TRADING SECURITY IN ALLIANCES:
JAPANESE AND GERMAN SECURITY POLICY
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the Cold War period and after, German and Japanese security and alliance policies have been frequently compared. Almost all analysts have stressed and continue to stress the basic similarities, rooted in similar histories, geopolitical circumstances, major alliance partners, constitutional limits, etc. This article claims that Germany and Japan have actually parted ways in their security and alliance policies since the early 1990s. Whereas the core function of German security policy is the ‘export’ of security, facilitated by the fact that there is no realistic threat to its territorial integrity, the core function of Japan’s security policy is to ‘import’ security (from the US). These different functions explain differing attitudes regarding the necessity of nurturing the alliance with the United States, Germany’s and Japan’s most important military ally. Whereas norms of multilateral and peaceful conflict resolution and the search for more autonomy are strong forces in both countries, exerting a powerful pressure towards a more independent stance, structural factors, but also the self-constructed role of Japan as security importer, prevent these forces from dominating the country’s security and alliance policies. The article makes a functional argument that cuts across the established dichotomy of realist and constructivist approaches.
1. A NEW EXPLANATION FOR GERMAN AND JAPANESE
SECURITY AND ALLIANCE POLICIES

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarism have sparked a
lively and still ongoing debate about the future direction of Germany’s and
Japan’s security policies. In the forty years following their disastrous defeat in
World War II, both countries had transformed themselves into economic
powerhouses with stable political systems. Both became deeply integrated into
international alliances. Their economic rise was facilitated politically as well as
financially by the constraints they accepted with regard to their military forces
which were limited in size and under tight international supervision. Such a low
profile in military matters was made possible by a close alliance with the United
States. Washington offered a security guarantee while at the same time providing
reassurances for smaller neighbouring countries against potential new threats from
their former nemesis.1

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the major motivation for both
Germany and Japan to strive for American protection and consequentially accept
American tutelage seemed gone. Would they both now transform their economic
power into military might and pursue once more independent and possibly
nationalist forms of foreign policies? The ensuing debate was shaped by a series
of widely quoted articles by neorealist authors who claimed that the anarchic
structure of the international system inherently undermined alliances between
powerful countries because these, in the interest of self-protection, are forced to
balance against other major powers. Rising international power and the
weakening of their security dependence would push Germany and Japan towards
more autonomous policies and finally even the acquisition of nuclear weapons as
the ultimate guarantee for national survival (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993).
Neorealist scholars argued in the early 1990s that signs for such a development
were already clearly visible and detected, for example ‘…the beginning of a more
forceful and independent course now that Japan no longer is constrained to “obey
US demands”’ (Layne 1993: 39). The same trend against a continuation of the
vital alliance with the US was supposed to happen in the case of the united
Germany.

These rather pessimistic predictions regarding the alliances, however, were
refuted by most of the subsequent literature on empirical as well as theoretical

1 The history of Germany’s and Japan’s alliance with the US is well known. A few titles suffice as
reference: Larres and Oppelland (1997); Schaller (1997); Iriye and Wampler (2001); Junker
(2004).
grounds. The rapid militarization of Japan and Germany and the expected dissolution of the alliances did not happen. Institutionalist theories explained this with the embedding of both countries in entangling alliances. These created a common set of interests, reenforced by economic interdependence (Anderson and Goodman 1993). According to this school, alliances accumulate political capital and are able to adapt to new geopolitical situations (Wallander 1999). They do not simply wax and wane as a response to external threats (Wallander, Haftendorn and Keohane 1999). An even stronger argument was made by scholars in the constructivist tradition. According to them, norms shape the preference formation of states and these norms do not simply whither away once new circumstances appear (Katzenstein 1996b). Scholars claimed the existence of particularly strong norms in Japan and Germany which had a huge influence on how these countries interpreted the international environment. Berger wrote of a ‘culture of anti-militarism’ (Berger 1996: 318) which derived from the lessons of history and manifested itself in a broad societal resistance to the use of military means as instruments of foreign policy. In addition, the elites of both countries are strongly wedded to a multilateral and cooperative mode of conflict resolution. These norms were by now anchored in domestic institutions, firmly entrenched in practices and, thus, do not change easily. Rapid reorientations, such as the ones forecast by neorealists, are very unlikely. Both Japan’s and Germany’s post-Cold War security policy have been explained in this vein (Katzenstein 1996a; Katzenstein 1997; Berger 1998; Inoguchi 2004). Hanns Maull has popularized the term ‘Civilian Power’ to describe the characteristics of such policies (Maull 1990). The international policies of civilian powers are dominated by a strong preference for the use of soft power resources instead of military means. The view that Germany and Japan represented prime examples of Civilian Powers gained wide currency and came to dominate research.

