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## Does gender equality promote social trust? An empirical analysis

# Does Gender Equality Promote Social Trust? <br> - An Empirical Analysis 

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#### Abstract

Fairness can be an important factor that promotes social trust among people. In this paper, I investigate empirically whether fairness between men and women increases social trust. Using the data of the World Value Survey from 91 countries, I find that gender discriminatory values negatively affect the trust level of both men and women, while actual conditions on gender equality, measured by labor and educational attainments and political participation, are not a significant determinant of social trust. Furthermore, fairness towards women is an important factor of social trust in countries where gender equality is relatively high, but the effect of the fairness is minimal in countries where there is a greater disparity in equality between the genders. Contrary to the expectation, the effect of gender equality is larger for men than women in more equal societies - a finding that calls for a closer look in a future study.


Keywords: trust; gender equality; fairness; value survey
JEL-codes: I30; J15; J16

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## 1. Introduction

Informal institutions - particularly social trust - play an essential role in economic growth, as social trust can function as a supplement or substitute for formal institutions in observing rule and order and keeping promises. Recent literature has examined and proposed many factors that are potentially important to determining the level of trust - income, education, formal institutions, cultures, and history (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Glaeser et al. 2000; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011, among many others). In fact, social trust is shaped and reshaped through permanent interactions with socioeconomic environments, institutions, and social norms. Among them, fairness is arguably an important factor that influences individual behaviors and attitudes of trusting /or distrusting others. Fair treatments, which are based on the fair application of the rule of game, provide environments where one can expect fair rewards for his/her efforts and contributions. Such fairness increases trust towards the rule of game as well as the other participants (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).

Some empirical studies suggest that women are less trusting than men, possibly because they face more discrimination and the rule of game is not fair for women (Glaeser et al. 2000). This observation leads to an argument that gender discrimination - or unfairness towards women - can be attributed to the low level of trust women tend to demonstrate. In this paper, I try to examine this question, the relationship between fairness towards women and social trust. In doing so, I hypothesize that gender equality can be a driving force of increasing social trust - particularly for women who are presumably the main beneficiaries of the fair treatments. On the other hand, gender equality may not have the same effect for men, because gender equality can be seen as a loss of privileges that men have established and/or unfavorable changes in the rule of game for them. However, the effect of gender equality may not necessarily be negative for men, if gender equality is considered as the spread of fairness throughout society. In other words, the effect of gender equality can vary, depending on how society takes the virtues of fairness towards women.

Through my investigation, I try to identify whether and how the effects of fairness are different between men and women as well as across societies. To do so, I decompose the effects by sex - men and women, respectively. Also, countries are sub-grouped based on their levels of gender equality in order to find whether fairness plays a different role in countries of different gender endowments. To account for the effects of gender equality, I employ gender
indicators that capture different dimensions of fairness between men and women - namely, gender-related values, female education, employment, and political participation. Using the World Value Survey for up to 91 countries (1995-2010), my findings suggest that fairness for women increases the level of social trust for both men and women, but the effect varies across countries with different levels of gender equality. In more equal countries, gender equality is a key determinant to social trust, however, fairness towards women does not seem to play any meaningful role in shaping trust in less equal countries. A strong effect of gender equality on men in more equal countries implies that gender equality is a common value in these countries that enhances trusting among people in general - independently from whether they are men or women.

My paper develops as follows. In section 2, I present the measurements of social trust and gender equality that are used for the empirical analyses. Section 3 discusses the working hypotheses and identification strategies. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical estimations, followed by section 5 that concludes the paper with some suggestions for future studies.

## 2. Measuring Social Trust and Gender Equality

Social trust reflects in the level of trust that people have with one another in a country (society) - particularly trust between people who have no personal relationships with one another. In order to measure the level of social trust, I make a use of the World Value Survey data (World Values Survey Association 2012). The World Value Survey includes several questions on trust, e.g. whether one trusts other people in general, those of different nationalities or religions, strangers, and personally connected people such as family and relatives. Among these questions, I take on the question of trusting others in general, because this question covers the widest range of trust including trusting unrelated people, and therefore, it can be the most relevant indicator reflecting general social trust level.

