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Abstract:
Palestinian suicide bombing/martyrdom speaks both to the symbolic significance of the human body and also to the connections that this form of violence has to religious and interconnected political authorities and influences. This article examines these religiously and politically inspired events using an analysis of emotion and body, placing particular emphasis on their mediation through culture. Drawing on Palestinian poetry, art and websites as well as existing research that includes mostly un-theorised discussions of body and emotion (especially humiliation) within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, this article goes beyond the blatancy of the final explosive act. As such, it uncovers a variety of deeply embedded cultural motifs and metaphors that speak to how body and emotion permeate the Palestinian cultural landscape and collective consciousness. This process, in turn, unearths the importance of ideologies that centre on religion, nationality, authority, land and self to the shaping of the cultural milieu from which the suicide bomber/martyr emerges.

Introduction

The proliferation of contemporary martyrdom/suicide bombing¹ around the globe has forcibly brought this form of offensive to the forefront of academic, media and popular discussion. Consequently, martyrdom/suicide bombing has generated much scholarly and journalistic research that both describes and seeks to understand the origins and the impact of this phenomenon. Most of the studies that have emerged over the last few years have focused on better-known instances of suicide bombing/martyrdom—for example, Palestinian, Chechen and Tamil. Furthermore, in the wake of September 11 2001, many more books and articles have emerged that focus on Al Qaeda specifically, or on suicide bombing and martyrdom operations more generally. In exploring martyrdom/suicide bombing one might place greater or lesser degrees of emphasis on factors such as religion, nationalism, international relations and foreign policies, and economics among other things (and much has been written about these influences).² Certainly, these lenses through which one can understand and theorise suicide bombing/martyrdom all feed into my discussion—but in a manner that leads me to the body and emotion as central sites of meaning, comprehension and theoretical exploration. Thus, this article examines Palestinian suicide bombing/martyrdom using an analysis of emotion and body, placing particular emphasis on the mediation of them through culture.³
Suicide bombing/martyrdom speaks not only to the symbolic significance of the human body but also to the connections that this form of corporeal manifestation has to religious and political governance. The suicide bomber’s/martyr’s body becomes a medium of communication—a symbol that, paradoxically, must disintegrate in order to impart its message. Negotiation of self and identity in and through one’s body under these conditions calls for an examination of how religious and political discourses and power structures shape and influence individuals’ decisions to forsake their bodies. In addition to examining the circumstances surrounding the material bodies of martyrs/suicide bombers, one needs to go beyond explicit physical manifestations in order to uncover the deeply embedded social and cultural corporeal motifs that speak to how the concept of body permeates multiple layers of meaning in the Palestinian cultural landscape and collective consciousness. These meanings are embedded in the final explosive act of the suicide bomber/martyr—the instant that brings forth the dual moments of self-destruction and the destruction of Israeli life and property.

Integral to the importance of the body under these circumstances, one can extrapolate the centrality of emotions—specifically humiliation—to such corporeal expression. In observing the cultural and social importance of emotion, one can discern its complex inter-relationship with material and metaphorical corporeal manifestations; hence, as a growing body of literature identifies, emotion and body are deeply interconnected, indicating the necessity of rethinking prior conceptual separations of them. Thus, in order to connect the manifest corporeal expressions of martyrs to the religious-nationalist goals that they represent, I look to a much neglected (Scheff, 1994: 3; Turner and Stets, 2005: 1) but increasingly recognised domain of sociology—sociology of emotions. More specifically, I focus on research that makes the conceptual and theoretical connection between body and emotion (for example, Lyon and Barbalet [1994]). In taking a combined theoretical approach, this article highlights the expression of emotion in the individual body, the social body and the body politic. By analysing material and metaphorical bodies as expressions of shared and individual emotions and experiences, we can appreciate the importance of emotions to the sociological theorising of human action.

Note on Methodology

In Palestinian literature, art, poetry, graffiti and elsewhere, one can find the body as a central organising motif of many concepts including identity, citizenship, community, and of the sometimes elusive and contested concept of Palestine itself. These cultural artefacts and expressions often end up being posted and reproduced on the Internet because many Palestinians use this medium as a means to communicate their experiences of the conflict. This type of online data allows access to a rich variety of materials that inform my discussion of the cultural landscapes that have produced the suicide bomber/martyr. Fortunately, a great deal of Palestinian written work is available in English: websites, for example, typically give the user options for both English and Arabic.
In addition I draw on the many instances in which the body and emotions make appearances—mostly in descriptive terms—in other academic research. This approach means that I am constantly searching out those explicit instances and implicit indications of body and emotion within the vast literature on suicide bombing/martyrdom and of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Some of these secondary sources are replete with untapped body/emotion narratives that while appear to me as quite obvious examples begging attention, have been left unexplored theoretically.

Whilst some of my sources point to the explicit social ordering of bodies, many others illustrate the ubiquity and power of corporeal metaphor. By examining the ways in which body metaphors emerge in a society’s cultural expressions, one uncovers layers of meaning that allow one to describe a particular period in time and the social action occurring within it. Antoine de Baecque proposes that corporeal metaphors permit a society to “represent itself at a pivotal moment of its history” (de Baecque, 1993: 4). Reflecting on his own methodology in researching the French Revolution, de Baecque argues that to some observers, the study of lesser known cultural products and the metaphors that they impart, may seem unlikely to shed much light on the conflict itself. He remarks:

“After all, what are we to make of Louis XVI’s genitals, or the wounds of the Republican martyrs? But once these are offered to fruitful interpretation, mysterious, pervading, different registers of texts or images—obscurc and limited at first glance—they oblige the researcher to take deep cross-sections that reveal the heart of the sufferings or troubles of a society. To probe the wounds of the martyrs is to penetrate into the Revolution; to investigate the impotence of the king is to understand the crisis of credibility of an entire political system thanks to the study of the numerous metaphorical shifts that propagated that representation” (de Baecque, 1993: 19).