This view was put to a test when Germany and Japan increasingly employed their troops abroad in multilateral missions and their leaders started to use rhetoric which emphasized the necessity of autonomous decision-making and a so-called ‘normalization’ of their foreign policies. However, voices claiming that neorealist predictions were now coming true remained a minority (e.g. Miller 2002; Inoguchi and Bacon 2006). Most studies still claim a basic continuity (Harnisch, Katsioulis and Overhaus 2004; Risse 2004; Maull 2004b; Nielebock and Rittberger 1999; Webber 2001; Maull 2006). The German-American clash on the Iraq War was widely interpreted as German reaction to America’s violation of multilateral norms (Rudolf 2005). German and Japanese military missions abroad were seen as the results of exceptional international crises and pressures from alliance partners.
However, this still begs the question why Germany, despite similar normative predispositions, seemed to be much faster than Japan in its acceptance of sending troops abroad as part of its international strategies. In particular, how can we explain the very different responses to the Iraq War of 2003? I argue that the constructivist argument of fundamental continuity obscures the core change in German security and alliance policies and the real reasons for a Japanese policy which (against neorealist predictions) still remains very much wedded to its traditional international policy, in particular with regard to the alliance with the US. The argument advanced here also suggests that policies suggested, for example, by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s pronouncements in his first policy addresses - to pursue a more robust diplomacy uninhibited by the historical burdens of World War II - will only go so far and not change Japan’s reliance on the alliance with the US (Pilling 2006). Nor will the recent nuclear test by North Korea (October 2006), despite a flurry of speculation after that event about a nuclear Japan.

To break up the by now rather sterile dichotomy of realist and constructivist approaches, I focus on the functional basis of German and Japanese security policies and the consequences for their alliance policies. Like neorealists, I locate the factors determining these functional bases in constraints resulting from the position of both states in the international system. However, I do not support neorealism’s mechanistic view of balancing and bandwagoning, because the motivation behind the policies of states regarding security alliances is not shaped by their relative power but rather by the function of their security policies which in turn also shapes the self-understanding of actors. The approach uses the basic insight of functional theories, i.e. that policies are determined by their function, as heuristic instrument and does not explicitly refer to any specific functional theory. The goal is to cut across entrenched ways of thinking in International Relations (IR) theory. As core functions of a state’s security policies I define security export and security import. Security Importers are states which are unable to solve their fundamental security problems, such as territorial integrity and safeguarding their sovereignty, on their own. Therefore, they have to rely on direct or indirect security guarantees of more powerful states. Their security policy is focused on their own territory; activities abroad result from objectives related to the basic function of security import. Security Exporters need no partners to deal with their fundamental security problems. They try to contain threats by preventively (or pre-emptively) combating potential risks through (military, economic and cultural) engagement abroad.

These two basic functions lead to fundamentally different alliance policies. Security Importers are forced to pursue a policy which is characterized by
asymmetric burden-sharing with one or several dominant security partners. Security Exporters do not need that and try to search for allies in the pursuit of their objectives within the framework of ‘equal partnerships’. Security Import and Burden-Sharing were characteristic for Germany’s security and alliance policies until the early 1990s, and they still shape Japanese policies. Germany, however, during the 1990s assumed rather quickly the role of a Security Exporter. One consequence was an insistence on nominal equality in its security partnerships and a more variable and ad-hoc pattern in the search for international partners.

To substantiate these claims, I will first analyze the functional basis of German and Japanese security policies and the consequences for their policies regarding security alliances until the end of the Cold War. Then I will look at the changes that occurred in the 1990s and I will derive predictions on the future of German and Japanese policies towards the US.

2. GERMANY AS SECURITY IMPORTER AND BURDEN-SHARER

Burden-Sharing and Security Import were the two fundamental bases of Germany’s alliance and security policy after it regained its (semi-)sovereignty in 1949. Chancellor Adenauer’s core goal was the consolidation of West Germany, at the expense of quick reunification (Schwarz 1991). The intensifying Cold War made the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic (in particular in the form of the enclave Berlin) seem very precarious. The necessity of guaranteed protection by the former adversary and now allied superpower, the United States, became an unquestioned dogma of Adenauer and his successors. After the US government had come round to the view that West Germany should become a vital part of the Western bulwark against Soviet expansionism, it was in principle ready to do so: the 1951 ‘troops to Europe’ decision embodied the American security guarantee for West Germany and the rest of Europe (Zimmermann forthcoming). However, there was one strict condition placed on this commitment. The Europeans were expected to contribute to the sharing of the defence burden. The central component of burden-sharing as envisioned by the US (and the UK) turned out to be the contested plan for German rearmament: it was to relieve the Western allies from the burden of paying for huge conventional forces and at the same time

2 The terms West Germany, Federal Republic, and Bonn (the former capital) will be used when reference is clearly made to the Western part of Germany until 1990. ‘Germany’ refers to the unified country.
utilize the growing West German economic potential (Zimmermann 2002). Despite intense protests in the German population and among West Germany’s neighbours, the plans went ahead. The country’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1955 codified the functional basis of the German-American alliance: Bonn imported security from the US, also in the wider sense reassuring the other Europeans through the continued presence of American troops. West Germany’s part of the deal was burden sharing: establishing conventional forces, paying occupation and later stationing costs, providing forward bases for US conventional and nuclear forces and extending numerous privileges to the US army. Economic burden-sharing was also part of the deal: West Germany cooperated in the US sponsored global economic institutions, it soon supported friendly regimes financially and it participated in the global ideological warfare. Nonetheless, the Americans continuously urged the Germans (and other allies) to assume more of the burden. This conflict continues to shape the diplomacy of the Western Alliance today (Duke 1993; Thies 2003; Sloan 2005: 83-86).