In answering this question on trust, people select one of the three choices: yes, no, and do not know. I take the percent of people who answer 'yes, I trust others' as an indicator of trusting people in general. The data is decomposed by sex, i.e. the percent of females who trust others and that of males. In this sample, $24.72 \%$ of men answered that they trust others, while $23.95 \%$ of women answered 'yes' to this question. The trust level varies across
countries to a significant extent (standard deviations: 14.54 for males and 14.90 for females, respectively).

The trust data of the World Value Survey includes up to 91 countries. This is a global sample, however, European countries tend to be overrepresented in the sample while African countries are underrepresented (see appendix B for the country list). Also, the World Value Survey has selection biases towards wealthier and institutionally better countries. The average GDP per capita of the sample countries is USD11,066 while that is USD9,137 worldwide. Also, the score of the World Governance Rule of Law indicator (Kaufmann et al. 2010) is higher in the sample countries than the global average: 1.00 versus -0.01 . In other words, the county sample represents above the global average level of countries in terms of economic and institutional development, thus the estimation results need to be interpreted with a caution - i.e. the results may not be applicable to low income countries and/or countries with weak institutions.

To the present, the World Value Survey provides six waves from 1980 to 2012, and, in this paper, I employ wave 3 (1995-1998), 4 (2000-2004), 5 (2005-2009), and 6 (2010-2012) for the analysis because the first two waves do not provide data on gender-related values that is used as an independent variable (see below for the details of this gender variable).

Turning to the measurements of fairness towards women, I employ two different kinds of gender equality indicators. Fairness towards women is not only about socioeconomic conditions on gender equality but also values and perceptions on women - i.e. whether women are considered as an equal human being as men. Thus, I take a gender-related value question from the World Value Survey as a measurement of values reflecting fairness towards women. The question is, whether one thinks that men should have more rights to a job than women. This question asks people's values and attitudes towards gender equality particularly in social areas - job situations - rather than private spheres, thus it can be a suitable indicator capturing the level of fair treatment in a public life that is arguable important to social trust. Respondents select one of the three choices in answering the question: yes (i.e. men should have more rights), no (i.e. men should not have more rights), and do not know. I take the percent of respondents who answer 'yes' as an indicator of discriminating women against men. The rate of answering 'yes' vary significantly between men and women. For female respondents, less than a third of them agree that men should have more rights, while about $41 \%$ of male respondents agree with such gender-discrimination in this respect. Also, variations
across countries are quite large. For women, the percent of 'yes' varies from $0.7 \%$ (Sweden) to $86.1 \%$ (Egypt) with the standard deviation of 17.92 . For men, it ranges between $1.5 \%$ (Sweden) and $93.1 \%$ (Egypt) and the standard deviation is 22.21 . The descriptive statistics suggest that more male respondents tend to agree with gender discrimination against women than female respondents, and the cross-country variations are also larger for males. The country sample includes up to 91 countries and the data is available for waves $3,4,5$ and 6 .

In addition to the gender-related values, I further employ gender indicators on socioeconomic conditions that reflect fairness between men and women. These indicators measure the relative levels of attainments women have achieved in comparison to those of men in three important dimensions: education, employment, and political participation. They are namely the ratio of female enrolment in secondary and university education to males'; the ratio of female labor force participation to males'; and the share of female parliamentary members. I take these comparative measurements showing the ratios between females and males because such comparisons better capture fairness towards women than some other indicators such as female enrolment or labor force participation rates in total female populations. The details of the descriptive statistics of these indicators are presented in appendix A.

## 3. Research Design

### 3.1.Hypotheses

The central question of this paper is whether fairness towards women increases social trust. In order to investigate this question, the following working hypotheses are proposed and empirically tested.

H0: Gender equality increases social trust.

The above statement provides a baseline hypothesis with the prediction that fairness between men and women leads more people to trust others because they can expect fair treatments among each other.

H 0 : The positive effect of gender equality is larger for women.