In this way, de Baecque recognises the importance of seeking out the smaller, more obscure details of historical events—those that some may deem merely anecdotal. The metaphors form the core of his methodology by presenting a gateway to the under-investigated stories of history. This article, too, unearths some of the historical details typically left untheorised in the study of Palestinian suicide bombing/martyrdom. Their inclusion here seeks to remedy this oversight by illustrating the multitude of ways in which we can find both body and emotion finding voice in the artefacts of Palestinian life.
Body and Emotion: Embracing the “Missing Link”

Despite the relative lack of attention that sociologists have paid to emotions (and their importance to corporeal expression), Chris Shilling argues that the roots of the sociology of emotions stems from classical theorists such as Durkheim, Comte, Weber and Simmel. Moreover, he illustrates how, later, Parsons squashed its further development (see Shilling 2002). Whilst psychological research on emotion proliferated and interest emerged also in anthropology and philosophy it appears that little interdisciplinary awareness occurred; hence, subsequent interested sociologists have taken a specifically sociological approach to researching it (Barbalet, 1998: 21). The early 1970s saw the slow re-emergence of this sub-discipline, and, since the mid 1990s, sociological theorising of emotions has gained wider acceptance among sociologists more generally.

Just as contemporary body theorising has overcome mind/body dualism, research on emotion has begun to reconcile the emotional/rational dualism of previous study. The legacy of the polarization of emotion and reason has been far-reaching, so that even now, many sociologists—even while accepting that the two are not polar opposites—continue to conceptually separate them for analysis (Turner and Stet, 2005: 21). Rather than hindering rational thought, however, emotions are a critical and integral part of it. Barbalet (2002), for example, argues that not only does reason *require* emotion, but also that *all* social actions have a fundamental emotional input.

Although at times emotional experiences may be highly individual and private, on other occasions, emotions can emerge as a social, collective phenomenon—a process that is evident in conflict torn societies such as Palestine. Collective emotions can manifest under many conditions with the common emotion being reflective of the “emotional climate,” although not every individual necessarily has the same emotional experiences (Barbalet, 2002: 5). Collective emotions may manifest in political settings, in social movements and in religious groups: thus, emotions are significant to politics (Berezin, 2002) and to religion (Corrigan [Ed.] 2008), and emotions typically infuse the nexus of religion, politics, nationalism and ethnic identity—especially when polarising ideologies are present (Corrigan, 2008a: 333). Berezin, for example, discusses the importance of emotion to macro-level politics, iterating that it can be a complicated process to disentangle arguments of cause and effect where cases of ongoing hatred play a role in conflict: is the hatred responsible for the continued violence or is it the outcome of it? (Berezin, 2002: 35). She proposes that despite the sidelined of emotions in much research on political conflict, “If there is any point of agreement in the new study of emotions, it is that they are so constitutive of social, and by extension, political life that they cannot be ignored” (Berezin, 2002: 36). Furthermore, she alludes to the connection between emotion and embodiment, when she identifies them as “physical” and “expressive” outcomes of a variety of forms of “destabilization” (Berezin, 2002: 36).

In examining emotions within the context of statehood and contestations over it, Berezin continues: “violence from the purely symbolic to the physical is the effect of the collective experience of the emotion of insecurity” (Berezin, 2002: 38). Thus, she identifies the difference between a “secure
state” and an “insecure state,” and proposes emotion as “a latent structure of affect within a macro political structure—the state” (Berezin, 2002: 39). The way in which the state exploits emotional energy is just as, or more important than, the generation of it (Berezin, 2002: 39-40) because national belonging and citizenship stimulate an emotional bond between populations and the geography that they inhabit. Thus, “citizenship [is a] felt identity” (Berezin, 2002: 41) that parallels geo-political boundaries. Furthermore, the emotional energy harnessed within the population becomes more evident during periods of conflict: leaders can mobilise this emotional force against enemies, real or perceived (Berezin, 2002: 43). The subsequent violence that can occur is—in part at least—explained by collective fear, hatred and shame—an emotional dimension of violence that Berezin laments many researchers of violence have paid little attention to. Likewise, Thomas J. Scheff (1994) proposes that national conflict has less to do with “material interests,” and more to do with that which is typically unspoken of—humiliation (a state that he argues compromises the basic human bond and creates shame). Moreover, when shame and the stress placed on social bonds are not recognised and resolved then “cycles of insult, humiliation, and revenge” result (Scheff, 1994: 3). Scheff acknowledges that material interests are significant to conflict, and that because they appear as the “topic” of it, they obscure the underlying and critical issue of humiliation.

What is humiliation then? Evelin Gerda Linder explains that the word derives from the Latin for earth—*hummus*. The word as a whole connotes a downward motion to the earth—a “degradation.” Linder argues that humiliation is not just an emotion—it constitutes a “social process” (Linder, 2001: 51) that must be understood in societies of violence and conflict as “a central feature of the social order” (Linder, 2001: 46). As Scheff (1994), Berezin (2002), Linder (2001) and other researchers (e.g. Held, [2004]; and Mendible, [2005]) propose, emotions generally, and humiliation specifically, need to be addressed when looking at the development and outcomes of conflict and war. Acknowledging and understanding the emotional component (and the bodily actions that are integral to them) provide us with a more complete and holistic picture of them.