West Germany attempted to pursue the sometimes difficult balancing act to keep its defence contribution as limited as possible and at the same time high enough to prevent the US from cancelling the overall deal. However, even in times of severe budgetary restraints and strong transatlantic disagreements on the overall strategy of the West, the pivotal importance of security import as the base line was never put into doubt. This remained stable despite a strong antimilitarist bias in large parts of the German population which advocated a demilitarized Germany (Duffield 1998). This norm certainly influenced the domestic debate and many features of German security policies, often in the form of a combination of pacifism and anti-Americanism. However, it never came to dominate during the Cold War (and after). Similarly, an important part of the German establishment argued for more German autonomy and reduced dependence on the United States. These traditional nationalists, however, were never able to escape the basic logic of German security import.

This was true for the debate on German rearmament, but also during the 1960s when the US became increasingly worried about the economic burden represented by its military commitments abroad. In a series of very controversial agreements, West Germany agreed to use its monetary strength to support the American dollar which, according to the most popular American interpretation, was under pressure not because the US had lost competitiveness vis-à-vis its European partners, but due to the foreign exchange cost of US security commitments (Zimmermann 2002). West Germany’s support in this respect and the inauguration of an increasing foreign aid program, which mostly benefited
needy American allies in the global ideological battle, was, like its own defence
efforts, completely tied to the interest of protecting its own territory. Bonn’s own
international policy was relatively passive. Thus, it resisted US demands for a
visible engagement in Southeast Asia. Once the American frustration with the
unhelpfulness of its allies threatened to spill over into the transatlantic security
guarantee, the Federal Republic agreed to important new financial concessions,
such as a guarantee to support the dollar. The Vietnam War cast doubts on the
stability of American security import. Thus, in the early 1970s, the Germans
became more open for steps towards a more autonomous common European
foreign policy. As part of their effort to get the Europeans to share more of the
burden, this was acceptable for the US. However, as long as the Europeans relied
on the American security guarantee, the Americans were not ready to give up their
leadership role and West Germany, in the final consequence, never seriously
contemplated shedding its asymmetric burden-sharing role for the sake of
uncertain European cooperation. The transatlantic Ottawa declaration of June
1974 reaffirmed the basic US security guarantee and the necessity of burden-
sharing (NATO 1974).

The intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s after the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan underlined the importance of German security import. Despite mass
protests in the population, West German governments agreed to the stationing of
medium range ballistic missiles on German soil and undertook further measures to
relieve the US from some of the associated burden (Haftendorn 1991: 168). In
1982, Bonn and Washington concluded a Wartime Host Nation Agreement which
regulated German support for US forces in the case of a military conflict (Duke
1993: 73). Throughout the Cold War decades the functional basis of the German
American alliance never changed: West Germany was conscious of the necessity
to import security from the US and agreed to an asymmetric role in the alliance
classified by burden-sharing.

3. JAPANESE SECURITY IMPORT AND TRANSPACIFIC
BURDEN SHARING

As mentioned before, Japan’s situation after World War II exhibited many
parallels to the one of West Germany. First, similarly to the Federal Republic, a
widely shared societal norm of non-military conflict regulation was one of the
longstanding consequences of World War II in Japanese thinking about
international affairs. This pacifist renunciation of military power as means for
resolving conflicts was enshrined in Chapter 2, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution. The constitution was imposed by the US, but large parts of the population accepted it as part of Japanese identity, as shown by the presence of strong pacifist parties. Despite this deeply engrained notion, Japan was remilitarized in the framework of an asymmetric alliance with the United States. Japanese post-war leaders were convinced that the country needed protection by the superpower, that is, it had to import security (Schoppa 2002: 103). The Japanese-American Security Treaty of 1951 granted to the US the right ‘to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan’. According to the treaty, these forces might also be used to protect Japan against outside attacks and even internal riots (if the Japanese government requested such help), and furthermore to maintain security in the Far East, an ominous reference given the ongoing war in Korea.\(^3\) In the following years, Japanese diplomacy tried to change this agreement more in line with the logic of its interest in security import: first, to limit its validity to the Japanese territory and, second, to obtain a tight and binding security guarantee from the US.\(^4\)

As in Europe, America’s security export had two faces. It protected Japan against Communist aggression and it reassured Japan’s neighbours by demilitarizing and controlling the former aggressor. This allowed Japan, like Germany, to put its energies behind economic reconstruction and rapid growth which in turn led to a ceaseless debate between the Alliance partners about the adequacy of Japanese burden-sharing. The so-called Yoshida doctrine, named after Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s most influential politician in the post-war decade, formulated the basic outlook of Tokyo’s security policy: close strategic cooperation with the US, radical limits on Japan’s own military potential and concentration on economic growth (Green 2001: 11). However, this caused another endless series of debates on permitted and non-permitted forms of support for the global and regional commitments of the United States (Tsuchiyama 2004: 77). In the revised Security Treaty of 1960, the notion of potential American military intervention in domestic conflicts was abolished, but the stationing rights for US forces were renewed. Japan also achieved a more binding form of the US security guarantee and, in a secret side-protocol, granted the US military the right of transit of nuclear weapons through Japanese territory (Gallicchio 2001: 124).