The second hypothesis predicts that fairness towards women affects the trust level of women more strongly than that of men. This is because gender equality improves societal environments more favorable to women. In a more equal society, women can develop higher confidence that they can be treated fairly and equally, which, in turn, leads women to trust other people more. On the other hand, the effect on men can be still positive because fairness generally promotes trust among people however, the effect for men might be smaller because the main beneficiaries of gender equality are women.

H 0 : The positive effect of gender equality is larger in countries where women's status is high.

The third hypothesis tests for potentially different effects of fairness towards women on social trust across different countries. The effect of gender equality can vary depending on the level of women's rights in a society, because fairness towards women can arguably be a more important value in a country where women's status is already high, compared to countries with a low level of women's standing. In other words, people likely take fairness between men and women as an essential necessity to trust others, if gender equality is already wellestablished within a country, while fairness towards women may not be as important in a country where discrimination against women prevails.

### 3.2.Identification Model

To test for the working hypotheses presented in section 3.1, I construct the following model that will be estimated by using a panel analysis.

$$
\begin{equation*}
y_{i t}=\alpha_{i}+\beta_{\mathrm{k}} * \operatorname{Gender}_{\mathrm{it}}+\mu_{\mathrm{n}} X_{\mathrm{it}}+\mathrm{t}+\mathrm{u}_{\mathrm{it}} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The dependent variable, $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{it}}$, is the trust level, measured by the percent of respondents who answer, 'yes, I trust people in general', in the World Value Survey. The level of trust is decomposed by sex, i.e. the percent of males who trust others and the percent of females who do so, respectively. Given the skewed distribution of the values of the dependent variable, I take a logarithm for the dependent variable, and therefore, the model takes a log-linear form.

Gender is a vector that contains the independent variables of main interest reflecting fairness towards women. First, it includes a variable of gender-related values, measured by
the percent of respondents who answer 'I think that men should have more rights to a job than women' in the World Value Survey. The variable is decomposed by sex, the percent of male and female respondents, respectively, corresponding to the dependent variable that is also decomposed by sex. Given the distribution functions of the values, this variable also takes a form of logarithm. In addition to the gender-related value variable, several variables accounting for gender-related conditions are also included. These are the ratios of females to males in secondary and university enrollment rates and labor force participation, as well as the share of female lawmakers in national legislative bodies - the data taken from the World Bank's Development Indicators (2014). These indicators reflect female achievements relative to males' in the prime dimensions of education, labor, and political participation. In total, the Gender vector consists of five variables $\{k=$ men more rights than women, female labor, university education, secondary education, and female MP\}.

X is a vector of the control variables that also affect the level of trust in a country. First, the income level of a country (GDP pc, data taken from the World Bank 2014) is included because better economic conditions can improve the level of trusting others (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Glaeser et al. 2000). Also, institutional factors are taken into account, given that people trust more if institutions are trustworthy and written rules are respected. With respect to the institutional aspects, I employ two variables - the level of trust in formal institutions (governments) and the rule of law indicator. The former reflects the level of people's perception towards the trustworthiness of the government, while the latter measures the functionality and effectiveness of law and order. The trust in government is decomposed by sex, measuring the trust level of males and females separately. The data on trust in governments is taken from the World Value Survey, and the rule of law indicator is taken from the World Governance Indicator (Kaufmann et al. 2010). In addition, two variables that reflect values arguably associated with trust are also taken account. First, tolerance towards social minorities can affect the level of trusting other people to whom which they have no current or previous relationship with. To address this point, the percent of people who answer that they do not want homosexuals as neighbors in the World Value Survey is included as a control variable. In addition to that, an indicator on people's values towards income equality is also included because economic fairness can promote trusting values among people. ${ }^{1}$ For the measurement of values on economic equality, I take the country-level average score of the

[^1]question in the World Value Survey, 'Incomes should be made more equal vs. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts'. Respondents select a score on a 10point scale, from 1 (income should be made more equal) to 10 (we need larger income differences as incentives for individual efforts). Hence, a smaller number indicates stronger preference towards income equality. Both the value questions on homosexuality and income equality are decomposed by sex, corresponding to the decomposed values of the dependent variable - male and female trust levels. Among the control variables, income, trust in governments, and no homosexual as neighbors take the form of logarithm.

