

Louise Amoore, Durham University

Point Clouds: Security Through Machine Learning

Whether in *Intuitive Surgical's* Vinci surgical robots, or in the geopolitics of automated weaponry, drones, and intelligence gathering, machine learning algorithms and operatives are trained for future action via the patterns of ingested cloud data. What kind of ethics is possible in the context of the intuitive learning of a posthuman composite? Can this form of cognition and action be meaningfully called to account? As Katherine Hayles has written, “what is lethal is not the posthuman as such, but the grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist view of the subject” (1999: 23). Thus, as contemporary legal cases proliferate, they persistently seek an identifiable human subject to call to account – a specific surgeon who made a mistake, a particular drone pilot or analyst who wrongfully targeted – who is often called the “human in the loop” of semi-supervised machine learning. Yet, machine learning is precisely changing the nature of what it means to be human, so that the errors of a neural net must involve an expanded and distributed sense of ethics. In this work I propose an alternative mode of ethics capable of responding to the intuitive learning of human and algorithm.

Claudia Aradau, King's College London

Digital self and other: the making of global surveillance

Big data and algorithms have increasingly projected an image of global security, supported by cloud infrastructures, shared data and increasing use of the ‘Internet of Things’ for surveillance purposes. Yet, the practices of data collection, mining and algorithmic surveillance are underpinned by complex differentiations of self and other. For instance, the NSA needs to determine what data it can capture through so-called ‘foreignness determination’. How does the algorithmic distinction between self and other enact global surveillance? We argue that we need to attend to the algorithmic devices of distinction between the digital self and other, citizen and non-citizen. These devices of distinction enact global surveillance by producing the digital non-citizen in ways that are impervious to oversight or critical scrutiny.

Jonathan Austin, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,
Geneva, and Anna Leander, Copenhagen Business School

Visibility, Aesthetics, and the International:

Local regimes of making (visible) the globality of security

This paper explores how locally embedded *regimes of visibility* lead to the conceptual, imagined, practical, and – indeed – ‘real’ emergence of the ‘global’ in security (studies, practice, politics, policy, etc.). Regimes of visibility are webs of practices, technologies, protocols of enunciation, territorial entities, and human voices that powerfully order how phenomena in the world around us go noticed or unnoticed, seen or unseen, visible or invisible. Within the realm of security these regimes increasingly *both* direct our gaze (quite literally) towards the more or less ‘global’ manifestations of security today (rendering them more or less visible) *and* serve to constitute, assemble, make coherent, and lead to the attainment of this very ‘globalization’ of security itself: regimes of visibility produce, reproduce, and foreground or background conceptualizations of the ‘globality’ or ‘locality’ of security. Drawing on insights from social theory exploring these regimes of visibility (Heinich, Brighenti, Rancière, Mitchell) we explore how particular everyday and locally situated material objects (photographs, paintings, furniture), technologies (computers, web infrastructures, tools of mediation), territorial entities (bases, black sites, etc.) and beyond all work to attain the globality of security in at least three ways. First, such regimes of visibility work to constitute the very imaginary of the global in global security as something that can – indeed – be concretely ‘seen’ in our everyday lives: they *produce* the global as a spherical totality imagined as an object of security. Second, they affectively provoke human subjects to act in a frequently non-deliberative fashion to respond to these global imaginaries of security by, for example, provoking both ‘global’ practices of terrorism and counter-terrorism alike or globalized policies of border protection *and* globalized practices of border encroachment, etc. In these affective consequences, regimes of visibility *reproduce* the imaginary of a global security. Finally, regimes of visibility also work to establish systems of world political hierarchy or stratification vis-à-vis the relative ways in which particular issues, persons, and polities are considered more or less ‘global’ in

their security politics. Taken together we argue that exploring security politics today, as well as broader world political spheres, cannot be achieved without appreciating the ways in which regimes of visibility that go far beyond older systems of propaganda, mediation, or mediatisation, are intrinsic to producing spatial imaginaries of the lived world through the ways in which they provoke a substantive “management of gazes” that effects *all* spheres of social activity, social scientific or not.

