frequently have very different levels of influence and relations with local decision-makers and different agendas regarding the prominence of security. Secondly, while the actual input into political decision-making is difficult to gauge even in Western liberal democracies, the challenge is magnified in countries where decisions, for example on budgets, are not taken locally but are made conditional upon funding granted by donors who respond to their own legislatures rather than to the local population.

4. A History of (In)Security in South Sudan

Security is clearly at the forefront of national and international stakeholders' priorities in South Sudan, given that the country has been mired in a noxious civil war for the past three-and-a-half years. That said, an overriding concentration on security in policy and discourse marked the country's short existence as an independent entity even prior to the outbreak of fighting in December 2013.

Insecurity has been a feature of life in South Sudan for almost as long as the idea of a Southern Sudan has existed. Periods of relative peace have only ever been spurious intervals between longer periods of war. For example, cattle raiding has been endemic in South Sudan (albeit in changing

forms) for several centuries, because cattle are the most important unit of wealth and worth, and one of the integral aspects of everyday as well as religious life (Deng 2010: 237). More importantly, since its conquest by Egyptian-Ottoman troops from 1821 onwards, the area and the very idea of South Sudan have been shaped by oppression and exploitation from a distant centre. This has been met by successive resistance movements to the Egyptian occupiers, the British colonialists and – since Sudan's independence in 1956 – to various democratic and authoritarian governments in Khartoum (Frahm 2012). The last chapter in this history of armed rebellion lasted from 1983 until 2005, when the Islamist Sudanese government, under international pressure and mediation, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A). That this peace agreement endured – in contrast to its numerous predecessors – can be attributed in no small measure to the changing discourse on international security in the post-9/11 environment, when Khartoum was legitimately concerned that it might become the next target in the Bush administration's war on terror (Ahmed 2009: 136).

The CPA not only granted autonomy to the South but also provided for an independence referendum to be held in 2011. The near-unanimous outcome of this referendum made South Sudan the world's youngest internationally recognized state on 9 July 2011. It is crucial, however, to keep in mind that the SPLM/A was far from the only representative of Southern Sudanese interests and ethnic groups during the war against the North. In fact, after a split in the movement in 1991, much of the ensuing decade was characterized by fighting between different Southern factions, some of them allied to Khartoum. While exact figures are hard to come by, it is not far-fetched to hold that more than half of the estimated two million victims of the war were the result of internecine fighting that lasted until tentative reconciliation steps in the early 2000s (Johnson 2011). The government for Southern (later South) Sudan was representative of these reconciliatory negotiations, as it integrated almost all remaining militias and their leaders into the SPLA in 2006. Crucially, only well-armed factions were given government positions, which highlights the close nexus between 'hard' military power and the ability to partake of the state's resources that has shaped South Sudan from its inception.

5. Travails of a post-liberation state

South Sudan belongs to a special class of post-conflict countries where the government is the successor to a liberation movement and where security plays a particularly prominent role in domestic politics. In so-called post-liberation countries, such as Eritrea, Timor-Leste, Namibia, Mozambique or Zimbabwe, "the new societies carried within them the essential elements of the old system against which they had fought" (Melber 2003: 12). This is because the experiences of armed struggle translated into peacetime and shaped the outlook of officers-turned-politicians on how to govern the country they set out to liberate. As the government's legitimacy ultimately hinged on its history and background as a successful rebel movement, an uneasy coalition formed between two groups: those members of the state structure that owed their position to their military exploits and maintained a primarily military outlook on running a country (Dorman 2006), and those external security advisers and embassy staff who also perceived the world through a security lens.

In this enabling environment, development – the government's second major discourse, embodied in the late SPLA leader John Garang's famous dictum "take the towns to the people" – is effectively discarded in policy decisions, though it maintains its status alongside security in declarations and speeches. As President Salva Kiir stated on Martyrs' Day 2011: "We have a daunting task ahead of us – development, development and development" (Gurtong 2011). However, the state does not put its money where its mouth is. The state budget, with between 40 to 60 percent of expenditures dedicated to the security sector, is a clear testament to the fact that security rather than development is the government's actual priority.