The data used to estimate the model includes 91 countries for the period that waves 3-6 of the World Value Survey covers (1995-2012). The cross-section time series nature of the data enables me to use a panel estimation technique that controls for unobserved variables excluded from the model specification above. First, there might be country-specific heterogeneity that affects the level of trust - for instance, cultural or historic characteristics of a country. As long as these unobserved variables are correlated to other observed variables, the estimation will be subject to biased results. To address such biases that may be caused by omitted variables, country-level fixed effects that demean time-constant countrycharacteristics are applied. The country-fixed effects are denoted as $a_{i}$ in equation 1. In addition, time-trends might also influence trust levels across countries. The time-trends that are common to all countries are controlled for by including year dummy variables - denoted as $t$ in equation 1. $u_{i t}$ is the idiosyncratic error term. Robust standard errors are applied in order to control for potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlations. In addition, standard errors are clustered at the country-level, allowing standard errors to be correlated within a cluster (country). Given the log-linear nature of the model, I use a linear panel estimation method with two-way fixed effects (country and time).

The model is estimated first with the full-sample (up to 91 countries) and then with subsamples grouped based on the level of gender equality. The sample is sub-grouped because the effect of fairness towards women can vary depending on the level of gender equality of a country (see discussions in section 3.1). Thus, I split the sample into two groups: the high gender equality group (above the average level of gender equality) and the low gender equality group (below the average). In doing so, I take the average of each of the five gender equality variables, and sub-group the sample in the five different ways - i.e. above and below the average values of the men more rights than women, secondary education, university
education, female labor, and female MP variables, respectively. Descriptive statistics of all the variables used including their average values are presented in appendix A .

## 4. Results

### 4.1. Overall Impact of Fairness in the Full-sample

First, the model is estimated with the full-sample consisting of up to 91 countries. The results are presented in table 1 . Columns 1-5 show the results when the dependent variable is the trust level of female respondents, while columns 6-10 present those of the male counterparts. In columns 1 and 5, the model is estimated with the four value-related variables only - excluding other control variables and the variables of gender-related conditions. When the trust level of females is the dependent variable, the coefficient of men more rights than women, capturing the level of gender discriminatory values, is negative, and the effect is statistically significant at the 5 -level (see column 1). Controlling for gender-related conditions additionally, the results differ depending on which variable of gender-related conditions enters the regression model. When female labor and university education (as a ratio to males') are included, the negative effect of gender discriminatory values remains (columns 2-3). However, the effect loses its statistical significance when female secondary education and political participation are controlled for (columns 4-5). On the other hand, none of the variables capturing gender-related conditions turn out to have a significant effect on the trust level of females. These results indicate that gender-related values (fair ways of thinking and perceptions towards women) are arguably more important to social trust than the actual conditions concerning gender equality (fair conditions for women). Quantitatively, a $10 \%$ point increase in the number of women supporting gender discriminatory values decreases the number of women who trust other people by 2.5-2.8\%-points. Regarding the effects of the control variables on the level of female trust, trust in formal institutions (governments) tends to increase social trust among people, while more discriminatory values against social minorities (homosexuals) decreases the level of trust.

Turning to the effects on the trust level of male respondents, the results are qualitatively similar to those for their female counterparts (see columns 6-10). Gender discriminatory values negatively affect the trust level of men, and the effect remains statistically significant when gender equality in labor and university education is additionally
controlled for. The magnitudes of the effect vary more largely for men than those for women, ranging from a $2.1 \%$ to $4.0 \%$-point reduction in the trust level, corresponding to a $10 \%$-point increase in the gender-discriminatory values. On the other hand, different from the results of females, the share of female legislators in parliaments turns out to have a positive and significant effect on the level of male trust. Concerning the control variables, trust in governments increases the social trust of males, while more discrimination against homosexuals decreases the trust level. Also, there is some evidence that income level has a positive effect on trust, while values supporting income inequality decrease the trust level of men.