Nina Boy, PRIO

The changing value of security – from neutral position to positive asset

This article looks at the changing valuation of ‘safety’ in post-crisis finance, characterized by a global trend of negative interest rates and a perception of scarce supply of safe assets. ‘Safety’ used to be a property of sovereign debt and until recently appeared immune to falsification by empirical data. It constitutes the epistemic foundation of modern finance theory in the form of the risk-free asset and used to incur a counterfactual cost – the safety premium – in the form of the opportunity cost of not having invested in a more risky and profitable asset class. The post-crisis valuation of safety is marked by a proliferation of measures, positing liquidity-based against ‘research-based’ valuation in response to a distortion caused by ‘captive demand’. It also transforms safety from a neutral position (presupposed in the form of the risk-free asset) to a positive value that incurs a different kind of cost: positing ‘average risk’ as the new neutral position brings into being ‘an unseen value called safety’ (Coppola). The charge for the store of value that negative interest rates imply render financial safety more akin to the political valuation of security, raising questions about how to understand the new constellation of the age-old entwinement of finance and security. It may have radical implications not only for the many industries (insurance, pension funds etc) that depend on making risk-averse investments that still yield a profit, but for the calculus of modern finance as such.

Marieke de Goede, University of Amsterdam

Producing Evidence in Terrorism Trials and Policies

Terrorism expertise is profoundly contested (Stampnitzky 2012). Nevertheless, evidence concerning terrorist patterns, behaviours and operational modes are produced in juridical and policy contexts, and come to function as valid grounds for security decision and legal judgement. This paper enquires into the production of valid evidence in terrorism law and policy. When it comes mobilising scientific expertise before courts, Sheila Jasanoff has shown that “expert evidence ... must be painstakingly pieced together from disparate, contradictory [and] incomplete sources” (2012: 197). Courts need to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ science. Security expertise is perhaps even more contested than scientific knowledge or medical sciences. That is not because the issues at stake are necessarily more contentious, but because the tradition of knowledge production in the security realm is less firmly settled. If scientific expertise builds upon centuries of ‘regulating objectivity’ (Daston and Galison 2010), the production of security knowledge is decidedly less tightly regulated (Villumsen, Berling and Bueger 2015).

This paper analyses how evidence is produced and inscribed with validity in terrorism law and policy. It focuses on two distinct settings, relating to the fight against terrorism financing. First, it examines international policy reports that assess and evaluate terrorism financing policies. I argue that these reports have produced a very specific ‘genre’ of the sanitised case study or example. This genre is inscribed with validity, if even its general isability and claims to causality cannot be independently verified. Secondly, the paper focuses on recent trials of terrorism financing and facilitation, taking up Jasanoff’s (2012: 185) call for a socio-legal analysis of the ways in which courts go about “determining what constitutes legitimate science,” and applying it to the context of recent ‘foreign fighters’ trials. In these court cases, security expertise concerning the situation in Syria and the modus operandi of IS has proven to be crucial to courts’ decisions. In addition, in The Netherlands, an important gender dynamic became grafted on to the politics of security expertise when the question of the role of women that women play in IS, took centre stage.

The production of valid evidence in relation to terrorism law and policy mediates between the global and the local. As Kim Lane Scheppele (2010: 307) has put it, “Law ... traffics between the universal and the specific.” The terrorism expertise analysed in this paper translates local, situated examples into global, generalised facts. In turn, it seizes upon global, generalised cases and reports, to produce legal judgements in singular, local cases. This paper offers a qualitative reading of court documents and expert reports, in order to examine the socio-legal production of “certified knowledge” in these contentious terrorism cases (Jasanoff, 2012: 196).