Japanese politicians also realized that the security import from the US entailed a very asymmetric relationship with the Americans. Nationalist

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\(^4\) This is shown by recently declassified documents from Japanese archives. See: ‘Japan studied narrower scope of security pact with U.S’ Japan Policy and Politics, 28 Feb. 2005.
politicians since have argued for more autonomy and periodically criticized Japan’s dependence (Nitta 2002: 77; Green 2001: 13). From the other side of the political spectrum, the socialist opposition railed against any militarization of the country, particularly not in the framework of a close alliance with the US which might get Japan involved in all kinds of international conflicts. Again, however, these forces were not able to prevail against the structural realities of Japan’s geopolitical position which required security import and therefore led to a situation in which the ‘logic of burden-sharing’ (Katzenstein 1996a: 102) defined US-Japanese relations. Conflicts about the respective burdens emerged already during the negotiations for the 1951 Security Treaty. Japan resisted American efforts to create a conventional force of 500,000-700,000 men. Like Germany, it instrumentalized domestic opposition to limit the size of the defence contribution the Americans were able to extract (Schoppa 2002: 101-5). In the end, both sides settled for about a fifth of this ambitious figure.

The treaty of 1960 sparked intense protest in the Japanese population, resulting in the fall of Prime Minister Kishi’s government. Many feared that this treaty would force Japan to participate in American military operations in Asia (Schoppa 2002). This danger became very obvious during the Vietnam War. Japan avoided any direct participation in the American effort, but it supported non-communist allies of the US financially and permitted that its territory became a major hub for US operations in South East Asia (Hughes 2004: 27-30). A State Department policy planning paper stated: ‘Our object should thus be to encourage Japan to concentrate her military efforts on air and sea defence of the home islands, plus the approaches thereto, while playing a modest role in international peacekeeping, and to urge also that Japan use her growing power along economic and political lines, bilaterally and in regional groupings, to assist the development and stability of countries of the area’ (Department of State 1968). However, the Japanese, like the Germans, toyed with the idea of reducing the dependence on the US as a result of the Vietnam disaster. But Japan did not have the German alternative in form of a regional alliance. Another option would have been to develop nuclear weapons. In a secret meeting with high-ranking German foreign ministry officials, the Japanese went so far as to suggest that, despite their signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they were planning to develop nuclear weapons over the long run. Meanwhile they would use Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to counter American demands for more conventional contributions. The Germans thought such outspokenness ‘shocking’ (AAPD 1999). However, it turned out that such speculations by Japanese officials were far removed from the reality of the Japanese situation.
The crisis of trust resulting from the Vietnam War actually sparked a reaffirmation of the alliance (Green 2001: 13). As a consequence of the War, dissatisfaction in the American Congress with the contributions of America’s allies to the global struggle ran to unprecedented levels, culminating in massive demands for a reduction of commitments abroad. With the Nixon doctrine of 1969, the administration seemed to move into the same direction and demanded an end to the disproportionate share of the military burden born by the US. This debate, which lasted into the 1980s, demonstrated to the Japanese governments that the American security export was based on a quid-pro-quo and not self-evident (Maull 2004a: 323; Tsuchiyama 2004: 78). Japan had to step up its burden-sharing efforts. This resulted in the ‘Guidelines for US-Japanese Defence Cooperation’ of 1978, in the framework of which Tokyo and Washington intensified their military cooperation (Green 2001: 19-23). They were a first steps towards a geographic expansion of Japanese support by defining the scope of mutual cooperation as including the deterrence of an attack on Japan, common activities in the actual case of an attack, and general support of the U.S. in situations which also endangered Japan’s security (Maull 1999: 293-4). As a consequence of the ‘Guidelines’, the cooperation between the militaries of both countries increased enormously (Katzenstein 1996a: 133). Japan became a major market for US military exports and assumed most of the cost of the American forces stationed in Japan. It also supported other US allies in the region, such as South Korea by extending trade privileges.5 Prime Minister Nakasone’s Midterm Defence Program for 1986-90 was directly placed under the heading of burden-sharing with the US (Tsuchiyama 2004: 78). At that time, also the previously fragile popular support for the alliance in Japan became more stable (Bobrow 1989).

Japan also undertook efforts to neutralize the threat to the security alliance resulting from the economic clashes of these years. It agreed to voluntary restrictions on exports and continued holding dollar reserves, enabling the US to perpetuate their twin deficits, partly caused by worldwide military commitments (Inoguchi 2004: 44). Despite the intense nature of these conflicts, Japan and the United States never principally questioned the alliance. Japan still needed the security import, and the Americans needed Japanese burden-sharing in the global conflict.

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5 Memorandum to Brzezinski from Mike Armacost regarding discussions with the Japanese government concerning an increase in Japan's cost-sharing responsibilities for the defense of South Korea, National Security Council, Jan 19, 1978, Declassified Documents Reference System.
4. GERMAN SECURITY AND ALLIANCE POLICIES
TRANSFORMED

German reunification sparked intense speculations about the future foreign policy of a bigger Germany, now liberated from the post-war restrictions on its sovereignty. However, it soon became obvious that Germany’s international policies would continue within the parameters of restraint and multilateral cooperation set by the post-war diplomacy of the Bonn Republic. Nonetheless, this continuity in the means obscures the fundamental change which is going on since the early 1990s: the transformation of Germany to a Security Exporter, a transformation that was to have a strong impact on the country’s alliance policies.