Of specific concern is the conceptual and theoretical pairing of discussions of emotion (especially humiliation) with explorations of the body. This pairing has occurred relatively infrequently thus far, but given the progress that has been made, the potential for developing and applying this form of analysis is great. Recognizing this critical connection, Sheper-Hughes and Lock argue that “insofar as emotions entail both feelings and cognitive orientations, public morality, and cultural ideology, we suggest they provide an important ‘missing link’ capable of bridging mind and body, individual, society, and body politic” (Sheper-Hughes and Lock, 1987: 28-29). Moreover, as they remark, emotional expression always is informed by culture. Hence, emotions do not stand apart from society or from the body; rather, they are an integral and important component of them. Thus, the complexities of social action are better understood when one recognises that actions (both in their material presentations and symbolic representations) are infused with emotion.
Lyon and Barbalet (1994) develop further the role of emotions to body theorising, proposing that emotions provide the physical body with a form of communicative agency. Emotion is, the authors argue, “necessarily embodied” and therefore, it is an essential element of the body’s—and of the self’s—social agency (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994: 50). On the fruitfulness of corporeal metaphors and symbols, Lyon and Barbalet (1994) expand on why exactly they are so effective: the success of corporeal metaphors, the authors argue, is due in part to the “cognitive and affective orientations” of them. They suggest that the initiation of emotions at an individual level within a collective context contributes directly to how the collective operates. Therefore, the “social (as opposed to the socialised)” body is an active agent of social life rather than one that is merely constrained by social forces (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994: 55). Lyon (1999) proposes that emotion has a multifaceted role as it is integral to “social and bodily relations and, [is] a product of structured social relations” (Lyon, 1999: 183). Indeed, she posits that one cannot separate emotions from body and cognition—they are intertwined both on an individual and societal level (Lyon, 1999: 184). Finally, Burkitt (2002) contends that one can understand emotions best when they are contextualised as existing in relation to the body and to the bodies of others—as well as to non-human entities (Burkitt, 2002: 151). He discusses emotions as ‘complexes’ because they originate both from “the body and discourse but are reducible to neither” (Burkitt, 2002: 153).

**Locations and Dislocations: Palestinian Corporeality and Emotion**

The rest of this article explores a sample of the numerous instances in which one can uncover both explicit and less obvious examples of emotion and body in Palestinian society and culture.

**(a) Emotional Climate**

The “boundary-drawing activity” inherent in nationalist (and, in this case, interconnected religiously oriented) goals comprise inclusionary and exclusionary practices (see Bauman, 1992) that resonate with the emotional foundations that contribute to the perpetuation of conflict, and in this instance, to the production of martyrs/suicide bombers. These attempts to maintain boundaries are emotionally fraught activities that require a cohesive social and political body to be effective. Nationalism encourages, and indeed thrives upon, ‘us’ and ‘them’ divisions, and when the ‘us’ is vulnerable to ‘them,’ then the discourse of self-identity and the problem of the ‘other’ strengthen (Bauman, 1992: 677-679). Likewise, because of the sometimes inflexible way in which religious identity manifests, the divisions between “them” and “us” sometimes creates extreme hostility towards the other—self identity in religious terms becomes absolute and generates negative emotions towards the other (Corrigan, 2008a: 337). Typically, the divisive nature of religious hatred is strengthened by an increase in one’s own belief system and a manifestation of deep love and reverence for it, its rhetoric and related sacred texts and deities or deities (Corrigan, 2008a: 341). Critically, when religion and nationalism combine, then the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ intensifies further.
Oppression and humiliation—coupled with the ongoing processes of political negation, breakdown of communication, poverty, overt acts of conflict and their counter acts have produced both personal and cultural humiliation (Held, 2004) for the Palestinian citizenry (See also Hafez [2006]; Hallaq [2003]; and Hassan [2011]). Perpetual loss of dignity due to Palestinian lack of might against Israeli occupation coupled with an inability to achieve economic and social success leaves many Palestinians feeling humiliated. The daily pain of humiliation is a theme that Khosrokhavar takes up in his analysis of Palestinian suicide bombers/martyrs. He proposes that for some individuals, suicide missions provide redemption—both religious and social (Khosrokhavar, 2205: 132-133).

Organisations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad further fuel Palestinian humiliation by emphasizing a hatred for Jews that reaches further back than existing territorial disputes to the very origins of anti-Semitism. Christian and Muslim resentment against Jews has a lengthy history that is an integral part of any tension with Jews both throughout history and within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hence, these organisations can use the emotional vulnerability of those affected by Israel’s contemporary expansionist practices to mobilise citizens to engage in martyrdom/suicide bombing or be supportive of it. In his study of contemporary jihad literature, David Cook (2002) proposes that following centuries of successful expansion, empire building and influence, the twentieth century (following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire) saw a period of decline for Islam. Radical Muslim leaders and intellectuals draw on motifs of Islamic humiliation to inspire modern day jihadists to take the offensive in order to re-establish Islam as a global force (Cook, 2002: 14-16). Within this context, suicide bombing/martyrdom “[is] one method of overcoming despair. It is attractive because it accomplishes a sense of optimism” (Cook, 2001: 16). The fractured nature of Palestinian territories, the very questioning of the concept of Palestine, and the conditions of the citizenry. (According to the United Nations 778,993 registered refugees live in the West Bank 778,993 and 1,106,19 live in the Gaza Strip 1,106,195. Many more live in other countries such as Syria and Jordan.) has resulted in an ‘insecure state’ (Berezin, 2002) that bears the wounds of the continuous cycles of violence not only between Palestinians and Israelis, but also between different Palestinian organisations. Within this ‘emotional climate’ (Barbalet, 2002), the influence of Sunni revivalist movements has meant that groups such as Hamas and PIJ have placed a renewed emphasis on physical jihad. When contemporary authority figures emphasise the need to do Allah’s will (according to their interpretation of it), one can imagine that their inspiration of appropriate and necessary emotional responses in those who follow the path of the martyr is extremely important. If the would-be martyrs are affectively engaged, believing and feeling that they are doing Allah’s will, then the training and rationalization processes are much more effective.