Andreas Folkers, University of Frankfurt

Securing Stocks

Only a few themes have animated critical security studies in recent years to the same extent as the problems associated with securing circulations and flows. The presentation seeks to contribute to and complement these debates by highlighting the often-neglected significance of stockpiles and standing reserves for the maintenance and security of circulations. The talk sets out from the assumption that there is no simple transition from the problem of stocks to the problem of flows in contemporary security apparatuses, but argues that we are rather witnessing a changing relation between stocks and flows generating new security problems as well as new security strategies. The talk will draw on a series of examples from recent developments in catastrophe preparedness and point out the wide variety of stocks as critical security matters ranging from stockpiled food to capital reserves, from medicine to cultural assets, from energy to information. I will discuss these examples in the light of recent debates on matters of security and the conference theme on “localizing global security” and argue that stocks are reterritorialized resources that stem from, enable and sustain deterritorialized global flows. However, stock is not just concrete and localized stuff in contrast to abstract flows. To avoid the “fallacy of simple location” (Whitehead) the talk will stress that stock is always already an abstract thing produced by diverse calculative and ordering techniques.

Jana Hönke, University of Groningen

The Global Making of Policing. Rethinking 'the Global' and Where it is Made

This talk will critically engage conventional perspectives according to which global policing is something good and benevolent that diffuses from a 'Western' centre to the rest of the globe. It will show that this, first, omits the violent experimenting with security technologies in the (post)colony under the auspices of imperial and liberal global governance. But second, it also fails to account for the pluralities of ideas and experiences of 'the global' and the agency of subaltern actors in co-constituting, circulating and changing security institutions and practices across localities. The argument is developed drawing from case studies on US urban policing, Gaza as laboratory, the heterogeneous policing of transnational business hubs in Central Africa, and South-South policing encounters from Colombia to West Africa, Brazil and Haiti.

Oliver Kessler, and Filipe dos Reis, University of Erfurt

Human Rights, Quantification and Risk

Starting with the observation of a recent "seduction of quantification" (Sally Engle Merry) among international policy circles, this paper reconstructs the recent turn to the vocabulary of 'risk' within and around the UN when it comes to the protection of human rights. Behind the introduction of the vocabulary of 'risk' stands the perceived need to 'translate' rather abstract notions of global human rights into concrete local situations on the ground. In order to make sense of this transformation, we proceed in three steps. First, we address the theoretical implications of governing the future through risk (based on cognitive expectations) instead of classical notions of human rights (based on normative expectations). Second, we reconstruct the emergence of 'risk' within and around UN legal and policy circles in recent times. Here, we highlight the specific form of knowledge production involved (e.g., fact finding and the production of indicators). Third, we discuss the implications of this transformation when it comes to the allocation of legitimacy and authority on a global level.

Andrew Lakoff, University of Southern California

Preparedness Indicators: Assessing Global Health Security in the Aftermath of Ebola

In the aftermath of the 2014 Ebola pandemic, numerous panels of global health experts sought to diagnosis the sources of failure that had led to a "preventable catastrophe," and to recommend post-hoc reform measures. One target of technical and administrative intervention was the condition of national and local public health infrastructures. Building on the requirement of the 2005 International Health Regulations that signatory nations "maintain core public health capacities," institutional actors such as the Global Health Security Agenda and the WHO Emergencies Programme sought to develop metrics to gauge levels of preparedness for an infectious disease outbreak within nation-states. In this process, the object and techniques of basic health infrastructure were redefined: core public health capacities referred not to the prevention and treatment of common illnesses in a national population, but rather the detection and containment of outbreaks of novel pathogens that threatened to spread globally. The talk will analyze this effort as emblematic of "reflexive biopolitics," which seeks to protect the functioning of critical systems from threats of interruption.

Andreas Langenohl, University of Gießen

Infrastructures and the Circulation of Security Concerns

This paper sets out to conceptually explore the notion of 'infrastructure' as a potential heuristic to make sense of the global and at the same time local dynamics of securitization. Today, infrastructures are prominent 'referent objects' (Ole Wæver) of securitization. We are witnessing a heightened awareness for potential threats to infrastructures whose aim is to enable global connectivities, like global financial market institutions, international air travel and shipping routes, and global digital data channels. Yet, infrastructures might be conceptually significant with respect to their ability to localize global security agendas because they tend to carry and inflate their

own threats. Digital data transfer is not only vulnerable to, but actively disseminates, all sorts of spyware and malware; airplanes carry the bombs that destroy them; financial markets multiply liquidity and risks and thus the very seed from which major crashes emerge. The paper argues that infrastructures, through reproducing the conditions of their own endangerment, are important hinges between the localization of security issues and their potential global circulation.