The first Gulf War in 1990/91 was a final manifestation of traditional transatlantic burden-sharing. Germany did not participate in the military campaign; however, it extended wide-ranging logistical support and substantial financial contributions (Duke 1993: 76-81). After the end of the Cold War and in recognition of the central role Germany played in the transformation of Eastern Europe, George Bush senior offered the German government a ‘partnership in leadership’ and thus a restructuring of the relationship. However, the aspirations to change the alliance into a partnership of equals turned out to be premature. First, the United States still saw an independent European security organization as duplication and a potential waste of resources. The operations in the Balkans during the 1990s furthermore demonstrated to many decision-makers in Washington that campaigns without clear ‘leadership’ were militarily inefficient. In addition, the Europeans themselves were split regarding the future of the alliance. In the early 1990s, most European NATO members, including Germany, saw no urgent necessity to change the basic terms on which the alliance functioned.6

Thus, in the first years after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, due to the military superiority of the US and the security deficit in Europe, the German-American security alliance remained wedded to the terminology of burden-sharing and consequentially also the acceptance of American leadership. As argued here, this was the natural consequence of the different functional roles of American and German security policies. However, in a slow way, German security policy began to change during these years. The focal points which became catalysts for this change were the question of Bundeswehr deployments abroad and September 11, 2001.

6 On those debates see Schmidt (2000).
Out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr were first seriously contemplated during the first Gulf War, when the Americans asked the new Germany to participate in military campaigns even if these were not strictly related to the NATO area. Of course, this ran directly against the widespread aversion to the use of military means in Germany which had its roots in the catastrophic experience of World War II. German politicians resisted US demands by pointing to Germany’s Basic Law which was interpreted as prohibiting out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 68). However, the Gulf War made clear (not for the first time) that this norm could easily conflict with the demands placed on the country by the alliance. In particular, Conservative politicians argued that the bigger Germany could no longer afford to stay at the sidelines when its allies undertook large-scale missions in the name of the alliance. Thus, they demanded an end to the taboo regarding military deployments abroad (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 71; Duffield 1998: 178).

Solidarity among allies became the argument which was used most frequently by the supporters of German military activities abroad. Governments in particular emphasized the necessity to bolster the German status as reliable partner in the alliance, whenever the question of Bundeswehr deployments was debated during the 1990s. This was, however, not a new argument. German activities abroad were defined here in the same way as earlier burden sharing efforts which were justified by the requirements of the transatlantic or European alliance. Thus, the traditional logic of burden-sharing was the base of this argument, and not a qualitatively new strategy (Takle 2002; Duffield 1998: 175). As we will see, this difference is essential for understanding the divergence of German and Japanese alliance policies.

In the domestic debate, the argument of solidarity with the allies clashed usually with the norm of antimilitarism. This conflict obscured the development of a de-facto qualitatively new base for German security policy which became visible only in the past couple of years. Yet it started already in 1989 as a consequence of the transformation in Eastern Europe and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Germany assumed a central role in the Western effort to stabilize the former Warsaw Pact countries, especially through massive financial transfers. Former Defence Minister Volker Rühe justified that in May 1994: ‘…if we do not export stability now, we will be sooner or later seized by instabilities ourselves’ (Rühe 1994: 422). In addition to enormous credits for East European economies, Bonn also dispensed large amounts to help scrapping obsolete nuclear weapons.
Traditional roles in the alliance were briefly reversed when Germany asked its NATO allies to participate in the cost (Duffield 1998: 94). The German government tried vehemently to multilateralize this stability export in accordance with the major characteristics of West German post-war foreign policy, that is, the use of economic instruments and the embedding of foreign policy in multilateral structures (Gardner Feldman 1999).

Stability export was also the underlying motivation of the efforts of the German government in the intensifying Yugoslav crisis 1991/92. The widely criticized rapid recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was justified on these grounds. Military instruments, however, were not yet considered. Yet, many observers thought already at that time that a strategy of stability export sooner or later could no longer renounce the use of military means. Of course, this argument flew into the face of the traditional norms of peaceful conflict resolution and the renunciation of German military out-of-area operations (Philippi 2001). The conflict was clearly exposed by the Bosnian wars. After lengthy debates, Germany slowly stepped up its participation in military peacekeeping missions, culminating in the Kosovo operation 1999. Apart from the Balkan missions, Germany also participated in the UN-Missions in Cambodia, Somalia and East Timor during these years and recently sent its Navy to help in the stabilisation of Lebanon (for details on the earlier missions, see Wagener 2004). Very soon after the decision to participate in the Kosovo campaign, Chancellor Schröder stated at the Munich Security Conference 1999, that Germany was now ‘without any hesitation ready to accept responsibility as normal ally’. This role was not limited to the NATO area: ‘In this sense our foreign and security policy has to be a contribution to the global safeguarding of the future. Let’s call it what it is: an export of political stability’ (Schröder 1999). Germany also gave up its reservations regarding the limited territorial reach of NATO after September 11 (Meiers 2006: 50). Each of these actions sparked heated domestic debates (Duffield 1998: 181-221). The argument that participation in these missions violated the Basic Law was voided by the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of June 1994, which held that out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr within the framework of collective security were constitutional if the parliament gave prior authorization (or in urgent cases, post-facto authorization).