6. Securitization as a Means to Regime Security: Security Sector Reform

For the intermediary period from 2005 until 2011, the Southern Sudanese government's priority was to ensure that the referendum over the region's future status would actually take place. This borderline-monomaniacal concentration on the independence referendum to the detriment of almost all other concerns, e.g. development, supports the contention that, for a secessionist movement, international recognition for its statehood claims matters arguably as much as vanquishing its opponents on the battlefield. However, while the international community, in the form of the United

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Nations and the African Union, was quick to accord international sovereignty to South Sudan, this did not automatically entail a willingness to uphold and enforce the state's external or domestic sovereignty.

As a result, the state elite's adaptation of the international language of security sector reform did not and still does not reflect a genuine acceptance of the values of civil administration. On the contrary, the discourse on security sector reform is employed by the present-day South Sudanese government to strengthen its hold on power, both discursively and in terms of hard power. Discursively, its claim to have brought higher levels of security and peace has been the government's second most important rallying cry, after the achievement of independence. However, the way security sector reform is implemented on the ground reveals that the official emphasis on securitization amounts to little more than maintaining regime security. Thus, in South Sudan, securitization of the public sphere is imposed in a top-down manner. This phenomenon can be observed in several subfields of state security: DDR, appeasement of militias and internationalization of national security.

7. Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

An area where it is most apparent that the focus on security basically means striving for *regime* security is the field of DDR, i.e. demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former fighters. DDR is a key item in the toolbox of post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding. It is deemed essential for a lasting peace settlement based on the rationale that unemployed or underemployed former fighters constitute a major risk to security in a post-conflict environment (Muggah 2009). In practice, however, such a mindset will potentially result in a prioritizing of the well-being of former soldiers and their kin over everyone else in society. This creates a perverse incentive to take up arms, or at least to pretend to have been a fighter at some point in the past.

In South Sudan, DDR has been an unmitigated failure. SPLA and SPLM have shown no signs of taking ownership of the DDR process and the SPLA actually uses DDR as a form of social service provision for indi-

viduals that are already back in civilian life, rather than for actual soldiers[3] (Stone 2011: 4-5, 8). This lack of governmental buy-in is epitomized by the fact that, contrary to CPA provisions, South Sudan used the CPA period to refurbish and upgrade its weaponry, Ukraine and Russia being the biggest suppliers (Wezeman et al. 2011: 28). Instead of falling by 90,000 as foreseen by the CPA, the number of soldiers has actually risen since 2005, as new soldiers have been recruited and some demobilized soldiers have been remobilized and reintegrated into the SPLA (Nichols 2011: 42). This result is mirrored by the outcome of several drives to disarm the civilian population, which is estimated to own two-thirds of all weapons in the country (da Silva et al. 2010: 6). Far from strengthening security and public trust, these efforts have left scores dead and contributed to instability and disenchantment with the government.

A much bigger problem, however, has resulted from the SPLA beginning to pay regular salaries from 2006/7, which has substantially decreased the attractiveness of taking part in DDR measures and meant that soldiers had to be pushed to participate. Furthermore, the allowance for demobilized soldiers is probably too small to entice well-paid soldiers with little marketable skills in the world outside the army to give up their guns. The government made matters worse by doubling SPLA salaries shortly before the referendum in January 2011 (Small Arms Survey 2011: 6). William Deng Deng, Chairman of the South Sudan DDR Commission, recognized that "the current approach is not sufficiently based in the realities on the ground" and advocated a stronger focus on training and educational activities for ex-combatants (Southern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission 2010). However, one of the first victims of the civil war that has ravaged the country since December 2013 has been DDR itself, as the government has rushed to mobilise new recruits (Sudan Tribune, 27 April 2014).