### 4.2. Varying Impact of Fairness across Different Levels of Gender Equality

The results of the full-sample estimation imply that fair values towards women promote social trust not only for women but also for men. On the other hand, the effects of fairness towards women on trust may vary across countries with different levels of gender equality, because gender equality can be more important social values in more equal countries and therefore its effect might be greater in determining social trust in these countries. To unpack these differentiated effects, I further conduct sub-sample analyses by sub-grouping countries based on their level of gender equality. The results are presented in tables 2-5.

First, table 2 shows the results of high gender equal countries measured by gender-related conditions - labor, university and secondary education, and political participation. In other words, countries are sub-grouped into two categories, i.e. above and below the average of female achievements as a ratio to males' in each of the four dimensions. The high gender equal group includes countries above the average level of gender equality and the results of these countries are presented in table 2 . Columns 1-4 show the estimation results on the level of female trust, while columns 5-8 are those on male trust. In high gender equal countries, the effect of the gender discriminatory values (men more rights than women) is widely negative and statistically significant at the $1-5 \%$ levels. Interestingly, the effect is more significant for males than females because the effect on female trust loses its statistical significance when countries are sub-grouped based on their records in secondary education and political participation, while the effect is always significant for males, regardless of different types of sub-grouping. Compared to the full-sample, the sizes of the effect of gender discriminatory values are greater in high equal countries. Specifically, a $10 \%$-point increase in gender
discriminatory values of women decreases their trust level by $3-4 \%$-points, while the same increase in gender discriminatory values of men reduces the trust level of males by 4.4-6.0\%points. On the other hand, the gender-related conditions do not turn out to create any additional effect on trust levels in high equal countries.

Turning to low gender equal countries, gender discriminatory values turn out to be irrelevant to determining the level of social trust for both men and women (table 3). The coefficients of men more rights than women variable are not significant in any of the regression models, independently from how countries are sub-grouped and which genderrelated conditions are controlled for. In this group of countries, institutional factors seem to be more crucial to social trust, having trust in governments and rule of law variables positively associated with social trust level. Interestingly, income level tends to negatively affect trust level in low equal countries, possibly because there might be some interaction effect between gender equality and economic wealth.

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of sub-samples grouped in an alternative way. Here, countries are sub-grouped based on their records on gender discriminatory values. In other words, high gender equal countries are those that the percent of respondents who answer, yes, men should have more rights to a job than women, is below the average percent of the all countries, while low gender equal countries are those above the average level. The results of these alternative sub-samples are similar to those presented in tables 2-3. In high gender equal countries, the effect of gender discriminatory values is negative and largely significant although the magnitudes of the effect are somewhat smaller than those in the other subsample estimations in tables 2-3. In low gender equal countries, gender discriminatory values do not have any impact on social trust.

One interesting finding is that the effect of gender equality is greater for the trust level of men than that of women - especially in high gender equal countries. This is somewhat different from my initial expectation. I predicted that gender equality ensured fair treatments for women so that they could trust other people more. However, it seems that fairness between men and women is important for both men and women - at least in more equal societies. The greater impact of gender equality for men might be attributed to the fact that the level of discriminatory values against women is generally higher for men in many countries and thus, reduction in gender discriminatory values may create a larger impact for them. Alternatively, gender equality may provide more opportunities for men to contact and work
with women who are presumably more trustworthy (Glaeser et al. 2000) because they are less likely to be involved in nepotism and corruption that are typically observed in group behaviors among males. As trustworthy environments have positive effects on the level of trusting others, greater exposure with women arguably increases the trust level of men. On the other hand, gender equality does not necessarily increase contact and exposure between women, thus its effect on trust would be smaller for women.

## 5. Conclusion

Fairness can be an important value that promotes social trust among people. In this paper, I investigated empirically whether gender equality - fairness between men and women increases social trust. My results show that discriminatory values against women negatively affect social trust for both men and women, while actual conditions on gender equality are less important. Furthermore, fairness towards women is a crucial determinant of social trust in countries where gender equality is relatively high, but the effect of the fairness is minimal in low-equal countries, signaling that fairness is a more influential value in more equal countries.