As mentioned, the political debate was shaped by the conflict of those who argued vehemently against the discarding of the anti-militaristic norm, mainly members of the Green and Social Democratic (SPD) parties, and those from the more conservative spectrum who emphasized the importance of solidarity in the alliance. Some commentators therefore argued that interests and norms related to Germany’s embedding in multilateral institutions were responsible for the new
policy of the Berlin Republic (Baumann 2001: 179; Duffield 1998: 175; Nabers 2004: 66). However, there are many indications, such as the German position during the war in Iraq and the new German defence guidelines, which suggest that this was one motive but not the dominant reason. In fact, what happened was that a new structurally induced function of German security policy slowly came to dominate policy despite domestic opposition and conflict. It was not a diffuse feeling of solidarity with the US and European allies but rather the transformation into a Security Exporter which explains Germany’s quick embrace of military engagements abroad.

This clearly articulated change in the German understanding of its security policy has manifested itself in former Defence Minister Struck’s widely quoted phrase: ‘The defence of Germany starts at the Hindukush’ (Struck 2003a). September 11 and the global reach of terrorism have accelerated this trend. Security export also lay at the heart of the Schröder government’s most important strategy document, the Defence Policy Guidelines of March 2003:

‘Defence as it is understood today means more, however, than traditional defensive operations at the national borders against a conventional attack. It includes the prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises and post-crisis rehabilitation. Accordingly, defence can no longer be narrowed down to geographical boundaries but contributes to safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy’ (DPG 2003).

‘Stability transfer’ and ‘equal partnership’ are also staples of Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) statements on security policy (CDU/CSU 2003). Not surprisingly, the Grand Coalition of Chancellor Merkel shows continuity in this respect (Meiers 2006: 58). On Oct 24, the Financial Times reported that according to the new 2006 White Paper ‘Germany’s military (would) officially abandon its primary post-war task of defending the country’s borders in favour of a more robust role for German troops on international missions’ (Williamson 2006). The White Paper quoted Defence Minister Jung with the words: ‘We have to deal early on with crises and conflicts where they originate, to keep their negative consequences to the extent possible distant from Europe and our citizens’ (Weissbuch 2006: 18). The language has not changed since the Schroeder government.

The notion of security export was also an essential part of the European Security Strategy of December 2003. Foreign Minister Fischer justified Germany’s participation in the European Union (EU) peacekeeping mission in Congo (ARTEMIS), apart from humanitarian aspects and European solidarity
during a speech in the parliament: ‘If this continent, our direct neighbour, starts to export the horrible instability which reigns there, the security interests of all Europeans in the 21st century will be directly implicated. The solution of these conflicts to my mind is therefore part of a European responsibility. Germany as one of the most important EU member states has to contribute to that’ (Fischer 2003).

Germany’s anti-terrorism policy is also shaped by security export. The fight against terrorism is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and until recently it concentrated exclusively on the pre-emption of threats from within, by either right- or leftwing extremists. The terrorist attacks since 2001 showed the limits of such a geographically confined concept. Thus, European cooperation was vastly expanded in this field, in addition to German-American consultations.8

German security export is furthermore evident in an ideological component: transmitting the German experiences with reconciliation in Europe and the consensual modes of policy-making in the EU into the realm of international politics. This became visible in the argumentation of the Schröder government during its campaign for a permanent seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. In its public announcements justifying this initiative, the German foreign office quoted from an article by Karl Kaiser in ‘Internationale Politik’ which emphasizes German achievements after World War II in this respect.9 All these examples are evidence of how the transfer of stability to distant regions and not the attempt to protect its own territory became the focus of German security policy.

What does the transformation from security importer to exporter mean for German alliance policies and specifically the alliance with the US? First, the functions of American and German security policy have become functionally equivalent: both see in the neutralization of potential threats outside of their own territory the central task. Of course, the extent and the means of the respective security export are vastly different, given the geopolitical positions and the enormous difference in capacities. However, the decisive factor of the argument

8 For details see the website of the Ministry of the Interior, <http://www.bmi-bund.de>.
made in this article is that both – the US and Germany with its European partners – have functionally equivalent security policies which can be described as security export.

From that follows that the reason for Germany’s willingness to accept an asymmetric burden-sharing role in the transatlantic alliance, the security import from the US, has disappeared. This is a decisive change in the bilateral relationship: whereas a traditional burden-sharing role necessarily creates a hierarchy within the alliance, the new role of German security policy removes such a hierarchy. When Chancellor Schröder in the Bundestag on 13 September 2002 said that ‘the existential questions of the German nation will be decided in Berlin and nowhere else’ (Schröder 2002), he succinctly expressed the new situation, in contrast to the Cold War.