8. Chequebook Securitization: Appeasement by Integration

The situation in the field of demobilization is emblematic for the government and state elite's outlook on security matters. Since security is syn-

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3 The one visible sign of official recognition of DDR's value can be found in a street in Juba's Thonping neighbourhood called "Street of the DDR".

onymous with regime security, reducing the number of available troops does not appear, in spite of the army's exorbitant costs, to be a good policy. South Sudan's dominant mode of governance is a neopatrimonial use of the state and its resources to maintain an informal network of patron-client relations that are meant to ensure its survival in power. This amounts to a form of chequebook securitization based on continuing financial pampering for the military. Appeasing different factions of the army in order to preempt rebellions is, therefore, the GoSS' preferred securitization approach. Impunity through broad amnesties for anti-government militias (issued both in 2011 and 2014) are portrayed as part of a strategy of "One People One Nation" (The Insider, 8 September 2014) and thus as a form of security through reconciliation.

In the immediate aftermath of the Naivasha Peace Agreement, the GoSS had been very successful in neutralizing the largest domestic source of insecurity at the time: the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). Having negotiated their integration into the ranks of the SPLA in the 2006 Juba Declaration, the SSDF was effectively broken as a military force (Young 2006: 39). While there were localized sources of insecurity, the issue of dealing with spoilers became especially urgent around 2010, when national and regional elections proved highly contentious – a number of defeated candidates refused to concede and took up arms against Juba. The most prominent of these generals-turned-rebel-leaders was George Athor who, having failed to win the governorship of Jonglei, operated with an estimated 3,000 fighters in the state until he was ambushed and killed in December 2011 (BBC News, 20 December 2011).

The prospect of being reintegrated into the army as the prize for a ceasefire, at a higher rank and with additional privileges, is clearly a risky strategy (as Athor's death suggests). Nonetheless, it is realistic and attractive enough to make taking up arms against the government in the first place a viable option for politico-military entrepreneurs. Spoilers that could not be kept under control by force were thus repeatedly forgiven and reintegrated into the ranks of the regular (and regularly paid) army. In 2014, for instance, the notorious militia leader David Yau Yau, who is responsible for numerous atrocities against civilians, was rewarded for signing a ceasefire agreement with the creation of a new administrative region under his personal command (Bubna 2015). Another illustration of this phenomenon is the career of General Peter Gadet, who was initially second-in-command in Paulino Matiep's pro-Khartoum militia but deserted to the rebel side for the first time in September 1999. Gadet later joined the

SPLA in the wake of the 2006 Juba Declaration before rebelling again in April 2011 and leading the newly formed South Sudan Liberation Army. He was eventually reintegrated into the SPLA in August 2011. The latest instance in his personal cycle of rebellion and reintegration was the seizure of Bor as part of Riek Machar's anti-Kiir alliance in December 2013. Gadet also holds the dubious honour of being the first South Sudanese targeted by U.S. sanctions (Gordon 2014).

The net result of all of this is that the ranks of the former rebel movement-turned-national force, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), have swollen and far outgrown their wartime size. This is not a carrot and stick strategy but a carrots *and ever more carrots* strategy, and it throws the state's weakness in providing security across its nominal territory into stark relief. Given that more than 40% of the state budget is devoted to the armed forces, which are estimated to number 210,000 men (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2014: 460), the dire state of security in much of the country is manifestly *not* the result of a lack of sticks. Instead, it appears attributable to a mixture of lack of training, lack of infrastructure, and an unwillingness, on the part of superiors, to get involved in local quarrels that do not concern them personally.

In turn, spending on development and investment in the civilian side of the state edifice inevitably suffers. Educational standards and provision of healthcare remain among the lowest in the world, and much of what is actually delivered to South Sudanese citizens comes from a wide array of international NGOs funded by donor money. Meanwhile, in many counties, judges and lower-level administrators are not physically present, yet even where they are, traditional authorities tend to prevail in the actual exercise of authority and adjudication of cases. The South Sudanese government's decision to neglect development in favour of security thus comes with undeniable costs and its implicit claim that security and development are compatible has so far turned out to be false.

