06.08.2026 New publication on sanctions, corruption, and domestic conflict
A new article by Mohammad Reza Farzanegan and Mohamad Alkurdi Albarawi has been published in the European Journal of Political Economy.
The study, titled “Destabilizing the corrupt: Economic sanctions and their conflict-inducing consequences,” examines whether the domestic effects of economic sanctions depend on the institutional conditions of the target country. Using panel data for 122 countries between 1996 and 2020, the authors analyse how corruption shapes the relationship between different types of sanctions and violent internal conflict.
The results show that trade sanctions are associated with higher conflict-related deaths in countries with higher prior levels of political corruption. In countries with lower corruption, trade sanctions are associated with fewer conflict deaths, a pattern that may be consistent with stronger institutional resilience and a temporary rally-around-the-flag response.
The findings suggest that sanctions do not operate independently of domestic institutions. Corruption can affect who bears the economic costs of sanctions, who gains access to scarce resources, and whether governments can protect vulnerable groups. The study therefore highlights the importance of considering governance conditions when designing sanctions. It also identifies anti-corruption reforms and stronger institutions as potential elements of resilience in target countries.
The article is open access:
Farzanegan, M. R., & Alkurdi Albarawi, M. (2026). “Destabilizing the corrupt: Economic sanctions and their conflict-inducing consequences.” European Journal of Political Economy, 95, 102885.
Contact
Prof. M.R. Farzanegan