Given the religious importance of it, further elaboration of the concept of jihad is important at this point. Jihad is largely misunderstood by most non-Muslims. Moreover, within Islam, the term has undergone changes in meaning. Historically, lesser jihad dealt with the struggle against unbelievers, while the concern of greater jihad was the propensity of the human spirit toward evil. Hence, the violence with which contemporary observers have come to associate with jihad and martyrdom
simply were not necessary conditions of it in prior centuries (Brown, 2001: 108; Khosrokhavar, 2005: 14). The distinction between lesser jihad and greater jihad was (and is) found however, mostly among Muslim mystics who do not accept the radicalisation of Islam. These mystics focus on greater jihad—the struggle that each individual endures with the self and the self’s propensity to contravene God’s laws (Khosrokhavar, 2005: 14). Critical to understanding physical or active jihad and martyrdom (as opposed to intellectual and spiritual versions) is an awareness of the emergence and influence of Sunni revivalist movements during the 20th century. These movements emerged in response to an era of quietism in Islam, seeking to foster a more activist oriented approach that harkened back to Islam’s origins. Revivalist groups sought to forge a stronger Islam that placed its focus on the centrality of Allah to their faith (Brown, 2001: 107-108). Significantly, they instilled a strong emphasis on physical jihad involving active armed combat, and, importantly, they fostered a deep sense of individual duty to participate in it. According to this movement, each Muslim is duty-bound to take individual action on behalf of Islam. Alongside this resurrection of armed struggle came a renewed emphasis on battlefield martyrdom, whereby those who become martyrs whilst fighting the enemy are conferred a greater status than those martyrs who died by nonviolent means (Brown, 2001: 110-111).

Interpretations of the Qur’an and the emphasis placed on particular verses (surahs) over others, has facilitated a radicalized version of jihad for contemporary radical movements. The selective emphasis on those verses that focus on war while de-emphasising and even ignoring those that emphasise tolerance and peace means that those who choose to do so, can create a cloak of religious legitimacy around violent acts of martyrdom. Today, among radical Islamists, active martyrdom has become “the ideal type” (Khosrokhavar, 2005: 15-17).

(b) (Re)Connecting With the Land: Sex, Gender and Identity.

The emotional climate of Palestine is evident in the frequent anthropomorphising of the land found in cultural expressions of the conflict. Sometimes explicit self-identification as Palestine occurs as Edna Yaghi’s poem, Palestinian I am, reveals. In this poem, Yaghi reflects the process of seeing one’s self as the land about which one is passionate. Of her body/herself/Palestine, she writes:

“I am the river that flows
Through the land.
I am the mountain
Noble and magnificent
Rising up out of chaos and destruction” (Yaghi, 2000).

Her words convey her strength in the face of conflict and her resolve to endure in the same way that the land does. She expresses her connection to her homeland in terms of its landscape as her body. Her body/land possess not only beauty and strength, but also the devastation that is a part of Palestine’s and her own narrative. She continues:
“I am the red poppy and yellow daffodil
That grow upon my bloodstained hills.
I am the battle cry of freedom
That echoes through my corridors
And every fiber of my being” (Yaghi, 2000).

Thus, Yaghi acknowledges and embraces the implicit connection between the travesty of conflict and the ramifications of it for the social body. Her life/her body, like Palestine, fights for renewal amidst the devastation.

The intimate connections between emotion, nation and body infuse the post 1948 Palestinian literature that Amal Amireh (2003) examines. Gender, nationhood and control emerge as dominant themes as many of the narratives describe the land as an extension of the state in terms of the human body. Amireh found that the gendered identities and metaphors that permeate this fertile body of fiction illustrate a great deal about the reaction of Palestinian people to the loss of their land. She explains that male and female authors alike imagine Palestine as a woman: “In metaphorizing the land as woman, then, the national story becomes the story of the possession of the land/woman by a man” (Amireh, 2003: 751). Critically, the loss of Palestinian land to Israel translates as “the rape of Palestine” to Palestinian people (from the Palestinian Authority’s website, quoted in Amireh, 2003: 751 [emphasis added]). Elsewhere, Oliver and Steinberg (2005) note that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land engenders a “sense of lost personal wholeness” for many Palestinians. Moreover, in biladi (romantic nationalist folk songs), the common land-as-woman metaphor frequently bestows Palestine with female body parts: the land “was said to possess eyes, waist, chest, bosom, hair, and a ‘perfumed spirit’” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 64).

Such expressions are found not only in literature and song, but also in art. Sliman Mansour’s (1998) painting “Salma”—reproduced as a poster during the first intifada, depicts a young Palestinian woman carrying a bowl of oranges. As one of the authors on the website, Antonym/Synonym: The Poster Art of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict comments of the image, “Modern Palestinian graphic iconography often represents Palestine via the figure of a woman.” The authors continue, “In this poster, the woman represents the historical ideal in terms of Palestinian cultural identity: a traditionally dressed woman offering guests hospitality and the bounty of the land. She is a symbol of fertility and plenty” (2007). Mansour added poetry to the foot of the image—line’s from Mahmoud Darwish’s, The Poem of the Land:

“Those who go forth into life ask not about their lives,
They ask about the land: did she arise?”