Luis Lobo-Guerrero, University of Groningen

Drake, Cimarrons and the Predation of Spanish Imperial Connectivity in XVI C

Between 1572 and 1573 Francis Drake, the famous pirate or privateer –depending on the imperial narrative followed-, made an alliance with a group of Cimarrons, renegade slaves, in the Isthmus of Panama. The purpose was to plunder Spanish treasures routed from Peru to Seville via the Caribbean. Whereas attention on this alliance has been on the economic benefit that resulted from it, it is taken in this paper as an *event* that helps understand three surfaces that made the connectivity on which the early Spanish Empire in America operated. The first is a racialised biopolitics tightly linked with a political economy of extraction. The second, a commercial route that linked the Spanish kingdoms in America with Seville. The third, a network of newly-created maritime ports in the Caribbean and the mainland. By engaging in analysis of the interaction of these three surfaces, the paper explores the historical epistemological characteristics of an order of governance, challenged by Drake's predation on the Isthmus.

Delf Rothe, University of Hamburg

Abyss through the looking glass: Visuality, technology and security in the Anthropocene

Evidence is mounting that the planet has entered a new geological epoch– the Anthropocene – with potentially catastrophic consequences for humans and other

living beings on the planet. Several authors including Simon Dalby, Audra Mitchell, or Madeleine Fagan have thus recently argued for a fundamental rethinking of security in terms of planetary, worldly or ecological security. The paper argues that this emerging literature on Anthropocene security has, however, overlooked that the latter is marked by a paradoxical condition. The crisis of the Anthropocene is unfolding at a planetary scale and at the timescale of geological “deep time”, and thus lies beyond human perception and apprehension. Rendering planetary changes and resulting security risks visible, requires a global assemblage of visual technologies, including satellite remote sensing, computer modelling, data visualization or risk mapping.

On the basis of this observation the paper seeks to sketch out the contours of a sociological (rather than philosophical) approach of Anthropocene security. Instead of asking how security should look like, the paper asks how security practices in the Anthropocene actually look like. Taking a practice-based, relationist perspective on security, the paper investigates different projects of satellite remote sensing and asks how these render planetary changes and resulting security risks visible, intelligible and thereby governable. It asks for the security logics, rationales, and epistemic models underlying these practices and studies how these become inscribed into technical decisions. And it seeks to reveal the new actor coalitions and networks that are forged through the cooperation of for example Earth system scientists, remote sensing specialists and security professionals.

Georgina Sinclair, University of London

Challenges of implementing Community Policing Programmes within Police Capacity-Building Programmes

European police reform impacts upon wider security sector reform where the transfer of ‘Western’ models of policing is embedded within international development programmes. There has been a sharp increase in European support for police capacity building over the past two decades across a range of security providers with

'community policing' the global aspiration. The success of many of these programmes remains questionable for academics and practitioners alike. The challenges lie in establishing lessons learned across European police establishments to build best practice and guiding principles within fragile and conflict affected states. This paper reflects on what constitutes the successful transfer of European models of best practice through case studies including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Lebanon. It suggests that improved systems for rigorous monitoring and evaluation are needed to establish guiding principles for better overseas practice.

Chris Zebrowski, Loughborough University

Acting Local, Thinking Global: Globalizing Resilience through 100 Resilient Cities

100 Resilient Cities (100RC) is a global urban resilience initiative sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. Established in 2013 the network has expanded from 32 to 100 cities, with the latest selection process receiving over 1000 applications from prospective cities. 100RC aims to enhance 'urban resilience' by identifying, supporting and disseminating innovative solutions to overcoming the particular stresses and shocks associated with any individual member city. 100RC demonstrates one way in which global initiatives are currently organizing to respond to the local challenges faced by cities, newly understood as 'complex ecosystems'. This paper investigates how resilience is understood, enacted and deployed through the diverse practices and sites associated with 100RC. It does so by drawing on recent work on assemblage theory (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011; Grove, 2013; Phillips, 2006) in order to understand the scalar organizational processes orienting contemporary global security initiatives.