One interesting and remaining issue that is not fully answered in this paper is that the effect of gender equality is stronger for the trust level of men compared to that of women particularly in more equal countries. This finding is contrary to the expectation constructed based on the argument that women are the main beneficiaries of gender equality and thus, the effect should be larger for them. This result implies that benefits one can secure through fairness may not be a main transmission channel between fairness and social trust, but it might be rather the general value systems consisting of fairness, equality, and tolerance that have a direct impact on social trust. It would be worthwhile further examining mechanisms transmitting the effects of gender equality to social trust that might vary between men and women.

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Table 1. Trust and Gender Equality (1995-2010)
Panel Analysis with Two-way Fixed Effects, full-sample

| DV | Trust level (female, log) |  |  |  |  | Trust level (male, log) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Men more rights than women (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.26 \\ (0.11)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.12)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (0.16)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.20 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.21 \\ (0.10)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.21 \\ (0.12)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.40 \\ (0.18)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.21 \\ & (0.15) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.18 \\ (0.26) \end{gathered}$ |
| Trust in governments (log) | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35 \\ (0.16)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (0.10)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19 \\ (0.11)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.12)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ |
| No homosexual as neighbors (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.19 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.26 \\ (0.09) * * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.24 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.22 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.21 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.09)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.11)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.08)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income more unequal | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.05) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.04 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.06 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.10 \\ & (0.07) \end{aligned}$ |
| Income (log) |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.09 \\ & (0.18) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35 \\ (0.29) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.17 \\ (0.40) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.43 \\ (0.25)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rule of law (index) |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.29) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.45 \\ (0.41) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.29) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.49) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female labor (ratio, F/M) |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| Univ. education (ratio, F/M) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Secondary education (ratio, F/M) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Female MP (share) |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.02)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Time FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. Countries | 91 | 87 | 69 | 74 | 76 | 91 | 87 | 69 | 74 | 76 |
| No. Observations | 181 | 174 | 126 | 138 | 116 | 181 | 174 | 126 | 138 | 119 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ (within) | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.42 |

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. $* p<.10, * * p<.05, * * * p<.001$.

Table 2. Trust and Gender Equality (1995-2010)
Panel Analysis with Two-way Fixed Effects, high-gender equal countries, by gender-related conditions

| DV | Trust level (female, log) |  |  |  | Trust level (male, log) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Men more rights than women (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.30 \\ (0.14)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.46 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.40 \\ (0.14)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.39 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.48 \\ (0.18)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.44 \\ (0.21)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.60 \\ (0.21) * * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.46 \\ (0.08)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Trust in governments (log) | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.09 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.23 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35 \\ (0.17)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.09)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.10 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.12)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.22 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ |
| No homosexual as neighbors (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.16 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.18 \\ (0.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.26 \\ (0.30) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income more unequal | $\begin{gathered} -0.09 \\ (0.05)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.05 \\ & (0.09) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.07)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.14) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.05)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.17 \\ (0.06)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income (log) | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.12 \\ (0.70) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.54 \\ (0.29)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.44) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30 \\ (0.15)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.48 \\ (0.45) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.57 \\ (0.27)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36 \\ (0.15)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Rule of law (index) | $\begin{gathered} -0.32 \\ (0.27) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.61 \\ (0.42) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.57 \\ (0.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.08 \\ (0.35)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.31 \\ (0.32) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.45 \\ (0.39) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.51 \\ (0.28)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Female labor (ratio, F/M) | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.003 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| Univ. education (ratio, F/M) |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Secondary education (ratio, F/M) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Female MP (share) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.15) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| Time FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. Countries | 56 | 37 | 50 | 36 | 56 | 37 | 50 | 36 |
| No. Observations | 108 | 63 | 90 | 51 | 108 | 63 | 90 | 51 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ (within) | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.36 | 0.66 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.82 |

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. $* p<.10, * * p<.05, * * * p<.001$.