9. Internationalization of National Security

The second pillar of securitization in South Sudan is the discourses and policies of international actors with a stake in the country's development. These regional and international actors, who interfere in South Sudan's internal affairs and territory, significantly shape the government's calculations and perceptions of security. Direct and indirect interference into the

affairs of South Sudan has been a constant for most of its modern history because it was neither independent nor autonomous. Today, a majority of the region's countries (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Egypt) are in one way or another involved in South Sudan, and it is habitual for these governments to fund and support insurgent groups in neighbouring countries as a means to strengthen their own hold on power by having proxy forces on the ground (Hemmer 2010: 2). Foreign-sponsored rebel militias, in particular, constitute a clear limitation to the GoSS's ability to effectively govern all of its nominal territory. On the other hand, South Sudan is itself a player in the game of regional destabilisation, as it has persistently provided logistical support to rebels in Sudan's Southern provinces and in Darfur (Gramizzi 2013: 65). At the same time, members of the Justice and Equality Movement, a militia from Darfur, allegedly helped the South Sudanese government to recapture Bentiu, the capital of Unity State, in January 2014 (International Crisis Group 2014: 22-23).

Khartoum, for its part, is known to have used proxy forces, as well as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), against the SPLA, and by most accounts continues to do so. In the years following South Sudan's independence, Sudan's intelligence service used airdrops to supply arms and ammunition to anti-SPLM militias (Leff/LeBrun 2014: 42-43) and there is evidence that Khartoum supported the most dangerous and active militia in the years 2012-13, the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army Cobra Faction run by David Yau Yau (Small Arms Survey 2013: 1). Furthermore, neighbours with whom Juba maintains cordial relations also circumscribe national security. Having supported and conducted joint operations with the SPLA during the civil war with Khartoum, the Ugandan army (UPDF) remained in South Sudan ostensibly to eradicate Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. However, far from engaging the LRA, UPDF soldiers have been running private businesses and mistreated the local population, while the GoSS turned a blind eye (Schomerus 2012: 129-131). The Ugandan army's ambivalent role in South Sudan became very apparent during the fighting that erupted in December 2013, when its troops rescued Juba and tacitly helped the government against the armed rebellion by bombing Bor and trying to take Malakal – all paid for by the South Sudanese government (Sudan Tribune, 14 February 2014).

The three troika countries United States, UK, and Norway have longstanding ties to South Sudanese movements and, in guiding and driving the negotiations that eventually culminated in the CPA and independence, they have a stake in seeing the state of South Sudan succeed. The U.S.

government, in particular, has invested much political capital, both during the Bush administration and under Obama's National Security Adviser Susan Rice (Welsh 2014). In addition to diplomatic backing and development aid, the U.S. army has trained an unknown number of SPLA recruits (Sudan Tribune, 3 December 2013) and acquiesced to the illicit shipments of arms to the country via Kenya[4] (Mariani 2014). As such, the GoSS' decision to prioritise security spending receives an indirect stamp of approval from the military aspects of the U.S. engagement with the regime in Juba. On the other hand, the U.S. was also instrumental in forcing President Kiir to sign a ceasefire deal in August 2015, which included the provision that the capital Juba was to be demilitarized and that all government troops were to withdraw (Sudan Tribune, 26 September 2015) – further evidence of the primacy of security considerations in peace negotiations.

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS, since July 2011: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)) has generally taken a very conservative interpretation of the scope of its activities and has refrained from interfering in domestic or inter-Sudanese conflicts. When the Sudanese army overran Abyei in 2011, an area claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan, the UNMIS troops stationed in the vicinity stood by and remained idle (Amnesty International 2011: 13). On the other hand, UNMISS troops have, on occasion, helped to curb violence in the state of Jonglei and were instrumental in giving shelter to fleeing civilians during the violence that ensued after the thwarted 'coup' on December 15th, 2013 (UNMISS 2014). Interestingly, the United Nations now frames the decision to open the UNMISS camps in South Sudan to civilian refugees as a watershed moment for human security and a model for how to deal with a similarly grave menace to civilians in the future. At the same time, the head of the UN mission, Ellen Margrethe Loej, articulated the awkward position that UNMISS finds itself in. She severely criticized the GoSS' record on civilian protection during the current war, yet at the same time insisted that "ultimate responsibility for protection of civilians remains with the Government including its national security forces, the SPLA and the South Sudan National Police Service" (Loej 2014).