These particular lines refer to Palestinian opposition to occupation and their continued struggle against it (Antonym/Synonym, 2007).
Returning to Amireh’s analyses, she found that the relationship between men and women within the context of the changing geopolitical boundaries translates as a loss of male control and a compromise to their masculinity. Housed in refugee camps with little or no means to work (and therefore little opportunity to marry and provide for families), the men in these novels are perceived as disconnected from their nation. The humiliation that they feel due to the oppressive circumstances leads to a deep-seated frustration and anger (Amireh, 2003: 752-753). Amireh posits that the novels ultimately leave little doubt as to the extent of the men’s experiences: “national defeat is experienced as castration” (Amireh, 2003: 753). In Palestine, land, family and the home are intertwined with integrity, self respect and honour; the loss of these things creates feelings of humiliation and offence (Moghadam, 2003: 74). In the Palestinian novels, one key way in which men in particular could restore honour and “regain their manhood” was by arming themselves against Israeli occupation (Amireh, 2003: 754). Many Palestinian children are born into refugee camps and know little beyond poverty and violence in their lives. Some have experienced the loss or imprisonment of family members. As a result of oppression and humiliation, many children have vowed not to live as their parents did. On the inevitable involvement of each subsequent generation, Jabr reflects: “I know these children will unite with the earth of Palestine, providing hydrocarbons and nutrition to our red soil. Our lemon trees will grow, our gnarled olive trees will bend as mothers over our dead and our bonds with the place where we were born will live on forever” (Jabr, 2000). These children, especially the boys, are endowed with the weighty task of restoring Palestinian honour and of repairing the fractured state of both Palestinian land and male identity.

Although female Palestinian writers have used some similar metaphors as their male counterparts, contemporary feminist writers have incorporated new dialogues that forefront the role of women in Palestine’s recent history. They challenge the dominant male discourses and explore the representations of women by organisations such as Hamas. This organisation conceptualises women largely in terms of their reproductive capacity, and it is responsible for the drive to remove women from the public sphere and to ensure that they are veiled (Amireh, 2003: 757, 760). Under pressure from Hamas, many women had to abandon Western-style clothing and wear ‘Islamic attire.’ Failure to do so aroused suspicions of cooperation with Israel, and resulted in punishments (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 30). The message that women cover their bodies and thus conform to new rulings was disseminated not only in the mosques, but also in public spaces. The following message is part of a piece of Hamas graffiti: “Hamas considers the unveiled as collaborators of a kind. It is our religious duty to execute collaborators” (cited in Goodwin, 1994: 289). Thus, the crisis of the conflict ushered in a new era of male control over women’s bodies—a clear reflection of their own frustrations. Critically, men began to equate Palestinian weakness and vulnerability with the Palestinian women whose bodies they regarded as “threats to national honor and security” (Amireh, 2003: 763). The fear that women’s bodies would compromise Palestinian goals was epitomised by the “Isquat” incident during which Islamic nationalist movements produced leaflets warning Palestinian men that the Israelis had enlisted Palestinian women to use sex to recruit Palestinian
men to join forces with Israel. Although there was no truth to the rumour, women came under increased scrutiny, and the need for men to control themselves sexually became ever more important (Amireh, 2003: 758-760).

The anti-feminist rhetoric of Hamas is part of a larger Islamization project in Palestine that creates sharp divisions between men and women. Because it appears that “body control is necessary for survival,” Amireh proposes that the rise of armed struggle allowed Palestinian men to reclaim their masculinity during the concluding period of the first intifada. Thus, their armed mobilisation put an end to an era of emasculated Palestinian men who had no control over their homeland or their bodies (Amireh, 2003: 759-760). Both the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLO)/Fatah’s leader, Yasser Arafat (1929-2004) and Ghassan Kanafani (1936-1972) a leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]—spoke about the armed struggle in terms of male virility and of the need to wed the male martyr to the female land (Amireh, 2003: 751, 754). Invoking romantic and bodily-sensual imagery, Fatah frames the martyr as one who weds Palestine upon his death. (Fatah members view Palestine not only as a woman but also as a bride.) The cost of this marriage is not financial; rather, the price is blood (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 76). Blood is frequently referred to in terms of the reinvigoration of Palestine: a common theme is that the blood of martyrs irrigates, fertilizes, and cleanses the land (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 64, 80, 92). Moreover, martyrs’ blood is never a waste “as it is transfused into the body of his society” (Motah-Hary, 2001: 9). In this way, that which is essential to sustaining the human body, instead, becomes essential to sustaining the land. Thus, the death of the martyr/suicide bomber contributes to the unification of the fractured nation, and of the reconnection of the many parts of the physical, spiritual and metaphorical body. Blood spilled in death renews the potential of Palestine’s life. One gives up one’s blood, one’s body as part of this cycle of selfhood and identity. The emotional connection between Palestinians and the land manifests in the disintegration of the martyr’s body: the communicative agency of the body (Lyon and Barbalet, 1994) expresses the goal of reconnection. In his discussion of self-realization through martyrdom, Khosrokhavar states:

“Although his body will be shattered into thousands of pieces, his martyrdom will make it in tact as is the idealized Palestine in his mind. By ridding himself of a body that has been cut to pieces, he acquires a higher unity that washes away his sins and gives him what he was refused in this world: status, a life, a sublime meaning and, in a word, an individuation that could not be made flesh in a real life in a sovereign nation without a unified territory” (Khosrokhavar, 2005: 135).

Palestine as nation and Palestine as self-identity, exist, disintegrate and re-emerge in different configurations as if a mirage of hope. Glimpses of the past, the present and the future emerge from the symbolic destruction of flesh. But the cycles of violence are ongoing, and the targeted destruction contributes to more blood on the soil of both Palestinian and Israeli land.
In large part, Arafat and Yassin were responsible for directing the body politic and for mobilizing support from the social body. Importantly, their followers attached a sense of certainty in the ability of each to regain lost territories and establish a unified and complete Palestine independent from occupation and interference. These individuals, therefore, were integral to the process of re-establishing a unified body—one that would recreate the identity and meaning of Palestine for the people who inhabited its lands. This emotionally charged set of expectations infused the many communities in Palestine with inspiration for the future of their country.