Table 3. Trust and Gender Equality (1995-2010)
Panel Analysis with Two-way Fixed Effects, low-gender equal countries, by gender-related conditions

| DV | Trust level (female, log) |  |  |  | Trust level (male, log) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Men more rights than women (log) | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.34 \\ (0.44) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.44) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.29 \\ (0.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.08 \\ (0.53) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.34) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.80) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.55 \\ (0.47) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ (0.86) \end{gathered}$ |
| Trust in governments (log) | 0.08 $(0.24)$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.77 \\ (0.23)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $-0.05$ <br> (0.08) | $\begin{gathered} 0.06 \\ 0.09 \end{gathered}$ | $-0.14$ (0.31) | $\begin{gathered} 0.88 \\ (0.30) * * * \end{gathered}$ | $-0.34$ | $-0.03$ |
| (log) | (0.24) | (0.23)*** | (0.08) | (0.29) | (0.31) | $(0.30)^{* * *}$ | $(0.19)^{*}$ | (0.23) |
| No homosexual as neighbors (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.12 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (0.07)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.16 \\ (0.04)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.26 \\ (0.08)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.32 \\ (0.06)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.06)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (0.09)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income more unequal | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.11) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.15 \\ (0.08)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income <br> (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.76 \\ (0.33)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.01 \\ (0.37) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.27 \\ (0.16)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.90 \\ (0.33)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.85 \\ (0.39)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.53) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.12 \\ (0.29)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.63 \\ (0.36)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Rule of law (index) | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.37) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.61 \\ (0.29)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.73 \\ (0.09)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.52 \\ (0.48) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.24 \\ (0.31) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32 \\ (0.36) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.71 \\ (0.16)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.61 \\ (0.52) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female labor (ratio, F/M) | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| Univ. education (ratio, F/M) |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.005)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.005)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Secondary education (ratio, F/M) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Female MP (share) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.03 \\ (0.03) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ |
| Time FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. Countries | 37 | 40 | 30 | 44 | 37 | 40 | 30 | 44 |
| No. Observations | 66 | 63 | 48 | 68 | 66 | 63 | 48 | 68 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ (within) | 0.50 | 0.68 | 0.86 | 0.70 | 0.47 | 0.67 | 0.82 | 0.57 |

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. ${ }^{*} p<.10, * * p<.05,{ }^{* * *} p<.001$.

Table 4. Trust and Gender Equality (1995-2010)
Panel Analysis with Two-way Fixed Effects, high-gender equal countries, by gender-related values

| DV | Trust level (female, log) |  |  |  | Trust level (male, log) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Men more rights than women $(\log )$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.36 \\ (0.19)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.19 \\ (0.11)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.25) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.37 \\ (0.13)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.65 \\ (0.16)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.34 \\ (0.13)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.51 \\ (0.16)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Trust in governments | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.13) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.21 \\ (0.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.10) * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.22 \\ (0.07)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.13 \\ (0.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.08)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| (log) |  | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.23) | $(0.10)^{*}$ | $(0.07)^{* * *}$ | (0.10) | $(0.08)^{* *}$ |
| No homosexual as neighbors (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.12) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.17 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.16 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.51 \\ (0.12)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income more unequal | $\begin{gathered} -0.08 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.03 \\ (0.09) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.06) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.06)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.07) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.22 \\ (0.32) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.20 \\ (0.61)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.10 \\ (0.56)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.07 \\ (0.46) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.85 \\ (0.54) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.96 \\ (0.44)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.78 \\ (0.56) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.48) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rule of law (index) | $\begin{gathered} -0.11 \\ (0.30) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.74 \\ (0.33)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.94 \\ (0.34)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.49) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.60 \\ (0.29)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.29 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.73 \\ (0.38)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.35 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female labor (ratio, F/M) | $\begin{gathered} -0.016 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.005 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| Univ. education (ratio, F/M) |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.004)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Secondary education (ratio, F/M) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.005 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Female MP <br> (share) |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.002 \\ & (0.03) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.02 \\ (0.01)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Time FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. Countries | 53 | 41 | 43 | 42 | 50 | 39 | 40 | 39 |
| No. Observations | 102 | 74 | 82 | 64 | 96 | 74 | 81 | 60 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ (within) | 0.19 | 0.45 | 0.34 | 0.51 | 0.33 | 0.62 | 0.35 | 0.74 |

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. $* p<.10, * * p<.05,{ }^{* * *} p<.001$.