The African Union's position is no less ambivalent in that it hosts the peace negotiations in Addis Ababa, but in a parallel operation runs a spe-

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4 Presumably less welcome to the U.S. administration were news that Juba turned to China for arms purchases when the West refused to send further supplies during the post-2013 war.

cial commission, headed by former Nigerian president Obasanjo, to investigate and report on crimes against humanity committed during the fighting. Yet when the commission's report was about to be finalized, the AU blocked its publication. Thus, when push came to shove, the AU was unwilling to take on a member state's government while at the same time clearly positioning itself in the peace and security versus justice debate (Frahm 2015).

Finally, multitudes of donors and non-governmental humanitarian agencies operate in the country and have taken over state duties in service provision (health care) and development. While most of these actors do not directly seek to influence public policy debates, the very fact that they function as a substitute for state services allows the government to continue its unitary focus on military security. This dilemma has been recognized by some agencies and donors, especially during the civil war of 2013-2016, but has nonetheless left the development community split into two camps. On the one hand are those that "argue that development efforts in South Sudan must continue unabated, although perhaps in a different shape or form", and on the other, those that believe in a more political role for development and fear that, unless the government changes course, "development investments risk being unsustainable over time or even being lost altogether" (Hemmer/Grinstead 2015: 5). This latter concern is also prominent in debates within South Sudan's limited public sphere. While the government has consistently emphasized its military prowess as a key element of its claim to rule, the effective inability to live up to its claim and maintain security, without assistance from domestic and international allies, has substantially undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of South Sudanese civil society.

10. Popular bottom-up responses to the official policies of securitization

The third perspective on securitization in South Sudan is that of the South Sudanese public. The following section focuses specifically on public perceptions of the South Sudanese police force and the public's response to the visible absence of security. It is notoriously difficult to ascertain what constitutes the public sphere and to determine who belongs to its protagonists. In South Sudan, this problem is compounded by the fact that a civil society, as a distinct sphere between society and state apparatus, can hardly be said to exist outside the churches of various denominations. Even

those organizations in the capital Juba that act as a corrective to official discourse, criticize the government and propose alternative policies, do not in fact constitute a sphere truly separate from the state.

To illustrate this conundrum, one only has to look to Jok Madut Jok, the head of the Sudd Institute, arguably the most outspoken and prodigious critic of security policy in the country, and with a weighty impact on opinion-making in the small policy community of Juba. Apart from running the Sudd Institute, whose initial funding derived entirely from the US Institute for Peace, which in turn has close ties to the U.S. army, Jok Madut Jok holds an academic post in the United States. At the same time, Jok is also part of the South Sudanese administration as Undersecretary in the Ministry of Culture. While this may be an extreme example of the way people and institutions overlap, it is not uncharacteristic of South Sudan's public sphere.

In spite of the public sphere's heterogeneity, one element that both surveys and anecdotal evidence concur upon is the high value people attach to human security. In a national survey, only 5% of respondents said that they did not experience any kind of violence (International Republican Institute 2011: 29). South Sudanese generally have a very low threshold for inciting violence in order to further personal interests or to settle an argument. Furthermore, a study on the psychological effects of war found high levels of aggression to be a very common characteristic of former SPLA soldiers (Winkler 2010: 18). The most common explanations for this are the militarization of society, the ease of access to weapons, and the lack of institutional capacity to provide security (Rolandsen 2009: 2). Yet, in spite of these findings, security was generally deemed to have improved in most parts of the country in the first years following the CPA. Moreover, at the time of the independence referendum, citizens still showed broad support for a strong and well-funded army to act as a deterrent to external as well as internal security threats (Cook 2011: 11-12).