However, this does not necessarily lead to increasing conflict with the US or signal that the transatlantic alliance has become unimportant for Berlin. The strategies of German security policy are, contrary to neorealist speculations, still marked by an instrumental and deeply rooted multilateralism (Duffield 1998: 65). Being a security exporter does not determine whether a state pursues unilateral or multilateral strategies, as the frequent American shifts in strategy after 1945 show. Almost all official German statements on security policy emphasize the importance of the country’s transatlantic and European links (White Paper 2006). Demands for a re-nationalization of German foreign policy are relegated to the extremes of the political spectrum (Varwick 2004: 18).

How then can we explain the German position in the Iraq War? Most analyzes emphasize the importance of domestic factors, in particular the 2002 national election campaign, or they see the opposition to the Iraq War primarily as a consequence of deeply rooted anti-militaristic norms in the population (Harnisch 2004: 173-4; Risse 2003: 15). While these factors certainly play an important role, they are not enough to explain the surprisingly blunt way in which Germany opposed the United States. Almost all statements by high-placed German officials on US-German relations in this period use phrases that are variants of ‘equal partnership’ (e.g. Struck 2003b). The New York Times quoted Schröder: ‘But consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told: We're going in. Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether’ (New York Times 2002). The Iraq War was not the first time the US has undertaken unilateral actions without consulting its allies. However, the difference is that the policy of the Bush administration not only violated the traditional norm of multilateralism, but also the new self-understanding that came with a new function of Germany’s security policy which does not accept an asymmetric burden-sharing role
anymore. The United States still bases its policy on such an understanding of mutual relations. However, the equivalence of US and German security policy creates German demands for a ‘partnership of equals’, in the sense of sovereign countries operating at eye level.\(^{10}\)

Without these differences of opinion, it would not be inconceivable for Germany to participate extensively in the stabilization of the Iraq, a major potential target for security export (but not in the original military campaign which, according to most Germans, exported instability to the region). Of course, budgetary constraints and remaining doubts about the new role make any spectacular operations by the German forces rather unlikely. In addition, popular opposition to military engagements abroad remains high. However, this does not change the basic fact of the functional re-orientation.

5. CONTINUITY IN JAPANESE SECURITY- AND ALLIANCE POLICIES

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the original rationale of the Japanese-American alliance seemed gone (Maull 2004a: 323-4). Many commentators now expected a quick normalization of Japanese security policy. An intense debate has started in Japan whether the geopolitical changes require a fundamental transformation of its security policies.

One of the major catalysts of this debate was the first Gulf War 1990-91. Japan pursued a similar policy as did Germany. It resisted US demands for a participation of Japanese troops on the ground and extended substantial logistical and financial help. The government tried to initiate legislation which would authorize Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions but it failed to win approval in November 1990 (Katzenstein 1996a: 126; Green 2001: 18). In any case, the threat to Japan’s economic situation from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait was effectively removed by the US. Thus, Tokyo continued to operate within the basic logic of burden-sharing.

However, Japan’s reluctance once again threatened to undermine the American security guarantee, because of intense domestic reactions in the US regarding the perceived Japanese free-riding behaviour, notwithstanding the huge financial contributions. A new wave of Japan-bashing swept the country

(Reischauer Centre 1992: 10-17). Tokyo realized that its so-called check book diplomacy had not yielded any political gains and had placed the country in a rather humiliating position (Green 2002: 24). Consequentially, Japanese governments began to advocate greater participation by its forces in military missions abroad (Green 2001: 197). The main lines of the ensuing debate were drawn in a similar way as they were in Germany. Many argued for the continuation of Japan’s civilian power status, stressing the pacifist traditions of the country. Some demanded participation in UN missions to prepare for the end of US protection (Ichiro Ozawa, 1994 *Nihon Kaizō Keikaku*; quoted in Mochizuki 1997b: 57-9; Green 2001: 19) or for a regional security system to lessen dependence on the US.

While this debate went on, Japan in fact moved towards direct participation in UN missions, provided its forces were not implicated in any combat activities (Katzenstein 1996a: 126-7; Aoi 2004: 116-7). In the mid-1990s Japan participated in a UN mission in Cambodia (Haar 2001: 131-44). In December 2001, the country sent troops to East Timor to support a peaceful transformation after the civil war. The most spectacular engagement, however, was the participation in the Iraq War since 2003. Tokyo thus seems to move down the same path as Berlin. However, it is not the same phenomenon: Japan did not make a conscious decision to export security.

Most Japanese decision makers do not see these activities in the framework of intrinsic strategic objectives but rather as a means to strengthen the security partnership with the US (Mochizuki 1997b: 59-61). The argument is similar to the one made by many in Germany during the 1990s regarding the importance of demonstrating solidarity in the alliance. In the final consequence, Japan’s ambivalence about military engagements abroad has been trumped by the ‘alliance imperative of demonstrating support for the US in Iraq to consolidate support for Japan’ (Hughes 2004: 47). In a press conference on the extension of the service of Japanese Forces in Iraq in early 2005, Koizumi indicated that strengthening the alliance with the Americans was the major reason: ‘Japan cannot secure its peace and independence alone in the context of international coordination and the Japan-US Alliance. I am aware of the significance of the Japan-US Security Treaty, considering the current and potential future situation regarding Japan’s neighboring countries... Many people agree that the Japan-US Alliance and international coordination is the way to ensure Japan’s development and prosperity. My decision this time is to implement this in concrete terms. I have no doubts about my decision’ (Koizumi 2005). Koizumi’s attempts to revise the constitution to enable Japan to participate more effectively in peacekeeping missions also have been explained in this vain (Pilling 2004).
For one, military cooperation with the US has become more and more extensive. The Japanese government, in the *National Defence Program Outline* (NDPO) of November 1995, stressed the security partnership more than ever and declared its willingness to participate in UN missions (Mochizuki 1997a: 13-14). In the so-called Nye-Initiative of 1995, the US emphasized the continued necessity of keeping troops in East Asia, signalling that it would not give up its role as security exporter (Funabashi 1999: 248-54).