As potentially unifying figures in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Arafat and Yassin appeared as important symbols of what Palestine means. Arafat’s supporters revealed that to them, Arafat embodied the very essence of Palestine. His image graced many of the walls between Gaza City and Egypt. In these murals, his followers depict him as Palestine—a landscape of trees and terrain represents his body, and on his arm lays a map of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip; the three lands combining to represent the whole (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 38).

Likewise, Yassin’s supporters sometimes depicted him as embodying the land, and often referred to him as “‘the throbbing heart of the intifada’” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 38, 33). They believed that Yassin—who was a quadriplegic—had overcome disability to fight for Allah. They didn’t see his body as a sign of weakness, but as one of strength. Oliver and Steinberg note:

“In the vast majority of media devoted to him, the sheik is drawn from the waist up, a face without a body, in sharp contrast to those who act in his name—the mujahidin, the holy fighters of Islam, who are often depicted as bodies without faces. Sometimes the fighter is depicted with no head at all, as if doubly to stress that he is pure body, myth in action, embodied imperative. The paralysis of the sheik only accentuates the fact that it is the young militants of his movement who constitute his body, the means by which the sacred commands he espouses and represents are fulfilled” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 34).

The relationship between leaders and followers often is revealed through such symbolic means: “the imagery of the body politic recurs in our reflections on the nature of order and disorder in the human community” (O’Neill, 2004: 37). Problematically, however, the oftentimes very different goals of the PLO and Hamas meant that the struggle for Palestinian identity and statehood was fractured from within. The competing ideologies and personalities behind them often wrenched the goal of a unified and free Palestine further from the reach of Palestinians as an already dislocated nation is crippled further by its own leaders.

Returning to Berezin’s concept of “insecure state,” she proposes that the mobilisation of socially shared and communicated emotions is pivotal during times of conflict. The leadership must be able to use this emotional energy and transfer it into action if they are able to overcome the dominance of the opposition. Thus, leaders can use emotions as a conduit with which to aid the mobilisation of
the social body for action against others. Yassin and Arafat both tapped into the emotional states of the Palestinian people in order to garner their support for their respective goals. Because emotional states have ramifications for corporeal expression, then it seems that humiliation and shame can produce a variety of forms of resistance including a willingness to forsake oneself and one’s body. (It is important to note, however, that not all Palestinians support suicide bombing/martyrdom operations. Many Palestinians engage in non-violent protest against Israeli policies, expansion, and wall building [see for example Nusseibeh, 2006: 40-42; O’Connor, 2005; Palestine Monitor, 2010]).

The events in Palestinian history since the creation of Israel have facilitated the rise of martyrdom/suicide bombing at least in part because of the disconnection from a unified Palestine that both the emergent leaders and the dislocated refugee population have experienced. The ultimate expression of this displacement is the suicide mission. The symbolism rests on the sacrifice of the human body in order to restore the land to legitimate authority and to the people—a reconnection of the body politic and the social body. The continuance of this project rests on the socialisation of each new generation into an accepted—and indeed—valued culture of martyrdom whereby those who kill themselves while taking the lives of Israelis receive the highest of honours. In this way, the head(s) of Palestinian resistance mobilise and coordinate the social body not only to support this end but also so that it offers up some of its strongest and most dedicated members.

(d) Before and After Sacrifice

An enormous range of complex and interconnected factors come together in the shaping of who does and who does not become a martyr/suicide bomber. Organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad do, however, have certain conditions and characteristics that they look for in likely candidates. For those committed to Hamas, a certain irony exists—would-be martyrs must have particular physical attributes—that is, they must be able “to pass, at least temporarily, as an Israeli Jew” should their missions take them into Israel (Hassan, 2001). Hence, the body of the Muslim Palestinian transforms into that of a Jewish Israeli in order to carry out the mission: in the final moments of the martyr’s life, his or her body is presented as that of the enemy’s.

The dedicated ‘living-martyrs”—that is, those individuals who have been accepted by an organisation and are committed to their training and future deployment—undergo intense training that requires mental and physical self-discipline, including periods of fasting. Further preparations include political and religious education, often for many hours each day. Knowledge of the Qur’an, the hadith, justifications for their actions, and learning further about Paradise are all part of the living martyrs’ world. Further demonization of the Jewish populations takes place also at this stage of the mobilisation process (Hassan, 2001).

Fatah and (especially) Hamas have romanticised martyrdom, and here again, the body plays a central role. During the first intifada, organisations disseminated stories that told of how the martyr’s body never decays. According to them, the body would remain sweet-smelling for several weeks after death, and roses would even blossom upon it (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 74). Certain hadith document the rewards for martyrs, and some of them pertain to the body. For example, men
will not feel pain during their martyrdom, and in addition to being absolved of all bad deeds and gaining immediate entrance into Paradise, they will marry seventy-two black eyed virginal women (*mantles* or *houris*) once they are there (see Karim, 1938: 164-176; Parfrey, 2001: 17; Victor, 2003: 112). The pure-eyed virgins “will have no disease and no urine and no stool and no spitting and no nose-dirt . . . and their perspiration [is] of musk” (Muslim in Karim, 1938: 164). Moreover, the women have sweet voices, live forever and are content in their state (Tirmizi in Karim, 1938: 176). The purity of women’s bodies is part of the reward for the martyrs (whose own bodies also will cease to emit waste products). Additionally, neither shall the martyrs’ bodies age, nor will they endure ill health and death (Muslim in Karim, 1938: 165). Important to understanding the significance of these bodily and other rewards is the Islamic distinction between “this lowly world (*al-dunya*) and the hereafter (*al-akhira*), the latter being immeasurably more valuable” (Winter, 1995: 37). Although Islam does contain dualistic discussions between the body and soul (Winter, 1995: 37), it defines the afterlife in bodily-sensual rather than spiritual terms (Winter, 1995: 39).x Some debate exists about the sexual nature of the women in Paradise. On one hand, many Islamic clerics deny the sexual nature of the rewards, saying that the *houris* are more like angels than wives (Reuter, 2004: 126-129). On the other hand, graffiti in the West Bank clearly alludes to the erotic nature of the martyr’s life in Paradise (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 76). As Moghadam (2003) notes, whether holy Islamic texts state that martyrs receive sexual rewards is not as important than whether organisations like Hamas affirm that they will (Moghadam, 2003: 73)—which they clearly do as one can ascertain from countless interviews with young Palestinian men (see Oliver and Steinberg 2005).