11. Filling the void of an absent state

This popular demand for the state, and especially the army, to provide human security has, however, not been fulfilled. The GoSS and its security organs are unable to maintain security, as they are hardly present outside

the main towns[5] (McEvoy/LeBrun 2010: 18, 20) and the state does not possess a monopoly on violence. Furthermore, the terrible condition of road and communication infrastructure means that large tracts of the country are inaccessible for security forces, especially during the rainy season when most roads turn to mud (Willems/Rouw 2011: 12). The governor of Jonglei actually admitted to the security forces' inability to protect citizens from raiding due to lack of access, saying, "[e]ven if you have police 20km (12 miles) away, they can't get there" (BBC News, 16 January 2012). Hence, civilians find themselves little protected from violence because neither army nor police intervene to put a halt to inter-communal fighting (Human Rights Watch 2009: 5) – even when there had been clear warning signs of impending clashes, the GoSS did not interfere to stop the violence (Médecins Sans Frontières 2009: 16). These continuously high levels of insecurity – due to cattle rustling, militias, and criminality – and the absence of a peace dividend are a major reason for public disaffection with the state and a challenge to its legitimacy (Bennett et al. 2010: 39).

Thus, while there is support for a strong army *per se*, when it comes to evaluating the actual performance, state security organs are widely mistrusted and even perceived as a menace, rather than as a helping hand (Barltrop 2012). A Crisis Group report found that "ill-treatment by under-resourced and sometimes predatory security forces" was a common complaint among South Sudanese (International Crisis Group 2011: 1-2) and a separate study ranked rogue conduct by soldiers and police as the main source of insecurity, next to tribal conflicts and crime (Cook/Vexler 2009: 49-51). The UN Human Rights Council found that, in South Sudan, "[s]ystematic human rights abuses continue in an environment of impunity, with the most frequent and worst abuses perpetrated by the security forces of Southern Sudan" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2011: 17). Crucially, there is a significant gap between the capacities of and popular attitudes towards the SPLA army on the one hand, and the police force on the other hand. It is the SPLA, and not the police, which is trusted, feared, and seen as the main provider of security (Ashkenazi et al. 2008: 34-37).

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5 To be certain, this claim is a generalization of security perceptions in South Sudan. As a matter of fact, security perceptions are always local and can differ substantially even within the same county due to, for example, the circle of mutual raiding and revenge killings one particularly village is involved in.

12. South Sudan Police Service

In those parts of South Sudan where they exist, the police force is the main interlocutor with the statutory state structure. While the overall number of police officers in the country has increased from approximately 30.000 to 52.000[6], there is little improvement in quality, as police culture and training remain violent, abusive, militarized and thus ill-suited for interaction with civilians. The police force consists mostly of former SPLA soldiers who were transferred to their new positions without proper training in police work (Mailer/Poole 2010: 9). Many are illiterate and lack even basic equipment, or are in fact *retired* SPLA soldiers that are too old to be effective policemen (Willems/Rouw 2011: 23). The GoSS's preference for the army, which the vast majority of high-ranking SPLM officials belonged to and fought for, is also reflected in the security sector budget, with spending for the SPLA far outpacing and, indeed, replacing spending on the police (OECD 2011: 40). As a result, the police are not only ill-equipped to deal with increasingly well-organized criminal networks from neighbouring states that operate on South Sudanese soil (Mbgua 2012: 17): they are also incapable of solving community-based issues such as cattle-rustling, as they are understaffed and outgunned by local raiding forces (Simonse 2011: 9).

Furthermore, when actually present on the ground, police often lack discipline and are widely seen as corrupt and even predatory (Downie 2013: 14). In a study of Ikotos County in Eastern Equatoria, respondents described how the police accepted bribes to let suspects go, used torture and collective punishments on the communities of suspected criminals and were prone to drunkenness (Ochan 2007: 21). Prior to the cabinet reshuffle and the appointment of Aleu Ayieny Aleu as the new minister of the interior in August 2013, many of the violent robberies in Juba were said to be have been committed by off-duty police officers who used their guns to acquire additional income (Interview with a foreign diplomat, Juba, 20 October 2013). This culture of violence and brutalization arguably goes back to SPLA training camps that, in the words of a high-ranking SPLA member, taught gun-worship and were run much like concentration camps (Nyaba 1997: 49-50).

