- Mike Felgenhauer and Elisabeth Schulte (2013): "Strategic Private
Experimentation" American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
- Elisabeth Schulte (2012): “Communication
in committees: Who should listen?”, Public Choice, 150,
- Hans Peter Grüner and Elisabeth Schulte (2010): “
Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for
information provision”, Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 76, 734-747.
- Elisabeth Schulte (2010): “Information
aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees”, Theory
and Decision, 69, 97-118.
- Elisabeth Schulte and Hans Peter Grüner (2007): “
Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information
processing”, Journal of Economic Theory, 134,
- Kerstin Gerling, Hans Peter Grüner, Alexandra Kiel and Elisabeth Schulte (2005): “ Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey”, European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 563-597.
Recent Working Paper
- Mike Felgenhauer and Elisabeth Schulte: "Strategic Private
We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent’s information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high, he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. If the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited, persuasion is impossible if the agent’s stakes are too high.