**Conclusion**

Religiously and politically motivated acts of violence and resistance take many forms, and often the body is the specific site of such petitions against oppositional ideologies and authorities. In the case of Palestinian suicide bombing/martyrdom, the protagonists of this form of violence engage explicitly in bodily sacrifice. Suicide bombers/martyrs have the particular goal of self-destruction in mind as a means to effect change, damage or destroy the enemy and/or to enact revenge. By doing so, the perpetrator makes the body a symbol of devotion and submission to a greater cause. Moreover, the suicide bomber/martyr typically destroys not only his or her own body, but also the bodies of others—the victims of the operation. These emotionally laden religious-political events impart immediate and obvious messages about the nature of conflict. An analysis of them examining the relationship between emotion and body (both in literal and metaphorical expressions) provides another dimension through which to illustrate the connections between violent expression and culture. In the obliteration of their own bodies and those of Israelis, the Palestinian martyr/suicide bomber is a multifaceted lens through which to explore Palestinian society. In turn, Palestinian society provides a medium with which to understand the martyr’s/suicide bomber’s body. Trying to detail, among other things, the cultural milieu that in part shapes the suicide bomber/martyr is not to condone or forgive the violence that they beget, and this article is not intended as a romantic invocation of a Palestinian ‘right’ to
violence. Rather, body, emotion and their socio-cultural expressions within, through and around the martyr/suicide bomber facilitates a very different layer of understanding of the conflict and of this particular form of violence. The devastation of martyrs/suicide bombers’ bodies illuminates the power of religious and nationalist discourses and of their ability to mobilize an emotionally devastated social body into extreme action. They symbolise also the failure of other means of settling conflict. Martyrs’ bodies have become emblematic of the Palestinian struggle for nationhood, and in some cases, for the establishment of a religiously rather than secularly defined state. By becoming a form of weaponry against Israeli occupation, these bodies go from life into death in an attempt to establish the ideals of the nation state. Imbued with religious and nationalist meaning, they self-destruct, taking the lives of others with them in order to communicate their political-religious ideologies. The martyr’s body as symbol is simultaneously ephemeral and enduring: the bodies disintegrate at the moment of self destruction, but are preserved in a lasting collective memory through a culture of celebration and through the sacrificial re-enactment of further operations.

The body exists both as a metaphorical tool, and also as material reality: at the behest of organizational authority, men and women train their bodies in preparation for martyrdom. Thus, the ideological nature of martyrdom is inscribed on and through the body of each martyr/suicide bomber. Like all human bodies, the body of the suicide bomber/martyr is situated and enacted within historical, cultural and social moments; taken together, these fragments of existence reveal insights into the complex relationships that give birth to corporeal expression. Simultaneously, emotions are a critical part of understanding how authorities are able to mobilize members of the social body during times of strife. The role of emotion in religious-political settings is one that not only helps to illustrate why martyrs are willing to forsake their bodies, but also why the body has become an integral part of religious and nationalist metaphors. Emotions are a critical link between ideology and action as manifested through the body. More specifically, humiliation emerges as a potent contributor to the ability of the body politic to find those willing to martyr themselves for larger ideologies. Zygmunt Bauman pointed to the consequences of it: “It is a banal truth that violence breeds more violence; somewhat less banal, since not repeated enough, is the truth that victimization breeds more victimization. Victims are not guaranteed to be morally superior to their victimizers, and seldom emerge from the victimization morally ennobled” (Bauman, 1989: 236). The simplicity of Bauman’s statement reduces the complexities of battles, wars and conflicts to a terrible truth: generation after generation suffers and in turn become part of the cycles of humiliation, fear and retribution. The emotional terrorism that they endure does not often allow for a benevolence of spirit; instead, it distorts what life perhaps could have been, and shapes the next generation of violence.
Notes:

i. I use both the terms *martyrdom* and *suicide bombing* together to reflect the polyvocality of the event.

ii. This vast and growing literature explores suicide bombing/martyrdom in terms of a wide range of factors including religious and political justifications (for example, Cook, 2001; Brown, 2001; and Lewinstein, 2001); nationalist responses to occupation (Pape, 2003); inter-group competition (Bloom, 2005); psychological profiling (Lachkar, 2002; Lester, Yang and Lindsay, 2004; and Soibelman, 2004) and combined multi-level analyses (Pape, 2003; Hafez, 2006). Other researchers have taken rather different approaches, such as Asad (2007), who compels us to challenge some of the more pervasive assumptions about the nature of terrorism and war, and Khosrokhavar (2005) who proposes that martyrs seek out individuation via their acts of death. Some research contains a strong theoretical component (e.g. Pitcher, 1998), whilst other works are more descriptive—and extremely useful due to their rich narratives (e.g. Oliver and Steinberg [2005], Victor [2003]).

iii. This article addresses suicide bombing/martyrdom within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict—specifically during the period following the first intifada through to the end of the second. The first intifada (1987-1993) began in the Gaza Strip before extending to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Intifada literally means ‘shaking off’ (La Guardia, 2003: 134) “to shake, to shudder, shiver, tremble” (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005) and was a response to Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Palestinian martyrdom/suicide bombing missions did not commence, however, until after the Oslo Accords of 1993 and escalated throughout the 1990s (conducted mostly by Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade [a branch of PLO/Fatah], Palestinian Islamic Jihad [PIJ], and Hamas). Between 1993 and 1997 this form of violence caused the deaths of one hundred and seventy-five people (including twenty-one suicide bombers) and the injury of nine hundred and twenty-eight people (Brym and Araj, 2006: 1969).