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6 A report, however, stated that 11.000 'ghost police' were discovered on the payroll while more cases were being investigated (*Al Jazeera*, 27 August 2013). There are similar rumours concerning the number of 'ghost soldiers'.

13. Self-help security from below

As the state visibly fails to live up to its promise to deliver security, people have been left to their own devices to provide protection against a range of violent actors. A good example is civilian self-help militias in the areas close to the borders with Uganda and the Central African Republic, which were founded in response to continuous attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army. Since the SPLA was either unable or unwilling to protect people in the area, inhabitants formed local, mostly sparsely armed self-defence groups, the so-called Arrow Boys (Cakaj 2009: 3-5). The government in Juba even pledged financial support to the Arrow Boys to conduct the fight in its stead, thus officially abandoning its pretension to a monopoly on legitimate violence (Conciliation Resources 2011: 14). It is conceivable that local feelings of abandonment by the state may very well become entrenched and eventually lead to a retreat from the state altogether.

This retreat from the retreating state also manifests itself in a less benign manner. Local conflicts over land, cattle or control of a county often take place without the government getting involved. In the state of Jonglei, for example, cattle raiding and traditional enmity between groups have escalated to the point of ethnic hatred between the Nuer and the Murle, two ethnic groups. Cattle raids have thus evolved to be not only about bounty but also about mutual ethnic animosity and the desire to kill or maim members of the other *ethnie* (Rands/LeRiche 2012: 7). From the perspective of these groups, their very existence is threatened. In their rhetoric, the Lou and Jikany Nuer White Army's ultimate solution to attacks by the Murle is genocide: "we have decided to invade Murleland and wipe out the entire Murle tribe from the face of the earth as the only solution to guarantee long-term security of Nuer's cattle. There is no other way to resolve Murle problem other than wiping them out through the barrel of the gun" (Quoted in Lacey 2013: 21). Such an escalation is only possible because of the failure of the state and its security agents to prevent the violence from spiralling out of control.

14. Conclusions

Two main findings emerge from this analysis of the different concepts, discourses and practices of security that exist in South Sudan. First, since the CPA and independence in 2011, the South Sudanese government has

consistently emphasized security as the prime necessity and objective of the state while, at the same time upholding the overwhelming priority of development. Though it was possible for these two objectives to coexist on the level of discourse, the dual goals of development and security do in fact conflict in actual politics and governance due to the state's sparse resources, both in terms of material endowment and human capacity. The snake bites its tail.

However, though the choice to focus on security over development may be defensible, as the state faces both domestic militias and hostile neighbours (Frahm 2014b), the government's decision to buy off rebel militias has hardly fulfilled its primary goal of regime security, while it has proven downright counterproductive in improving human security. Whereas security provision by local communities has, in some cases, filled the void left by the state, in other areas – notably in Jonglei – the same void has allowed localized grievances to spin out of control and take on the form of ethnic cleansing. It remains to be seen how the Government of National Unity that is set to emerge from peace negotiations will itself address the ever-looming issue of balancing security with the state's manifold other tasks.

Secondly, this analysis of securitization discourses in South Sudan has run into a number of challenges that are, I would argue, inherent to the application of a securitization framework and methodology in post-conflict countries with highly fragmented and contested structures of authority. In a post-conflict environment where national stakeholders have only limited sovereignty, where a national public sphere is barely developed or non-existent, and where an array of international actors, from governments to international organizations to NGOs, have taken over part of the state, a discourse analysis along the lines of securitization theory becomes devilishly complex, if not unfeasible. A methodological rethink is necessitated by the sheer multitude of actors, many of them responding to very different audiences (e.g. the U.S. congress or Norwegian public opinion), and by the very difficult task of ascribing actual decision-making power to individual actors. In the meantime, it is uncertain what securitization as a theory and a methodological tool has to offer for a deeper understanding of frail post-conflict situations.

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