Table 5. Trust and Gender Equality (1995-2010)
Panel Analysis with Two-way Fixed Effects, low-gender equal countries, by gender-related values

| DV | Trust level (female, log) |  |  |  | Trust level (male, log) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Men more rights than women (log) | $\begin{gathered} 0.27 \\ (0.75) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.79 \\ (0.86) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.75 \\ (0.86) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.65 \\ (0.79) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.14 \\ (0.71) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.71 \\ (1.07) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.42 \\ (1.52) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.84 \\ (1.40) \end{gathered}$ |
| Trust in governments | 0.40 |  | $0.64$ |  | $0.47$ | $1.12$ | $0.70$ | $0.53$ |
| (log) | (0.33) |  | $(0.36)^{*}$ |  | (0.37) | (0.92) | (0.59) | (0.67) |
| No homosexual as neighbors ( $\log$ ) | $\begin{gathered} -0.23 \\ (0.13)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.39 \\ (0.08)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.36 \\ (0.07)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.42 \\ (0.09)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.12)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.22 \\ (0.06)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.20 \\ (0.06)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.30 \\ (0.11)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ |
| Income more unequal | $\begin{gathered} -0.18 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.21 \\ (0.19) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.29 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.37 \\ (0.13)^{* * *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.18 \\ (0.15) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.07 \\ (0.23) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.21) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.30 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income (log) | $\begin{gathered} -0.37 \\ (0.28) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.63 \\ (0.31)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.83 \\ (0.43)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.38 \\ (0.54) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.14 \\ (0.20) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.25 \\ (0.24) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.91 \\ (0.54)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.28 \\ (0.42) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rule of law (index) | $\begin{gathered} 0.42 \\ (0.27) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.41 \\ (0.54) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.46 \\ (0.27)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.25 \\ (0.53) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.28 \\ (0.29) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ (0.60) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.76 \\ (0.30)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.65 \\ (0.74) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female labor (ratio, F/M) | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.01 \\ & (0.02) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  |
| Univ. education (ratio, F/M) |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.001 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.0003 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
| Secondary education (ratio, F/M) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Female MP <br> (share) |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.04 \\ (0.02)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.05 \\ (0.03)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| Time FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. Countries | 41 | 32 | 35 | 35 | 46 | 35 | 38 | 41 |
| No. Observations | 72 | 52 | 56 | 55 | 78 | 52 | 57 | 59 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ (within) | 0.45 | 0.57 | 0.60 | 0.71 | 0.34 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.57 |

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. $* p<.10, * * p<.05, * * * p<.001$.

Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | No. Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Trust, female | 181 | 23.95 | 14.90 | 2.2 | 74 |
| Trust, male <br> Men more rights than <br> women (female) | 181 | 24.72 | 14.54 | 3.6 | 73.3 |
| Men more rights than <br> women (male) | 181 | 31.23 | 17.92 | 0.7 | 86.1 |
| Trust in governments <br> (female) | 181 | 40.82 | 22.21 | 1.5 | 93.1 |
| Trust in governments <br> (male) | 181 | 44.64 | 18.79 | 7.1 | 96.6 |
| No homosexual as <br> neighbors (female) | 181 | 48.67 | 27.34 | 0.9 | 99.6 |
| No homosexual as <br> neighbors (male) | 181 | 52.98 | 25.62 | 0.9 | 99.6 |
| Income more unequal <br> (female) | 181 | 5.70 | 1.07 | 3.24 | 8.25 |
| Income more unequal <br> (male) | 181 | 5.87 | 1.00 | 3.43 | 8.21 |
| Income <br> (GDP pc.) <br> Rule of law <br> (index) | 176 | $11,066.41$ | $14,299.45$ | 159.8 | 65,767 |
| Female labor |  |  |  |  |  |
| (ratio, F/M) |  |  |  |  |  |

Andorra, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Cyprus, Germany, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Macedonia, Mali, Montenegro, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, El Salvador, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, West Bank, Yemen, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe (91 countries).


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ I also included GINI coefficients that measure the actual level of income inequality of a country, however, the inclusion of the GINI-index variable results in dropping the number of observations by almost $50 \%$. Thus, this variable is excluded in the final estimation model.