Against the backdrop of the failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit, and the failure on the part of both Palestinians and Israelis to follow through on commitments (see Kurtzer [2007] for an analysis), the second intifada (Oct 26 2000-July 12 2005) saw the West Bank and Gaza become defined by a devastating statistic: “the highest per capita death toll due to—suicide bombing.” This intifada resulted in 657 deaths (148 were suicide bombers) and the injury of 3,682 individuals (Brym and Araj, 2006: 1969).

iv. A sharp distinction exists between the approach of Palestinian nationalists and Palestinian Islamists to Palestinian folk culture. Islamists dislike the (secular) nationalism inherent to folk culture, as well as its romanticism. They find nationalism to be ideologically incongruent with Islamism; whereas romanticism is problematic because of its sensuality (Oliver and Steinberg, 2005: 64-65).

v. Poster art has been a vital component of creative expression and resistance to Israeli occupation. American, Dan Walsh, has accumulated the largest collection of Palestinian poster art in the world, some of which is available to view through Liberation Graphics website, *Antonym/Synonym: The Poster Art of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*.

vi. Darwish (1941-2008) was considered Palestine’s national poet.

vii. Although Islam does call for modesty in women’s (and men’s) attire, neither the Qur’an nor the *hadith* insist that women wear items such as burquas, niqabs or other body and face covering garments. Moreover, during the first intifada, many Palestinian women began to embrace Western clothing as their contributions to the struggle reflected also their increasing gains in the public realm (Victor, 2003: 10-11). In her analysis of Palestinian graffiti during the first intifada, Julie Peteet (1996) found much graffiti that specifically addressed Muslim women, calling on them to adopt stricter dress codes— to reject alleged non-Islamic styles in preference for veiling and so forth.
These messages (usually from Hamas) pointed to the desired ‘Islamicization’ of women’s bodies in the public sphere as part of the process of resistance against Israel (and arguably as part of the goal of many Islamists to create a strict pan-Islamic community that adheres to narrow cultural/religious norms).

viii. Fatah is the largest political party of the PLO. Suicide bombers/martyrs are aligned with Fatah’s military branch, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.

ix. Hamas spiritual leaders such as the late Sheik Yassin claimed that Muslim activism was at the heart of bringing about the first intifada—for mobilizing Palestinian people against Israel. Critically, he and other Islamists at the time stated quite clearly that despite the relatively secular sensibilities of Yasser Arafat, Palestine should not become a secular state, but an Islamic one based on shari’a law (Juergensmeyer, 1993: 69-71). Hamas’s rhetoric during their emergence at the time of the first intifada bolstered the religious nature of the conflict. Their organisation around Palestinian mosques and their use of religious absolutisms in discussing the conflict—that is, Israel is Evil and Palestine is Good—brought religion rather than nationalism to the forefront of the conflict (Juergensmeyer, 1993: 72-73). More recently, Frisch (2005) has argued that since the beginning of the second intifada, Fatah and its military branch, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, have become increasingly religiously driven or Islamacized. He illustrates also that throughout the history of the PLO and Fatah, Arafat consistently used religion as a mobilisational tool to appeal to his mostly Muslim audience. While many commentators identify the PLO as a secular, politically left-of-centre organisation, Frisch points to Arafat’s speeches and documents, the majority of which he framed with the language of Islam—drawn mostly from the Qur’an and the hadith (Frisch, 2003: 394-395). Certainly, compared to Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the PLO/Fatah are not as religiously oriented: for example, Fatah does not want to institute shari’a law in Palestinian society whereas Hamas does. Moreover for Fatah, Islam is a means to an end (a free independent Palestine) while for Hamas, Islam is the end (Frisch, 2003: 396). Writing in 2003, Frisch pointed also to the increasing popularity of Hamas as an indicator of the Islamicization of the conflict (Frisch, 2003: 392), and of course, since then Hamas has come into power.

x. The emphasis on enduring corporeal existence and pleasure may be due in part at least to the very human, non-spiritual rendering of the prophet Muhammad in the hadith. Winter notes that when one compares Islamic discussions of Muhammad to Christian writings on Jesus, texts such as the hadith emphasise his earthly human origins, whereas Christian texts stress the divine nature of Jesus’ conception (Winter, 1995: 39). Moreover, the nature of the soul is a complex one in Islamic philosophy although at a fundamental level, all Islamic philosophers agree that the soul resides within the body. They concur further that soul comprises both rational and non-rational parts as well as vegetative, animal and human components. The soul is responsible for the operation of the body, which by itself lacks the ability to function. (The soul comes into being at the same time as the body.)

Because the soul perfects the terrestrial body, Islamic philosophers have for the most part limited their discussion of the soul to its terrestrial form as opposed to its celestial one. Critically, the body is an essential component of any definition of the soul in Islamic thought; without relating to a body, the soul does not exist. Disagreement exists over what exactly happens to the rational soul when the body dies (Inati, 2006). Some Islamic writers propose that the resurrected body is quite similar to the earthly one, whereas other thinkers argue that the celestial body will appear identical to the earthly one but will be capable of experiencing pleasure, bliss and satisfaction in a manner that we earthly beings cannot fathom. Most Islamic thought on this matter does converge...
though: “With few exceptions, then, contemporary Muslims affirm the resurrection of the body and disagree only on the nature of that body in relation to the frames we inhabit on earth. The idea of a purely spiritual resurrection has found few advocates” (Idleman Smith and Yazbeck Haddad, 1981: 133).

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