In April 1996, the US and Japan concluded an agreement regarding the provision of military services by the Japanese for American forces (Maull 2004a: 324). This intensified cooperation resulted in the 1997 *Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation* (Guidelines 1997). These did away once and for all away with the geographic restrictions for Japanese support of American operations (Smith 2003: 122). At the same time, both countries signed an *Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement*, which foresaw Japanese support for American peacetime manoeuvres and in peacekeeping missions with or without UN-mandate (Hughes 2004: 99). In this context belong also the recently regularized meetings of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee. 11 The continuation of Japan’s security import is also shown by its pursuit of participation in the planned Ballistic Missile Defence system of the US (Nakamoto 2006). Of course, the real threat of North Korea, dramatically displayed by its recent nuclear test and missile tests over Japanese territory, is one of the major reasons for that as well as a potential Chinese threat. Again, this will result in increased technological and strategic dependence on the US (Hughes 2004: 114). The basic logic behind these reaffirmations of the bilateral alliance remained burden-sharing.

Second, the necessity to import security from the US is also caused by Japan’s failed attempts to establish regional security structures and cooperation mechanisms. The underlying reason for that is the dominance of the bilateral partnership with Washington:

‘With regard to...regional multilateral frameworks, such as the Asian Regional Forum, and Japanese participation in UN peace-keeping operations and the ‘war on terror’, Japan’s exploration of multilateralism is designed more to ultimately strengthen bilateral cooperation with the US. In no way do Japanese policymakers seriously contemplate multilateralism as providing an alternative or even rival to the bilateralism of the security treaty’ (Hughes 2004: 118).

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The centrality of this alliance is stressed almost unanimously by research: ‘Japan remains dependent on American hegemony for its own security in East Asia....Indeed, much of Japanese diplomacy is aimed at buttressing U.S. leadership in the United Nations and the international financial institutions’ (Green 2001: 5; see also Aoi 2004: 120). Thus, there is no fundamental change in Japanese security and alliance policies. The core function remains the same as during the Cold War: stabilizing and even enhancing the Japanese-American security alliance (Maull 2004a: 335; Soeya 2005).

Of course, this means that Japan continues to be relegated to a burden-sharing role which it does not like and which strongly constrains its autonomy. Japan is still forced to import security from the US. Two structural reason of Japan’s international environment are responsible for this: first, the continued threat from North Korea and China (Funabashi 1999: 254-6; Hughes 2004: 42-46). In addition, conflicts with Russia are possible, for example the Kuril and Sakhalin Island controversy; second, Japan is not integrated in trust-enhancing regional structures and it has not made a determined effort to come to terms with its past (Berger 2003; Aoi 2004). This perpetuates tensions in the region and deprives Japan of an alternative to the US security guarantee.

Thus, the US-Japanese alliance is still dominated by the logic of burden-sharing. The dynamic of bilateral relations always follows the same blueprint: ‘Japan seeking both autonomy and a greater defence commitment and the United States seeking greater burden sharing’ (Green 2002: 29). The imperative of security import continues to trump the norm of antimilitarism and the search for independence. Japan will continue to be confronted with American linkage strategies in bilateral economic relations (which Germany escaped through EU common trade policies and a redefinition of its security role).

**CONCLUSION**

Germany’s alliance policies have fundamentally changed: its security partnership with the US was defined by burden-sharing and American leadership and it is now defined by an equality of functions, causing a demand for a balanced partnership. Since the mid-1990s, Germany and the US conduct a functionally equivalent security policy - Security Export – whereas during the Cold War, Germany had to import security from the US and was constrained into a burden-sharing role. Thus, the fundamental goals and means of the US and Germany look more alike: both try to contain threats to their security by intervening politically, economically and militarily in the international system. Slowly, Germany equips
itself with a similar range of instruments to fight these threats, albeit, of course, on a much lower quantitative level and under serious financial constraints. Besides normative preferences, this requires the continued integration of German security policy in multilateral structures, in particular the European Security and Defence Policy.

Although Japan on the surface seems to move towards security export, its relations with the US and its security policy are still fundamentally based on burden-sharing and security import. The latter is required because of the threat from North Korea, China, and possibly Russia. In addition, Tokyo has no regional alternative in its security policy, similar to European security cooperation. Thus, unlike Germany, Japan perpetuated and intensified its security cooperation with the US in the past 15 years and consequentially also its burden-sharing role. A more equal partnership between the US and Japan, as urged by the Armitage report of 2000 (Armitage 2000) is hardly likely, even if Japan assumes more tasks outside of its own zone of influence. This basic situation will not change in the near future.

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